t . bers of the House of Representatives, ? CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATE, TO THEIR _ CONSTITUENTS, THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR WITH GREAT i BRITAIN. PHILADELPHIA: PRINTRO: AT. THE OFPice OF TuR UNITED STATES’ OAZETTE. . py) \ 154,279 HR F S073: 2 A3 v . Ly nt ; Pe Oy fap ; A, 7 a'y oe % 4 ia ee Pad’ 3 Ba sae any. stag of debate cédented| reasons { ot easi! ever, on mn A Republick has’ for its basis the a _ capacity and right of the people to govern “oe o} themselves. principle ofa repre- ye sentative republick is the responsibili of the representatives to their consti- /|- tuents. Freedom and publicity of debate ‘ .& ave essential to the preservation of such § forms of government. Every arbitrai.- B abridgment of the right of speech in re- | presenfatives, is a direct infringement of the liberty of the people. Every unne-. im cesuary concealment of their proceedings ‘an approximation towardstyranny. When .by systematick rules, a majority takes to t the right, at its pleasure, of limit- ing .speech, or denying it, altogether; hem secret sessions multiply; and in sas eget to the importance of questions, Tsthe studious concealment of debate, a ') @hpeople may be assured, that such prac- “(tices continuing, their freedom is but a . Reflections, such as these, have been forced upon the. attention of the under- § signed; members of the house of repre- sentatives of the United States, by the eyents of the present session of congress. They. have witnessed a principle, adopt- ‘t ed’ as. the law of the house, by which, under, a novel application of the previous question, a power is assumed by the ma- jority to deny the privilege of speech, at * _ | any. stage, and under any circumstances ~ ©, \of debate.: And recently, by an unpre- ‘| cédented assumption, the right to give “e.* treasons for an original motion, has been ‘ ) — §made to depend upon the'will of the ma- coe gpority. ote Principles more hostile than these to the «. fexistence of represcntative liberty, can- ae ot easily be conceived. It is not, how- ever, on these accounts, weighty as they . ADDRESS. The undersigned Members of the House of Representatives, ere to their respective Constituents. are,that the undersigned have undertaken this address. A subject of higher and more immediate importance impels them to the present duty. . 4 The momentous question of war, with Great Britain, is decided. On this topick, so vital to your interests, the right of publick debate, in the face of the world, sud especially of their constituents, has been deniedto your representatives. They have been called into secret session, on this most interesting of all your publick relations, although the circumstances of the time and of the nation, afforded no one reason for secrecy, unless it be found in the apprehension of the effect of pubs lick debate, on publick opinion; or of pub- lick opinion on the result of the vote. Except the message of the president of the United States, which is now be- fore the publick, nothing confidential was communicated. That message contained no fact, not previously known. No one reason for war was intimated, but such as was of a nature publick and notorious. The intention to wage war and invade Canada, had been long since openly avow- ed. The object of hostile menace had been ostentatiously announced. The in- adequacy of both our army and navy, for successful invasion, and the insufficiency of the fortifications for the security of our seaboard were every ‘where known. Yet the doors of congress were shut upon the people. They have been carefully kept in ignorance of the progress of mea- sures, until the purposes of administra- tion were consummated, and the fate of the country sealed. Ina situation so ex- traordinary,the undersigned have deemed it their duty by no act of theirs to sanction w proceeding, so novel and arbitrary. On AY Wie contrary, they made every attempt, the system, liad beco’ne identified with {in their power, to attain publicity fortheir the pride, the character, and the hope.of » proceedings., All such attempts were our cabinet. As is natural with men, vain, When this momentous subject ‘who have a great stake depending on the was stated, as for debate; they demande © success of a favourite theory, pertinacity ed that the dcors should be opened. seemed te increase as its hopelessness _, Phis being:refused, they declined dis- hecame apparent. As the inefhiciency, of" cussion; being perfectly convinced, from this system could not.be admitted, by ite indications, too plain'tobe misunderstood advocates, without ensuring its abandon- that, in the house, all argument, with ment, ill success was, carefully attributed | closed doors, was hopeless; and that any to.the influence of <i he s act, giving implied validity to so flagrant To this cause the people were taught’ an abuse of power, would be little less . to charge its successive failures and not than treachery to the essential rights of to. its intrinsiek imbecility. In this state’ afree people. In the situation, to which ofthings the undersigned deemed it on hes. the undersigned have thus been reduced, per, to take away all apology for they are compelled, reluctantly to resort rence to this oppressive system. They to this publick declaration of such views were desirous, at a period'so critical it of the state and relations of the country, publick- affairs, as far as was consistent» as determined their judgmentand vote with the. independence of opinion,'to | upon the question of war. “A measure contribute to the restoration of harmony of this kind has appeared to the under- in the publick councils, and concord ' signed to be more imperiously demand- gmong the people. And if any advan- ed by the circumstance of a mes- tage could he thus obtained inour foreign sage and manifesto being prepared and relations, the undersigned, being: ene ° Circulated at publick expense, in which gaged in-no purpose of personal or party - the causes for war were enumerated, and advancement, would rejoice, in such an! ‘ ye the motives for it concentrated,inia man- occurrence. ist ner suited to agitate and influence the | The course of publick measures also publick mind. In cxecuting this task it at the opening of the session, gave Lope: will be the study of the undersigned to that an enlarged & enlighter -4 system 0 reconcile the great duty they owe tothe defence, with provision for, or security of people, with that constitutional respect our maritime rights, was about'to be come which is due to the administrators ofpub- menced; a purpose, which, wherever lick concerns. found, they deemed it their duty to foster, In commencing this view of our af- by giving, to any system of meabures, fairs, the undersigned would fail in duty thus comprehensive, as unobstructed a to themselves did they refrain from re- course as was consistent with their gene- curring to the course, in relation to pub- ral sense of publick duty. After a course lick measures, which they adopted, and of policy, thus liberal and conciliatory, have undeviatingly pursued, from the it was cause of regret that a communicas commencement of this long and eventful tion should have been purchased by an. session; in which they deliberately sacri- unprecedented expenditure of secret ser- ficed every minor consideration to what vice money; and used,.by the chief ma- they deemed the best interests of the gistrate, to disseminate suspicion and country. jealously; and td excite resentment, For a suecession of years the under- among the citizens, by suggesting impu- signed have, from principle, disapproved tations against a portion of them, as a Series of restrictions upon commerce, unmerited by-their patriotism, as unwar- according to their estimation, inefficient ranted by evidence. as respected foreign nations and injuri- It hag always been the opinion of the ous, Chiefly, to ourselves. Success, in undersigned, that a system of peace was to trial, by whi ‘that of activity and dani ment. } count thadiinc the un mistake “war, we only fro our mea political very ge It ap; wrong's, jency, of” dl, by. ite bandon- tributed € taught s and not this state | od it pro-' for adhe ny advane » ur foreign 5 peing: ene wherever ty to foster, measures, pstructed. a their gene- er a course onciliatorys ommunica- ased by an. secret sere b chief mae picion and esentment, sting impu- them, as » as unwar- nion of the | ment. f peace was the policy, which most adepones with the character, condition, and interest of the United States; that their remoteness from the theatre of-contest, in Lurope, was their peculiar felicity and shat-noth- ing but.a necessity, absolutely imperious, should induce them to enter as parties into wars, in. which every consideration of virtue and policy seems to be forgot- ten, under thé overbearing sway of rapa- city and ambition, “There is:a new cra inhuman affaivs. «The European world is convulsen..i The advantages. of our own situationare peculiar. «© Why * quit our-own to stand upon foreign ground ? Why, by. interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of Euro- pean ambition, rivalship, interest, hu- mout, or caprice ?” ~ Iwaddition to the many moral and pru- dential: considerations, which should de- _ ter thoughtful men from hastening into the perils of such a war, there were some eculiar to the United States, resulting m the texture of the government and the: political relations of the people. A form of government, in no small degree experimental, composed of powerful and independent sovereignties associated in ® velations, some of which are critical, az well-as novel, should not be hastily pre- cipitated into situations, calculated to put totrial, the strength of the moral bond, by. which they are united. Of all states, that of war is most likely to call into activity the passions, which are hostile and dangerous.to such a form of govern- Time is yet important to our country to settle and mature its recent institutions. Above all, it appeared to the undersigned from signs not to be mistaken, that if we entered upon this ‘war, we did it as a divided people; not only from a sense of the inadequacy of our means to success, but from moral and political objections of great weight and very general influence. It appears tothe undersigned, that the wrongs, of which the U. States have to * Washington, (i 5 complain, although in some aspects, very grievous to our interests, and in. many humiliating to our. pride, were yet of a nature which in the present state of the world, either would not justify war, or which...war would not remedy. Thus, far instance. the hovering of British ves- sels upon our coasts, and the occasional insults to-our ports, imperiously deman- ded such a systematick application of hare bour.and seacoast defence, as would ree pel, such: aggressions; but in no light, can they be considered as’ making a ree sort to war, at the present time, on the part of the United States, either necessary or expedient. . So also, with respect to the Indian war, of the origin of which, but very imperfect imformation has as yet been given tothe