BY THE SAME AUTHOR. HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDENT OF CHI- NESE BUDDHISM:— K Sanskrit-Chinese Dictionary, with Vocabularies of Buddhist Terms in Pali, Singhalese, Siamese, Burmese, Tibetan, Jtlougolian and Japanese. Second Edition. Eevised and Enlarged. Hongkong, 1888. BUDDHISM :^lts Historical, Theoretical and Popular Aspects, in Three Lectures. Third Edition, Kevised, with x4.dditions. Hongkong, 1884. FENG SHUT:— The Rudiments of Natural Science in China. London and Hongkong, 1873. A CHINESE DICTIONARY IN THE CAN- TONESE DIALECT:— Yom Volumes, with Appendix. London and Hongkong, 1877 to 1883. MATERIALS FOR A HISTORY OF EDUCA- TION IN HONGKONG :-Iie])vmt from the China Review. Hongkong, 1891. EUROPE m CHINA Digitized by the Internet Arciiive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/europeinchinahisOOeiteuoft /tU<u/./^-<- - EUROPE IN CHINA THE HISTORY OF HONGKONG FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE YEAR 1882 V BY r! f. FJTRL, Pli.D. (TrBixr.) INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS, TrON(;KON<i Tli« ucriuil well ^een is rlie iileal.— C/o7///« LONDOX .rZAC & COMPANY irONGKOXCr KELLY ct WAF.Sn, Ld. 1895 636^3. TO MY WIFE WINEFRED NEE EATOX IX MEMORY OF THIRTY YEARS OF WEDDED LIGHTS AND SHADOWS SPENT IN CANTON AND HONGKONG THIS BOOK WHICH OWES EVERYTHING TO HER IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED llogistercd in accordance with the provisions of Ordinance No. 10 of 1888, at tlie offtce of the liaj 1st I'd r General, Suprnne Court House. HoufjhoiHj. PREFACE. TO Europeans residing in Hongkong or China, I need not offer any excuse for inviting them to take up this book. The natural desire to learn to understand the present by a consideration of the past, will plead with them better than I could da But the general reader, in England and elsewhere, I entreat for a reconsideration of the popularly accepted view that but little importance, beyond that of a curio, attaches to Hongkong, its community and position, or indeed to European relations with China. At first sight, indeed, the Colony of Hongkong appears like an odd conglomeration of fluctua- ting molecules of nationalities, whose successive Governors seem to be but extraneous factors adventitiously regulating or disturbing the heavings of this incongruous mass. But in reality the Hong- kong community is solidarily one. Though an unbridged chasm does yawn in its midst, waiting for a Marcus Curtius to close it and meamvhile separating the outward social life of Europeans and Chinese, the people of Hongkong are inwardly 11 PREFACE. bound together by a steadily developing commu- nion of Interests and responsibilities: the destiny of the one race is to rule and the fate of the other to be ruled. The different periods of Hongkong's history, though demarcated each by the admi- nistration of a different Governor, are In reality the successive stages of the growth of one Ideal person (the Colony) naturally expanding Itself in a continuous line of so many generations, as It v^ere, of one and the same Ideal family (the community). Looking deeper still, there is seen underlying this mixed and fluctuating population of Hongkong a self-perpetuating unity: the secret Inchoative union of Europe and Asia (as represented by China). This union is in process of practical elaboration through the combined forces of commerce, civilisa- tion and Christian education, and particularly through the steady development of Great Britain's political influence in the East, an Influence which dates back to the earliest days of the East India Company in India and China. Indeed, the Anglo-Chinese com- munity of Hongkong specifically represents that coming union of Europe and Asia which China stubbornly resists while Great Britain and Russia, France and Japan unconsciously co-operate towards It- As representing that union, the Hongkong community has its root in the earlier and smaller community of British and other European merchants I'REFACE. iii with their Chinese hangers-on settled at the Canton Factories. But Its earliest prototype can be discerned in the previous settlements of the Portuguese and Dutch and more particularly of the agents of the East-India Company who were unconsciously working out in China, as well as in India, the international problem with the solution of which Hongkong is specially concerned. When, under the impulse of the awakening free trade spirit in England, the East- India Company had to withdraw from the field (1834), the British free-traders at Canton continued to represent Europe in China, and, when driven out thence, transplanted to Hongkong (1841) those Ckltpy unifying commercial and political principles which 7\tfuf* are to the present day the ntiflprlyinpr element.^ oi^ V*^ progress in the historic evolution_ of Hongkong. ^ ^^ But as the history of the Hongkong community presents thus an unbroken chain of influences con- necting the political mission of Europe with the present politics of Asia, so also the successive administrations of the government of this Colony have the same inner unity. Though each Governor is but a transient visitor, each possessed of his own idiosyncracies, and each controlled by an ever shifting series of Secretaries of State for the Colonies, behind them all is that ideal but none the less real entity, the genius of British public opinion, which inspires and overrules them all. That genius, feeling its > IV PREFACE. mission in Europe and North America fulfilled, has of late commenced to enter upon a new field of action whereby to complete its destiny. Asia and generally the countries and continents bordering on the Pacific Ocean, now task the energies of Downing Street and of the Governors sent forth from it, as well as the energies of the India Office, with pro- blems of such increasingly international bearings, that both the Colonial Office and the India Office are rapidly outstripping in importance the Foreign Office, and the necessities of both now demand the creation of a Ministry specially charged with the direction of British affairs in the Far East. The fact is. the fulcrum of the WorhVs balance of power has shifted from the West to the East^ from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. To the popular view the position of Hongkong in the East appears to be that of a remote Island, a mere dot in a little-known ocean. In reality, however, Hongkong, which commercially ranks as the second port of the British Empire, occupies a geographically most fortunate place in relation to the peculiar destinies of the Far East. For the last two thousand years, the march of civilization has been directed from the East to the West: Europe has been tutored by Asia. Ennobled by Christianity, civilization now returns to the East: Europe's destiny is to govern Asia. Marching at the PREFACE. V head of civilization, Great Britain has commenced her individual mission in Asia by the occupation of India and Burma, the Straits Setdements and Hongkong. By fifty years' handhng of Hongkong^ Chinese population, Great Britain has shewn how readily the Chinese people (apart from Mandarindom) fall in with a firm European regime, and the rapid conversion of a barren rock into one of the wonders and commercial emporiums of the world ^ has deman stratedjA^hat Chinese labour, industry and commerce can achieve under British rule^ Moreover, located on the western border of the Pacific, in line with Canada in the North -East, with Her Majesty's Indian and African Possessions in the South-West, and with the Australian Colonies in the South, Hongkong occupies a specially important position, not only with regard to the problems gathering round China and Japan (In their mutual relations to Great Britain, Russia and P" ranee), but especially also with regard to the ereater role which the Pacific Ocean is destined to play in the closing scenes of the world's history. What the Mediterranean and Atlantic were while civilization moved from East to West, the Pacific is bound to become now since the tide of progress runs from West to East. Africa is even now being brought into the sphere of. modern civilization by the combined powers of Europe. The turn of South- America will come next There is not a first-class VI PREFACE. power in the world that has not possessions on the shores of the Pacific. Great Britain and the United States, Russia and France, Germany and Italy, Spain and Portugal, all vie with each other in the control of countries bordering on, or islands situated in, the Pacific basin. It requires no prophet's gift to see that the politics of the near future centre in the East and that the problems of the Far East will be solved on the Pacific main. Contests will be sure to arise and in these contests Hongkong will be one of the stations most important for the general strength of the British Empire. Here, evelK more than in its bearing upon thelAsiatic problem, lies the real importance of Hongk(5Sg.ZlSucIi- is vj^ the position of this Colony in relation to the destinies V y^of the^Far ._Eastj_^^o//^^(>//^ will yet have aJ)i'o- if ^ /fmineni place in the future history of the' British i hf Empire. ) Ov_.--^''-'^^he foregoing consideratons will commend the subject of this book to the attention of the general reader. xA.s to its treatment, the endeavour of the writer has been to combine with the aims of the historian, writing from the point of view of universal history, the duties of the chronicler of events such as are of special interest to European residents in the EasX so as to provide at the same time a hand- book of reference for those who take an active interest in the current affairs of this British Colony PREFACE. VU as well as in British relations with China. This volume brings down the story of Hongkong's rise and progress to the year 1882. The more recent epochs of its history are too near to our view yet to admit of impartial historic treatment for the present. E. J. EITEL College Gardens, Hongkong, August 2, 1895, CONTENTS, Page Chap/j>. Commencement of British Trade with China, A.O. 1025 to 1834, i (U). International Retationh, A.l). 1C25 to 1H?>4, 12 . III. Monopoly ffirsits Free Trade, 10 IV. The Mission of Lord Napier, 26 V. Dissensions and a Quiescent Policy, A.D. 1884 to 188C 42 VI. Thk Skauch for a (^^lony. 53 VII. Chanok of Policy (52 W\W The Opicm Qckstion and the Exodus ^^ FROM Canton (1880). 75 IX. Exodus from Macao anj) Evfnts Leading UP to the Cession of Hongkong, 1889 to 1841, i)C X. Prk-P.ritish Hlstory of the Island of Hongkong, 127 1 Q ' XL (NWFIRMATION OF THK CksSION OF HONG- KON(;, ISIl to 1S48, !.'>'» XII. The Administration of Captain Elliot, Jiuinarv 20 to Anoiist 10, 1841, 1C3 CONTENTS. ra,?e Chap. XI n. The Administration of Sir H. Pottinger, August 10, 1841, to May 8, 18U, 179 XIV. The Administration of Sir J. F. Davis, May 8, 1844, to March 18, 1848, 211 XV. The Administration of Sir S. G. Bonham, March 20, 1848, to April 12, 1854, 258 XVI. A Brief Survey, 288 XVII. The Administration of Sir J. Bowring, April 13, 1854, to May 5, 1850, 208 XVIII. The Administration of Sir Hercules Robinson, September 0, 1850, to Marcli 15, 18G5, 85;3 XIX. The Interregnum of the Hon. W. T. Mercer, and the Administration of Sir R. a. MacDonnell, March 15, 18fi5, to April 22, 1872, 408 XX. The Administration of Sir A. Kennedy, April in, 1872, to March 1, 1877, 477 XXI. The Administration of Sir J. Pope Hennessy, April 22, 1877, to Marcli 7, 1882, 522 XXII . A Short Simma r y, , . . , 508 [XDE>;. HISTORY OF HONGKONG. CHAPTER I. Commencement of British Trade with China. A.D. 1625 to 1834. fpHE history of Britisli Trade with Cliina, which preceded §P Great Britain's connection with India, is comprised, from its first commencement down to the year 1834, in the history of the Honourable East India Company. Unfortunately, however, the story of the Company's relations with China is one of the darkest blots in the whole history of British commerce. That great and powerful Corporation, which governed successfully Asiatic kings^ and princes, and covered itself with administrative, financial and even military glory, particularly in India, was entirely nonplussed by China's dogged self-adequacy and persistent assertion of supremacy, and had its gl')ry, its honour, its self-respect rudely trampled under foot by subordinate Chinese Mandarins. The Court of Directors, having at the instance of Captain J. Sares (since 1613 A.D.) established a factory at Firando, in Japan, under a treaty with the Japanese Government, was induced also (A.D. 1025) to open tentative branch-agencies at Tywan (on the island of Formosa) and next in Araoy (on the opposite mainland of China). This move was made during the last few years of the reign of the Chinese Ming Dynasty which systematically welcomed foreign merchants. Encouraged by the results, the Directors of the East India Company resolved (A.D. 1627) to open trade also with Canton, by way of Macao. But the Portuguese, who had already estabhshed themselves there 2 CHAPTER I. (since 1557 A.D.), strenuously objected to admit such a powerful interloper to a share in the profits of the Chinese trade, and the attempt failed. Nothing daunted, however, the Court of Directors forth- with (A.D. 1034) negotiated a Treaty with the Portuguese Governor of Goii, under whose control Mncao was, and by virtue of this Treaty the British ship London (Captain AVeddcll) was admitted into the port of Macao and, after bombarding the Bogue Forts at the entrance to the Canton Kiver, her gallant commander was received in friendly audience by the Viceroy, who forthwith granted him (July 1055) full participation in the Canton trade, to the great chagrin of the ^facao traders. Thus British trade commenced at Canton, but through petty international jealousies on the part of the Portuguese and other causes it languished, until at last Oliver Cromwell concluded, on express principles of reciprocity, a Treaty (A.D. 1654) with King John IV. of Portugal, giving fi-ee access to the ships of both nations to any port of the East Indies. Ten years later, the East India Company, having at last secured a house at Macao, endeavoured to set up a regular factory at Canton also. But by this time the native Ming Dynasty had been supplanted by the ]Manchu invaders who established (A.D. 1()44) the present Tatsing Dynasty and manifested from first to last a haughty contempt for all persons engaged in trade and an irreconcilable animosity against all foreign intruders. In conquering Amoy (A.D. 1G81), the Manchus destroyed the Company's agency there and at Zelandia (Formosa), but the Portuguese at Macao, having made themselves useful to the new Dynasty by rendering military aid to the invaders, were with haughty contempt tolerated where they were, without any formal concession being made to them. The Manchus, disdaining to make any distinction between Portuguese and English, as being equally barbarians in their eyes, allowed foreign trade at Canton to continue, though thenceforth under galling and vexatious restrictions. COMMEXCEMENT OF BRITISH TRADE WITH CHINA. g The East India Company's Supercargoes soon found that, 80 long as they indirectly and humbly acknowledged the supremacy which the Manchu Dynasty now claimed over the whole world, expressly including also all foreign barbarians, the Chinese officials were perfectly ready to accept costly presents and to encourage foreign trade provided that it would quietly submit to their irregular exactions. Thereupon the Company began (A.D. 1681) sending ships direct from England to Macao, and later on (A.D. 1685) they succeeded in re-opening their agency at Amoy and (A.D. 1702) planting a factory also on the island of Chusan. Up to this time, trade had been conducted in a loose and irregular manner. On the arrival of a ship in the waters of Canton, she was boarded by an officer of the Hoppo (Imperial Superintendent of Native Maritime Customs), who was at once offered a present (called curashaw) upon the value of which depended the mode of measuring the ship, whereupon followed (in the absence of a fixed tariff) a disgraceful bargaining and haggling over the rates of port charges, linguist's fees and customs duties to be levied. When all these negotiations, hurried on frequently by a threat on the part of the Supercargo to take the ship away or temporarily suspended by sundry practical menaces on the part of the Hoppo's officers, had been concluded, the ship was allowed to proceed to Whampoa (the port of Canton) and there admitted to open trade with any officially recognized native merchant or broker. A serious change was introduced with the year 1702. The East India Company having sent out (A.D. 1699) a Chief- Supercargo (Mr. Catchpoole) who was commissioned to act as King's Minister or Consul for the whole empire of China and the adjacent islands, the Chinese officials responded with a counter move, While the Chief-Supercargo's royal commission was studiously ignored and the term tai-pan (chief-manager) applied to the King's Minister, a Chinese merchant, entitled Hhe Emperor's Merchant' but among the Company's Super- cargoes thenceforth known as ' the Monster in Trade,' was now 4^ CHAPTER I. (A.D. 1702) appointed by the Chinese Government to supervise foreign trade. This Emperor's Merchant had the exchisive monopoly of the foreign trade and, in addition to the Hoppo's officers who had to be phed with presents and fees as before, this Monster in Trade had now to be satisfied in the same way. All imports and exports had to pass through his hands, all commercial transactions of the foreign merchants had to be settled through his agency. He was for some time nominally the sole intermediary between the foreigners and native merchants, and likewise the exclusive channel of communications between the foreign merchants and skippers (including the East India Company's Agents with the King's Minister) on the one hand and the Chinese Government on the other. Thenceforth free trade was at an end and the monopoly of the East India Company was by astute Chinese policy met by an equally powerful combination of Chinese monopolists, who periodically had to disgorge their profits to the Provincial Authorities (the Viceroy and the Governor of Canton), and to the Hoppo, au officer of the Imperial Household. The latter had to purchase by a heavy fee a five years' tenure of the monopoly of collecting the native and foreign customs duties of Canton, and on his return to Peking, he was invariably squeezed like a sponge by the Imperial Household. Thus foreign trade was thence- forth ground down between the upper and nether mill-stones of the Chinese Authorities and the Emperor's Merchant and his successors. Nevertheless, the East India Company's Supercagoes speedily managed to adapt tlieir policy to the new^ arrangement. Trade continued to flourish. The ships proceeded thereafter first of all to Macao, then sent up agents to Canton to arrange, in w^hatever way it could be done, the amount of presents, measuring fees, port charges, duties and brokerage, and then, when everything w'as satisfactorily arranged, the ship would proceed to the Bogue (the entrance to the Canton River, guarded by two forts, Chuenpi on the East and Taikoktau on the West) and, after paying fees and duties there, a chop (a COMMENCEMENT OF BRITISH TRADE WITH CHINA. 5 •stamped permit) would be granted to each ship to proceed to Whampoa to trade. By the year 1715, a regular routine had been established and British ships now began to omit the visit to Macao and to proceed, on arrival in Chinese waters, straight to the Bogne, where, after anchoring for some days, everything was settled by the Supercargoes as above. A new change was made in the conduct of the foreign trade in the year 1720, when an ad valorem duty of 4 per cent, was laid on all imports and exports and a Committee of Chinese merchants, henceforth known as the Co-Hong, was substituted in place of the one Emperor's Merchant. But this Committee was likewise placed under the supervision of the Hoppo, and, as before, made answerable to the Viceroy and Governor for all dues on trade. These Co-Hong Merchants were as a body solidarily responsible for the solvency of each member of the Co-Hong, both as regards indebtedness towards the foreign merchants and as regards the share of the Provincial Authorities .in their profits. Moreover they were responsible, as a body, for the payment of all fees and duties by every foreign ship, and even for any offences or crimes committed by the ships' officers or crews. By an Imperial Edict (A.D. 1722) they were also commissioned to levy an import dnty on opium, amounting to 3 taels per picul. This system was nominally improved upon by the intro- duction (A.D. 1725) of a fixed tariff. Upon this measure the Imperial Authorities at Peking had insisted to enable them better to gunge the proper amount of their own share in the profits of this flourishing foreign trade. Nevertheless, the publication of the tariff failed to do away with the previous '.system of bribery and corruption, as both the Hoppo's officers and the Co- Hong looked upon the tariff only as the minimum basis of their own accounts with the Provincial and Imperial Governments. Consequently they systematically exacted from the foreign ships as much over and above the tariff charges •■as they could possibly screw out of them. Q CHAPTER I. A special tax of 10 per cent, was put on all foreign imports- and exports in the year 1727, but after making (A.D. 1728) a strong united appeal to the Throne, in the humblest form of subject suppliants, the Company's Supercargoes were granted,, on the occasion of the accession of the Emperor Kienlung (A.D. 1786), exemption from this tax. By this time about four Englisii ships, two French, one Danish and one Swedish ship arrived every year to share in the Canton trade. Portuguese trade was confined to Macao. However, in the year 1754, a. new method of extortion was introduced, by requiring each ship, on her arrival, to obtain first of all, by special negotiation, the security of two members of the Co-Hong, before the usual arrangements concerning measuring fee, cumshaw, linguist's fee, and customs duties could be entered upon. Up to this time, the monopoly of the Co-Hong concerned only the disposal of the cargo and the purchase of exports, but from the year 1755 all dealings of foreigners with small merchants and purveyors of ships' provisions were strictly prohibited, and especially all dealings of the ships with native junks and boats, \\hilst anchoring outside and before entering the river, were visited with severe penalties. Owing to occasional smuggling mal- practices on the part of natives, countenanced by foreign skippers, an Imperial Edict prohibited (A.D. 1757) all commercial transactions with foreign ships, whether outside the l^ogue or at Whampoa, and confined trade strictly to Canton. As this measure not only tended to hamper trade operations in Canton waters, but threatened the extinction of the flourishing Amoy agency, the Committee of Supercargoes sent Mr. Harrison,, together with a very able interpreter, Mr. Flint, to Amoy (A.D. 1759) to arrange with the local Authorities a continuation of the Amoy trade on special terms. When these negotiations- failed, Mr. Flint, sharing the opinion of the Supercargoes that the obnoxious Imperial Edict had been obtained by the Cantonese Authorities through false representations, proceeded (with the secret support of the Amoy Authorities) to Tientsin and succeeded in getting his views, involving serious charges against COMMENCEMENT OF BRITISH TRADE WITH CHINA. J the Hoppo and the Cantonese Authorities, brouglit to the notice of the Throne. An Imperial Commissioner, authorized to remove the Hoppo from his post and to abohsh all illegal imposts, was sent to Canton with Mr. Flint to investigate the charges against the Provincial Authorities. The inevitable result followed. The Hoppo and the Cantonese Authorities having made their terms with the Commissioner, Mr. Flint was ordered to appear in the Viceroy's Yamen to answer a charge of having,, while at Amoy, set at defiance the Imperial Edict of 1757. Mr. Flint