publick, Without any express act of Congress, an expedi tion. was last. year, set on foot and prosecuted into Indian Yerritory, which had been relinquished by treaty, on the part of the United States. And now we are told about the agency of British traders, as to Indian. hostilities. It de- serves consideration, whether there has been such provident attention, as would have been proper to remove any cause of. complaint, either real or imaginary, which the Indians might allege, and to secure their friendship. With all the sympathy and anxiety excited by the state of that frontier; important as. it may be, to apply adequate means of pro- tection, against the Indians, how is its salety ensured by a deciaration of war, which adds the British to the: number of enemies? As “ a decent respect to the opinions of mankind” has not induced the two houses of congress to concur in declar- ing the reasons, or motives, for their qnacting a declaration of warythe under- signed and he publick are left.to search, clsewhere, for causes either real, or os- tensible. If we are to consider the pre- sident ofthe United States, and the com- mittee of the house of representatives, on foreign relations, as speaking on this solemn occasion, for congress, the Uni- ted States have three principal tonicks ¢f eT ee ae orders in council. ' Concerning the subject of impress- ments, the undersigned sympathize with our unfortunate seamen, the victims of this abuse of power, and participate in the national sensibility, on their endo They do not conceal from themselves, both its.importance and its difficulty; and they are well aware how stubborn ‘is the will end how blind the visidn of pow- erful nations, when great interests grow . into controversy. But, before a resort to war for such, interests, a moral nation will considcr what is just,and a wise nation what is expedient. If the exercise of any right to the full extent of its abstract nature, be inconsistent with the safety of another nation, morality seems to require that, in practice, its exercise should, in this respect, be modified. Ifit te proposed to vindicate any right by war, wisdom demanis that it should be of a nature, by war to be obtained. The interests connected with the subjects of impress- ments are unquestionably great to both nations; and in the full extent of abstract right as asserted by each, perhaps irre- concilable. The government of the United States asserts the ‘broad principle, that the flag of their merchant vessels shall protect the mariners. This’ privilege is claim- ed, although every person on board, ex- cept the captain, may be an alien. ‘The British government asserts that the allegiance of their subjects is ina- lienable, in time of war, and that their seamen, found on the sca, the common highway of nations, shall not be protect- ed by the flag of private merchant vessels. “The undersigned deem it unnecessary here to discuss the question of the .A- merican claim, for the immunity of their flag. But they cannotreftain from view- ing it asa principle, of a nature very broad and comprehensive, to the abuse of which the temptations are strong and numerous. And they do maintain that, before the calamities of war, ‘in vindica- 6 a gulate of the right;‘so that the acknows ledged injury, to other nations, pre hey are clearly’ of peace of this happy and ty should not be abandoned, for the sake of affording facilities to cover #Frenc property;'or to employ British s t he claim ‘of Great Britain to the sere vices of her seamen is neither novel nor peculiar. The doctrine of alle ; for which she contends is common to the governments of Europe. France: as well as England, has maintained it for centuries. Both nations claim) in | time of war, the services of their’ subs jects. Both by decrees forbid their en-. tering into foreign employ. Both recall them by proclamation. 1 No mun can doubt that, in the’ pres. sent state of the French marine, if Ames rican merchant vessels were met at sea) having French seamen on board, France would take them. Will any man believé that the United States would go'to ‘war against France, on this account ? For very obvious reasons, this prificis ple occasions little collision with France; or with any other nation, except Eng- land. With the English nation, the people of the United States are closely. assimilated, in blood, language, inter- course, habits, dress, manners, and cha+ racter. When Britain is at war and the United S.ates neutral, the merchant sers ' vice of the United States holds out to British seamen, temptations almost irre. sistible ;—high wages and peaceful ems ploy; instead of low wages and war sers’ vice ;—safety, in licu of hazard ;—entire independence in the place of qualified servitude. ; That England whose situation is insus lar, who is engaged in a war apparently for existence, whose seamen are her bul. wark, should look upon the effect ofour principle upon her safety with jealousy is inevitable; and that she will not haz- 7 ard the. practical consequences of its men, in the merchants’ service of the U. all dibe ex: exercise is certain. The States, is as little reconcilable with the : 06 ‘th ’ prqnaninds directly, ermanent as the present intcrest of the @ the for the de of the thoughtful and United States. The encouragement of J acknows virtuous in this country, is—whe- foreign seamen isthe discouragement of 7 nations, ,fo> such an abstract right be the native American. revented: tifiable, before atterapting to guard The duty of government towards this that the against its injurious oe by legis- valuable class of men.is not only to pro- - communi. Jative regulation, in failure of treaty. tect but to pacronize them. And this ythesake = A dublous tight should be advanced cannot be done more effectually than by or ® wit hesitation. An extreme right should securing to American citizens the privi- eamens (@ be.asserted with discretion., Moral duty leges of American navigation. othe sere req. that a nation, before i, appeals The question of. impressment, like’ novel nor to iteelt, should have been not only true every other question relative to com- ile to itself, but that it should have failed in merce, has been treated in such a man- mon to a no, duty to others. If the exercise of a ner, that what was possessed is lost with- France, an unregulated manner, bein out obtaining what was sought. Pre- atained it fect, a standing invitation to the sub- tensions, right in theory, and important claim; in @ jects of a foreign power to become de- in interest, urged, without due conside- ieir aubs (§ serters and traitors, is it no injury to that ration of our relative power, have even- their en- tuated in a practical abandonment, both power? Ce::ainly moral, obligation demands of what we hoped and what we enjoyed. that the right of flag, like all other hu- 3s. @ man rights, should be so used, as that, while. it. protects what is our own, it should.not injure what is another’s. In @ practical view, and so long as the right nf flag is restrained, by no regard to the ndeniable interests. of others, a war, on account. of impressments, is only a war pr the right of employing British sea- men on American merchant vessels. . The claim of Great Britain pretends > no further extent than to take Brizish eamen from private merchant vessels. ip the exercise of this claim, her officers ke. American seamen, and foreign sea- en, in the American service; and al- bugh she disclaims such abuses, and offers redress, whcn known, yet un- ubtedly grievous injuries have resulted the seamen of the United States. But @ question is: Can war be proper for ch cause, beforejall hope of reasonable pommodation has failed? Even after the ttingui shment of such hope, can it be our own practice be so re- led as to remove, in such foreign : y reasonable apprehension of The undersigned are clearly of opi- ma. that the employment of British sea- Vales) In attempting to spread our flag over foe | reigners, its distinctive character has been lost to our own citizens. The American seaman, whose interest it is to have no competitors in his em- ployment, is sacrificed, that British sea- men may have equal privileges with himself. Ever since the WU. States have been a nation, this subject has been a matter of complaint and negotiation; and every former administration have treated it, ac- cording to its obvious nature, as a sub- ject rather for arrangement than for war. It existed in the time of Washington; yet this, father of his country recom- mended no such resort. It existed in the time of Adams; yet notwithstanding the zeal in support of our maritime rights which distinguished his administration, war was never suggested by him as.the remedy. During the eight years Mr. Jefferzoi: siood at the helm of affairs, it still continued: a subject of controversy and negotiation: but it was never made a cause for war. It was reserved for the present administration to press this topick to'thé extreme and most dreadful -resort of nations; although England has officially disavowed the right of impress- 8 ih seein 8 ment as it respects native citizens, and an arrangement ‘might well be made consistent with the fair pretensions of ‘such’as are naturalized. soni gel That the real state of this question may be understood; the undersigned re- cur to the following facts as supported by official documents. Mr. King, when minister in Eygland, obtained a disavow- al of the British government of the right to impress American seamen, natufalized as well as native, on the high seas.’ An arrangement had advanced nearly to a conclusion upon this basis, and was bro- ken off only because G. Britain insisted to retain the right:on the narrow scas. ‘What, however; was the opinica of the American minister on the probability of ‘an arrangement appears from the publick documents comnwnicated to congress in in the session of 1808, as stated by Mr. Madison, in these’ words: + At the mo ment the articles were expected to. be ‘signe, asexception of * the narrow seas’ was urged’and insisted on by lord St. Vincents, and being utterly inadmissible on our par', the negotiation was aban- doned.” Mr. Kinz seems to be of opinion, howeve;, that “ with more time than was left him for the experiment, the objec- -tion might have been overcome.” What ‘time was left Mr. King for the experi- ‘ment, or whether any was ever made, has not been disclosed to the publick. Mr. King, soon after returned to America— It is manifest from Mr. King’s expres- sion that“he was limited in point of time, and it is equally. clear that his. opinion. was, that an adjustment could take place That Mr. Madison was ‘also of the same opinion is demonstrated by his letters to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, dated the - 3d of February, 1807, in which he uses these expressions: « [I take it for grant- ed that you have not failed to make due use of the arrangemyent concerted by: Mr. King with lord Hawksbury ‘in the year 1802, for settling the question’ of impressment. On that occasion, and un- der that administration, the British prin- ciple was fairly renounced tn favour of : * ; the right of our flag, lor’ Hawkesbury having agreed fr SHS imfreasments on the ‘high seas,’ and lord St. Vinge requiring nothing more than.an tion’ of the nertee seas, an © resting on the obsolete "chains 8f i, tain to some peculiar ‘dominion’ over them.” Here then we ‘have a full ac- w ; of the nation, the relinquishment of ‘the right was a measure, which the aba ment could not ade)it, without taking on itself'a responsiviiiy, which no ministr; would be willing to meet, howarir rest: ing the exigency might be. ‘They offers ed, however, on the part of Great Briti m to’ pass laws making it penal for Brit commanders to impress American’ citi- zens, on board of American vessels, On ° the high seas, if America would’ pass’a law, making it penal for the officers of the United States to grant certificates of citizenship to British pts tit This - will be found, in the same documents, in a letter trom Messrs. Monroe: and Pinks ney'to Mr. Madison, dated 11th Novem. ber, 1806. Under their peremptory in- structions, this proposition, on the’ part Great Britain, could not be acceded to by our ministers. “Such, “however, was thé temper and anxiety of England, and’sach ‘the candour and good sense ‘of our mi- nisters, that an honourable andadvan- — tageous arrangement did take place, The authority of Mr, Monroe, then minister at the court of'Great Britain, now secre- tary of state, and one of the present ad- ministration,*who have _ recommended ‘war with England, and assigned impréss- ments as a Sule Mapper chestders nese in asserting, that it was honour- able and advantageous: for ina. letter from Richmond dated the 28th of. Veb- fuary, 1808, to Mr. Madison, the fc ilow- ing exptessions are used by Mr, Mon- roe: # I have, on the contrary always be- lieved and still do believe that the ground on which that interest [impressment } was placed by the. paper of the,British com- missioners of 8th .November, 1806, and the explanation which accompanied it, was both-honourable and advantageous to the United States, thatit contained a-con- cession in their favour on the part of -Great Britain, on the great principle in contestation, never before made by a formal and obligatory act of their govern- ment, whic) was highly favourable to their interest.” With thie opinion of Mr. King so de- cidedly evpressed; with the official ad- mission »' Mr. Madison; with the ex- _ plicit declaration of Mr. Monroy, all con- curring that Greot Britain was ready to abandon impressment on the high seas, and with “an honourable and advantage- ous arrangement, actually made by Mr. Monroe, how can it be pretended, that all hope of setuciment, by treaty, has tailed? how can this subject furnish a proper cause of war? With respect to the subject of block- --ades; the principle of the law of nations, as asserted by the U, States, is, that a blockade can only be justified when sup- ported by an adequate force. In theory this principle is admitted by Great Bri- ain. It is alleged, however, that ia ractice she disregatds that principle. The order of blockade, which has been made a specifickjground ot complaint by France, is that of the 16th of May 1806, Yet, strange as it may seem, this order, which is, now, made one ground of war -between the two countries, was, at the . time of its first issuing, viewed as an act of favour and conciliation. On this sub- *] ject it isnecessary to be explicit. The vague and indeterminate manner, in _which the American and French govern- _ments, in their official paptrs, speak of this order of blockade, is calculated to x * ay 9 mislead. An importance is attached to it, of which, in the opinion of the,under- signed, it is not worthy.’ Let the facts speak for themselves. In Aug. 1804, the British éstablished a blockade at the entrance of the French ports, naming them, from Fecam™ to Os- tend;, and from their proximity to the British coasts, and the absence of all complaint; we may be petmitted to be- lieve that it was a legal blockade, ene forced according to the usages of nations. On the 16th of May, 1806, the English Sccretary of state, Mr. Fox, notified to our minister at London, that his govern- ment had thought fit to direct necessary measures to be taken for the blockade of the :oasts, rivers and ports, from the river Elbe.to the river Brest, both in- clusive.* In point of tact, as the terms used in the order will show, this paper, which has become a substantive and) avowed cause for non intercourse, embargo and war, is a blockade, only of the places, on the French coast, from Ostend. to the Seine, and even as to these it is, merely, as it professes to be, a continuance of a former and existing blockade. For with respect to the residue of the coast, trade of neutrals is admitted, with the excep. tion only, of enemy’s property and arti. cles contraband of war, which are liable ‘to be taken, without.a blockade;‘and ex- cept the direct colonial trade of the cne- my, which Great Britain denied'to be RMA CARRERE ls Nia intl BLN * Lhe terms of the order ave these: “ ‘That the said coast, rivers and ports must be consi- dered as blockaded,” but, “that such block. ade shall not extend to prevent neutral ships and vessels, laden with goods, not being the pro- perty of his majesty’s enemies, and not being contraband of war from approaching’ the said coasts and entering into and sailing from the said rivers and ports save and except the coast- rivers and ports from Ostend to the river Seine, already in a state of strict and rigorous block- ade; andwhich are to be considered as so con. tinued,” with a proviso that the vessels enter, ing had not been laden at a port belonging to, or in possession of, the enemies.of G. Britain, and the vessels departing were not destined tv an enemy port, or had previously broken block. ade.” 3 i 4 Ls 10 free by the law of nafions. Why the or- der was thus extended, in its form, while in effoct it added nothing to orders and regulations, already existing, will be known by adverting to papers which are before ‘the world. In 1806, France had yet colonies, and the wound inflicted on our feelings; by the interference of the British government in our trade with those colonies, had been the cause of re- monstrance and negotiation, At the mo- ment when the order of may 1806,:was- made, Mr. Monroe, the present secreta-, ry of state, then our minister plenipoten- tiary at the court of Great Britain, was in treaty on the subject of the carrying trade, and judging on the spot, and at the time. he unhesitatingly gave his opinion, that the order was made to favour Ame- riéan views and interests. This idea is unequivocally expressed, in Mr. Mon- roe’s ietters to Mr, Madison of the 17th, and 20th* of May, and of the 9th of June, 1896, And as late as October, 1811, the same entleman, writing as secretary of state to the British mizister, speaking of the same order of blockade of May, 1806, says: “It strictly was little more than a * The following are extracts from these let- ters. In that of the 17th May 1806, he thus speaks of that blockade. It is ** couched in terms of restraint, and professes to extend the blockade further than was heretofore done. nevertheless, it takesjit from many ports already blockaded, indeed, from all East of Ostend, and West of the Seine, except in articles contra- band of war and enemies property, which are seizable without blockade. And in like form of exception, considering every enemy as one power, it admits the trade of neutrals, within the same limits, to be free in the productions of enemies colonies, in every, but the direct route between the colony and the parent coun. try.’ Mr. Monroe adds: * It cannot be doubt- af that the note was drawn by the government, in reference to the question, and if intended as the foundation of a treaty, must be viewed in a very favourable light.” On the 20th of May, Mr. Monroe writes to Mr. Madison, that he had been ‘strengthened in the opinion that the order of the 16th was drawn with a view tc the question of our trade with eneinies colonies, and that it promises to be highly satisfactory to our commercial intevests.” eS iat blockade of the coast from Seine to Os- tend,” “The object was to afford to the U. States an accommodation respectilig the colonial trade.” It appears, then, that thisxorder was.in point of fact, made to favour our trade and was so understood and admitteed by the government of this country, at that time and since; that, insteatl. of extend- ing prior blockades it lessened them: that the country from Seine to Brest, and from Ostend to Elbe was. ‘inserted to open them to our colonial trade and for our accommodation, and that it was - never made the subject of complaint, by the American government, during its practical continuance; that is; not until the first order in council; and-indeed, not until after the first of May 1810; and until after the American government was apprised of the ground, which it was the will of France should be taken upon the" subject. Of this we have the most decisive proof in the offers. made under the ad- ministration of Mr. Jefferson, for the discontinuance of the embargo as it re- lated to Great Britain; none of which re- quired the repeal of the blockade of May 1806; and also in the arrangement made during the administration of Mr. Madi- son, and under hig eye with Mr. Erskine. The non intercourse act. of March 1809, and the act “ concerning commercial ine tercourse.” of May 1810, vest the presi- dent of the United States with the very same power, in the very same terms. Both authorize him “ir case either G. Britain or France shall so revoke or mo- dify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States,” to declare the same by proclamation. And, by the provisions of one law in such case, non intercourse was to cease; by those of che other it was to be revived. In consequence of power vested, by the first act, the arrangement with Erskine was made and the revocae tion of the orders in council of January and November 1807, was considered as a full compliance with the law and as removing all the, anti-neutral edicts.— Seine to Os Afford to the h respecting order was.in r our trade dmitteed by try, at that - of extend- sened them: ¢ to Brest, as. inserted l trade and that it was bmplaint, by during its $; not until indeed, not 1810; and rnment was h it was the en upon the | st decisive der the ade n, for the rO as it ree if which re- ade of May ‘ment made Mr. Madi- ir. Erskine, March 1809, mercial ine t the presi- th the very me terms. e either G. oke or moe hall cease rce of the i¢ same by ‘ovisions of course was r it was to | Of power rangement the revocae of January sidered as tw and as | edicts. The blockadé of May 1806, was not in- cluded in the arrangement, and it does not appear, that it was deerjcu of suffi- cient, importance to engage even a thought. Yet under the act of May, 1810, which vests the very same power, a revocation of this blockade of May ‘1806, is made by. our cabinet a sine qua won; an indispensible requisite! And now after the British minister has directly avowed that this order of blockade would not continue after a revocation of the orders in council, without a due applica- tion of an adequate force, the existence of this blockade is insisted upon, as a _ justifiable cause of war, notwithstanding, that our government admits a blockade is legal, to the maintenance of whieh an adequate force is applied. The undersigned are aware that in justification of this new ground, it is ‘now said that the extension on paper, for whatever purpose intended, favours the principle of paper blockades. This how- ever, can hardly be urged, since the British* formally disavow the principle; and since they acknowledge the very doctrine of the law of nations for which the American administration contend, henceforth the existence of a blockade becomes a question of fact: it must de- pend upon the evidence adduced in sup- ort of the adequacy of the blockading orce, From the preceding statement it is ap- parent that whatever there is objection- * Mr. Foster in his letter of the 3d July 1811, ‘to Mr. Monroe, thus states the doctrine main. tained by his government. “Great Britain has never attempted to dis- pute that, in the ordinary course of the law of nations, no blockade can be justifiable or valid, unless ‘it be supported by an © adequate force destined to maintain it, and to expose to ha- zard all vessels attempting to evade its ope- vation.” Mr. Foster in his letter to Mr. Monroe of the 26th July, 1811, als. says: “The blockade of May 1806, will not cominue after the repeal of the orders in council, unless his majesty’s go- vernment shall think iit to sustain it by the special apolication of a sufficient naval force, and the fact of its being so continued, or not, will be notified at the time.” Ml able in the principle of the order of May 1806, or in the practice under it, on ground merely American, it cannot be set up as a sufficient cause of war; for until France pointed it. out asa cause of controversy, it was so far from being regarded as a source of any new or grievous complaint, that it was actually considered by our government in a ia- vourable light. : The British orders in council are the remaining source of discontent, and avowed cause of war. These have here- tofore been considered by our govern- ment in connexion with the French de- crees. Certainly the Sritish orders in council and French decrees form a sys- tem subversive of neutral rights and cons stitute just grounds of complaint, yet, viewed relatively to the condition of those powers. towards each other, and of the United States towards both, the undersigned cannot persuade themselves that the orders in council as they now exist and with their present effect and operation, justify the selection of Great Britain as our enemy, and render ne- cessary a declaration of unqualified war. Every consideration of moral duty, and political expedience. seems to concur in warning the United States, not to min- gle in this hopeless and, to human eye, interminable European contest. Neither France nor England pretends that their aggressions can be defended on the ground of any other belligerent right than that of particular necessity. Both attempt to justify their encroach- ments on the general law of nations by the plea of retaliation. In the relative position and proportion of strength of the United States to either belligerent, there appeared little probability that we could compel the one or the other, by hostile operations, to abandon this plea. And as the field of cor mercial enter- prise, after allowing to the decrees and orders their full practical effect, is still rich and extensive, there seemed as little wisdom as obligation to yield solid and certain realities for unattainable pretene ions. The right of retaliation, as exist, 5 12 fap fneither belligerent, it was impossi- ble for the United States, consistent with €ither its duty or interest, 'to admit. Yet such was the ostate of the decrees and trder's ot the respective belligerents, in relation, to the rights of neutrals, that, while, on the one hand, it formed no jus- tification to either, so on the other, con- current, circumstances formed a com- lete’ justification to the United States: Nn maintaining, notwithstanding these encroachments, provided it best,.com- ported with their interests, that system of impartial neutrality, which is so de- sirable to their peace and prosperity. For if it should be admitted, which no course of argument can maintain, that the Berlin decrees which was issued on the, 2ist of November, 1806, was justified by the antecedent orders of the Bri- tish admiralty, respecting the colonial trade, and by the order of block- ade’ of the i6th of May, preceding, yet on this account, there resulted no right of retaliation to France, as it’ respected the United States. They had expressed no acquiescence either in the British interference with the colonial trade, or in any extension of the principles of blockade. Besidesy had there been any such neglect, on the part of the United Staies, as warranted the French empe- rour in adopting his principle of retalia- tion, yet in the exercise of that preten- ded right, he past the bounds of both publick law and decency; and in the very €xtravagance of that exercise, lost the advantage of whatever colour the British had afforded to his pretences. Not con- tent with adopting a principle of retaliay tion, in terms limited, 4nd appropriate to the injury of which he complained, he declared, “ all the British Islands, in a state of blockade; prohibited all com- merce aid correspondence with them, all trade in their manufactures; and made lawful prize of all merchandise, belong- ing to England, or coming from its ma nufactories, and colonies.” The violence of these encroachments was equalled only by the insidiousness of the terms, and manner, ia which they were promulga- ted. _The scope of the’ expressions of the Berlin decree, was so general that it embraced within its sphere, the whole, commerce of neutrals with. England. Yet Decres, Minister of the Marine of France, by a formal note, of the, 24th December, 1806, assured our minister, plenipotentiary, that the imperial decree, of the 2lst November, 1806, was not to affect our,commerce, which would stilt be governed by the rules of the treaty; established between the two countries.” Notwithstanding this» assurance, howe- ver, on the 18th September following Regnier Grand Minister of justice, de- claved “ that the intentions of the Emper- » our were that. by virtue of that decrce French armed vesséls, might seize in neu- tral vessels, either English property, . of merchandise proceeding from the English manufactorices; and that he had reservedsy, Jor future decision the question whether they might not fossess themselves of'neu- tral vessels going to or from England, al- though they had no English manufactures on board.” Pretensions se obviously exceeding any measure of. fetaliation that, if the precedent acts of the British government, had afforded’ to such a re» sort, any colour of right, it was lost in the violence, and extravagance of these assumed principles. To the Berlin decree succeeded the British orders in council, of the 7th of January, 1807, which were merged in the orders of the 11th of November fol. lowing. These declared “ all ports, and places belonging to France, and its allies, from which the’ British flag was exchue ded, all, in the colonies of his Britannick majesty’s enemies, in a state of block- ade;—prohibiting all trade, in the pro- duce and manufactures, of the said-coun- tries or colonies;:and making all vessels trading to or from them, and all mer- chandise, on board subject to capture and condemnation, with an exception, only in favour of the direct trade, between neu- tral countries and the colonies of his majesty’s enemies.” These extravagant pretensions, on the part of Great Britain, were imme- :xpressions. of general that re, the whole, th. England. he Marine of of the, 24th our minister, perial decree, 16, % was not ch would stilt of the treaty; 0 countries,” rance, howe- er following ofthe Emper- » f that decerce seize in neues frropfieriy, of n the English had reserved, stion whether elves of'neu- England, al- manufacturcs @ obviously f. fetaliation f the British lo such a re~ was lost in ce of these cceeded the f the 7th of merged in vember fol- il ports, and d its allies, was exclue Britannick of block- in the pro- b Said-coun- all vessels 1 all mere apture and on, only in ween neu- bies of his sions, on re imme- ( 1S _ diately succeeded, by others, still more extravagant on the part of France.— Without waiting for any knowledge of the course the American government would take, in relation to: the British or- ders*in council, the French Emperour issued, on,the 17th of December follow- _ing, his Milan decree, by which “ every ship of whatever nation, which shall have submitted to search, by an English ship, or to a voyage to England, or paid any tax to that government, are declared denationalized and lawful prizé. «“ The British Islands are declared in a state of blockade, by sea and iand, and and every ship of, whatever nation, or ‘whatsover the nature of its cargo may be, that sails from England, or those of the English colonies, or of countries , occupied by English troops, and pro- ceeding to England, or to the English _ Colonies, or to countries occupied by the English, to be good prize.” The nature sad. extent of these ‘njuries thus accu-_ mulated by mviuai eiforts of both belli- gerents, seemed to teach the American statesman this important lesson; not to attach the cause of his country to one, “or the viner; but by systematick and so- -lid | provisions, for seacoast and mari- time defence, to place its interests, as far ‘as its situation and resources permits beyond the reach’ of the rapacity, or ambition of any European power. Happy would it have: been for our country, ifa course of policy, so simple and obvious, had been adopted ! Unfortunately administration had re- course to a system, complicated in its , nature, and destructive in its effects: which, instead of relief from the accu- mulated injuries of foreign governments, served only to fill up, what was wanting in.the measure of evils abroad, by artifi- cial embarrassments at home. As long ago asthe year 1794; Mr. Madison, the present president of the U States, then a member of the House of Representatives, devised and proposed a system of commer- cial restrictions, which had for its object the coercion of Great Britain, by a denial to her of our products and our market; as- Tish r - 2 ” us ee ie Lb Mamet serting that the former was, ina manner essential to her prosperity, either as nes cessaries of life, or as raw materials for her manufactures; and that without the latter, a great proportion of her la- bouring classes, could not subsist. In that day of sage and virtuous fores thought, the proposition was rejected. It remained, however, a theme of unceas- ing panegyrick among an active class of American politicians, who with a systes matick pertinacity inculcated among the people, that commercial restrictions were a species of warfare, which would ensure success to the United States, and humili- tion to Great Britain. There were two circumstances, inhe- rent