went, accompanied by all the Supercargoes, but as soon as they reached the Viceroy's offices, they were set upon by his underlings, brutally ill-treated, thrown on the ground, forced to perform the official act of homage (kneeling and knocking their foreheads on the ground) called kotow and sent back with ignominy, with the exception of Mr. Flint. He was thrown into prison and, as the virtuous Court of Directors refused to pay the bribe of ^1,250 which was demanded by his^ jailors, he was kept under rigorous confinement at Casa Branca until November 17G2, when he was released and deported to England. The Court of Directors, who had by the action of their servants hitherto stooped sub rosd to every form of Chinese bribery and corruption, and borne every indignity heaped upon their representatives with equanimity, thought at last, on hearing of the ill-treatment of their Supercargoes, that the Chinese were going rather too far. So they sent a special mission to Canton (A.D. 1700), with a letter to the Viceroy, protesting against the Co- Hong system and asking for Mr. Flint's release. But the mission was treated with contempt by the Manchu Government and failed to have any effect whatever. By giving however increased secret presents, the Supercargoes caused things to go on more smoothly, and ten years later (A.D. 1771) the Company's Supercargoes succeeded in purchasing permission to reside during the winter months (the business season) at Canton, instead of coming and going with their respective ships. The ships used to arrive towards the end of ^ CHAPTER I. the south-west monsoon (April to September) and leave again for Europe with tlie north-east monsoon (October to March). But unless special permission to linger a little longer was obtained, the Supercargoes, now at last established in separate factories (allotted to the several nationalities) in Canton, were annually, ac the cli:inge of the season, furnished with passports and warned to be off to Macao. Thence they had, at the end of summer, to pelition for passports again, to enable them to return to Canton the next season. At last (Fchrnary 13, 1771), the dissolution of the Co- Hong, wliich had become the most galling burden of the time, was gained by the Supercargoes resident at Canton, a triumpli which previously every form of persuasion and •every art of diplomacy had in vain been employed to secure. But the sum paid for this favour amounted to a hundred thousand taels, which sum the Authorities accepted, because the Co- Hong were bankrupt and in arrears with their contributions due to their respective official superiors. Xevertlieless, this privilege was not enjoyed very long, for ten years later (A.D. 1782) the previous Co-Hong system was, under a new name, re-established by the appointment of twelve (subsequently increased to thirteen) 'Mandarins,* who were however simply native brokers, thenceforth known as Hong merchants. These had, like the former Co-Hong, the monopoly of the foreign trade, subject to the supervision of the Hoppo and of the Provincial Authorities, to whom they were responsible for the payments due by, and for the personal conduct of, all foreigners. These Hong merchants held the same j^osition, and had the same privileges and responsibilities as the Co-Hong. The only differences were that they bore another title and that for their previous solidary responsibility in financial matters was now substituted a guarantee fund, known as the Consoo (Association or Guild) fund. But this fund was created at the expense of the foreign trade, on which thenceforth a special tax was levied for the purpose. As the East India Company and the merchants COMMENCEMENT OF BRITISH TRADE WITH CHINA. y -of other natioualities quietly submitted to this chanofe in the system, trade continued to proceed as before. Thereupon the Chinese imposed (A.D. 1805) a further special tax, like the modern Li-kin, to provide for the necessities of coast defence and other warlike preparations against the foreign ships. This measure was taken by the Chinese because they had observed that the foreign ships had, owing to the steady increase of the value of their cargoes, gradually increased their armaments. Trade, however, continued increasing from year to year. But soon a hand's breadth of a cloud, destined to develop into a tempest, arose on the commercial horizon in the shape of the ' exportation of bullion ' question and the altered attitude of foreigners generally. With the gradual increase of the opium trade, the Chinese observed Avith dismay that the balance of trade, though still in favour of China, was steadily diminishing from year to year as foreign commerce expanded. In the year 1818 a rule was therefore made to restrict the exportation of silver by any vessel to three-tenths of the excess of imports over exports by that vessel. The tea trade, indeed, increased very rapidly, to the great satisfaction of the Chinese officials, especially since teas began (A.D. 1824) to be shipped direct from China to the Australian Colonies. But however fast the export of tea increased, the imports of opium out-stripped it in the race. Accordingly in the year 18;U the Chinese Authorities, in their dread of the increasing outflow of silver from China, imposed upon foreign merchants such severe additional restrictions, that the Select Committee of the East India Company's Supercargoes, headed by Mr. H. H. Lindsay, threatened to suspend all commercial intercourse. Eventually, however, when matters came to a crisis (May 27, 1831), the Select Committee \ielded and. in token of their submission, handed the keys of the British Factory to the Brigadier in charge of the Provincial Constabulary (Kwong-hip). Though victorious for the moment, the Chinese officials could not help noticing on this occasion more than ever before, that a considerable chanj^e had come over the demeanour of 10 CHAPTER r. the foreign merchants. The East India Company's chiefs seemed to have lost somehow their former control over the foreign commnnity, and the latter would not submit now, as formerly, to all the caprices of the Chinese Authorities; they were talking now of international and reciprocal responsibilities, and murmured seditiously against trade monopolies as commercial iniquities. Moreover the restrictions placed on the opium ships, from which the Provincial Authorities were reaping their richest harvests, were persistently evaded by the ships anchoring at the island of Lintin or in the Kapsingmooii channel, outside the Bogue, where, with the connivance of the Authorities, the foreign merchants had established stationary receiving ships, serving the purpose of floating warehouses for all sorts of goods. This measure encouraged a great deal of smuggling on the part of Chinese private traders, and the consequent infringement of the official trade monopoly curtailed the share which the Provincial Authorities had in the whole trade. The Chinese officials now saw clearly that a different spirit had crept in among the foreigners at Canton, that even the servile attitude of the former East India Company's officers was rapidly giving way to claims of national self-respect, a most preposterous thing, as it appeared to the Chinese, on the part of outer barbarians, and finally that the most intelligent private merchants freely expressed their conviction that, owing to the approaching dissolution of the East India Company's Chinese monopoly, the whole foreign trade with China would have to be placed on a distinctly international basis by the year 1834. The Viceroy now perceived and reported to Peking that a serious crisis was approaching. Accordingly an Imperial Edict was issued (September 19, 1832) ordering all the maritime provinces to put their forts and ships of war in repair 'in order to scour the seas and drive off any European vessels (of war) that might make their appearance on the coast.' Thus prepared, the Chinese calmly awaited the year 1834, OOMMEXCEMEXT OF BRITISH TRADE WITH CHIXA. H continuing meanwhile to encourage foreign trade and to levy on it as many charges, regular and irregular, as it would bear. What the British Government failed to discern, the Emperor of China foresaw clearly, viz. that a war was bound to arise from the denial of China's supremacy. 4f.,|»-i- CHAPTER II. International Relations. A.D. 1625 to IS 84. ^f^URING the whole period above reviewed, the relations ■^^ between the Chinese Government and the East India Company had been conducted on the express understanding-, which for nearly two centuries was tacitly acquiesced in by the Company, that China claims the sovereignty over all under heaven ; that trade, whether retail or wholesale, is a low degrading occupation, fit only for the lower classes beneath the contempt of the Chinese gentry, literati and officials ; but that the Emperor of China, as the father of all human beings, is merciful even to barbarians, and as their existence seems to depend upon periodical supplies of silk, rhubarb and tea, the Emperor permits the foreign traders at Canton to follow their base instincts and allows them to make money for themselves by this trade, subject to official surveillance, restrictions and penalties. At the same time, though permitted to reside at intervals in the suburbs of Canton, foreigners must not suppose that they are the equals even of the lowest of the Chinese people ; they must not presume to enter tlie city gates under any pretext wdiat- •ever, nor travel inland, nor take into their service any natives except those belonging to the Pariah caste of the boat population (known as Ham-shui), forbidden by law to live on shore or to compete at literary examinations. So long as the Company's Supercargoes, and other foreign .merchants resorting to Canton, silently accepted the degrading INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. "ig. status tlius assigned to tliem, and tacitly acknowledged the political supremacy and tlie Heaven-bestowed jurisdiction of the Chinese Government, things went on tolerably and trade continued in spite of all restrictions. The Chinese were confirmed in this low estimate of foreign character and culture by the to them singular fact that, with very rare exceptions, none of those foreigners seemed able to learn the Chinese language nor even to conceive any appreciation of Chinese history, philosophy or literature, besides shewing utter incapacity to comprehend the principles- of Chinese polity, morality and etiquette. Nor did these barbarians exhibit any symptoms of religious life, so far as the Chinese could observe, to whom they appeared to have no soul whatever above dollars and sensual pleasures. ♦The more the Chinese saw of foreigners, the less they found themselves able to classify them with other nations like the Coreans, Japanese, Loochooans, Annamese or Tibetans, all of whom readily appreciated and adopted Chinese culture and €hinese forms of religion and etiquette. Hence they could only characterize the barbarians from Europe or America as- * foreign devils.' The first intimation the Chinese received of a superior moral power, inherent in the character of foreigners, was conveyed to them by contact with officers of the British navy. When the first British man-of-war, the Centaury arrived in Chinese waters (November, 1741), the Hoppo's officers pretended not to-understand any difference between a ship of His Majesty, and an East India Company's trader. They insisted upon measuring the Centaur, and coolly demanded the usual trade charges. However, her commander, Commodore Anson, very quietly and good-naturedly resisted all pretensions and by sheer force of character, combined with judicious menaces, brushed all objections aside, and forced his ship without positive hostilities through the Bogue and up to Whampoa. On arrival there, he fairly took away the breath of the Chinese officials by notifying them that he proposed to call in person on the Viceroys 14 CHAPTER II. to pay his respects to His Excellency, which was his bonnden duty as the Officer of His Majesty King George 11. of Great Britain and Ireland, and that 'there must be no breach of etiquette.' The unparalleled boldness of this typical British tar was so novel to the Chinese Authorities that it cowed them completely. The Viceroy admitted the importunate sailor to a personal interview, treated him to cold tea and ice-cold etiquette, and not until the Commodore set sail and left Chinese-^vaters did the Chinese Authorities recover their breath and resume their former policy of undisguised contempt for all foreigners. However, on the next occasion (February, 1791), when His Majesty's Ships Leopard and Thames arrived and desired to folio vv the precedent set by Commodore Anson, they found thiqgs changed. The Chinese officials now stubbornly refused to allow the ships to enter the Bogue and the officers had to content themselves with a flying personal visit to the port and suburbs of Canton. Nevertheless the next visitor, Captain Maxwell, of H. M. S. Alceste (November 12th, 1816), was determined to follow the example of Commodore Anson. On arrival at the Bogue, a Chinese officer boarded the Alceste and informed the Captain that, before proceeding any further, he must obtain the security of two Hong merchants and declare the nature of his cargo. The gallant Captain pointed to his biggest guns as his security and declared the only cargo carried by a British man-of-war to be powder and shot. Thereupon the frightened officer beat a hasty retreat and subsequently sent on board a stern refusal to allow the ship to enter the Bogue. In reply, Captain Maxwell politely informed the commanders of the Bogue forts of the exact hour when he intended to pass through the Bogue, and, after giving them ample time to make all their preparations, he gallantly ran the gauntlet of the Bogue forts, under sail, leisurely returning the fire of the forts after aiming and firing the first gun with his own hands. Though becalmed within range of the forts, he succeeded in pushing his way to Whampoa without serious ■casualty on his own side. After anchoring there, Captain INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. 15 Maxwell resumed his communications with the Chinese officials with the utmo.st good nature, and the Chinese Government, likewise ignoring what had happened, allowed him to do just as he pleased until he took his ship awaj. But no direct official intercourse was accorded to Captain Maxwell in spite of his bravery. The several Embassies that were sent with autograph letters from King George III, accompanied by costly presents and much pomp of show7 retinue, had even less effect upon the attitude which the Tatsiiig Dynasty assumed towards foreign commerce, than the servile bribes and presents of the East India Company's Supercargoes or the periodical demonstrations of British pluck by His Majesty's naval officers. Lord Macartney's Embassy (A.D. 1792), sent forth by George III, with strong complaints and sanguine expectations, was treated by the Chinese Government as a deputation of tribute-bearers, like those that periodically came from the Loochoo Islands. Lord Amherst's Embassy (A.D. 1815), vainly expected to result in the establishment of diplomatic intercourse with Peking, w'as treated politely but strictly as a tribute-bearing commission. When Lord Amherst lingered, hoping to be allowed to remain near the Court, he was quietly told that it was high time for him to petition for the issue of his passport and be off. Henceforth the chroniclers of the Tatsing Dynasty complacently recorded the fact of Great Britain having been formally admitted to a place in the list of the nations tributary to China by voluntary submission. Nevertheless both the bold appearance of British frigates in Chinese waters and the humble presentation at Court of British Ambassadors had a certain amount of effect in impressing the Chinese jxiople with the conviction that Europeans after all were considerably above the ordinary class of barbarians known to them. Special instances of the steadily increasing importance of the British navy were not wanting. In the years 1802' and 1808 British marines occupied Macao to protect the Portuguese settlement against a threatened attack by the French. In the 16 CHAPTER IL former year the troops were not withdrawn, in spite of irate protests by the Cantonese Authorities, until peace with Franoe was restored. In the hitter year Admiral Drury withdrew his men again and abstained from forcino- his way up to Canton in order to please the East India Company's Committee and to avoid interference with trade. Again, in tlie year 1814, H.B.M. Frigate Doris cruized in Canton waters to intercept American ships, and when the Viceroy instructed the Committee to order her off, the Committee, to the surprise of the Chinese officials, declared that they had no power whatever in the matter and were quite willing that trade, as threatened by the Viceroy, should be stopped. The Committee, moreover, by adroit management, improved the opportunity so as to obtain from the frightened Viceroy important concessions, viz. the right to send Chinese petitions to the Governor of Canton under seal, to employ native servants without restraint and to have their dwellings secure from Chinese intrusion. The gradual development of the British navy not only impressed the Chinese ^authorities but served the purpose of enabling foreign merchants to take a firmer attitude towards Chinese pretences of political and judicial supremacy. Foreign merchants never consented to formally acknowledge their subjection to Chinese criminal jurisdiction, though they were often compelled by sheer force to submit to it. But not until the year 1822 were the Chinese distinctly informed that foreigners refused on principle to submit to Chinese jurisdiction. In the year 1750 the French surrendered to the Chinese Authorities one of their seamen, and again in 1780. In 1784: the Enolish surrendered a gunner who, in fii-ing a salute, had accidentally killed a native, and they actually submitted to his being executed by strangling. In 1807 again a British sailor was surrendered, and though Captain Rolles, of H.M.S. Lion, obtained his release, a fine of Ji20 was paid. In 1821 the Americans surrendered a foreigner (Terranuova) to Chinese jurisdiction and submitted to his being strangled. But in the very next year, when two natives were killed in a scuffle with INTERNATIONATi RELATIONS. \J men of H.M.S. Topaze, the British oomniander, assisted by Dr. Morrison as interpreter, made it quite clear that a recognition of Chinese claims of jurisdiction over British seamen and particularly over men-of-war's crews was entirely out of the question. Thenceforth no foreigner was surrendered to a Chinese Court. In 1831 a curious episode occurred, illustrating the strained international relations which had gradually arisen. In spring 1831 the Select Committee of the East India Company took upon itself to enlarge the garden in front of their factory by reclaiming a narrow strip of foreshore. Soon after, when the merchants had all retired to Macao for the summer, the Governor of Canton, resenting the unauthorized reclamation, came in person to the British factory and ordered the premises to be forthwith restored to their previous condition. Meanwhile he walked into the Select Committee's dining room where a life-size picture, representing George lY. as Prince Regent, was hanging. On being informed that it was the portrait of the then reigning King of England, the Governor took a chair and deliberately sat down wn'th his back turned to the picture. The Select Committee reported this deliberate insult to their Directors and the merchants used various means of making their indignation known to the Chinese officials. One of their defenders publicly alleged (September 15, 1831) that the Governor disavowed any intentional disrespect and blamed the Committee for desecrating the picture by exhibiting it without a curtain of Imperial yellow and for omitting to place in front of it an altar with frankincense. Lord William Bentinck, then Governor-General of India, addressed (August 27, 1831) a letter to the Governor demanding an explanation, but took no further steps when the Governor, whilst refusing to notice Lord Benti nek's letter, issued (January 7, 1832"), an edict denying the imputation. The picture in question (by Sir T. Lawrence) now graces the dining room of the Government House of Hongkong, whither it was removed from Macao in February 1842. 2 18 CHAPTER II. All these experiences impressed the Chinese Authorities with the conviction that the claim of extra-territorial jurisdiction was but a symptom of a deeper seated claim of international rights, the concession of which would be the deathblow to China's sovereignty over all the nations of the earth. n S e) CHAPTER III. Monopoly versus Free Trade. 'prOWEVER galling this stolid assertion of self-adequacy ;^^ and supremacy, and this persistent exclusivism of the Chinese Government, must have been to the East India Company's officers and to the Ambassadors specially com- missioned to bolster up the position of the East India Company in China, it must not be forgotten that the East India Company was, within its own sphere, just as haughty, domineering and exclusive a potentate, as any Emperor of China. Private British merchants, scientists, missionaries, and even English ladies, had us much reason to complain of the tyranny of the East India Company's Court of Directors, as their Supercargoes suffered in their relations with the Chinese Government. "When naturalists or missionaries, entirely unconnected with trade, desired to pursue their noble avocations at any port of Asia occupied by the East India Company, they were either strictly prohibited and ordered off, or permission was granted in exceptional cases, as a matter of extraordinary favour, and under galling injunctions and restrictions. As to the treatment of foreign ladies, the coincidence between the policy of the Chinese Government and that of the East India Company is striking. When the first English- speaking lady, a Mrs. McClannon who, with her maid, had been shipwrecked on her way to Sydney and picked up at, sea by the American ship Betsey, arrived at Macao, the Chinese officials professed themselves shocked. They refused to admit the ship to trade. What with barbafian merchants, residing 20 CHAPTER III, on the coast, and what with flying visits by naval officers^ they said, it was difficult enough for Chinese officials to keep, the foreign trade in order, but that barbarian women should also enter the hallowed precincts of the Celestial Kingdom was an outrage of Chinese fundamental principles of propriety and beyond all endurance. However, as usual, a cumshaw (bribe) smoothed away the objections, only the Captain of the Betsey, who so gallantly had rescued the shipwrecked women, was officially informed that he must never do it again, and take away the women as soon as possible on pain of permanent exclusion from the trade. As a parallel to this Chinese interdict placed on women, the Court of Directors of the East India Company renewed (A.D. 1825) a previously existing stringent order that European females were under no circumstances to be admitted to Canton. So strict was this rule, and so engrained did it become in the trading community of Canton, that the Hongkong successors in the old Canton trade maintained, until comparatively recent years, the same principle in the form of restrictions which the leading firms placed on marriage in the case of their employees. As regards private traders in Canton, the East India Company watched, for nearly two centuries, with Argus' eye against the violation of their monopoly by adventurous intruders. No British subject was allowed to land at Canton except under a passport from the Court of Directors. Nor was any British ship permitted to participate in the China trade except when owned or chartered, or furnished with a licence, by the Company or by the Indian Government. Such licences were moreover subject to be cancelled at any moment by the Select Committee at Canton, who had also legal power to deport any British subject defying their authority. Nevertheless there were bold spirits who forced their way in. In the year 1780 a Mr. Smith was discovered at Canton trading on his own account, but was immediately ordered off without mercy. However, the East India Company's power extended only over ■their own nationals, and private traders of other nationalities MONOPOLY VERSUS FREE TRADE. 21 openly defied the Company whilst profiting by its presence. The Portuguese (from Macao), the Spaniards (from Manila), and the Dutch (from Formosa) had preceded the East India Company in the Canton trade, and could not be ousted. Danish and Swedish merchants (A.D. 1732), French (A.D. 1736), Americans (A.D. 1784) and others forced their way in, and international comity on the one side and Chinese policy on the other protected them against the interference of the East India Company. Soon, moreover, private British merchants also secured admission to Canton, and openly defied the Company's monopoly by taking out foreign naturalization papers. Thus, for instance, Mr. W. S. Davidson, an English merchant, visited Canton in the year 1807 and subsequently traded in Canton, on his own account and as agent of English firms, for eleven consecutive years (1811 to 1822), under a Portuguese certificate of naturalization, which he had obtained without fee in London, with the assistance of the British Ambassador to Brazil. Many others followed the example of Mr. Davidson. The renewal of the East India Company's charter, in 1813, made no great difference in the conduct of its Chinese trade. But as the Company was from that date compelled to publish its commercial accounts separately from its territorial accounts, British merchants generally became aware of the profitable aspects of trade with China. Moreover the public press now began to undermine the Company's monopoly by suggesting on sundry -occasions that trade with the East would be carried on more profitably by private merchants than by the Company. But the antagonistic forces of Monopoly and Free Trade, thus evoked, took years to gather strength for a final struggle. The earliest pioneer of British free trade in Canton was Mr. William Jardine, founder of the still flourishing firm of Jardine, Matheson & Co., who visited China off and on between the years 1802 and 1818, and resided in Canton continuously from 1820 to January 31, 1839. Next in time and influence came W. S. Davidson (referred to above), R. Inglis of Dent & Co. 22 CHAPTER Iir, (1823 to 1839) and the brothers A. Matheson (1826 to 1839) and J. Matheson (of whom we shall hear more anon). The Mathesons exercised particular influence, as so long ago as 1827 they established in Canton a weekly newspaper, the 'Canton- Register,' to disseminate the principles of free trade and to- oppose a prolongation of the East India Company's monopoly. To this paper Charles Grant referred (some time before 1836) in the following memorable words : 'The free traders appear to cherish high notions of their claims and privileges. Under their auspices a free press is already maintained at Canton ; and should their commerce continue to increase, their importance will rise also. They will regard themselves as the depositaries of the true principles of British commerce.' During the three or four years that preceded the expiry of the East India Company's Charter, it was already foreseen by the free traders, who were staunch advocates of the Reform Bill of 1881, that the Company's monopoly was not likely to be renewed by a Reformed Parliament. The officers of the Company themselves had the same apprehensions and gradually relaxed its rules against the admission of private interlopers at Canton. Happily, before the (juestion of renewing the Company's Charter had to be decided, tlie first Reform Bill swept away those rotten boroughs which would have enabled the well-organized band of monopolists in the House of Commons, aided and abetted as they were by the ignorance or indifference as to all questions of Eastern trade which distinguished the vast majority of honourable members, to crush the few scattered advocates of commercial freedom. It was the first Reformed Parliament that fulfilled the hopes and realized the prophecies of the British free traders at Canton, stripped the East India Company of its commercial attributes, delivered the China trade from the thraldom of monopoly, and thereby paved also the way for its eventual liberation from the tyranny of Chinese mandarindom. ; . Thus it happened that, even before the final expiration (A.D. 1834) of the Company's Charter, free trade cheerily MONOPOLY i VERSUS FREE TRADE. . §3 began to rear its head at Canton. A new impetus was thereby given to British trade, and in the year 1832 as many as seventy-four British ships arrived at Canton. The little band of high-spirited, highly-educated and influential private merchants, that gathered at Canton during the closing years of the East India Company's monopoly, were, by their very position,, ardent advocates of free trade and determined opponents of protection and monopoly in every shape or form. Some of them removed in later years to Hongkong and the spirit of free trade that filled them descended as a permanent heirloom to the future merchant princes of Hongkong. If the experiences of the East India Company negatively paved the way for the future Colony by demonstrating the irreconcilable antipathy of the Chinese against any equitable intercourse with Europeans, and the impossibility of conducting trade on a basis of international self-respect at Canton, this little band of free traders, the Jardines, the Mathesons, the Dents, the Gibbs, the Turners, the Hollidays, the Braines, the Inues, unconsciously did for the future Colony of Hongkong what subsequently Cobden did for Manchester, and prepared the public mind for future free trade in a free port on British soil in China. When, as above mentioned, the Select Committee of the East India Company at Canton descended to the lowest step of degradation and handed the keys of the British factory to the Chinese Constabulary (May 27, 1831), the free traders, filled with righteous wrath, rushed to the front with the first of those public meetings which, in subsequent years, became such a characteristic means of venting public indignation in Hongkong. On May 30, 1831, this first public meeting of British subjects in China was held, under the presidency of William Jardine, and solemnly resolved to remonstrate against- the policy of the Select Committee of yielding to the caprice of the Native Authorities and * to appeal to the home country/ But the public mind of that dear country was by no means ripe yet for an unbiassed understanding of the real grievances 24 CHAPTER III. and needs of the China trade, and the next advices from London informed the free traders of Canton (April 31, 1832), then smarting under a new order of the Hoppo positively forbidding' foreign ships to remain at Lintin (April 11, 1832), that general apathy prevailed in England as to the restrictions and interruptions or hardships of the China trade. However, the hated monopoly of the East India Company at Canton finally ceased and determined on April 22, 1834, and the chagrin felD at the discovery that the East India Company, though closing its factory at Canton, left behind a Financial Committee for brokerage purposes, was almost forgotten in the general rejoicing over the first private British vessel, the ship Sarah, that openly sailed from Whampoa for London as the pioneer of the new free trade. Vaticinations, principally originating with the servants of the East India Company, were not wanting that under the Corapany*s regime British trade with China had reached its zenith and was bound to decline henceforth. It was asserted in Parliament that China offered no further outlet for British goods and that, by throwing open the trade to all comers, things would go from bad to worse. But the free traders had a better insight into the inner workings of the trade movement. They confidently predicted a great development of British trade to set in at once and history verified their expectations. A few of these free traders were even keen enough to foretell (April, 1834) that the Act of King William IV., by .which he abolished the exclusive rights of the East India Company, 'would aid very much in hastening the abolition of the long cherished exclusive rights of the Celestial Empire.' All may not have seen this at the time, but all were aware that a new period in the history of British trade with China was inaugurated thereby. It required, indeed, no prophet's vision to foresee that the inherent difficulties of commercial intercourse with the Chinese were considerably accentuated by the substitution of free trade for monopoly. MONOPOLY VERSUS FREE TRADE. 25- But the spirit which moved the British ParHament to wrench asunder the shackles in which British trade had been kept for two long centuries by the East India Company, was the potent spirit of free trade, and in this general free trade movement we see above the dark horizon the first streak of light heralding the advent of the future free port of Hongkong. «i>*-^-:T4'.h^^^ CHAPTER IV The Missiox of Lord Napier. ^EARS before the trade monopoly of the East India Company was actually dissolved, it was foreseen by both the British- Cabinet and by the Cantonese Authorities, that the substitution of a heterogeneous and internally dissentient community of irresponsible free traders for a responsible and conservative Corporation like the East India Company would bring on a serious crisis in the relations existing between Great Britain and China. When informed, by direction of the British Government, that the Charter of the East India Company would in all probability not be renewed, but British trade thrown open to all subjects of His Majesty, the then Viceroy of Canton (January 16, 1831) instructed the chief of the factory at Canton to send an early letter home, stating that, in case of the dissolution of the Company, it was incumbent to deliberate and appoint a chief- manager (tai-pan), who understood the business, to come to- Canton for the general control of commercial dealings, by which means affairs might be prevented from going to confusion, and benefits secured to commerce. This was the shrewd suggestion of a Viceroy holding his office for five years, and, as given informally, not necessarily binding upon his successor. It embodied, however, a recognized principle of Chinese policy, viz., that the traders of any given place must be formed into one or more guilds, each having a recognized headman who can be held solidarily responsible for the doings of every member of his guild. All that was here proposed was, to place British and foreign free traders in Canton under a THE MISSION OP LORD XAriER. 27 tangible and responsible head, having the status of an ordinary private trader, such as was accorded (A.D. 1G99) to Mr. Catchpoole, but corresponding, on the EngUsh side, with the position held, on the Chinese side, by the head of the Hong Merchants. The establishment of a Chamber of Commerce, formed by compulsory membership and controlled by a permanent British president, would have exhausted the meaning of the Viceroy's suggestion. What the Viceroy wanted was merely leverage for applying the screw of official control and exactions whenever desirable. It is nofc likely, however, that the British Cabinet acted upon this informal message of a Canton Viceroy, or at any rate not without taking pains to ascertain its authoritative character and real purport. As Cliiua had for centuries tolerated and regulated foreign trade at Canton, the Cabinet may well have proceeded on the general assumption that British merchants had gained a status involving, on the part of China and England, reciprocal responsibilities and rights. At any rate a Bill was laid before Parliament to regulate the trade to China (and India) and in due course received the Royal assent on August 28, 1838. This Act (3rd and 4th Will. IV. ch. 93), whilst throwing open, from after April 22, 1834, the trade with China (and the trade in tea) to all subjects of His Majesty, declared it expedient, 'for the objects of trade and amicable intercourse with the Dominions of the Emperor of China,' to establish 'a British Authority in the said Dominions.' Accordingly the Government was authorized by this Act to send out to China three Superintendents of Trade, one of whom should preside over ' a Court of Justice with Criminal and Admiralty Jurisdiction for the trial of offences committed by His Majesty's subjects in the said Dominions or on the high sea within a hundred miles from the coast of China.' The Act also expressly prohibited the Superintendents, as the King's (Officers, from engaging in any trade or traffic, and authorized the imposition of a tonnage duty to defray the expenses of their peace establishment in China. The will of the British nation thus off-hand decided what for two centuries the Chinese Government had persistently refused to grant, viz., that British. :28 CHAPTER IV. subjects in China were entitled to the privileges of extra- territorial jurisdiction. The Chinese war of 1841 (wrongly styled the opium war) was the logical consequence of this British Act of 1833. The passing of this Act is one of the best .illustrations of 'that superb disregard of consequences abroad which ever distinguishes British legislators when they try to meddle in foreign affairs of which they know nothing.' In pursuance of this Act the Eight Honourable William ■ John Napier, Baron Napier of Merchistoun, Baronet of Nova Scotia and Captain in the Royal Navy, was selected by Lord Palmerston to proceed under a Royal Commission to China as Chief Superintendent of British Trade, and to associate with himself there, in the Superiutendency of Trade, two members ■of the East India Company's Select Committee. By a special Commission under the Royal Signet and Sign Manual (dated -January 26, 1834), Lord Napier, together with W. H. Ch. Plowden and J. F. Davis, were appointed 'Superintendents of the Trade of British Subjects in China,' empowered to impose duties on British ships, and directed to station themselves for the discharge of their duties within the port or river of Canton and not elsewhere (unless ordered), to collect trade statistics, to protect the interests of British merchants, to arbitrate or judge in disputes between I3ritish subjects, and to mediate between them and the Chinese Government. To these orders, distinctly investing the three Superintendents with extra-territorial, political and judicial power over British subjects, to be exercised within the dominions of the Emperor of China 'and not -elsewhere,' there was added the special injunction 'to abstain from any appeal (for protection) to" British military or naval forces, unless in any extreme case the most evident necessity shall require that any such menacing language should be holden or that any such appeal should be made.' If we had to believe that both Lord Palmerston and his chief. Earl Grey, supposed, that the Chinese Government would concede or silently tolerate the merest shadow of extra- •territorial rights to be exercised by the British Government in THE MISSION OF LORD NAPIER. 29^ its proposed supervision of British merchants residing within the Dominions of the Emperor of China, we would have to assume that these experienced statesmen made an incomprehensible blunder. It seems much more probable that we have here one of those many cases which have caused historians to characterize Lord Palmerston's general policy as an incessant violation of the principle of non-intervention. There is reason to suppose that Lord Palmerston, w^ith his keen political foresight, anticipated the probability that this attempt to establish quietly a mild form of extra-territorial jurisdiction would by itself, apart from any existing complications, be sufficient to provoke hostilities. But he no doubt anticipated also that in the end English public opinion would support him. In giving his final instructions to Lord Napier, Lord Palmerston (January 20, 1834) enjoined him 'to foster and protect the trade of His Majesty's subjects in China, to extend trade if" possible to other ports of China, to induce the Chinese Government to enter into commercial relations with the English Government, and to seek, with peculiar caution and circum- spection, to establish eventually direct diplomatic communication with the Imperial Court at Peking, also to have the coast of China surveyed to prevent disasters.' But Lord Palmerston added to all these peaceful instructions the significant direction, 'to inquire for places where British ships might find requisite - protection in the event of hostilities in the China sea.' Surely we are justified in saying that Lord Palmerston then, as ever after, was determined that, to use his own words, like the civis Romanus of old, wherever he be, ' every British subject should feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong,' — even in China. Assuming that the British Government could reasonably argue, on the ground of their interpretation of the Viceroy's invitation of 1831, and on the principle of established reciprocal responsibilities and rights, that the Chinese Government ought to be willing, or at any rate should be compelled, to admit 30 CHAPTER IV. into Canton a forei<,ni Superintend(Mit of British trade and accord to him an official status; no fault can be found with the Royal Instructions suj^plied to Lord Napier, except that these instructions associated with him, in the official superintendence of British trade in China, two former servants of the East India Company. Clearly it was the exj)ectation of the Cabinet that Lord Napier should experience at the hands of the Cantonese Authorities a treatment different from that which the Chinese Government had, for two centuries, uniformly accorded to the Supercargoes of the East India Company, Mr. Catchpoole, the King's Minister or Consul, not excepted. The Cabinet desired the Chinese Government to dissociate, in mind, Lord Napier as the King's Officer from mere traders and therefore to accord to him the privilege of direct official intercourse. But at the same time the Cabinet associated him, in fact, with men wlio for years past had practically been the subordinates of the Hong Merchants. Mr. Plowden and Mr. Davis, though gentlemen of the highest character and refined culture, and best fitted in every respect to advise Lord Napier in his delicate mission, had in the eyes of the haughty Mandarins merely the status of peddling traders. It seems that all the lessons which the history of the East India Company's experiences in China had taught England, were entirely thrown away upon the British Cabinet Ministers, whose ignorance of the contempt in which Chinese officials hold all traders, however worthy or honoured, defeated the very object of the Royal Instructions. But then, it would seem as if the Crown Lawyers who must have advised the Cabinet that the British Crown had an international right to plant Royal Superintendents at Canton, invested with political and judicial powers, and to do that without previous permission obtained from the Chinese Government, must have had rather peculiar notions of international law. It must be remembered, how^ever, that the international law of those days held non-Christian States to be outside the comity of nations, and distinctly accorded to Christian communities, residing in non-Christian countries, the right of extra-territorial THE MISSION OP LORD NAPIER. 3]^'. jurisdiction. It is possible, also, that there was, on the part of the Crown Lawyers and the Cabinet, no assumption of any ])ositive right to establish a British Superintendent at Canton. Lord Palnierstoii specially enjoined upon Lord Xapier, that 'in case of putting to hazard the existing opportunities of intercourse,' he was not to enter into any negotiations with the Chinese Authorities at all. These words, together with the subsequent condemnation of Lord Xapier's action by the Duke of Wellington, who gave it as his opinion that Lord Xapier ought to have been satisfied 'to keep the enjoyment of what we have got,' suggest the surmise that the British Cabinet did not mean forcibly to claim any right of stationing a British official at Canton or of exercising any extra-territorial jurisdiction over British subjects Avithin the Dominions of the Emperor of China, but that their policy was merely to take the Chinese Government by surprise, to try it on, so to say, in €hinese fashion, to see how far the Chinese Authorities would yield; but, in case of failure, rather to be satisfied with what the Chinese were willing to concede, than to demand what could be obtained only by an appeal to force. If such, however, was the intention of the British Cabinet, it was a kind of diplomacy unworthy of England, and moreover foolish, because such a continuation of the mistaken policy which the East India Company's Court of Directors had followed for two centuries, was, under the altered circumstances, impossible. A community of independent British free traders, knowing that Parliament had conceded to them the privilege of extra-territorial jurisdiction, was not likely to remain content with the enjoyment of what they had got, if that enjoyment was to be coupled with the continuance of the old regime, •galling to personal and national self-respect. Moreover, if such was the real policy of the British Government, it was unfair to Lord Napier to keep him in the dark. For he evidently had no notion of it, until perhaps at the very last moment, when he resolved to retreat from Oanton. Possibly it was then that his eyes were opened to 32 CHAPTER IV. the strategies of the Cabinet, and, if so, it was this discoven\ rather tlian the iornominions treatment he encountered at the hands of the Chinese, that broke his heart. It seems very probable that, whatever the real aim of the British Government may have been, the Cabinet had been acting under the advice of the Directors of the East India Company, and if so, this was sufficient to ruin Lord Napier and his mission. Immediately on his arrival at Macao (88 miles South of Canton), on July 15, 1834, Lord Napier, finding that Mr. Plowden had meanwhile left China, appointed Mr. (sub- sequently Sir) John F. Davis to be second, and Sir G. Best Hobinson (another member of the East India Company's Select Committee) to be third Superintendent of British Trade in China. The three Superintendents then made the following appointments, viz., Mr. J. \Y. Astell to be Secretary to the Superintendents, the Rev. Dr. Robert Morrison (who unfortunately died a few weeks afterwards, when he was succeeded by Mr. J. R. Morrison) to be Chinese Secretary and Interpreter, Captain Ch. Elliot, R.N., to be Master Attendant (in charge of all British ships and crews within the Bogue), Dr. T. R. Colledge to be Surgeon, Dr. Anderson to be Assistant Surgeon, and the Rev. J. H. Yachell to be Chaplain to the Superintendents. Finally Mr. A. R. Johnston w\as appointed to be Private Secretary to Lord Napier. The Commission, after some interviews with messengers of the Viceroy, soon proceeded (July 25, 1834), without waiting for a passport, to Canton. On the very day of his arrival, however, Lord Napier was at once subjected by the Chinese Authorities to unprovoked insults, in the treatment of his baggage and his servants, and the Customs tide-waiters officially reported that 'some foreign devils' had arrived. To these indignities Lord Napier quietly submitted. But he endeavoured, without loss of time, to open direct official communication, first with the Viceroy and then with the Governor of Canton. His object was merely to inform the Provincial Authorities, in THE MISSION OF LORD NAPIER. 