in this system of coercing Great Britain by commercial restrictions, which ought to have made practical politicians very doubtful of its result, and very cau- tious of its trial, These were the state of opinion in. relation to its efficacy among commercial men in the United States; andthe state of feeling which a resort to it would unavoidably produce in Great Britain. On the one hand, it was undeniable that the great body of commercial men in the United States had no belief in such a dependence of Great Britain°upon the United States, either for our produce or our market, as the system implied. j Without the hearty cooperation of thi class of men, success in its attempt was obviously unattainable. And as on them the chief suffering would fall, it was al- together unreasonable to expect.that they would become cooperating instruments in support of any system which was rain to them and without hope to their coin. try. On the other hand, as it respects Great Britain, asystem proceeding upon the avowed principle of her dependence upon us was among the last .to which a proud and powerful nation would yield. Notwithstanding these obvious consi- derations, in April, 1806, Mr. Madison being then secretary of state, a law passed congress prohibiting the importation of certain specified manufactures of Great Britain and her dependencies, on the ba- 14 sis of Mr. Madison’s original proposie tration, and its agents by their direction. tion. Thus the United States entered But neither as publick men noras citizens on the system of commercial hostility can they consent that the. peace and against G. Britain. prosperity. of the country should be sa- The decree of Berlin was issued in crificed, in maintenance of a position, . the ensuing Novembe~ (1806.) The which on no principle of evidence. they treaty, which had been signed at London, deem tenable. They cannot falsify or in December, 1806, having been reject- conceal their conviction that the French ed by Mr. Jefferson without being pre- decrees neither have been nor are revo’ sented to the senate for ratification, and ked. 7d the non-importation act not being repeal- © Without pretending to occupy the ed but only suspended, Great Britain is- whole field of argument which the quese sued her orders in council, on the 11th tion of revocation has opened, a concise November, 1807. On the 2!st of the same month of No- vember, Champagny, French minister of statement seems inseperable from the occasion. The condition on which the non inter- foreign affairs, wrote to Mr. Armstrong, course, according tothe act of lst Mays the American minister, in the words fol- 1810, mightbe revived against G. Britain, lowing: *“ All the difficulties which have was, onthe part of France, an effectual given rise to your reclamations, sir, revocation of her. decrees. What the would be removed with ease, if the go- president of the U. States was bound to - vernment of the United States, after require from the French government was, complaining in vain of the injustice and the evidence of such effectual revocation. * violations of England, took, with the Upon this point both the right of the U. whole continent, the part -of guaranty- States and the duty of the president’seem ing it therefrom.” to be resolved into very distinct and un- On the 17th of the ensuing December deniable principles. The object to be ob- the Milan decrees were issued on the tained for the United States from France part of France, and five days afterwards was, an effectual revocation of the des the embargo was passed on the part of crees. A revocation to be effectual must. the United States. Thus was comple- include, in the nature of things, thi8 es- ted, by acts nearly cotemporaneous, the sential requisite; the wrongs done to the circle of commercial hostilities, neutral commerce of the U. States, by the After an ineffectual trial of four years operation of the decrees, must be stop- | to control the policy of the two belli- ped. Nothing short of this could be an gerents by this system, it was, on the part effectual revocation. > of the United States, for’a time, reline | Without reference to the other.wrongs quished. The act of the Ist May, 1810, resulting from those decrees to the com- gave the authority, however, to the pre- merce of. the United States, it will be sident of the United States to revive it sufficient to state the prominent. wrong against G. Britain, in case France reve- done by the 3d’article of the Milan de- ked her decrees. Such revocation on cree.* J. nature of this wrong essen- the part of France was declared by the president’s proclamation on the 2d Noy. — © This articve is in these words: 1810, and, in consequence, non inter — « ape, 777, The British islands are declared course was revived by our administration tobe ina state of blockade, both by land and against G. Britain. At all times the undersigned have looked with much anxiety for the evi- dence of this revocation. They wished sea. Every ship of whatever nation, or what- soever the nature of its cargo may be, that sails from the ports of England, or thgse ofthe English colonies ,and of the countries occupied by English troops and proceeding to England, not to question what, in various forms, oy tothe English Colonies, or to countties oc- hasbeen so often asserted by the adminis- cupied by English troops is good and lawfyl - eir direction. or as citizens >. peace and should be sa- f a position, vidence. they ot falsify or t the French nor are revoe * occupy the ich the quege ed, a concise le from the he non inter. tof lst Mays st G. Britain, . an effectual What the as bound to- srnment was, 1 revocation. * ht of the U. ssident'seem inct and un- sct to be ob- rom France of the des ectual must. 8, thi8 es. one to the ates, by the stbe stop- Ould be an her. wrongs o the com. it will be ent. wrong Milan de- png essen- re declared y land and in, or what- y be, that hgse of the 8 occupied o England, intties oc. d lawfyl 15@ tially consisted in the authority given'to French ships of war and privateers to make “prize, at sea, of every neutral vessel sailing to or from any of the-En- glish possesyons. Theauthority to cap- ture was the very essence of the wrong. Tt folfows; therefore, that an effectual re- vocation required that: the authority to capture should be annulled. Granting, therefore, for the sake of argument (what from its terms and its nature was cer- tainly tot the case) that the noted letter of the duke of Cadore of the 5th of Au- gust, 1810, held forth a revocation, good in point of form, and unconditional, yet it was not that effectual revocation for which the act of ae May: 1810, alone authorized the president of the U. States to issue his proclamation, unless in con- sequence of that letter the authority to capture was annulled. ‘The letter itself is no annulment of the authority to cap- ture, and it is notorious that no evidence of the annulment of this authority to capture everhas been adduced. It has not even been pretended. On the con- trary, there. is decisive and almost daily evidence of the continued existence of this authority to capture. ‘The charge of executing the decrees -of Berlin and Milan was, so far as con- cerned his department, given, by the terms of those decrees, to the French mi- nister of marine. According to establish- ed principles of general law, the impe- rial act which gave the authority must be annulled by another imperial act, equally formal and solemn; or, at least, the au- thority to capture: must be countermand- éd by some order or instruction from the minister’ of marine. Nothing short of this could annul the authority according to the rule of the sea service. Was such annulling act ever issued by the French emperour? Were any such counter- manding orders or instructions ever gi- ven. by the French minister of marine? In exercising a trust committed to him prize, as contrary to the present decree, and may be captured by our ships of war, or onr priva- teers, and adjudged to the captor.” = ——— eee acu” by the legislature, on a point so interest- ing to the neutral commerce of the U. States, and so important to the peace of the nation, was it not the duty of the pre- sident to have the evidence of such an- nulment before the issuing of any pro- clamation? Has he ever insisted upon such evidence? Was it of no conse- quence in the relative situation of this country as to forcign powers that the re- gular evidence should he received by our administration and made known? Why has a matter of evidence, so obviously proper, so simple in its nature, so level to general apprehension, and so imperi- ously demanded by the circumstances of the case, been wholly omitted ? And why; if the Berlin and Milan decrees are an- nulled, as is pretended, does the French emperour withhold this evidence of their annulment? Why does,he withhold jit when the question of revocation is pre- sented under circumstances of so much urgency ? Not only has it never been pretended that any such imperial act of annulment has issued, or that any such orders or in- structions, countermanding the authority to capture, were ever given, but there i decisive evidence of the reverse in the conduct of the French publick armed ships and privatcers. Noy. 1810, these ships and privatecrs have continued to capture our vessels and property on the high seas, upon the principles of the Berlin and Milan de- crees. A numerous list of American vessels thus taken since the lst of Nov. 1810, now exists in the office of the se- cretary of state; and among the captures are several vessels, with their cargoes, lately taken and destroyed at sea, without the formality of a trial, by the command- er of a French squadron at this moment cruising against our commerce, under orders given by the minister of marine, to whom the execution of the decrees was committed; and these, too, issued in January last. In the Baltick and Medi- terranean seas, captures by French pri- vateers ure known to us, by official docu- ments, to have been made under the au- At all times since. thority of these decrees, How then are they revoked? . How have they ceased to vie'ate our neutral commerce? Had any repeal, or modification of those decrees, in truth taken place, it must have been communicated to ,the prize courts, and would have been evi- denced by some variation either in their rules, or inthe principles of their deci- sions. In vain, however, will this nation seek for such proof of the revocation of the decrees. No acquittal has ever been had, in any of the prize courts, upon the ground that the Berlin and Milan decrees had ceased, even as it respects the Uni- ted States. On the contrary, the evidence is decisive that they are considered by the French courts as cxisting. There are many cases corroborative of this position. It is enough to state only two, which appear in the official reports. The American ship Julian was captured by a French privateer on the 4th July 1811, and on the tenth of September 1811,the vessel and cargo were condemns ed by the council of prizes at Paris, among other reasons, because she was visited by several English vessels, On