33- pursuance of his instructions, that he had arrived bearing the King's Commission and invested with political and judicial powei-s for the control of British subjects in China. But this information was couched in terms characteristic of a dispatch or official communication, and implying that the writer had an official status. By accepting the letter, the Chinese Government would have recognized Lord Napier as having such a status in China. Accordingly reception of the letter was peremptorily refused. The Viceroy, after sending Lord Napier word (through the Hong Merchants) 'that he could hold no communication with outside barbarians,' authorized the Prefect of Canton, the Prefect of Swatow, and the Deputy Lieutenant-General in command at Canton to go, together with the Hong Merchants, and interview Lord Napier in order to ascertain what he really w^anted. This interview took place on August 23, 1834, and ended with the sage remark of the gallant Lieutenant-General, 'that it would be very unpleasant were the two nations to come to a rupture,' to which Lord Napier made the significant reply that England was perfectly prepared. The Hong Merchants offered to deliver the letter to the Governor of Canton, on condition that it should be rewritten in form of a humble petition, having on the outside a certain Chinese character (pien) which marks an application made by one of the common people (not having literary or official rank) to a Chinese official from a Magistrate upwards. But one of the Hong Merchants used the opportunity to heap a gratuitous insult upon Lord Napier. Addressing him in writing, he used characters which designated Lord Napier, by a pun, as 'the laboriously vile.' Lord Napier's argument that a former Viceroy had by edict invited the British Government, in 1831, to send a chief to Canton to supervise trade, was met on the part of the Chinese Authorities by a denial of the meaning which Lord Napier attached to tliat invitation. They pointed out that in several proclamations issued by the Governor of Canton (August 18 and September 2, 1834), it was distinctly stated, that 'the- 3 34 CHAPTER IV. commissioned officers of the Celestial Empire never take cognizance of the trivial affairs of trade,' that ' never has there been such a thing as official correspondence with a barbarian headman,' that *the English nation's King has hitherto been reverently obedient,' that *in the intercourse of merchants mutual willingness is necessary on both sides, wherefore there can be no overruling control exercised by officers,' and finally *how can the officers of the Celestial Empire hold official correspondence with barbarians ? ' Whilst declining to adopt the form of a petition. Lord Napier adopted a suggestion of the Hong Merchants to substitute another designation of the Governor of Canton, but otherwise Lord Napier's official message was left unaltered, in the form of a dispatch. But no messenger could be found to deliver it. So Mr. A.stell, accompanied by the interpreters, proceeded with the latter to the city gates, w^here the party were detained for hours and subjected to every possible indignity. Various officials came, but one and all refused to deliver the letter to its address, unless it was couched in the form of a petition. It seemed to the Chinese preposterous that a barbarian official should claim an official status in China. It was with them not merely a question of etiquette and form of address, such as was subsequently settled by a special provision of the Treaty of Nanking, but it was a plain question of polity. The Chinese officials claimed supremacy over all barbarians, whether traders or officers, and the form of this letter was a deliberate denial of it. The one word 'petition' (pien) was now made the test of British submission to China's claim of supremacy. Lord Napier continued firm in his refusal to 'petition' the Viceroy, nor would he accept the renewed offer of the Hong Merchants to act as his intermediaries in his communications with the Chinese Government. He remained in Canton, although the Hong Merchants had informed him that the Provincial Authorities would not receive any message from him, unless it was sent through the channel which had been constituted by Imperial Authority, and brought him an order by the Governor 1 THE MISSION OF LORD NAPIER. 35 ■of Canton, dated August 18, 1834, directing bim to leave Canton at once. Thereupon the Chinese Authorities resolved to drive him away by applying, to begin with, indirect force. A proclamation was issued calling upon the people to stop all intercourse with the British factory. The supply of provisions to British merchants was strictly prohibited and all Chinese servants were ordered to leave them forthwith. Next, the Hong Merchants were ordered to stop shipping cargo by any British vessel and to make an effort to induce the several British merchants to disown the assumed authority of Lord Napier and the other Superintendents and to declare their wiUingness to obey the orders of the Chinese Authorities, which would be conveyed to them, as formerly, by the Hong Merchants. Foreseeing the danger of dissension, Lord Napier had <jalled (August 16, 1834) a public meeting of British merchants, warned them against the intrigues of Hong Merchants and suggested the formation of a British Chamber of Commerce, to ensure joint action and to provide a medium of communication between the merchants and the Superintendents. This suggestion was now adopted and (August 25, 1834) a British Chamber of Commerce was formed by the following firms, viz., Jardine, Matheson & Co., R. Turner & Co., J. McAdam Gladstone, J. Innes, A. S. Keating, N. Crooke, J. Templeton & Co., J. Watson, Douglas, Mackenzie & Co., T. Fox, and John Slade (Editor ■of the Canton Register), The Committee of this first British Chamber of Commerce in China were J. Matheson, L. Dent, R. Turner, "W. Boyd, and Dadabhoy Rustomjee. When the Chinese Authorities found that the British merchants rejected all temptations offered to them individually tlirough the Hong Merchants, and that the whole British community unanimously supported Lord Napier's pretensions, stronger measures were taken. Trade with British merchants and communication with Whampoa was now (September 2, 1834) stopped and the factories were surrounded by a cordon of Chinese soldiers. British merchants were informed that they were allowed to depart by way of Whampoa for Macao, but none would be 36 CHAPTER IV. allowed to return. KSome Chinese compradors and shop-keepers^ who had secretly supplied the British factories with provisions, were arrested and the British community found themselves in danger of being starved out. Seeing the critical position of affairs, Lord Napier, in the absence (at Macao) of the other two Superintendents, consulted the Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, and at their request dispatched an order for two frigates to come up to Whampoa and thence to send up a guard of marines for the protection of His Majesty's subjects. Accordingly H.M. Ships Imogene and Andromache sailed through the Bogue (September 5, 1834) under a rattling fire of the forts, to which they gallantly replied, silencing one battery after the other, until they reached Whampoa (September 11, 1834). A guard of marines also succeeded in forcing their way into the British factories. Naturally enough, the Chinese now, instead of continuing hostilities, blandly recommenced negotiations through the Hong Merchants. The Provincial Authorities offered to resume trade Avith British merchants at Canton, on condition that the two frigates should leave the river and that Lord Napier should retire to Macao ' until the pleasure of His Majesty the Emperor of all under Heaven was known.' Recognizing now the official status of Lord Napier, they urged with some emphasis that 'it Avas a thing hitherto unknoAvn for a barbarian official to reside at Canton.' But there was no room left to doubt the sincerity of the Chinese Authorities, both in their expressed willingness to resume trade and in their indignation at the attempt of the British Cabinet to establish extra-territorial jurisdiction without the previous consent of the Chinese- Government. Lord Napier turned again to his instructions, and now, perhaps, his eyes were opened as to the policy concealed under Lord Palmerston's words concerning 'the case of putting to hazard the existing oj^portunities of intercourse.' Sick in body and mind, separated from the other two Superintendents, Lord Napier now broke down completely and instructed his surgeon,. THE MISSION OF LORD NAPIER. 37; Dr. Colledge, to make in his name what terms he could with the Chinese Authorities. Accordingly Dr. Colledge wrote (September 18, 1834) to the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, informing- him that he had been authorized by Lord Napier ' to make the requisite -arrangements with the Hong Merchants.' A meeting was arranged, Dr. Colledge and Mr. Jardine representing Lord Napier and the British community, whilst two Hong Merchants, Howqua and Mowqua, a(;ted on behalf of the Chinese Authorities. Two •contradictory statements of what took place at this meeting exist, and although there can be no doubt but that Dr. CoUedge's account of the transaction is correct, the ofHcial report which the Hong Merchants made of this interview deserves some ^consideration as characteristic of the misunderstandings or misinterpretations which in subsequent years attached to all similar negotiations between Europeans and Chinese. The words which Dr. Colledge used were these : ' I, T. R. Colledge, engage on the part of the Chief Superintendent, ^he Right Honourable Lord Napier, that His Lordship does grant an order for His Majesty's Ships at Whampoa to sail •to Lintin. on my receiving a chop (stamped passport), from the Oovernor for His Lordship and suite to proceed to Macao, Lord Napier's ill state of health not permitting him to correspond "with your Authoi'ities longer on this subject. One condition I deem it expedient to impose, which is, that His Majesty's Ships do not submit to any ostentatious display on the part of your Government.' Howqua replied : * Mr. Colledge, your proposition is one of the most serious nature, and from my knowledge of your character I doubt nob the honesty of it. Shake hands with me and Mowqua, and let Mr. eTardine do the same.' The Chinese official account of this meeting is as follows : ''The Hong Merchants, Woo Tun-yueu and others (Howqua a,nd Mowqua) reported (to the Governor of Canton and his -colleagues) that the said nation's private merchants, Colledge and others, had stated to them that Lord Napier acknowledged S8 CHAPTER IV. that, because it was his first entrance into the Central Kingdom^ he was ignorant of the prohibitions, and therefore he obtained no permit; that the ships of war were really for the purpose- of protecting goods and entered the Bogue by mistake; that now he (Lord Napier) was himself aware of his error and begged to be graciously permitted to go down to Macao, and) that the ships should immediately go out (of the Central' Kingdom), and he therefore begged permission for them to- leave the port.' The informality of the proceedings naturally opened the- door for a variety of versions as to what actually transpired.. But the omission, on the part of Dr. Colledge, of any stipulation as to the resumption of trade consequent on the departure of Lord Napier and of the ships of war, indicates that, while determined to save the life of Lord Napier at any cost, he had reason to trust in the determination of the Chinese Government not to forego the profits of the British trade so long as their own exclusive supremacy was maintained. Lord Napier received his passport and started (September 21, 1834) for Macao, after giving an order to the commanders of H.M. Ships Imogene and Andromache to retire beyond the Bogue. Lord Napier desired to travel in his own boat, but the Chinese insisted upon conveying him to Macao themselves, escorted him like a prisoner, did everything on the way tO' annoy him by the noise of gongs, crackers and firing salutes,. which the Mandarins in charge of the escort persisted in,, although Lord Napier repeatedly remonstrated against it, and they protracted the voyage, which need not have taken more than twenty-four hours, so as to last five days. By the time Lord Napier reached Macao (September 26, 1834), he was beyond recovery and died a fortnight later (October 11, 1834), worn out with the harassing and distressing annoyances which he experienced at the hands of the Chinese Authorities, as well as by the unnecessary delay interposed on his passage down to Macao, and especially also by the consciousness, that appears- to have come over him at the last, that he had been placed THE MISSION OF LORD NAPIER. 3^ in a false position by the ignorance of the Cabinet as to the real attitude preserved by the Chinese Government all along, and by the obscurity in which the Orders in Council and the instructions of Lord Palmerston enveloped the real policy of the British Government. Lord Napier died, like Admiral Hosier, *of a grieved and broken heart.' As soon as the Cantonese Authorities learned that the frigates had left the river and that Lord Napier had reached Macao, they reported to the Emperor that * Napier had been driven out and his two ships of war dragged over the shallows and expelled,* but they eagerly resumed commercial intercourse with the British merchants (September 29, 1834), placing them, however, under fresh restrictions. They expressly stipulated that henceforth no barbarian official should presume to come to Canton but only persons holding the position of tai-pan (the vulgar term for the East India Company's Chief -Supercargoes), and that all commercial transactions should be strictly confined to dealings with the Hong Merchants. Moreover, they published now (November 7, 1834) an Imperial Edict prohibiting the opium trade. Thus ended the melancholy mission of Lord Napier. Its failure is clearly not due to any want of diplomatic tact or courage on the part of Lord Napier, but to the clashing of Chinese and British interests. Nor can we blame the Chinese Authorities, who, accustomed by the policy of abject servility, maintained by the East India Company for two consecutive centuries, to deal with Europeans willing to forego for the sake of trade all claims of national and personal self-respect> were entirely taken by surprise when they suddenly encountered^ on the part of the British Government, the identical notions of national self-adequacy and political supremacy which had hitherto been the undisputed monopoly of the Chinese Government. The crowning misfortune of Lord Napier was that by the time (end of November) when the first news of the disastrous ending of his mission reached England, the administration of Lord Melbourne (who had taken Earl Grey's place in July) had come 40 CHAPTER IV. to an end (November 14), that Lord Palmerston was tlierefore out of office and the Duke of Wellington at the helm of affairs. Bnt the worst feature of this whole melancholy spectacle is the stolid apathy with which the English public received the news of the failure of Lord Napier's mission and the heartless cruelty with which the Duke of Wellington condemned Lord Napier's conduct. The silent acquiescence of the British public in the expulsion from Canton, in so degrading a manner, of the principal officer of their King and their country, lowered British reputation in the eyes of the Chinese and contributed to encourage them to venture upon future outrages. As to the Duke, he never had much respect for Lord Palmerston's or anybody's statecraft. With a belief in his own shrewd intuition of the right thing to be done at any critical moment, he combined a somewhat brusque manner of criticising supposed diplomatic blunderers. He looked upon this whole scheme of the fallen Whig leaders as a bungle from the beginning to the end and judged it, exactly as he judged the Cabul disasters €ight years later, as a cise of 'giving undue power to political agents.' The series of insults heaped upon Lord Napier, while alive, by the Chinese Authorities, was kindness compared with the cruel injustice with which the Duke of Wellington censured liord Napier when dead. The man whose 'puissant arm could bind the tyrant of a world' proved childishly impotent in his encounter with Chinese mandarindom. The hero who, 'conquering Fate, enfranchised Europe,' entirely missed liis opportunity of becoming also the liberator of European trade in Asia. The noble Duke entirely forgot himself when he gave it as his opinion (March 24, 1835) that Lord Napier had brought about the failure of his mission by assuming high-sounding titles, by going to Canton witliout permission, and by attempting an unusual mode of communication. Understanding that British trade in China was flourishing again, in spite of the defeat Lord Napier had sustained at Canton, the Duke recommended to keep the enjoyment of what we have got and to repress the ardour of ' British traders. THE MISSION OF LORD NAPIER. 41 The British Government, having first disregarded the lessons afforded by the experiences of the East India Company, now misinterpreted tlie lessons to be derived from Lord Napier's fate. Clearly, the time for a British Colony in China had not come yet. Hongkong- had to wait yet a little longer. Another and sharper lesson was needed. CHAPTER V. Dissensions and a Quiescent Policy. A.D, 1834 to 1836, fHE expulsion of Lord Napier and the indignities deliberately- heaped upon him (in 1834) were but the premonitory symptoms of a thunderstorm of Chinese Imperial, official and popular wrath, which was to burst over the heads of the British community at Canton five years later (in 1839). For the present, this precursory brief disturbance of the peace was succeeded by a temporary lull. During this interval, however, internal dissensions sprang up among all the parties concerned, in the British Cabinet, among the Superintendents who succeeded Lord Napier, among the British merchants and among the Chinese. Mr. J. F. Davis (later on better known as Sir John Davis, Sinologue and Governor of Hongkong) succeeded to the post of Chief Superintendent of British trade in China (October 12, 1834), Sir George B. Robinson acting as Second and Mr. J. H. Astell as Third Superintendent. When announcing to Lord Palmerston the changes that had taken place, Mr. Davis declared that an unbecoming and premature act of submission to the Chinese Authorities would not only prove fruitless but mischievous, and that therefore ' absolute silence and quiescence ' seemed to him the most eligible policy to pursue, until receipt of instructions from the Cabinet. But the British Cabinet was not in a position, for years to come, to form any definite policy with regard to China. Lord Palmerston was temporarily (November 14, 1834, to April 10, 1835) out of office and when the Whig leaders resumed the reins of the Government (April 10, 1835, to September 16, 1841), DISSENSIONS AND A QUIESCENT POTilCY. 43: they felfc the ground under their feet too unstable to risk their existence by adopting a definite policy with regard to China. The Duke of Wellington personally adopted the views of the Chinese officials and did not shrink from applying them to the past, in condemning Lord Napier's action, or to the future in approving of Mr. Davis' proposed policy of inaction. As to the British public, it took the attitude of sfcolid apathy, caring nothing for these things, so long as the supply of tea and silk was forthcoming at the usual prices. Accordingly, when Mr. Davis, fearing lest he be left without any instructions, forwarded positive suggestions, they were, though good enough to be taken up and acted upon in subsequent years, quietly shelved for a good while by the Government. Mr. Davis recommended (October 24 and 28, 1834) not to send out another cumbrous and expensive Embassy, but to appeal to the Emperor of China by means of a dispatch to be delivered by a small fleet at the mouth of the Peking River (P.eiho), and, if such an appeal should fail, as he expected it would, to use then measures of coercion. Mr. Davis recommended this course on the ground that the Imperial Government of China sincerely desired to ameliorate the condition of British, merchants, but tliab the Cantonese Authorities, by their mis- representations, kept the Emperor in the dark as to the real position of affairs. Mr. Davis, at the same time, stated that the Mandarins at Canton were anxious to keep the control of British merchants in the hands of the Hong Merchants, because this system enabled them to lighten their own respon- sibilities and to practise their heavy exactions on the trade witL greater impunity. In these views Mr. Davis was cordially supported by the whole British community of Canton and Macao, who forwarded (December 9, 1834) a petition signed by sixty-four British subjects and addressed to the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Their unanimous opinion was that the long acquiescence in the arrogant assumption of superiority over the monarchs and people of other countries, claimed by the Emperor- 44 CHAPTER V. of China, had caused the disabilities and restrictions which had been imposed on British trade in China, and that Lord Napier's not having the requisite powers, properly sustained by an armed force, had put British merchants in their present degraded and insecure position. Accordingly they suggested to the King in. Council, that a determined maintenance of the rank of •the British Empire in the scale of nations was the proper policy to adopt, and they recommended the plan which was actually carried out seven years later in the so-called opium war, viz., that a Plenipotentiary, with an armed force, proceed to a convenient station on the east coast of China and demand of the Emperor ample reparation for the insults offered to Lord Napier, to the King and to his subjects, and to propose the appointment of Imperial Commissioners to arrange with the British Plenipotentiary a basis for regulating British trade, so as to prevent future troubles, and to extend trade to Amoy, Ningpo and Chusan. The fact tliat at the close of the year 1834 ample reasons existed for making this demand and for taking this action, which without coercive measures was impossible, is important. Equally important is the other fact that the subsequent war of 1841 did no more than what was needed and demanded in the" year 1834. For these facts show that the subsequent expulsion of the British community from Canton (in 1839) and the whole opium question, as connected with the war of 1841, were merely accidental accessories to the fact already patent in the year 1834 to every resident in China, the foreign merchants and the British Superintendents, that the necessities of British trade, combined with British national and individual self-respect, were so irreconcilable with Chinese contempt of trade and Chinese notions of supremacy and autocracy, as to make war between Great Britain and China an absolute necessity. In no other way could the Chinese Authorities be induced to make reasonable concessions to the merchants, whom they had themselves invited and whom they desired ♦to continue their commerce with China. Nothins: short of I DISSENSIONS AND A QUIJCSCENT POLICY. 45, an armed demonstration of force could induce the Chinese Mandarins to grant foreign trade a dignified modus vivendii War with China was, at the close of the year 1834, a mere question of time. Strictly speaking it was simply a question of arousing public opinion in England to a recognition of the actual necessities of the case. But it took years to accomplish this, and meanwhile affairs in China were in a state of transition, which made the position of the British merchants and their Superintendents extremely awkward. British merchants in Canton, at Macao and at the anchorage of Lintin, were nominally under the control of the British Superintendents. But the Chinese Authorities persistently protested against their claim of an official status, and the- British Cabinet left their political authority unsupported and their jurisdiction over Biitish subjects undefined. Moreover it was asserted by many British merchants that their own Government had broken faith with them in the matter of the dissolution of the East India Company's trade monopoly. For the Government had by Act of Parliament thrown open the trade with China and thereby invited them to operate at Canton, and yet the Government appeared to tolerate and sanction a survival in Canton of the East India Company's^ trade monopoly in the form of a Financial Committee of bill brokers who, with the resources of the Indian revenues at their command, hampered, and domineered over, the commercial operations of British free traders. This yoke was the more chafing, because the Chinese Authorities increased their exactions on British ti'ade almost from month to month, ever since the East India Company's charter had ceased. Consequently, headed by Jardine, Matheson & Co., E. Turner & Co., J. Iniies, J. McAdam Gladstone, A. S. Keating, J, Watson, K Crooke, AY. S. Boyd, J. Templeton & Co., and Andrew Johnstone, the British Chamber of Commerce at Canton protested against the continuance in China of any part of the East India Company's factory, even for the puriDOse of selling bills on India and purchasing bills on England, by making -46 CHAPTER V. advances ou the goods and merchandise of individuals intended for consignment to England. They pleaded that this practice was an infringement of the Act of Parliament which required the East India Company to abstain from all commercial business ; that it raised the prices of Chinese produce ; that it encouraged improvident speculation ; that it shut out British mercantile capital through occupying the field with the revenues of India ; and that it formed, through an understanding with the Hong Merchants, a close monopoly of the most desirable teas. Meanwhile the Chinese Authorities continued their previous tactics. They had not the slightest wish to kill the goose which laid the golden eggs ; only the goose must have no aspirations above a goose and remain in their own exclusive grasp. As soon as they heard of Lord Napier's arrival in Macao, they re-opened trade (September 29, 1834) and rescinded the prohibition against pilots bringing foreign vessels up to Whampoa. Trade forthwith re-commenced and proceeded as briskly as ever, both at Canton and at Lintin. But the Cantonese xYuthorities and the Hong Merchants scrupulously avoided recognizing the British Superintendents as having any official status whatever, whilst they used every possible means, fair and foul, to persuade individual British merchants to disavow the authority and jurisdiction of the Superintendents. They even attempted to induce the Chamber of Commerce to nominate ' a trading tai-pan ' (a Chief-Supercago) to be officially recognized by the Chinese Government as responsible for the personal conduct and for the commercial transactions of every foreign merchant, and especially also for the Lintin opium trade. To the invitation to nominate a trading tai-pan, specially ordered by the Governor (October 19 and 20, 1834), the British merchants, having been particularly warned by the Secretary to the Superintendents to remain loyal (November 10, 1834), replied in a body, that no authority of the kind could be held by any British merchant without the authority of the British Crown. Nevertheless the British community did not disguise to the Superintendents that, if the suggestions they had both made DISSENSIONS AND A QUIESCENT POLICY. 47 to the British Government were disregarded, the mercantile commnnity would have no faith whatever in the quiescent policy of the Superintendents, and that, unrecognized as the Commission remained in relation to the Chinese Authorities and unable to iissert their claims to political and judicial authority, they ought not to expect the British mercantile community to look to them for guidance, direction or protection. One of the merchants, Mr. Keating, having a petty dispute with the firm of Turner & Co. concerning a claim of three hundred dollars, preferred against him by that firm, went so far as to deny the jurisdiction of the Superintendents altogether, on the ground of the undefined character of their functions and of their want of power to enforce their decisions. On the same grounds Mr. Innes, another British merchant, when wronged by the Chinese, deliberately threatened the Superintendents with taking the law into his own hands and making independently reprisals upon the natives. Whilst these and similar disputes divided the foreign merchants and their Superintendents, the Chinese Authorities and the Hong Merchants were not in any more amicable relations. The Hong Merchants were severely censured by their superiors for having failed to bring the foreign merchants under a responsible foreign head and for the consequent failure of any means of inducing them to stop the trade carried on at Lintin by the opium receiving-ships. Moreover, free trade principles began to assert themselves on the Chinese side. The Hong Merchants' own monopoly began to crumble down. For some time past the Senior Hong Merchant, who alone was solvent, had virtually been acting as the sole holder of the monopoly, but lately the other Hong Merchants, tempted by their indebtedness to the foreign merchants and to the Mandarins, had taken to the practice of sub-letting some of their privileges to private Chinese traders and shopkeepers, to whom ,they individually issued licences to deal in foreign goods under the names of the respective Hong Merchants. In this way it had come to pass that the neighbourhood of the factories at Canton 48 CHAPTER Y. was g'radnallj surrounded by a colony of Chinese free traders and shopkeepers. Afc the sight of this inroad of free trade principles, the Mandarins waxed wroth and a series of fulminating edicts went forth against the Hong Merchants and the sub-licensees. Such was the state of affairs in January 1835, when Mr. Davis, seeing himself unrecognized, powerless and without prospect of an early change of policy, prudently vacated his post as Chief Superintendent and returned to England (January 21, 1835). Sir George Best Eobinson now assumed office as the Head of the King's Commission, declaring his intention to follow the quiescent line of policy initiated by Mr. Davis. Mr. J. F. Astell acted as Second and Captain Ch. Elliot, R.N"., as Third Superintendent, but when Mr. Astell resigned soon after (April 1, 1835), Captain Elliot succeeded to the post of Second and Mr. A. R. Johnston to that of Third Superintendent, whilst Mr. E. Elmslie acted as Secretary and Treasurer. Dissensions now multiplied on all sides. Sir George Robinson conceived an insuperable antipathy against the British free traders whom he falsely represented to the Foreign Office as having caused Lord Napier's failure by their bitter party strife, as being possessed of an anxious wish, aiding and abetting therein the Chinese Authorities, to avoid any reference to the Superintendents, and as divided among themselves by virulent dissensions to a fearful extent. Sir George was, however, equally at variance with his colleagues in the Commission. He differed from the other two Superintendents- on matters of policy, so much so, that he not only separated from them, leaving them at Macao or Canton while he established himself (November 2, 1835), with the Secretary and the archives of the Commission, on board the cutter Louisa at Lintin, but wrote from thence to Lord Palmerston (January 29, 183G) recommending to reduce the Commission to one member ' because disunion and opposition inevitably results from the existence of a Council or Board of three.' DISSEXSIOXS AND A QUIESCENT POLICY. 4^ At Liiitin Sir George remained enthroned in the very centi-e of the bated opium traffic, which the other Superintendents equally loathed as a source of disgrace and danger. Sir George^ though residing in the midst of the opium dealers, was no admirer of the opium trade. On the contrary, he expressly applied to Lord Palmerston for orders to authorize him to prevent British vessels engaging in this traffic. Sir George fondly imagined then that he would be able to enforce such orders. But the opium consumption had by this time already assumed such dimensions and gained such popularity on the Chinese side, that no power on earth, whether British or Chinese, could have stopped either the demand by the Chinese people or the supply by the foreign shipping. Very properly, therefore, Sir George further advised Lord Palmerston (February 5, 1836) that* a more certain method would be to prohibit the growth of the poppy and manufacture of opium in British India.' Throughout his tenure of the office of Chief Superintendent (January 22, 1835, to December 14, 183C), Sir George B. Robinson had no communication with the Hong Merchants nor with the Cantonese Authorities, who rigidly adhered to their determination not to recognize the presence of any foreign official. When the crew of the Argyle were seized on the Chinese coast and detained (January 25, 1835), Captain EUiot went to Canton (February 4, 1835) and demanded their liberation. He was curtly ordered to leave Canton, but the crew was set at liberty (February 18, 1845). On February 23, 1835, the Canton officials made a public demonstration of their determination to carry out the Imperial edict (of November 7, 1834) and, having seized some chests of opium, burned them in pubUc. In private, however, they continued to connive at and to foster the opium trade, and commerce continued quietly throughout the year. In autumn (October IG, 1835) Sir G. B. Robinson wrote to the Duke of Wellington, to whom he looked as his patron rather than to Lord Palmerston,. that he had never in the slighest degree perceived any disposition 4 50 CHAPTER V. on the part of the Chinese Authorities to enter into any communication, or even to permit any intercourse with the officers of this Commission and that Elliot's attempts to open up communication with them had only involved him in additional contumely and insult, thereby greatly impeding the prospective adjustment of existing difficulties. The words which the Duke of Wellington penned (March 24, 1835) in condemnation of Lord Napier's mission, 'he (the Chief Superintendent) must not go to Canton without permission, he must not depart from the accustomed channel of com- munication, but he must have great powers to enable him to control and keep in order the King's subjects (the free traders), and there must always be within the Consul-General's reach a stout fi-igate and a smaller vessel of war,' seemed to be always ringing in Sir George's ears and formed the keynote of what he loved to call his 'perfectly quiescent policy.' He regarded himself as a Consul-General, unaccredited indeed to the Chinese Government, buo specially commissioned to keep the free traders in order where they most needed it, at Lintin. There he remained, out of touch with the leaders of the legitimate trade at Canton and Macao, unrecognized by the Chinese Authorities and separated from his own colleagues in the Commission who desired to follow an active policy. Until the close of the year 183G, Sir George practically did nothing except signing ships' manifests and port clearances and writing dispatches to Lord Palmerston, in which he triumphantly reported from time to time that trade continued to flourish without disturbance, thanks to his own perfectly quiescent hne of policy, and persistently dinning into the Minister's cars that he was ' waiting for His Lordship's positive and definite instructions as to future measures.' In one point, however, Sir George went beyond the lines of the Duke of Wellington's policy. He was constantly on the look-out for a place where British trade might, be conducted without being shackled with the extortions and impositions of the Mandarins, and where the Chief-Superintendent might be DISSENSIONS AND A QUIESCENT POLICY. 51 iDeyoiid the dissensions and virulent party strife of the Canton free traders. At first he thought only of a passive demonstration (April 13, 1835) to be made, against the Canton Authorities, by a temporary removal of all British subjects to merchant ships to be stationed ' in some of the beautiful harbours in the neighbourhood of Lantao or Hongkong.' Next he recommended (December 1, 1835) that the Commission should be permanently stationed at Lintin, and later on (January 29, and April 18, 1836) he informs Lord Palmerston, that tlie Chinese Authorities seem to have but one object, viz., to prevent the Commission establishing themselves permanently at Canton, and that without intimidation and ultimate resort to hostilities no proper under- standing can be established. Accordingly he suggested, that ' the destruction of one or two forts, and the occupation of one of the islands in the neighbourhood, so singularly adapted by nature in every respect for commercial purposes, would promptly produce every effect we desire.' If Sir George B. Robinson had been a jDrophet, he could not have anticipated more distinctly the future origin of our Colony, the battle of Chuenpi and the occupation of the Island of Hongkong as accomplished seven years later, in January 1841. Lord Palmerston, however, was not prepared yet to express an opinion as to any suggestion leading up to the permanent establishment of a British station or colony in the East. Neither did the Duke of Wellington's ideas go beyond the establishment of a Consul-General in a Chinese port, backed by a stout frigate and a smaller vessel of war. Lord Palmerston had all along been little inclined to listen to Sir George Robinson's expositions of the Duke's notions or to pay any attention to his monotonous dithyrambies on the subject of the quiescent line of policy. As to the positive and definite instructions regarding future measares, for which the Superintendents were waiting in vain from 1834 to 18oG, it was not until Lord Palmerston's views had gained the ascendancy in the public mind over those of the noble Duke, that the Minister vouchsafed to give Sir George any instructions <is to his policy. And when (June 7, 1836) he at last did so, 52 CHAPTER T. he curtly informed Sir George that there was no longer any necessity for maintaining the office of Chief-Superintendent which was hereby abolished, and that Sir George's functions should cease from the date of the receipt of this dispatch. Accordingly he instructed Sir George to hand over the archives of his office to Captain Elliot whom he requested to consider himself as Chief of- the Commission. Sir George, nothing daunted, remained at his post and appealed for reconsideration (probably looking to the Duke of Wellington for rescue), but it was all in vain. The Cabinet had begun to see that the quiescent policy had failed. Four months afterwards Lord Palmerston repeated his instructions and Sir George returned to England. Thus ended the reign of the quiescent policy of Mr. Davis, and Sir George Robinson. A more active policy was to Im inaugurated as soon as public attention in England could be aroused to a sense of the dishonour heaped upon British merchants and officers by Chinese autocracy. -H'i=:=|>' CHAPTER VI. The Search for a Colony. (i^IR George B. Robinson was by no means the first discoverer -(^ of the need of a British Colony in the East. Nor was Lord Palmerston the only statesman that shrank from the idea and found himself unable to form hastily a final opinion upon such a suggestion until the force of events had actually accomplished it. So far back as 1815, Mr. Elphinstone, then President of the Select Committee of the East India Company's Supercargoes at Canton, recommended to the Court of Directors, that they should jstablisb_ a high diplomatic Plenipotentiary *on a convenient station on the eastern coast of China/^an^ as near the capital of the country as might be foand most expedient.^ He further i;ecommended that, this Plenipotentiary should be attended by a sufficient maritime force to demand reparation of the grievances from wliich the trade Avas suffering. The Directors of the Company, with all their statesman-like sagacity, did not see their way to follow up this suggestion, the carrying out of which would have anticipated the sound basis of commercial relations which was eventually obtained some thirty-six years later, by the very course of action first recommeuded by Mr. Elphinstone. The next person to take up and develop Mr. Elpinstone's idea of a station on the east coast of China as a point cPappui for a naval demonstration, intended to compel China to redress grievances and to make some commercial concessions, was Sir George Staunion, the famous translator of the original statutes of the Tatsing Dynasty (Penal Code of China), who ,had also been a trusted servant of the East India Company in China. Having returned to England, he entered Parliament. In the course of a debate which took place in the House of 54 CHAPTER VI. Commons (June, 1833) concerning the arbrogation of the East India Company's trade monopoly, Sir George Stannton moved a series of resolutions, one of wliicli (No. 8) ran as follows : *Tliat, in the event of its proving impracticable to replace the influence of the East India Company's Authoritie.s by any system of national protection, directly emanating from the Crown, it will be expedient (though only in the last resort) to withdraw altogether from the control of the Chinese Authorities, and to establish the trade in some insular position on the Chinese coast where it may be satisfactorily carried on beyond the reach of acts of oppression and molestation, to which an unresisting submission would be equally prejudicial to the national honour and to the national interests of this country.' Whilst this important subject w^as under discussion, the House was counted out, and on a subsequent resumption of the debate the resolutions were negatived without a division, indicating the general indifference as regards Chinese affairs which then prevailed in England. At the time when Sir George Staunton drafted the foregoing resolution, the project of stationing in Canton three Superintendents of British trade in China was definitely placed before the country by the Bill above mentioned which passed into law two months later. In speaking of ' a system of national protection directly emanating from the Crown,' Sir George Staunton referred to Lord Napier's proposed mission, the failure of Avhich he appears to have foreseen. In suggesting a remedy for this expected failure, the establishment of the Commission ' in some insular position on the coast, beyond the reach of acts of oppression and molestation,' Sir George Staunton may not have had in his mind more than the establishment of a trade station after the fashion of the East India Company's factories, but he evidently came very near the idea of a British Colony. He had to advantage studied the history of the East India Company and drawn from it lessons which Cabinet Ministers- failed to master. Speaking before the House of Commons in support of the above resolution, he argued that the port of THE SEARCH FOR A COLONY. 55 Canton was one of the least advantageous in the Chinese dominions, either for exports or for imports, that the trade of Canton was wholly abandoned to the arbitrary control of the Local Authorities, and was by them subjected to many and severe and vexatious burdens and to various restrictions and privations of the most galling' and oppressive nature, and finally that those evils were wholly attributable to the nature and character of the Chinese Government. About the time when these sage counsels were urged in the House of Commons upon an apathetic audience, another former servant of the East India Company, Sir J. B. Urmston, who had been at the head of the British Factory in Canton in the years 1819 and 1820, published (London, 1833) a pamphlet under the title ' Observations on the Trade of China* (printed for private circulation only). In this pamphlet, Sir J. B. Urmston impressed upon the British Government the necessity of removing the trade entirely from Canton to some other more northern port of the Empire. Ilis argument was that British trade at Canton had always been at the mercy of the caprice and rapacity of the Cantonese Authorities and their subordinates, and that Canton was one of the worst places in the Empire which could have been chosen as an emporium for the British trade. Accordingly Sir J. B. Urmston named Niugpo and Hangchow as central and convenient places for British commerce, but gave it as his decided opinion that an insular situation, like Chusan, would be infinitely more so. We see, therefore, that Mr. Elphinstone, Sir George Staunton and Sir J. B. Urmston were of one and • the same way of thinking,, having correctly drawn the lessons of the past history of British trade in China, but that, as former employees of the East India Company, they thought of a factory rather than of a Colony. It is remarkable, however, that Cabinet Ministers profited so little from the advice thus tendered in Parhament and in the Press, as to commit the blunders which characterized, a few D-.onths later, their design of Lord Napier's mission and the instructions by which they frustrated it. 56 CHAPTER \^I. When an echo of the foregoing discussions reached Canton at the close of the year 1888, a writer in one of the local publications, signing himself ' A British Merchant,' made some further suggestions. Canton, he said, should no longer be the base of operations, be they of negotiation, of peace, or of war. An Admiral's station sliould be selected, and, for the sake of resting on some point, Ningpo might be adopted or the adjacent island of Chusan. The writer then goes on discussing the annexation of Formosa, the seizure of the island of Lantao (close to Hongkong), the cession of Macao to be obtained from the Portuguese, but finally rejects the seizure of any portion of Chinese territory as impolitic and the cession of Macao as impracticable. The author of this letter thereupon labours to recommend the idea of negotiating a treaty with China under which some port of the east coast of China should be opened to British trade, free from the restrictions in force at Canton. A treaty port with a British Consulate seemed to him preferable to a Colony, but how such a treaty could be negotiated without compulsion by force of arms, he did not explain. The honour of having first discerned and directed attention to the peculiar facilities afforded by the Island of Hongkong belongs to Lord Napier. In a dispatch addressed to Lord Palmerston (August 14, 1834), in Avhich he urged the necessity of commanding, by an armed demonstration, the conclusion of a commercial treaty to secure the just rights and interests of European merchants in China. Lord Xapier distinctly recommended that a small British force ' should take possession of the Island of Hongkong, in the eastern entrance of the Canton River, which is admirably adapted for every purpose.' It is possible, however, that Lord Napier, as subsequently Captain -Elliot, thought of Hongkong as a future Chinese_tj-eaty port ratlier than as a^rjtislLColony. The next advocate of a similar policy w^as Sir George B. Robinson, who, as stated above, urged upon Lord Palmerston (in 183G) to withdraw from Canton and to occupy 'one of the islands in the neighbourhood (of Lintin) so singularly adapted by nature in every respect for THE SEARCH FOR A COLONY. 