the same day the Hercules an American Ship was condemned by the imperial court of prizes, alleging ‘that it was impossible, that she was not visited by the enemy’s ships of war.” So familiar to them wasthe existence of the decrees, and such their eagerness to give them effect against our commerce, that they fained a visitation to have taken place, and that notwithstanding the express de- claration of the captain and crew to the contrary. In addition to which evidence Mr. Russell’s letter to the secretary of state, dated 8th May 1811, says: It may not be improper to remark that no Ame- rican vessel captured since the Ist Noe vember 1810, has yet been released.” From this it is apparent that the com- manders of the national vessels, the privateersmen and the judges of the prize courts, to which may be added also the custom house officers, who, as the instruments of carrying into effect the decrees, must have been made acquaint- @16 ed with the repeal had it existed, have been, from first to last, ignorant of any ree vocation; and uniformly. acted upon the principle of their existence. If other evidence of the continued ex- istence of those decrees were requisite, the acts ofthe French governmenrafford such as is full and explicit. Champagny, duke of Cadore, minister. of foreign rey lationsy in his report to his majesty the emperour and king, dated Pari’, 3d De- cember, 1810, speaking of the decrees of. Berlin and Milan, says expressly: As long as England shall persistin her oy- ders in council, your majesty will fersigt in your decrees” ——Than which no decla- ration can be moxg, direct not only. that the Berlin and Millie decrees are unre- voked, but that they, will so remain, until the English orders in council are, with- drawn. Andin the address delivered:by his imperial majesty, Napoleon, to. the council of commerce on the 31st March 1811,-he thus declares: “ The decress of Berlin and «Milan are the. fundamental laws of my empire. For the neutral na- Vigation I consider the flag, as an exten- sion of territory. The power which-suf- fers its flag to be violated, cannot be con- sidered as neutral. The*fate of the A- merican commerce will soon be decided. I will favour it if the United States con- form themselves to these decrees, Ina contrary case their vessels. will be driven from my empire.” And as late as the 10th.of March last, in a report of the French minister of foreign relations, communicated ¢o the conservative senate, it is declared “ that as long as the British orders in council are not revoked, and the principles of the treaty of Utrecht, in relation to neu- trals put in force, the decrees of Berlin and Milan ought to subsist, for the powers who suffer their flag to be de- nationalized.” In none of these acts is there any exception in favour of the U. States. And onthe contrary in the re- port of March last, by placing those de- crees on the basis of “ the principles of the treaty of Utrecht,” the French minis- ter has extended the terms of revocation beyond all prior pretensions, existed, have ant of any res ed upon the ontinued ex- ve requisite nmentafford! Champagny, if foreign res Majesty the arid, 8 De- he decrees of: ressly: “& As ist-in her oy y will persist ich no decla- 1ot only that es are unre- ‘emain, until il are with- delivered:by leon, to. the 31st. March ie decress of fundamental > neutral na- as an exten- r which.suf- nnot be con- te of the A- be decided. i States con- crees, Ina. ill be driven March last, minister of ated to the lared “ that in council inciples of ion to. neu- s of Berlin st, for the to be de- hese. acts is r of the U, in the re- r those de- rinciples of tnch minis revocation Those who maintain the revocation of these decrees as it respects the United ‘States, rely wholly upon the suspension W@/ cf the decisions of the French prize courts, in relation to some few vessels, and the liberation of others, by the special lirection of the Frengh emperour. Can ihete‘be stronger presumptive evidence @ Nehe existence of those decrees than that no vessel is excepted from eir operation, until after the special exercise of the emperour’s will, in the particular case. If the decrees were effectively revo- ked, there would be no captures; or if any were made, liberation would be a matter of course and of general right; in- stead of being an affair of particular fa- vour or caprice. Is it for vexations and ‘indulgencies like these, that the people of the United States are to abandon their commerce and peace? Is it for such fa- vours they are toinvite the calamities of war? Ifthe resources of negotiation were exhausted, had the government no pow- ere remaining to diminish the causes of national controversy, by preventing abuses? After this, had it no powers to rovide for protecting indisputable and important rights, without waging a war of offence? Inthe regular exercise of legislative and executive powers, might not the fair objects of interest for our country have been secured completely by consistent and wholesome plans for de- fensive protection? And would nota na- tional position, strictly defensive, yet q | highly respectable, have been less bur- thensome to the people than the project- ed war? Would it not be more friendly to the cause of our own seamen—more safe for our navigation and commerce; more favourable to the interests of our agriculture; less hazardous to national » character; more worthy of a people jea- ‘Tous of their liberty and independence? For entering into these hostilities is | there any thing in the friendship or commerce of France in its nature very rs or alluring? Will ithe ‘reaping of the scunty fields of French trade, which we seek, in any i7 way compensate for the rich harvest of general commerce, which by war we are about to abandon? When entering into a war, with Great Britain, for commer. cial rights and interests, it seems impos- sible not to inquire into the state of our commercial relations with France, and the advantages the United States will obtain. We may thus be enabled to judge whether the prize is worth the contest. By an official statement, made to cone gress during the present session, it ap- pears that of 45,294,000 dollars of domes- tick productions of the United States, exported from September 30th, 1810, to October Ist, 1811, only 1,194,275 dollars were exported to France and. Italy, /in- cluding Sicily, not a dependency of France. France is now deprived of all her fo- reign colonies, and by reviewing our trade with that country for several years past and before the date of the orders in council, it will appear that, exclusive of her foreign possessions, it has been com- paratively inconsiderable. The annexe ed statement marked A taken from offi- cial documents, shows the quantity of particular articles, the produce of the United States exported to all the world, distinguishing the amount both to France and to England and her dependencies from 1810 to :611. From this statement it appears, now small a proportion of the great staples of our country is taken * by *It appears by it that for twelve years past France has not taken in any year, more than Cotton 7,000,000 pounds Rice 7.000 tierces Tobacco 16,000 hogsheads Dried Fish 87,000. quintals Of flower, naval stores, and lumber, none ot any importance, It also appears, by it, that the annual average taken by France for twelve years, was, of Cotton 2,664,090 pounds Rice 2,253 tierces, ' Tobacco 5,927 hogsheads Fish 24,735 quintals Of late years some of these articles have not been shipped at all directly to France, but they have, probably, found their way thither through the northern ports of Evrope. © — OE I Napa P » ie or 18 Byance. While Franee retained her colonies produce found its way to the mo- ther country through the United States, and our trade with her in these ar. ticles, was not inconsiderable. But since she has been deprived of her foreign pos- sessions, and since the establishment of her municipal regulations, as to licenses, this trade has been in a great degree, annihilated. With respect to colonial produce none canbe imported into France except from particular ports of the Uni- ted States and under special imperial li- censes. For these licenses our mer- chants must pay what the agents of the French government think proper to de- mand. As to articles of our domestick ‘produce, they are burdened with such exorbitant duties, and a! ‘ubjected to such regulations and res’ _ tions on their importation as, in ordi.) y times, will amount to a prohibition. On the 5th of August 1810, the very day of the duke of Cadore’s noted letter, a duty was im- osed on all sea island cotton, imported nto France, of more than eighty cents per pound, and on other cotton of about aixty cents per pound, amounting tu three or four, times their original cost in the United States. And as to tobacco, the French minister here on, the 23d July 1811 informed our government that it was “under an administration [en ea in France; the administra'ion (he says is the only consumer and can purchase only the quantity necessary for its con- sumption.” And by other regulations not more than one jifteeth of all the to- bacco consumed in Fraice, can be of fo- reign growth. The ordinary quantity of tobacco annually consumed in France is estimated at ¢hirty thousand hogsheads, leaving only about two thousand hogs- heads of foreign tobacco to be purchased in France. In addition to these impositions and restrictions, the importer is not left at liberty with respect to his return cargo. By other edicts, he is compelled to vest the avails of his importations, if, after poying duties and seizures, any remain, such articles of French produce and manufacture, as the French government thinks proper to direct. Two thirds at least must be laid out in silks and the other third in wines, brandies, and other articles, of that country. To show that this account of our commercial relations with France does not rest on doubtful authority, the undersigned would refer to the statements and declarations of our goretaenent on this subject. In a lette: rom Mr. Smith, the late secretary of state, to the minister of France here, of the 18th December, 1810, speaking of our trade to that country, under its regu- lations, after the. pretended repeal of the decrees, Mr. Smith says: “ The restric- tions of the Berlin and Milan decrees had the effect of restraining the American merchants from sending their vessels to France. The interdictions in the system that has been substituted, against the admission of American products, will have the effect of imposing upon them an equal restraint.” “If then, for the revoked decrees, municipal laws, producing the same commercial effect have been substituted, - the mode only, and not the measure, has undergone an alteration. And however true it may be, that the change is law- ful in form, it is, nevertheless, as true, that it is essentially unfriendly, and that it does not at all comport with the ideas, inspired by your letter of the 27th ult. in which you were pleased to declare the ¢ distinctly pronounced intention of his imperial majesty of favouring the com- mercial relations, between France and the United States, in all the objects of traffick, which shall evidently proceed from their agriculture, or manufactures.’ scIf France by her own acts, has blocka- ded up her ports against the introduction of the products of the United States, _what motive has this government, in a discussion with a third power, to insist on the privilege of going to France? Whence the inducement, to urge the annulment of a blockade of France, when, if annulled, no American cargoes could obtain a market in any of her ports? In such a state of things, a block- ich government Two thirds at n silks and the dies, and other To show that ercial relations ‘st on doubtful ed would refer larations of our ct. In a lette € secretary of France here, of 10, speaking of under its regu. d repeal of the “ The restric- lan decrees had the American their vessels to s in the system d, against the products, will y upon them an oked decrees, ng the same en substituted, - > measure, has And however thange is law. less, as true, ndly, and that vith the ideas, he 27th ult. in to declare the tention of his ‘ing the com- n France and the objects of ntly proceed nanufactures,” sy has blocka- P introduction nited States, rnment, in a yer, to insist to France? to urge the of France, ican cargoes any of her DES; & block- 4 of the coast of France would be, to © United States, as unimportant, as would be a blockade of the coast of the Caspian sea.” And so far has the French emperour en from ig cent in whole or in part, hese odious regulations as to us, in con- ‘ soqyence of our submitting to give up ur English trade, that they have been ’ Cade a subject of special instructions, to the minister who has been sent to the court of France. Mr Monroe, in his letter of instructions \o Mr. Barlow of July 26, 1811, saya: “ Your early and particular atttention will be drawn to the great subject of the commercial relation which is to subsist, in future, between the United States and France. The President expects that the commerce of the United States will be placed, in the ports of France, on such a footing as to afford it a fair market; and to the indus- try and énterprise of their citizens, a reasonable encouragement. An arrange- ment to this effect was looked for, imme- diately afterthe revocation of the decrees, but it appears from the documents, in this department, that that was not the case; on the contrary that our commerce has been subjected to the greatest discou- ragement, or rather, to the most ofiftres sive restraints; that the vessels, which carried coffee, sugar, &c. though sailing directly from the United States to a French port, were held in a state of sequestration, on the principle, that the trade was prohibited, and that the impor- mation of these articles was not only un- lawful, but criminal; that even the ves- sels, which carried the unquestionable productions of the United States, were exposed to great and expensive delays, tedious investigations, in unusual forms, and to exorbitant duties. In‘short that the ordinary usages of: commerce be- tween friendly nations were abandoned.” Again Mr. Monroe, in the same let- ter, says: ‘* It the ports of France, and her allics are not opened to the com- merce of the United States, on a libe. ral scale and on fair conditions, of what avail to them, it may be asked, is will be the revocation of the British of ders in council? In contending for thé revocation of hese orders, so far as it was an object of interest,the United States hadin view, a trade to the continent.’ It was a fair, legitimate object and worth contending for, while France encouraged it. But if she shuts her ports on our commerce, or burdens it with heavy duties, that motive is at an end.” He again says: “ You will see the injustice and endeavour to prevent the necessity of bringing in return for American care goes, sold in France, an equal amount in the firroduce, or manufactures of that country. No such obligation is imposed on French merchants, trading to the United States. They enjoy the liberty of selling their cargoes for cash, and taking back. what they please from this country, in return. It is indispensable, that the trade be free, that all American citizens engaged in it be placed on the same footing, and, with this view, that the system of carrying it on, dy licenses, granted by French agents be immediatee ly annulled.” The despatches from Mr. Barlow, by the Hornet, most clearly show that the expectations of our government have not only not been realized, but that even the frromises obtained, by our minister are of a very unsatisfactory nature. Indeed while Bonaparte is sending armies to the north of Europe, to take possession of the ports on the Baltick, and by his fast sail- ing squadrons, is burning American ves- sels on the Atlantick, all expectations of a free trade from France, must be*worse than vain. Notwithstanding the violence of the belligerents, were the restrictions of our own goverament removed, the commerce of the United States might be extensive and profitable. It is well known that from the gallantry of our seamen, if mere chant vessels were allowed to arm and associate for self defence, they would be able to repel many unlawful aggressions. The danger of capture would be dimi- nished, and in relation to one of the belligerents at least, the risk, under such 20 circumstances, Would soon be measured tion of our restrictive system, By that by ensurance, ; table it *pPears that the value of the ‘he discussions of our government, exports o | in relation to the British orders in coun- France, Holland, and Italy, was, durin Ples. on which they were issued. And exports to all other: parts of the world, the French minister, in his last communi. and which are now left free to WS Not. Cation, on this subject made to the Con- withstanding the effect of the British or. Servative Senate, on the 10th of March ders in council, exceed thirty cighe mile Jast, speaks of the blockade of the ‘loth of lions! So extensive a. commerce it ig Uy 1806 «as annihilating the rights of P¥oposed to surrender for the restricted all maritime States and putting: under trade the French €mperour will] allow, interdiction whole coasts and empires;” A trade burdened by impositions, or. ha. and of the orders 1) council of 1807, as rasseq by vexations, from French domi. though stil} subsisting, and that accord. nation, and French Douaniere, or custom ing to their Principles all vessels were house offic, Ts, in almost every port of Compelied « to Pay a tribute to England Continental Europe, and ull cargoes a tariff to her ustoms,” —_As in the Scale of Commercial advan. hat the real extent and Principle of tages France has little to offer, in res the blockade of May 1806 were, turn, for the many obviong hazards, which ave already been explained. With 4ccording to the wish of her Emperour, respect to the British orders of 1807, the United States are about to incur; the truth is, that by a new order issy. so, in the moral estimate of National NOxXlous transit duty called by the French Scene of things, on which we are enter. Minister « tribute and tariff” was done ing, away, The new order of April 1809, A nation, like the United States, hap. which is now the subject of complaint is PY inits great local relations; removed together with the colonies, Plantations * Value of articles of domestick Produce, ex. and settlements in the possession of those ibis 4 hs the world, iy §ovecnments respectively, and al! ports 4 n 1807 and places jn the northern parts of Italy, Whole amount, $41,953,797 Mr 699,508 to be reckoned from tie ports of Orbi- et Rese ith. tello and Pesuro, inclusively,” To France 3,226,698 2,716,141 The effect then ofthe British orders of To Holland, now blockade now in force, is to deprive us __ part of Franee 5,609,964 5,098,234 of the Commerce of France, Holland and T° Italy 185,346 250,257 a part of Italy, And they leave open to 7,022,008 6,064,632 US the commerce of all the rest of the rena, : world. What that is, some estimate may To England and be formed by recurrence to the subjoin. ‘ Cig 19,179,981 27,915,077 ed table, which exhibits the state ofour To all other parts commerce during 1806 and 1807—the of the world 14,051,740 14,719,883 two last years antecedent to the opera- 34,231,791 42,634,560 eee — moe eemmeghy system. By that the value of the stick products, to Italy, was, durin nh average only o illion of dollare.o— of our domestick arts of the world, ft free to ws note of the British or-. d thirty eight mile a commerce it is for the restricted perour will allow. m positions, or. ha- om French domi- waniere, or custom st every port of ommercial advan- le to offer, in ree 1s hazards, which of her Emperour, - about to incur; nate of national ttle character to xpect in the dark h we are enter- ited States, hap- lations; removed of Europe; with ng vast fields for rial possessions, want;——its fire. stick produce, exe In 1807 Whole amount, $48,699,592 eS — eT 2,716,141 3,098,234 250,257 6,064,632 27,915,077 14,719,883 42,654,960 ees ee 21 sides safe;—its altars undefiled;—from invasion nothing to fear;—from acqui- sition nothing to hope;—how shall such a nation look to Heaven for its smiles, while throwing away, as though they were worthless,’ all the blessings atid joys, which peace and such a distin- guished lot, include? With what pray- .ers can it address the Most High, when it prepares to pour forth its youthful rage; upon a neighbouring people; from whose strength, it has nothing to dread, from whose devastation it has nothing to gain ? If our ills were of a nature that war “would remedy; if war would compensate any of our losses; or remove any of our complains, there might be some allevia- tion of the suffering in the charm of the ‘prospect. But how will war upon the and protect commerce upon the ocean? What balm has Canada for wounded honour? How are our mariners benefited by a war which exposes those who are » free, without promising release to those who are impressed? But it is said that war is demanded by honour. Is national honour 4 principle which thirsts after vengeance, and is ap- peased only by blood; which, trampling on the hopes of man, and spurning the law of God, untaught by what is past and careless of what is to come, precipitates itself into any folly or ~~dness to gratify a selfish vanity or to satiatiate some unhallowed rage? If honour demands aawar with England, what opiate lulls that honour to sleep over the wrongs done us by France? On land, robberies, sei- zures, imprisonments by French autho- rity; at sea, pillage, sinkings, burnings under French orders. These are notori- ous. Are they unfelt because they are French? Is any alleviation to be found in the correspondence and humiliations of the present minister plenipotentiary of the United States at the French court? In his communications to our govern- ment, as before the publick, where is the cause for now selecting France, as the friend of our country and England as the enemy? If no illusions of personal fecling, and no solicitude far elevation of place, should be permitted to misguide the publick