57 commercial purposes.' At the same time when Sir George Robinson sought to impress upon the Foreign Office the advantages of an island station, away from Canton, another former resident of China appealed to the British public, commending the same policy, seeking to arouse pubUc opinion in England and to turn it in favour of the project first advanced by Mr. Elphinstone. In a pamphlet, entitled 'The Present Condition and Prospects of British Trade with China,' and published in London in 18:^0, Mr. James Matheson of Canton, expounded and expanded Mr. Elphinstone's advice of sending a Plenipotentiary to China, who should take his station on one of the islands on the east coast of China and tlience negotiate, by the demonstration of a small naval foi'ce, a commercial treaty, the object of which should be to secure for British trade in China an insular location beyond the reach of Chinese officialdom. This clearly pointed to a British Colony to be established on the coast of China. Mr. Matheson, however, was no advocate of war with China. Neither did he imagine that China would readily consent to the establishment of a British Colony at her very gates. Mr. Matheson argued that a state of preparedness for war is the surest preventive of war, especially in our dealings with a nation like China, and that a firm policy, plainly supported by a strong rieet, ready for war, might, if judiciously pressed home, be all that would be absolutely necessary. Thus Mr. Matheson struck, in 1830, the key-note of the policy which eventually procured the establishment of the Colony of Hongkong. What Mr. Matheson thus urged upon the home country as a whole by his pamphlet, he impressed especially also upon the various Associations and Chambers of Commerce within reach of his influence in England and Scotland. In the course of the year 1886, several memorials wei^e accordingly presented at the Foreign Office from various parts of Great Britain, requesting that immediate and energetic measures should be adopted for the extension and protection of commerce in China. Among them was a memorial of the Glasgow East India 58 CHAPTER VI. Association, addressed to I^ord Palinerston. This document suggested, no doubt at tlie instigation of Mr. Matlieson, 'the obtaining, by negotiation or purchase, an island on the eastern coast of China, where a British factory may reside, subject to its own law^s and exposed to no colhsion with the Chinese.' When the Glasgow merchants thus recommended to seek, by negotiation or purchase, the cession of an island for the establishment of a factory, they did not mean a factory like the trade stations of the East India Company, but a factory of British and notably Scotch free traders, in the Canton sense of the word. They forestalled thus in principle the future cession of Hongkong, although their thoughts then turned, with Mr. Matheson, more in the direction of Chusan than of Hongkong. The idea w^hich Mr. Matheson thus prominently brought, by his pamphlet, before the general public, and by the Glasgow memorial before the Cabinet, to desert Canton and to seek, somewhere on the east coast, an island where British trade with China might be conducted under the British flag, on British ground, and under British government, was not left without its opponents. Mr. H. Hamilton Lindsay, also a former Canton resident and ex-member of the East India Company's Select Committee, published, in 183G, a Letter addressed to Lord Palmerston under the title ' British Relations with China.' In this pamphlet, whilst recommending the adoption of a belligerent policy in opposition to Mr. Matheson's armed peace procedure, Mr. Lindsay advocated the formation, on the coast of China, of two or three depots with floating warehouses, like the above mentioned hulks anchored at Lintin. Each of those depots, he suggested, should be guarded by a stout frigate and thrown open for the resort of merchant vessels to trade there. As to the project of forming a Colony, Mr. Lindsay added that he would on no account advocate the taking possession of the^ smallest island on the coast. Another opponent of the Colonial policy came forward anonymously, by a pamphlet published in London, in 1836, by THE SEARCH FOR A COLONY. 59* a resident in China, under the title 'British Intercourse with Cliina.' The anonymous author of this pamphlet represented the Missionary view of the question and suggested that the Government should choose a pacific policy towards China on grounds of expediency, humility and generosity, and confine its political action to the establishment of a Consulate at Canton together with a small fleet for the protection of trade. To combat the foregoing opponents of his scheme, Sir George- Staunton now came forward again and published, in 1836, a pamphlet entitled * Remarks on British Relations with China/' Sir George had, however, but little to say that was new. He argued, as before, that Canton was the very worst station to- select for trade purposes, but he now advocated the occupation of an island on the coast without previous negotiation with the Chinese Government. He stated that there were many islands on the coast over which the Chinese Government exercised no act of jurisdiction, and that such an island might easily be taken possession of with the entire consent and good-will of the inhabitants if there were any. Moreover he now pointed^ very aptly, to the precedent afforded by the Portuguese Colony on the island of Macao, the original occupation of which was an act precisely of that description which Sir George Staunton advocated, and not the result of any previous authentic cession by the Chinese Authorities, as pretended by the Portuguese. So far, however, this general search for a Colony in the East was more a groping about for an island on the east coasT" of China than in the neighbourhood of Canton. Chusan was most in favour. Next came Ningpo and Formosa. But other places also were mentioned. At the close of the year 1836, when this war of the pamphleteers Avas transferred from England to Canton, the general divergence of views was increased. Mr. G. Tradescant Lay, a naturalist who had accompanied Captain Beechy's Expedition to the Bonin Islands, strongly advocated, in the Canton newspapers and by a pamphlet published in 1837, the occupation of one of those islands for the purpose of a British Colony. Hongkong was almost out of the running. -^0 CHAPTER YI. However, the annexation of Hongkong was under the consideration of the Canton free traders early in the year 1836, when a correspondent of the Canton Register made the following prophetic remarks (April 25, 1836). 'If the lion's paw is to be put down on any part of the south side of China, let it be Hongkong ; let the lion declare it to be under his guarantee a free port, and in ten years it will be the most considerable mart east of the Cape. The Portuguese made a mistake: they adopted shallow water and exclusive rules. Hongkong, deep water, and a free port for ever!' This antici23ation of the future was Ixitthe^view ot a minority"" at Canton. Most of the British merchants continued to cling to the notion that the inner waters of Canton afforded a special vantage ground, that the lion's share was there where their trade was acknowledged by the Chinese Authorities, that at Canton therefore the British representative should reside and that, unless he were to reside there, he would be simply nowhere, whether for the Chinese Government or for his countrymen. At the time when the discussion as to the best location of the British trade waxed hottest in the Canton papers, there was published in the same papers (December, 1836) a detail description of the coast of China for the benefit of mariners, and in these papers, entirely unconnected with the above-mentioned search for a Colony, we find Hongkong referred to in the following words : — 'On the west of the Lamma channel is Lantao (about " CO miles S.E. of Canton) and on the east are Hongkong and Lamma. North of Hongkong is a passage between it and the main, called Ly-ee-moon, with good depth of water close to the Hongkong shore, and perfect shelter on all sides. Here are several good anchorages. At the bottom of a bay on the opposite main is a town called Kowloon and a river is said to discharge itself here (a statement the incorrectness of which is palpable, unless by the word river a little creek is meant). On the S.W. side of Hongkong, and between it and Lamma, are several small bays, fit for anchorage, one of THE SEARCH FOR A COLONY. gX which, named Heang-keang, probably has given name to the- island. Tytam harbour is in a bay on the S.E. side of the island, having the S.E. point for its protection to the eastward, other parts of the island on the N. and W. and several small islands off the entrance of the bay to the south. It is roomy and free from danger.' It was unfortunate that the search for a Colony had met with opposition in Canton and developed in England into a war of pamphleteers. This conflict confused instead of forming public opinion. At any rate nothing definite was accomplished. Parliament would not take up the question, and Lord Palmerston, whose mind was by this time made up, preferred to wait until he was sure as to the drift of public opinion. No one, it will be observed, took a share in this search for a Colony except persons directly connected with the China Trade past or present, unless we except a crude concoction by a writer of the East India House (a Mr. Thompson) who, in a pamphlet published under the title * Considerations representing the Trade w^ith China ' (London, 1886), deprecated war for commerce only. Neither public opinion nor the Cabinet approved of or took more than a languid interest in the measures discussed. However, attention had been called to the subject in prominent places, and the public mind was now, in some measure at least, prepared to accept, reluctantly though it be, the idea of establishing a British Colony in the East, when, four years later, this project was suddenly presented to the nation as an accomplished fact by the news of the cession of Hongkong brought about by the force of events rather than by any continuation of this search for a Colony. CHAPTER VII. Change of Policy. 1836 to 1838, WN June 1836 a marked change commenced in the policy A of the British Cabinet. Previous to that time the Duke of Wellington's Memorandum of March 24, 1835, had, as above mentioned, suggested that the British Chief-Superintendent of Trade in China should not proceed to or reside at Canton, that he should not adopt high-sounding titles, that he should jiot depart from the accustomed mode of communication with the Chiiiese Government, that he should not assume a power hitherto unadmitted, but keep, by the support of a stout frigate, the enjoyment of what little had been got, and leave it to the future to decide whether any effort should be made at Peking or elsewhere to improve our relations with China, commercial as well as political. This quiescent line of policy initiated by the Duke and expounded in China, after Lord Xapier's defeat, fcy Mr. Davis and Sir George Robinson, ended on June 7, 188G, for it was now to be substituted by Lord Palmerston's own dij)lomacy, hitherto restrained by the indolence of public ojDinion ^nd by the divergent views of the Duke of Wellington. The merchants at Canton, though disappointed in their ^expectation that the Government would take steps to obtain redress for the insulting treatment accorded to Lord Napief, soon had reason to perceive that a different policy was about to be inaugurated. When the firm of Jardine, Matheson & Co. introduced (September 20, 1835) the first merchant steamer Jardine to ply on the Canton Eiver, Captain Elliot, then still under the sway of the quiescent policy, protested against such a proceeding as contrary to the laws and usages of China, and, lunder the orders of Sir George Robinson, placed an interdict CHANGE OF POLICY. 63 on the employment of the steamer in Chinese waters. Bat now (July 22, 1886) Lord Palmerston wrote to Captain Elliot warning him that, whilst avoiding to give any just cause of- offence to the Chinese Authorities, he should at the same time be very careful not to assume a greater degree of authority •over British subjects in China than that which he in reality possessed. Another indication of the change of policy that had now taken place, was a direction Lord Palmerston gave, plainly intimating that free trade and free traders were now viewed by the Cabinet in a light different from that in which the Duke •of AVellington had looked at them. What had constituted in the eyes of Canton merchants the most galling element of the Duke's quiescent jwlicy was his determination, expressed in his Memorandum, ' to control and keep in order the King's subjects,' implying that the British community at Canton consisted of <t set of smugglers, pirates and ruffians, requiring that the Superintendents be armed with the strongest powers for their coercion rather than protection. Mr. Davis, Sir George Robinson •and even Captain Elliot, had hitherto been under the impression that all the powers and authorities formerly vested in the Supercargoes of the East Lidia Company, including the power to arrest and deport to England unlicensed or otherwise objectional)le persons, might be lawfully exercised by the Superintendents of British Trade in (Uiina ; but now (Xovember s, 183G) Lord Palmerston informed Captain Elliot that, as no license from His Majesty was now necessary to enable His Majesty's subjects to trade with or reside in China, such power •of expulsion had altogether ceased to exist with regard to China. To avoid recurrence of the difference of opinion between •co-ordinate Authorities, which had hampered the Commission during Sir George Robinson's tenure of office, Lord Palmerston iibolished the office of Third Superintendent, and, whilst confirming Captain Elliot as Chief, and Mr. Johnston as Second Superintendent, now (November 8, 1836) placed the latter under the orders and control of the former. The suite, salaries and 64 CHAPTER VII. contingent, allowances of the Commission were also reduced at the same time, and the two Superintendents were given to understand that their appointments were only provisional and temporary. This was unfortunate, for it caused doubts, both among the British community and among the Chinese Authorities, as to the official status of the two Superintendents. Some years later Captain Elliot, with a view to control the conduct of law^Iess British subjects, carrying on (in daily conflict with Chinese revenue cruizers) a forced contraband trade between Lintin and Whampoa, established (April 18, 1838) a system of police regulations exclusively applicable to the crews of British-owned vessels under the British flag. Lord Palmerston, after keeping the Regulations submitted to him unnoticed for a whole year, wrote at last, on the day when the whole foreign community were already under rigorous confinement in consequence of those lawless doings, a dispatch in which he suddenly came forward with notions of international laAV which ought to have entirely vetoed the former mission of, and Privy Council instructions given to. Lord Napier. Lord Palmerston then (March 23, 1839) informed Captain Elliot that the Law Officers of the Crown were of opinion that the establishment of a system of ship's police at Whampoa, within the Dominions of the Emperor of China, would be an interference with the absolute right of sovereignty enjoyed by independent States, which could only be justified by positive treaty or by implied permission from usage. Accordingly Captain Elliot was instructed to obtain, first of all, the written approval of the Governor of Canton for those Regulations. By the time this curious dispatch reached Elliot, British trade had been driven out from Canton, thanks to Lord Palmerston's inaction. But, whilst thus curtailing the powers and restricting the official standing and jurisdiction of the Commission, Lord Palmerston sought to uphold their position in other respects in relation to both the Macao and Canton Authorities. It appeared to British observers that the Macao Governors had, ever since Lord Napier's arrival, played into the hands of CHANGE OP POLICY. g5 the Chinese Authorities and seo'etly professed tliemselves as their allies against the British. Latterly, when the Chinese Government, and even some of the British merchants, openly disowned and defied the authority and jurisdiction of the British Superintendents, the Macao Governor had the hardihood of declining to recognize His Majesty's Commission, going even so far as to omit returning answers to tlieir letters. After making strong representations on this subject to the Government of Portugal and causing proper instructions to be sent from Lisbon to the Governor of Macao, Lord Palmerston now (December 6, 183G) informed Captain Elliot that measures had been taken to recall the Governor of Macao to a proper sense of the respect which is due to Officers acting under His Majesty's Commission, and that orders had been issued for a ship of war to be stationed in Chinese waters with special instructions to watch over the interests of British subjects at Macao. The firm attitude thus assumed towards the Government of Macao, Lord Palmerston desired also to apply to the regulation of Captain Elliot's relations with the Cantonese Authorities, In direct opposition to the Duke of Wellington's Memorandum, Lord Palmerston repeatedly (July 22, 183G, and June 12, 1837) instructed Captain Elliot to decline every proposition to revive official communication through the customary channel of the Hong Merchants, to communicate with none but Officers of the Chinese Government, under no circumstances to give his written communications with the Chinese Government the name of petitions, and to insist upon his right, as an Officer commissioned by the Xing of England, to correspond on terms of equality with Officers commissioned by any other sovereign in the world. ' It might be very suitable,' wrote Lord Palmerston, 'for the servants of the East India Company, themselves an association of merchants, to communicate with the Authorities of China through the Merchants of the Hong, but the Superintendents are Officers of the King, and as such can properly communicate with none but Officers of the Chinese Government.' ^6 CHAPTER VII. It seemed ub this moment as if the British Lion was beginning to wake up, but the Chinese cared nothing for his growl from a distance. When Lord Palmerston, however, discovered (November 2, 1837) that Elliot could not possibly communicate with the Chinese Authorities otherwise than as a tributary barbarian petitioner, he shrank from the simple expedient of a naval demonstration which, by the destruction of the Bogue forts, would, in a couple of hours, have prevented years of misery. Nevertheless, Lord Palmerston once more enjoined Captain Elliot to continue to press, on every suitable opportunity, for the recognition, on the part of the Chinese Authorities, of his right to receive, direct from the Viceroy, sealed communications (nob orders) addressed to himself without the intervention of the Hong Merchants. Whilst anxious that Elliot should have a distinct official position and gain it by the logic of plausible arguments, he left him unsupported by a sufficient fleet to apply the only logic the Chinese would have respected, the demonstration of power. When Elliot urged (November 19, 1837) that Lord Palmerston should at least write a letter to the Viceroy of Canton, as the Directors of the East India Company had done on several occasions, or send a Plenipotentiary to present, at the mouth of the Peiho, an auto- graph letter of Queen Victoria, claiming a sebtlement of all the grievances of British trade in China, Lord Palmerston explained that, in such a case, the question of the opium trade would have to be taken up, but that Her Majesty's Government did not yet see their way towards such a measure with sufficient clearness to justify them in adopting such a course at bhe momenb. What hampered Captain Elliot, next to his want of a fleet, was the undefined state of his jurisdiction which prevented both the Chinese Government and the foreign community in Canton understanding or recognizing his authority. Lord Palmerston sought to amend this defect by means of the China Courts Bill which was before Parliament at the end of the year 1838, but it was arrested in its progress, mainly in consequence of objections raised by Sir George Staunton. CHANGE OF POLICY. 67 The British community of Macao and Canton were, under these circumstances, very much thrown upon their own resources. They estabUshed (N'ovember 28, 183G) a General Chamber of Commerce, but the mixture of nationalities in it caused a good • deal of friction. Nevertheless the Committee (re-elected, November 4, 1837) succeeded in redressing sundry grievances by arbitration, built a clocktower, arranged a Post Office, fixed the regulations of the port and supervised the sanitary arrangements of the factories. An attempt was made (January 21, 1837) to form a representative Committee of British merchants for the purpose of providing an official channel of communication between the British community and their Superintendents, and also in order to ensure joint action in any emergency, but the attempt failed for want of unity among the leading British merchants. However, they were not wanting in loyalty. On the demise of William IV, a public meeting was held (November 27, 1837) and an address was agreed upon, expressing condolence with Queen Victoria, and praying that Her Majesty's reign might be long and glorious and that Her Majesty's name might be associated to the end of all time with things religious, enlightened and humane. What troubled the peace of British merchants in Canton most of all at this time, Avas the insolvent condition of most of the Hong ^Merchants. The foreign free traders had not, like the East India Company, the command of an unlimited treasury, enabling them to give long credits and to sustain a long privation of large portions of their trading capital. Nor were they in a position to adopt the former policy of the East India Company's Select Committee and distribute their business among the different Hong Merchants in proportion to their respective degrees of solvency and thus maintain a command of the market. Nearly all the thirteen Hong Merchants were more or less involved at the beginning of the year 1837 ; iour were avowedly insolvent ; one, Hing-tai, was formally declared bankrupt, his indebtedness to foreigners amounting to over two million dollars; and another, King-qua, was on the verge 68 CHAPTER VII. of bankruptcy. The Viceroy of Cautoii sanctioned, in the case of Hing-tai's bankruptcy, an arrangement to be made with his foreign creditors, but the latter rejected the terms offered. As the Chinese Government had originally appointed the Hong Merchants on the principle of mutual responsibihty, had repeatedly insisted upon the payment of such debts, and imposed for many years past a special tax on foreign commerce in order to create a guarantee fund for their liquidation, the British merchants had both law and prescription on their side. Moreover, on a similar occasion (A.D. 1780), an officer in the service of the East India Company (Captain Panton) had succeeded, by means of a letter addressed to the "Viceroy of Canton by a British Admiral (Sir Edward Vernon) and forwarded by a frigate (the Sea-horse), in obtaining (October, 1780) an Imperial Decree ordering partial repayment of a similar debt. Naturally enough, therefore, the British creditors of Hing-tai now argued that the simple intervention of the British Cabinet with the Imperial Government at Peking would facilitate the adjustment of the whole of their claims against the bankrupt Hongs. In this sense a memorial was addressed (March 21, 1838) to Lord Palmerston, signed by the following, firms, viz. : Dent, Turner, Bell, Lindsay, Dirom, Daniell, Cragg, Layton, Henderson, Stewart, liustomjee, Fox Bawson, Nanabhoy Framjee, Eglinton Maclean, Bibby Adam, Gibb Livingston Gemmell, Macdonald, Wise Holliday, Kingsley and Jamieson How. Nevertheless, foreseeing the unwillingness of Lord Palmerston to press their claims with due promptitude upon the Chinese Government, the above-mentioned firms meanwhile applied directly to the Cantonese Authorities, without the intervention of Captain Elliot. A long and exasperating correspondence ensued, the upshot of which was that the British merchants obtained payment of their claims against the Hing-tai Hong at a reduced rate but by instalments secured by the Chinese Government, and further the Viceroy sanctioned, at their request, the liquidation of King-qua's debts. In fact, through firmness of purpose combined with a nominal submission. CHANGE OF POLICY. 