councils; if it is, indeed, honourable tor the true statesman to consult the publick welfare, to provide,in truth, for the pub- lick defence, and‘ impose no yoke of bondage; with full knowledge of the wrongs inflicted by the French, ought the government of this country to aid the French cause by engaging in war against the enemy of France? To sup- ply the waste of such a war and to meet _ the appropriations of millions extraor- dinary, for the war expenditures, must our fellow citizens, throughout the union, be doomed to sustain the burden of war taxes, in various forms of direct and indi- rect imposition ? For official informa- tion, respecting the milions deemed re- quisite for charges of the war; for like information, respecting the nature and amount of taxes, deemed requisite for drawing those millions from the com- munity, it is here sufficient to refer to estimates and reports made by the se- cretary of the treasury and the committee of ways and means, and to the body of resolutions, passed in March last, in the house of representatives. It would be some relief to our anxiéty, if amends were likely to be made, for the we"kness and wildness of the project, by the prudence of the preparation. But in no aspect of this anomalous affair can we trace the great and distinctive properties of wisdom. ‘There is seen a headlong rushing inio difficulties, with little calculation about the means and little concern about the consequences. Witha navy comparatively nominal, we are aiiout to ehter into the lists against the greatest marine onthe globe \\ ith a commerce, unprotected and spread over every ocean, we propose to make profit by privateering, and for this endanger the wealth, of which we are honest proprietors. An invasion is threatened of the colonies of a power, which, without putting a new ship into commission, or taking another soldier in« to pay, can spread alarm, or desolae tion along the extensive range of our 22 seaboard. The resources of our country, in their natural state, great beyond. our Warts, or our hopes are impaired by the effect of artificial restraints, Before ade- quite fortifications are prep: red for do- mestick dtfence, before meh, or money are provided for a war of attack. why has- ten into the midst of that awful contest, wich is laying waste Europe? It cannot be concealed, that to engage in the pre- sen war against Enyland is to place our: atlves on the side of France; and exposes ‘ ws tothe vassalage of states, serving un- der the banners of the French Emperour. The undersigned cannot refrain from asking what are the United States to gain by this war? Will the gratification of some privateersmen compensate the na- tion for that sweep of our legitimate com- merce hy the extended marine of our enemy, wich this desperate act invites? Will Canada compensate the middle states, for New York; or the western states for New Orleans? Let us not be deceiv- ed A war of inva.ion may invite a retort ot invasion. When we visit the peacea- ble, and, as to us, innocent colonies of Great Britain with the horrous of war can we be assured that our own coast will nat be visited with like horrours? Ata crisis of the world such as the pre sent, and under impressions such as these, the undesigned could not consider the war into which the U. States have, in secret, been precipitated, as necessary, or requir- ed by any moral duty, or any political ex- pediency George Sullivan, Martin Chittenden, Abijh. Bigelow, Willian Ely, ‘illiam Reed, Sami, Taggart, Laban Wheaton, Leonard White, Richard Jackson, jun. Elisha R. Potter, Efiaph’s Champion, Jno. Davenport, jr. Lyman Law, Jona. O. Moseley, Lewis B. Sturges, Elijah Brigham, Josiah Quincy, Fimo, Pitkin, jun. Benjamin Tallmadge, H. Bleecker, James Emott, Asa Fitch; Thos. R. Gold, James Milnor, Hi. M. Ridgely, C. Goldaboroughy Philin B., Key; Philip Stuart, John Baker, Jas. Breckenridge, Jos. Lewis, jun, Thos. Wilson, ., A, MBryde, Jos. Pearson. NOTE A. yg Quantity of particular articles, the fara- duce of the United States, exported Jrom 1800 ¢o 1811, viz, COTTON. ft To all parts ofthe world, T°France. To England lba, lbs. lbs. + 1800 17,789.803 none 16,179,513 1801} 20911,201 844,728 18,953,065 * 1802 27,501,075 1,907,849 23,473,995 1803 41,105,623 3,821,840 27,757,307 1804 38,118,941 5,946,848 25,770,748 1805 40,383,491 4,504,329 $2,571,074 1806 37,491.282 7,082,118 1807 66,612,737 6,114,358 1808 12,064,346 2,087,450 1809* 53,210,225 none direct 13,365,957 1010+ 93,874,201 do. 86,171,915 1811 69,186 do. 46,872,452 RICE. , Tierces Tierces Tierces 1800 112,056 none 77,547 1801 94,866 2,724 65,023 * In 1809, in consequen.e of the embargo and non-intercourse act, 4 millions of pounds of Cotton were shipped for Madeira, 10 and a lialf millions to the Floridas, 6 mi'ions to Fayal and other Azores, 1 million and three quarters to Portugal, and 10 millions to Sweden. ¢ 1810, about 4 millions of pounds of Cotton were shipped for Spain, 3 millions for Portu- gal, 3 millions for Madeira, 10 millions for Flo- ridas, 2 millions for Kurope generally, 4 mile lions for Fayal and the Azores, 14 millions for Denmark and Norway, and § millions for Sweden. + In 1811, 9 millions of pounds of Cotton, were shipped for Russia. 24,256,457 ‘ 7,992,593 (fr eecker,y Fitch, Milnor, Idaborough, Stuart, 1808 Breckenridge, =, ce Wilson. a fa Pearson. ” pe my plea, the para- tes, exported . ToEngland lbs. 16,179,513 | ‘ 8,953,065 ¥ 23,473,995 — 27,757,307 25,770,748 $2,571,074 24,256,457 © 53,180,211 7,992,593 ° 13,365,967 86,171,915 46,872,452 Ss llr Te TTS la Q ~~ Tierces 77,547 ) 65,033 —— F of the embargo ons of pounds of ra, 10 and alialf / lions to Fayal 1 three quarters Sweden. ounds of Cotton ons for Portus millions for Flo- nerally, 4 mil- , 14 millions for ° § millions for a) is 3801 unds of Cotton, ae ie ci 803 ms Toall parts cfiheworld Tr date To Fnplanh 1804 810, 74 258.518 | 1805 777,512 none 235,'76 1806 782 724 hone 308.048 1807 1,249 819 none 619.9 8 1808 263 213 hone 70 084 1809 846 247 none 230 822 1810 798,431 none 192 477 1811 1,445 012 2964 275 534 NAVAL STORES—TAR. Bbls Bbls Bbls 1800 59.410 none 58 798 1801 67 487 none 62 632 1802 37.497 797 21.330 1803 78.989 none 75 395 1804 58 181 do 45 210 1805 72.745 do §9.439 1806 62 723 do 50,668 1807 59,282 do 51 232 1808 18.764 do 17 700 1809 128.090 do 82 072 1810 87,310 do 50.021 18it 149.796 do 123 034 ‘ TURPENTINE, 1800 33.129 no.e 32 580 1801 85 418 do 35.143 1802 38 764 do 36.769 1803 61,178 do 60 732 1804 77 825 do 76,950 1805 95,640 do 94 328 1806 74.7381 do 71.854 1807 53.451 do 52 107 1808 17 061 do 17 009 1809 77 398 do 22,885 1810 62912 do 86.995 181] 100,242 do 97 250 LUMBER. Of the vast quantitics of Lumber ex- ported from 1800 to 1811, only a few Staves and Heading went to France, as follows, viz. Thousands of Stavee and Heading. 23. hy world To France To England 9,822 7,186 37,393 81,838 3,116 00 78,385 6,014 49,75 56,830 1,601 24,7387 102,627 3,392 39,298 9,692 3,006 37,417 9,228 none direct . 4,298 116,907 do 32,138 119,356 do 40,045 TOBACCO. Hhds Hhds Hhds 78,680 143 $7,798 103,758 5,006 §5,256 77,721 16,216 29,938 86,291 9,815 47,829 83,343 14,623 24,700 71,752 12,135 18,169 83,186 9,182 26,272 62,232 2,876 23,047 ' 9,576 566 2,526 52,921 mone direct 8,965 84,134 do 24,067 35,828 569 20,342 FISH, Dried or Smoked. Quintals Quintals Quintals 392,727 none 141,420 410,948 1,687 111,030 440,929 27,067 92,679 461,870 3,491 71,795 567,828 3,765 76,822 514,549 73,004 55,676 §37,457 19,347 66,377 473,924 87,654 55,242 155,808 16,144 26 998 345 648 nene 66,566 280804 | 2,150 55.456 216,387 28.622 33,243 : PICKLED FISH. "None exported to European France. FLOWER. Bbls. Bbls. Bbs. 653,052 none 365,739 1,102,444 none 758.023 1,156,248 14628 484 886 1,311,853 18,045 502,006 1801 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1608 6,349 357 321 466 716 616 105 | oie RBS cE RR 1 Co serass to their constituents on the subject of the war with Great Britain. sewed, uncut. 24 THE subscribers to the foregoing ad- dress having referred to the report of the secretary of the treasury, for « offi; cial information respecting the millions deemed requisite for charges of the war; and to estimates and reports made by the secretary of the treasury and the committee of ways and means, and to the body of resolutions passed in’ March last in the house of ‘representatives, for like information respecting the*nature and amount of taxe. deemed’ requisite for drawing those millioris from the com- munity,” the editor has thought proper to subjoin the following list of bills re- ported to the house of ‘representatives, by the committee of ways and means, on the 26th of June 1812. . These bills for taxing the people to an amnountaltogether unexampled and unknown in:tiiis coun- try, are drawn in gtrict conformity to the estimates, reports, and resolutions above referred to; but instead of being inmme- diately passed into laws, they were, upon ‘a motion of Mr. Roberts of Pennsylvania, ordered to lie on the, table, and, the further consideration of them. was after- wards postponed on motion of the-same gentleman, till the first Monday in ,No- vember next, which will be after the elec- tion of a President and Vice President. A motion to print the bills was reject- ed bya Jarge majority. It is said that the friends of Mr. Madison’s reelection in congress from Pennsylvania concur- red in the opinion that it woukt te ha- zardous to let the people feel the weight of these enormous and unexampled taxes before the choice ofelectors. The pass- ing of the bills was therefore postponed, and an early session of congress ordered, so that as soon as the election is over they are to be taken up and the taxes laid without delay. In the mean time a law has~ been passed for issuing Treasury Notes, end increasing the national debt by bor- 839 War ot 1812. Philadelphia (1812). giek 6, ~ enpply the wants of the governmen rowing money, which, it*is hoped, ‘a Ls aftePhe election. . The following is a list of the bills it laying ihe téxes which are to Sup port Mr. Madison and the, war. . A bill to lay and collect a direct tax within the United States. [Land Tax. A bill for the assessment and coll tion of direct taxes and internal duticag? A bill imposing additional duties om the tonnage of shipsand vesse]s. A bill to retain 25 per centim on’ Bes drawbacks allowed by law. "St, A bill laying a duty on imported salt A bill to establish’ the office of ¢ missioner of the Revenue. A bill :o lay duties on licenses to tailers of wines, spirituous liquors, foretgn merchaadise. A billto lay duties on carriages for conveyance of persons. } A bill to lay duties on licenses to dige tillers of spirituous liquors. [Whisky Tax.} ag A bill laying duties on sales at auctig of foreign merchandise, and of ships oP vessels. be A bill laying duties on sugar refi; within the United States. A bill laying duties on bank no and on notes of hand, and on sou bills of exchange of acertain descripti (Stamp Tax.] b. A bill making further provision for the Collection of internal duties, An address of members of the House of Representatives of! 8vo, | CF 1b .§0 |» 4.