69 to the absolutism of Chinese officialdom, the British merchants gained concessions which the British Government conld not have gained for them, whilst claiming international equality, ^except by an armed demonstration. Captain Elliot's relations with the Cantonese Authorities were, throughout his whole tenure of office, characterized by an unceasing battle for a formal recognition of his official status and for the ordinary courtesies of official intercourse, which China never conceded until they were wrung out of her at the point of the bayonet by the Nanking Treaty. On the ground of what on the surface seemed to be petty questions of official etiquette, Elliot had, single-handed and unsupported, to fight the battle between China's stubborn assertion of supremacy over all barbarian potentates, Queen Victoria included, and England's quiet but deliberate claim of international equality. Elliot's position in this conflict was extremely difficult. On the one hand, the Cantonese Authorities argued that for two centuries British merchants had acknowledged, with abject servility, China's claim of supremacy and consented to take the orders of the Governor or the Hoppo at the hands of the Hong merchants; that Lord Macartney and Lord Amherst had brought tribute from the Kings of England; that Imperial Decrees, which admitted of no alteration, had fixed the mode of governing foreign trade at Canton; and that there was no intelligible difference between a Royal Superintendent like Elliot and a Supercargo of the former East India Company, the latter having wielded, in the experience of Chinese officials, more authority and power over their countrymen than Lord Napier or Captain Elliot ever 230ssessed. On the other hand. Lord Palmerston, with equal justice, persisted in giving Captain Elliot reiterated instructions, based on an assumed equality of the British and Chinese nations, and, on account of the barbarities of the Chinese Penal Code, virtually amounting to a claim of extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction over British subjects trading at Canton. The mistake was that he, at the same time, left Elliot without 70 CHAPTER Vir. a sufficient fleet to enforce these just and proper claims. It is bard to say what Captain Elliot ought to have done under the circumstances. Had he carried out Lord Palmerston's instructions literally, had he adopted the unusual mode of communication enjoined upon him, and assumed the high- sounding title of the King's Officer, boldly insisting upon equality of official intercourse, be would have courted the fate and condemnation that fell on Lord Napier. Had he informed Lord Palmerston the thing was impossible without having recourse to arms, and advised him to adopt the only remaining alternative of retiring from Canton and establishing a British Colony on one of the beautiful islands in the neighbourhood, say Hongkong, he would probably have been dismissed with as little ceremony as Sir George Robinson. What Captain Elliot actually did remains to be told. He commenced his duties with the determination not to protract the interruption of official communication between the Superintendents and the Cantonese Authorities by any demand of redress for the insults offered to the King and the country by the treatment accorded to Lord Napier, but to exhibit a conciliatory disposition, by respecting Chinese usages, and refraining from shocking the prejudices of the Chinese official mind. Accordingly, in his first communication to the Yiceroy of Canton (December 14, 188G), he did not refer to the events connected with Lord Napier's death, but on the contrary explained that all he desired was * to maintain and promote the good understanding which has so long and so happily subsisted.' This letter, written at Macao and delivered at Canton by the hands of two Agents of the East India Company (J. H. Astell and H. M. Clarke) and two British free traders (W. Jardine and L. Dent) to the Hong Merchants, was conveyed to the Governor of Canton as a humble petition of the barbarian headman Elliot. Looking to the tenor of this letter and to the form of its delivery, the Yiceroy justly concluded that the old policy of the East India Company was to be resumed by the cowed barbarians. CHANGE OF POLICY. 71 To make sure, he sent a deputation of Hong Merchants to interview Elliot at Macao, to question him as to his official status and policy, and to impress upon*him that he must first of all send a humble petition begging for a passport, and then remain at Macao until Imperial permission had been obtained for him to visit Canton, from time to time, during each business season. The result of the interviews that took place was that Elliot did as he was told. He applied, in form of a petition, for a passport and dutifully waited at Macao until a report had been sent to Peking stating that the hatchet had been buried in Napier's grave, that Elliot was virtually but a Chief-Supercargo with a different name and a smarter uniform, aud that things would go on as of yore. Accordingly, three months later (March 18, 1837) the Hoppo informed the Hong Merchants that ' Elliot having received a public official commission for the control of foreign merchants and seamen, although his title be not the same as that of the Chief-Supercargoes (tai-pan) hitherto sent, yet in the duty of controlling he does not differ, and that therefore it is now the Imperial pleasure that he be permitted to repair to Canton, under the existing regulations applicable to Chief-Supercargoels, and that on his arrival at the provincial capital he be allowed to take the management of affairs.' In forwarding a passport for Elliot to the Hong Merchants, he instructed them to give Elliot particular orders that *as regards his residence, sometimes at Macao, sometimes at Canton, he must in this also confonn himself to the old regulations, nor can he be allowed to loiter (at Canton) beyond the proper period.' Thus the official status of the King's Officer was fixed : subject to the control of the Hong Merchants and under the orders of the Hoppo, let him obey tremblingly ! Captain Elliot accepted this humiliating position, with- out further remonstrance and promised (December 28, 1836) to remain in Macao until further instructed. In March 1837 an Imperial edict was received at Canton authorizing Elliot's 72 CHAPTER yU. proceeding to Canton. Accordingly he removed (April 12, 18o7} to Canton with Mr. Johnston, the Second Superintendent, and took with hinoT his whole suite, consisting of ii Secretary (Mr. Elinslie), two Interpreters (Mr. Morrison and ^Ir. GiitzlaiT), two Surgeons (Mr. Colledge and Mr. Anderson), and a Chaplain (the Rev. Mr. Vachell). On arrival at Canton, Captain Elliot at once set to work to obtain a modification of his official status. He commenced (April 22, 1837) by protesting that he •could not possibly continue sending any further communications to the Viceroy through the Hong Merchants, but, on meeting with a curt refusal, yielded this point five days later, on being graciously allow-ed to send his petitions through the Hong- Merchants under a sealed cover addressed to the Viceroy. But the Canton Authorities communicated with Elliot only through the Hong Merchants, to whom they addressed their orders. Thus things went on, quietly enough, for about seven months, whilst the Viceroy (September, 1837) repeatedly instructed the Hong Merchants to order Elliot to send the receiving ships away from Lintin, and Elliot persisted in declaring that he had no power to do so, although he had informed the British merchants (December 31, 1836) that Macao and Lintin were included in his jurisdiction over British subjects and ships. On receiving, however, renewed instructions from Lord Palmerston to maintain the dignity of an Officer of the British Crown, Captain Elliot humbly informed the Viceroy of Oanton (November 23, 1837) that, with all respect for His Excellency's high dignity, he must discontinue the use of the character Pie/i on his addresses to the Governor. When the Viceroy peremptorily declined making the slightest concession on this point, Elliot plucked up courage, hauled down his flag and retired to Macao (November 29, 1837). The Canton Authorities, not in least moved by this proceeding, took no notice of Elliot's departure, but recommended to the Emperor (December 30, 1837) to stop the regular foreign trade until the receiving ships at Lintin had taken their departure. Meanwhile all official intercourse with Captain Elliot remained suspended. CHANGE OF POLICY. 73 Lord Palmerston approved of Elliot's proceedings (June 15, 1838) and senfc Admiral Maitland, who arrived on July 12, 1838, in H.M.S. WelJesley, to cheer him up. Here was an opportunity for Captain Elliot, and the Chinese unwittingly improved upon it by foolishly firing on a boat of the Wellesletj. But Captain Elliot missed his chance and allowed the Chinese to cajole him. Admiral Maitland was satisfied with a mild apology by the Chinese Admiral and the usual exchange of empty civilities between the two Admirals took place. Thus the commander of the Wellesley was induced to sail away peacefully (September 25, 1838), but under circumstances which justified the assertion on the part of the Chinese that they had ordered him off. This palpable mismanagement of the Admiral's visit to China also met with Lord Palmerston's unqualified approval. But the Chinese Authorities, having by this time taken the measure of Captain Elliot's position, now reduced his official status to an even lower level. They induced him actually to yield (December 31, 1838) the very point for the sake of which he had struck his flag a year before, and to communicate with subordinate officers of the Governor of Canton, by means of humble petitions. The British newspapers in Canton now overwhelmed him with a torrent of abuse, and even meek Lord Palmerston regretted it and mildly suggested, six months later, (June 13, 1839) as a remedy, that Elliot should not omit to avail himself of any proper opportunity to press 'for the substitution of a less objectionable character than the character Pien." But the real .degradation in this move Lord Palmerston did not understand. The concession which Captain Elliot made, in December 1838, aud the price he paid for the re-opening of official communications, involved far more than the use of an objectionable character. For the official status now assigned to Her Majesty's Commission and accepted by Elliot (December 26, 1838) was this: whilst previously receiving, from the .lips of the Hong Merchants, the orders of the Viceroy and the Hoppo, the latter being next in runk to the Viceroy, he was henceforth to receive throusrh the Honof Merchants the orders of the local 74 CHAPTER VII. Governor's subordinate officers, the Prefect of Canton city and the Commandant of the local constabulary. Well might the Englisli newspapers of Canton cry shame at the fresh indignities, heaped upon British honour by placing the Queen's Commission in China on a level below that of subordinate police officers^ in a position far lower than that of the former Supercargoes. But, on the other hand, it must also be considered that Elliot made these concessions at a time when, through the lawless proceedings of foreigners engaged in the opium traffic between Lintin and Whampoa, the life and property of the whole foreign community had been placed in jeopardy and a dreadful catastrophe was believed to be impending. Elliot believed that this humiliating mode of communication with the Chinese Government would only be of brief duration, pending the succour he expected to receive from the home country. In this he was mistaken. The public mind of England did not care for or understand these things, or at any rate the nation was not prepared yet to redeem the honour of the British flag in China. Stronger measures had to be taken by the Chinese to arouse public opinion in England, and the occasion for such measures was furnished by the opium trade itself. ^i^?~^~r'4..|.-T-r-^> CHAPTER VIII. The Opium Question and the Exodus from Canton. 1839, The tasfce for opium is a congenital disease of the Chinese- race. At the beginning of the Christian era, the uses and effects of opium were the secret of the Buddhist priesthood in China. Priests from India secured for themselves divine honours by performing feats of ascetic discipliue, fasting and mental absolution, sitting for instance motionless for months at a time indolently gazing at a black wall. These feats were jDerformed by means of opium. Buddhist and Taoist priests peregrinated through the whole of China performing astounding medical cures by means of opiates. Centuries before European medical science discovered the uses of opium, there was all over China a large and constantly increasing demand for this drug, and, though opium was grown in China from the earliest times, most of the supply was imported into China by Arab tradei-s at Canton aud Foochow. Nevertheless, while numbers of individuals taking opium in excess were physically and morally ruined by it, the use of opium never affected the health of the race to any perceptible extent. When the smoking of opium and the consequent practice of introducing opium vapour into the lungs commenced in China, is not known. As early as A.D. 1678 a regular duty on foreign imported opium was levied at Canton, but for 77 years after that date the annual import did not exceed 200 chests. By the year 179C, however, the annual rate of importation had risen to 4,100 chests and the rapid spread of a taste for opium smoking, and the consequent demoralisation of individuals who smoked opium to excess, attracted the attention of the Government. Accordingly the importation of 76 CHAPTER VIII. opinra was formally prohibited (A.D. 179G) by an Imperial Edict, the regular levy of a duty on opium ceased, and for it was substituted, with the connivance of the Cantonese Authorities, a system of secret importation under a clandestine levy of official fees. The effect of this Imperial prohibition was an immediate rise in the selling price of opium, and a consequently increased supply. Chinese historians report that by the year 1820, the annual clandestine sales of opium at Canton had reached a total of nearly 4,000 chests. But we have exact statistics of the annual exportation of opium from India, most of which found its way to Canton, while the remainder Avhich went elsewhere was balanced by imports of opium into China from other countries. These Indian Government statistics show that the exportation of opium from India continued, from A.D. 1798 to 1825, with very little variation, at an average rate of 4,117 chests per annum; that it rose in the year 182G, at a bound, to 0,570 chests, and continued until the year 1829 at an average annual rate of 7,427 chests; that in the year 1880 the export suddenly rose to 11,835 chests and continued, until the year 1835, at an average annual rate of 12,095 chests. But in the year 1837, on account of the enhanced demand caused by the general expectation entertained in 183G that the trade would be legalised, the exportation of opium took another sudden bound, rising to 19, GOO chests, in consequence of which the total amount of opium, accumulated in the hands of opium merchants at Canton and Macao during the period 183G to 1837, reached a total of 30,000 chests. Of these, some 20,000 chests were sold in 1836, to the value of about two million pounds sterling, of which sum £280,000 w^ent into the pockets of the High Authorities. The trade in opium was all along carried on at Canton in the foreign factories, where the Hong Merchants and their privileged clients and €ven Chinese officials openly purchased — from the various foreign merchants, representing English, Anglo-Indian (chiefly Parsee), Portuguese, American, French, Spanish, Danish, and Dutch Arms — written orders (chops) for opium to be delivered by ships i THE OPIUM QUESTION. 77 anchored in the outer waters of the Canton River. The opium was not stored at Canton, but at first it was warelioused in Macao, subsequently it was kept on board ships anchored at Whainpoa (the port of Canton), until, with the year 1830, a new practice arose. Foreign ships now used, on arrival from India, to anchor first at the mouth of the Canton River, viz, at Kam-sing-moon during the S.W. monsoon (April to September) or at Liiitin during the N.E. monsoon (October to March), and there to discharge their opium into stationary receiving hulks, whereupon the ships proceeded with the remainder of their cargo to Whampoa to engage there in the legitimate trade. In the year 1830, there were only five such receiving ships in Chinese waters, but by the year 1837 their number had increased to 25, most of which were either English or temporarily transferred to the English flag, though some were openly under the American, French, Dutch, Spanish and Danish flags. These receiving ships, anchored at Lintin or Kam-sing-moon, were heavily armed and strongly manned, so much so that no Chinese fleet could possibly interfere with them successfully. They were readily supplied with provisions by native boats (known as bumboats) and during the business season the officers in command of these receiving ships were in daily communication with their respective agencies at Canton and Macao by means of fast foreign cutters or schooners, manned by Indian lascars, and known as European passage-boats. Since the winter of 1836, when foreign ships were forbidden to anchor at Kam-sing- moon, and the prohibitions enforced by the erection of a shore battery guarded by a naval squadron, the opium ships were (1837 to 1841) confined to the station at Lintin. But whenever the Cantonese Authorities made a special show of interference with the opium traffic, as carried on at Lintin, some of the most powerfully armed opium ships would be sent away to the eastern and north-eastern coasts of China, to sell opium wherever practicable along the coast, in a manner similar to that practised at Lintin. In the year 1826 the commanders of the receiving ships anchored at Lintin made an arrangement 78 CHAPTER VIII. Avitli the revenue cruizers established by the Viceroy Li Huug-pan, under which these cruizers, for a monthly fee of Taels 36,000, allowed the opium to pass freely into the ports of Whampoa and Macao. And in the year 1837, when strict orders had been issued by the Emperor to stop all opium traffic at Lintin, the Commodore Hou Shiu-hing, in command of the Viceroy's cruizers, arranged with the commanders of the opium ships at Lintin, to convoy or actually to carry by his vessels the opium from Lintin to its destination, for a fixed percentage of opium. Some of the opium which he thus received, the wily Commodore then presented to the Viceroy as captured by force of arms, and on these meritorious services being officially reported to the Throne, the Emperor bestowed on the Commodore a peacock's feather and gave him the rank of Rear-Admiral. The Annals of the present Manchu Dynasty (partly translated by Mr. E. H. Parker), from which the foregoing statements are taken, allege that the opium annually stored in the original five receiving ships did at first not amount to more than 4,000 or 5,000 chests, but that later on (1826 to 1836) there were, on the 25 receiving ships, some 20,000 chests of opium in any one year. The extraordinary dimensions which the opium trade thus assumed, with the connivance of the Chinese Authorities, as a forced trade (neither legal nor strictly speaking contraband), especially during the decade from 1826 to' 1836, naturally aroused anxious attention both on the part of the English and Chinese Cabinets. The English Government viewed with apprehension the annually increasing importance which the East India Company's opium monopoly assumed, since 1826, as a source of public revenue. The extent to which the income of the Indian Government had gradually become dependent upon the cultivation and export of opium, likewise caused the English Cabinet much anxiety and perplexity. Parliament also took the matter up and appointed a Select Committee to investigate the questions involved, both in 1830 and 1832. In the latter year, however, THE OPIUM QUESTION. 79 the Committee, though by no means approving of the opium traffic, gave it as their opinion that it did not seem advisable to abandon so important a source of revenue in the East India Company's monopoly of opium in Bengal. Captain Elliot, the Government's representative in China, personally abhorred the opium trade, root and branch, and did not diguise his views either in his relations with the merchants in Canton or in his communications to the Government. He stated the j^erfect truth when he wrote to Lord Palmerston (November 16, 1839) that, if his private feelings were of the least consequence upon questions of a public and important nature, he might assuredly and justly say that no man entertained a deeper detestation of the disgrace and sin of this forced traffic on the coast of China; that he saw little to choose between it and piracy; and that in.>his place, as a public officer, he had steadily discountenanced it by all the lawful means in his power, and at the total sacrifice of his priva,te comfort in the society in which he had lived for years. But he also stated perfect truth, and in this respect Chinese history supports him, when he wrote to Lord Palmerston (February 2, 1837), that the opium trade commenced and subsisted only by reason of the hearty concurrence of the Chief Authorities of the southern provinces of China and indeed also of the Court at Peking; that no portion of the foreign trade to China more regularly paid its entrance duties than this opium traffic ; and that the least attempt to evade the fees of the Mandarins was almost certain of detection and severe punishment. Captain Elliot further stated, on the same occasion, that a large share of these emoluments reached not merely the higher dignitaries of the Empire, but in all probability, in no very indirect manner, the Imperial hand itself. The fact that, for centuries past, the principal trade revenue office at Canton (that of the Hoppo) has always been, as it still is, the monopoly of officers of the Imperial Household, lends force to this surmise. But what prevented Elliot's taking official proceedings against the opium trade, which he personally loathed, was the same consideration 80 CHAPTER Vlir. which had prevented the Parh'amentary Committee of 1832 disavowing it altogether. The evil had ah-eady gone on too long. The opinm trade had, by its financial operations, become so intertwined with the legitimate trade, that separate dealing with it was impossible. The import of opium into China, as it gradually expanded, giive an enormous impetus to the export of tea and silk from China to the European markets, and the whole opium trade had imperceptibly become a necessity both for China and for Europe ; for China, because the craving for opium was so widespread among the Chinese people, that the demand for it defied the severest criminal enactments ; for Europe, because the sale of opium, which had by this time come to form three- fifths of the whole British imports into China, provided a very large portion of the funds required for operations, in Chinese produce destined for European markets. Indeed, as Elliot put it (February 21, 1837), the movement of money at Canton had come to depend, by the force of circumstances, almost entirely upon the deliveries of opium at Lintin. The tares could not be rooted out now, without destroying the wheat. Lord Palmerston, and the other members of the Cabinet, whilst unanimous in their dislike of the opium trade, could not yet agree to any definite solution of the problem. On one point Lord Palmerston was perfectly clear, viz. that Her Majesty's Government could not possibly interfere for the purpose of enabling British subjects to violate the laws of the country to which they trade, and that therefore any loss which such persons may suffer in consequence of the more effectual execution of the Chinese laws on this subject, must be borne by the parties who have brought that loss upon themselves by their own acts. He wrote to Elliot to this effect (June 15, 1838), but at the same time declared that the Cabinet did not feel sufficient confidence in their apprehension of the opium problem to enter upon any negotiations with the Chinese Government regarding the repression or legalisation of the trade in opium. Nevertheless there are indications that Lord Palmerston had, in his own mind, already settled the leading THE OPIUM QUESTION. 31 principles of that policy which he formulated later on (Februaiy 2G, 1841), in the following words. 'It is evident,' he wrote to Rear Admiral Elliot and to Captain Elliot, ' that no exertions of the Chinese Authorities can put down the opium trade on the Chinese coast, because the temptation both to the buyers and to the sellers is stronger than can be counteracted by any fear of detection and punishment. It is equally clear, that it is wholly out of the power of the British Government to prevent opium from being carried to China, because even if none were grown in any part of the British territories, plenty of it would be produced in other countries, nnd would thence be sent to China by adventurous men, either British or of other nations. The present state of Chinese law upon this matter makes the trade illegal; and illegal trade is always attended with acts of violence. Battles between Ch inese war- junks and British smugglers have a necessary tendency to produce unfriendly and embarrassing discussions between the British and Chinese Governments, or at all events to keep alive hostile feelings between the British and the Chinese people. It would seem, therefore, that much additional stability would be given to the friendly relations between the tw^o countries, if the Government of China would make up its mind to legalise the importation of opium upon payment of a duty sufficiently moderate to take away from the smuggler the temptation to endeavour to introduce the commodity without payment of duty. By this means, also, it is evident that a considerable increase of revenue might be obtained by the Chinese Government, because the sums which are now paid as bribes to the custom- house officers would enter the public coffers in the shape of duty.' The policy of the Chinese Government was for a long time equally undecided, wavering between legalisation and \ extirpation of the opium trade. The counsels of the leading statesmen of China were divided until the close of the year 1838. But, whilst divided in their opinions as to the desirability of stamping out the use of opium, and as to the possibility of 6 S2 CHAPTER Vni. preventing smuggling effectively, all the principal statesmen of China were singularly unanimous in looking at the opium question not, as we might suppose, from a moral point of view, but simply and solely as a financial problem. Their objection to the opium trade was not that it fostered a vice gnawing at the vitals of the nation, but that it caused the balance of the trade to turn against China and that it accordingly drained China of silver and impoverished the nation. The Chinese author of the above-mentioned Annals ■of the Manchu Dynasty, whilst personally holding the same views of the opium traffic which Elliot held, and occasionally indulging in elaborate tirades concerning the immorality of the traffic in opium, gives, as the reasons why the Chinese Government condemned the trade, purely financial arguments. Formerly, he says, a rule had been in force, that no silver was to be exported and that the w^hole foreign trade should be conducted by barter, which compelled foreign merchants annually to import half a million dollars, but, he adds, with the expansion of the opium trade it came gradually to pass that a balance of silver had annually to be made up by China. Thus also a- Memorial to the Throne, by Wong Tseuk-tsz, which contributed much to the victory eventually scored by the anti-opium party in Peking, argued that the growing consumption of opium was at the root of all China's troubles, because silver was becoming scarce and relatively dear, the value of the tael having advanced from 1,000 to 1,G00 cash in price. But since the year 1832, and especially all through the year 1836, the counsels of the pro-opium party were decidedly in the ascendant at Peking and in the provinces. A joint Memorial, presented to the Throne in 1832 by the ex-Viceroy and the Governor of Canton, boldly recommended the licensing of the opium trade on the ground that such a measure would reduce the price of opium and thereby diminish the export of silver, and secretly hinted that the encouragement of the growth of native opium would still further impede the avaricious plans and large profits of ^ THE OPIUM QUESTION. 83 the foreigners. Another Memorial, presented to the Throne in spring 1836, further argaed that the legalisation of the opium trade would bring it under the rules of barter; that thereby the baneful effects of the trade, consisting in an annual loss of over ten million taels inflicted on the currency of the realm, would be entirely obviated; but that for this purpose the Hong Merchants must be made personally responsible for the conduct of the whole opium trade and for the entire abolition of the traffic carried on at Lintin ; and that the success of the scheme depended upon levying such a small duty (seven dollars a chest) as to cut off all inducement to smugglers to risk their lives. When the* Emperor remitted this Memorial (June 12, 183G) for further report, it was generally assumed at Canton that it was now oiily a question of framing the regulations for the detailed organisation of the legalisation scheme. Elliot gave utterance to an opinion generally entertained at the time in the best informed official circles of Peking and Canton, when he wrote to the Foreign Office (October 10, 1830), that he expected soon receiving the final orders from Peking for the legalisation of the opium trade. When, a few weeks later (October 28, 1836), the Viceroy issued orders for the expulsion from Canton of twelve foreign opium merchants, eight of whom were British subjects, it was still thought that this measure, though rigidly insisted on (November 23 and December 13, 1836), was only meant as a blow directed against the Lintin trade. This surmise was confirmed when an Imperial Edict (dated January 26, 1837) appeared, which declared the baneful effects, arising from a prevalence of opium throughout the Empire, to consist in a daily decrease of fine silver, and consequently placed a strict interdict on the exportation of sycee silver, without prohibiting the trade in opium. On February 2, 1837, Elliot wrote to Lord Palmerston, that he was still of opinion that the legal admission of opium may be looked for. That the Lintin trade was the principal, if not exclusive, cause of objection, was further demonstrated by another Imperial Edict with reached Canton in August, 1837. This Edict stated 84 CHAPTER Vlir. that, whereas the illicit trade, the importation of opium and exportation of sycee, depended entirely on the receiving ships stationed at Lintin, the resident foreigners must immediately be ordered to send those ships away. Elliot accordingly had fonr successive demands made upon him to order those ships to leave China, and finally he was directed to write to his King and request him to command those ships to leave, and to prohibit their return to China. Captain Elliot declined to interfere on the ground that his duties w^re at Canton and that he had no power, and he hinted that the Chinese Authorities were themselves at fault in not recognising him properly as a Government Officer. But towards the close* of the year the hopes of the legalisation of the opium trade grew fainter and fainter and Captain Elliot now (December 7, 1837) reported to Lord Palmerston, that things were in snch a condition of uncertainty that it was impossible to divine what the Chinese Authorities meant, as they were wandering from project to project and from blunder to blunder, and that the protection of British interests demanded that a small naval force should immediately be stationed in Chinese waters. Lord Palmerston must have seen the reasonableness of Captain Elliot's request. But he had by this time determined npon applying to Chinese affairs his favourite policy of masterly inaction. So he deliberately left Elliot and the British community to their fate, unprotected by any fleet, and waited to see what the Chinese Government would really do. Whilst the British and Chinese Cabinets hesitated as to the course to be taken, the hangers on of the Lintin trade pushed matters to a crisis. During the first few months of the year 1888, the liumber of foreign cutters and schooners carrying opium from Lintin to Whampoa increased enormously, and the deliveries of opium were now frequently accompanied by conflicts in which fire-arms were used freely. Elliot discovered that many of these craft were owned by British subjects, but he was powerless. When he devised (as above THE OPIUM QUESTION. 85 Tiientioned) some police regulations for the purpose, Lord Palmerstou informed him that he had gone beyond his powers in doing so. The Cantonese Authorities, irritated by this incomprehensible inactivity of Elliot, desired to give foreigners in general a warning, and caused a native, convicted of smuggling opium and sycee, to be executed under the walls of Macao (April lo, 1838). Trade continued, though under gloomy apprehensions, as everybody felt that a crisis was approaching. Things went on, however, quietly enough, until the close of the year, when (December 8, 1838) some boxes of opium, that had been brought up to Canton, presumably from an American ship anchored at Whampoa, were seized in front of the house of Mr. Junes and discovered to be his property. The Chinese Authorities immediately ordered both Mr. Innes and the ship in question to leave Canton waters within three days (subsequently extended to ten), whilst the Hong Merchant, who was security for the ship, was at once exposed in the stocks with a heavy wooden collar round his neck. This caused great excitement, the more so as thai other Hong Merchants sent Mr. Innes a written warning that they were going to pull down his house over his head. The threat was, however, not carried out, and the excitement had well nigh subsided, when (December 12, 1888) the Chinese Authorities, resolved to give the foreigners another lesson to intimidate them, brought a criminal, condemned to death on a charge of selling opium, and made arrangements to execute him in the square, right under the windows of the factories. Some of the foreigners at once protested against the erection of the tent which was to accommodate the officials, othei-s pulled down what scaffolding had already been put up, while a mob of some six thousand natives that had collected stood by and at first applauded the proceedings of the foreigners, laughing at the discomfiture of the Chinese police. But when some foreigners imprudently pushed in. between the mob, and assaulted some of the crowd with sticks, popular feeling turned against them and the cry 86 CHAPTER Vlir. *ta, ta' (kill them) was raised on all sides. Showers of stones now forced the foreigners into their houses; the doors were hastily barricaded ; a shot was fired, happily without doing- any injury ; the mob were about making preparations for the entire demolition of the factories, and the life of every foreigner in Canton was in imminent peril, when the Authorities sent troops at the last moment and restored quiet. But the Hong Merchants, whom the Authorities held responsible for the disturbance, now declared that trade must be suspended altogether, unless the traffic carried on in small craft between Lintin and Whampoa were immediately put a stop to. Elliot would have gladly exceeded his legal powers to do so, but Lord Palmerston had left him without sufficient naval support to clear the waters of Canton of an armed traffic, carried on by the riffraff of every foreign nation, supported by the Chinese people and secretly participated in by Chinese officials. All he could do was to make an appeal to the conscience of the foreign community and to warn the offenders. He called a public meeting (December 17, 1838) and asked the merchants to co-operate with him in his efforts to stop the traffic between Lintin and Whampoa. But the reckless foreigners on board the boats down at Whampoa cared neither for the threatenings of Elliot or the Chinese Authorities, nor for the general reprobation in which all the respectable foreign merchants at Canton held this traffic. Elliot exhausted all his executive powers by serving a notice upon all British subjects engaged on those boats, which warned them that, unless they at once left the Canton Eiver, he would consider them as outlaws and leave them to be dealt with by the Chinese Authorities. When Elliot issued this notice (December 18, 1838), his communications with the Chinese Government had been interrupted for nearly a year. It was at this juncture, believing some dreadful calamity to be impending upon the whole foreign community at Canton, that Elliot resolved to resume official intercourse with the Chinese Government at any cost, and accordingly he made THE OPIUM QUESTION. 87 the humiliating concessions above mentioned, consenting to address the Cantonese Authorities as a humble petitioner and to receive communications, which really were orders, from the subordinates of the Governor of Canton city. He sacrificed his personal and official dignity, because he saw no other way of preventing a massacre. However, the Cantonese Authorities were too well aware of the advantages connected with the continuance of the foreign trade at Canton, to resort deliberately to any extreme measures. They had no wish to stop trade altogether, or even to suppress the fair opium traffic at Canton, but they were determined to stop the forced traffic between Lintin and Whampoa, because it evaded the exactions of the higher officials. The new year (1839) opened with gloomy forebodings, for on the day when trade was re-opened (January 1, 1839),. a rumour spread in Canton that the party at Peking, opposed to the legalisation of the opium trade, had gained a decided ascendency in the Imperial councils. And, indeed, while Elliot was penning a dispatch to Lord Palmerston (January 2, 1889),. imploring the Foreign Office for some support under his embarrassino^ circumstances, statino^ also that there was no time to be lost in providing for the defined and reasonable control of Her Majesty's subjects in China, the former Viceroy of Hukwang, Lam Tsak-sii, better known as Com- missioner Lin, was already on his way, armed with extraordinary powers as Special Lnperial Commissioner and High Admiral. Lin had previously distinguished himself as an uncompromising anti-opium agitator and now, whilst travelling along the wearisome route from Peking to Canton, he concocted an elaborate scheme to entrap all the opium dealers and to extirpate the whole opium traffic by one fell blow, besides bringing the Cantonese Authorities once for all to book for their connivance at, and share in, the opium trade. The news of his approach caused, indeed, all the local officials, from the Viceroy down to the Hong Merchants, to quake in their shoes. Accordingly the opium traffic was actually stopped 38 CHAPTEE VIII. for several raoiitlis before Lin's arrival, and the Authorities bestirred themselves to make a show of serious repressive measures. They now (January 10, 1839) issued a notification strictly prohibiting the conveyance of opium from Lintin to Whampoa, and further (January 10, 1830) called upon all foreign merchants to pledge their word that they would have nothing whatever to do with the smuggling of opium or w'itli the exportation of silver. Again, acting upon advance orders sent on ahead by Commissioner Lin, the Viceroy now ordered the backdoors of the factories to be blocked up and set a watch in front. Having thus shut in the foreign community, the Viceroy and the Governor issued (January 30, 1839) a joint proclamation addressed directly, without the intervention of the Hong Merchants, to all foreign merchants. In this proclamation foreigners were told that the Imperial Commissioner Lin, sent from Peking to extirpate the whole opium traffic, was hourly expected to arrive in Canton. The Viceroy and Governor even added, in their zeal, what was entirely against Lin's plan, that the foreign merchants must at once send all the warehousing vessels, anchored in the outer seas, away. These orders were enhanced by the threat that, in case of disobedience, trade would be brought to an end for ever. The real sting of the proclamation was, however, when read in the light of the newdy established blockade of the factories, in the words 'thus are the lives of all you foreigners in our grasp.' This blockade of the factories and the imprisonment of the whole foreign conununity was, indeed, the indispensable preliminary to the execution of Lin's deeeply laid scheme. Having thus caught the whole of the foreign merchants in his net, Lin, to keep them busy, allowed the legitimate trade to contiime unmolested for the present, and proceeded first of all to examine the high officials and the gentry of Canton as to the detailed history of the opium traffic, censuring some and cashiei-ing others. But he at once ordered measures to be taken to intimidate the foreign merchants further by the strangling THE OPIUM QUESTION. 89 of a Chinese opium dealer (February 2G, 1839). in fronfc of the factories and in the presence of a formidable array of Chinese troops. Further, to cut off their eventual retreat to Macao, he ordered the Bog-ue forts to be guarded by a fleet, and a blockade of Macao to be commenced by land and sea. To prev^ent a collision, now imminent, Elliot ordered (March 7, 1839) all English-owned passage boats to remain outside the Bogue. But, thinking English residents at Macao to be at the moment in greater peril than those at Canton, Elliot proceeded, with the permission of the Chinese officials (March 10, 1839) to Macao, where, to his great relief he found H.M. sloop Lame which had just arrived. On passing through the Bogue, Elliot had noticed that large numbers of fire-rafts and war junks were being collected there, in evident preparation of an attack on the foreign merchant shipping anchored at Lintin, and on arrival at Macao he found active measures in progress for an effective blockade. After making all necessary arrangements with Captain Blake, the commander of the Lame, for the protection of British residents at Macao, and ordering all British ships in Chinese waters immediately to rendezvous, for mutual protection, in the harbour of Hongkong, Elliot hastened back to Canton, and, although finding every outlet of the Canton River guarded by Chinese cruizers, he pushed resolutely on. Having heard, en route, of fresh perils of his countrymen at Canton, and believing that some desperate calamity would ensue unless he reached Canton at once, he pluckily forced his way, unarmed, in a small but fast-sailing gig of the Lame, manned by four blue-jackets, through the successive cordons of Chinese soldiery, until, he reached, at the imminent risk of his life, the British factories. Elliot's arrival (March 24, 1839) revived the drooping spirits of the foreign community who were at the moment in sore perplexity, and the sight of the English flag waving j^roudly and defiantly from the factory tower, where, in place of the demolished flagstaff, the ensign staff of the Lame's gig had been put up by Elliot's ordei*, inspired every heart with fresh couragfe. 90 CHAPTER YIII. During Elliot's absence, the Imperial Commissioner Lin had sent to the foreign merchants (March 18, 1839) a demand for the surrender of all opium stored on board ships in Chinese waters, threatening them with their lives if the order were not obeyed forthwith. While the merchants were deliberating what to do, the Hoppo, acting under Lin's orders, prohibited foreigners, some of whom now sought to get away, retreating to Macao (March 19, 1839) and took measures to cut oif all communication with Whampoa and the outside shipping. At the same time the factories were surrounded by a stockade and a triple cordon of Chinese troops on land, and by a semi-circular bridge formed by war junks on the river side. When these measures were complete (March 21, 1839), the demand of the surrender of all opium was repeated. The General Chamber of Commerce now sought to appease the Authorities by an offer to surrender 1037 chests of opium, but the offer was contemptuously rejected, and Mr. Lancelot Dent, being supposed to have under his orders six thousand chests of opium, was now (March 22, 1839) summoned to appear in person before the Imperial Commissioner and to surrender himself forthwith at the city gate. Naturally, all the foreign merchants made .common cause with him and it was unanimously resolved that he should not go. Thereupon all Chinese servants were ordered to leave the factories, and all supplies of fresh water and provisions were cut off. Moreover, the senior Hong Merchants (How-qua, senior, and Mow-qua), loaded with iron chains fastened round their necks, were n'>w (March 3, 1839) sent to the factories, under the charge of the Prefect of Canton, with orders, under pains of immediate decapitation, to bring Mr. Dent with them into the city. The whole foreign community, however, declared that he should not go, and when the Hong Merchants affirmed that it would really cost them their lives if they w^ent away without him, Mr. Inglis pluckily volunteered to go in place of Mr. Dent, if three others would accompany him. This offer, readily accepted by the Prefect as a happy compromise, was at once acted upon by three other gentlemen, THE OPIUM QUESTION. 91 Thom, Slade and Fearon. The four heroes proceeded accordingly, with the Prefect and the Hong Merchants, into the city and were examined, at the temple of the Queen of Heaven, by a Committee of the highest local officers, under the GovernorV orders, viz. the Chief Justice, the Treasurer, the Crrain Intendant and the Commissioner of the Salt Gabelle. These high officials were so struck with admiration of the bravery of the four Englishmen, that, after briefly examining them, they allowed them to return to the factories unmolested. Next day, however, the demand for Mr. Dent's surrender was renewed and the foreign community were just deliberating what was to be done now, when Elliot arrived in their midst, took Mr. Dent under his arm and carried him off to his own room, informing the Chinese officers that he would rather surrender his own life than that of any Englishman under his charge. On the following day (March 25, 1839), whilst the foreign merchants signed bonds, pledging themselves not to deal in opium nor to introduce it in China in any way, Captain Elliot applied to the Viceroy, respectfully claiming passports for all English ships and people at Canton, adding that, unless these passports were granted within the space of three days, he would be reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the men and ships of his country were forcibly detained, and act accordingly. The Chinese Authorities took no notice of this covert threat, well knowing that H.M. sloop Lame could not engage the Bogue forts single-handed. If anything were wanted to prove that, even in this opium contest, the real question at issue was the absolute supremacy of China over England, the reply, which EUiot now received from the Viceroy Tang Ching-ch'ing, would prove it. Elliot had, at the close of his letter, expressed a regret that the peace 'between the two countries' (meaning of course China and England) was placed in imminent jeopardy by the late unexplained and alarming proceedings of the Chinese Authorities. The Viceroy, in reply, stated that he could not understand what Elliot meant by 'the two countries'; that of course he could not possibly mean to compare England with China, which would- D2 CHAPTER VIII. be absolutely preposfceroiis, because all regions under heaven were in humble submission to the Government of China, while the heaven-like goodness of the Emperor overshadowed all ; and that the English nation and the Americans had, by their trade in Canton, of all those nations in subjection, enjoyed the largest measure of favour. 'Therefore,' argued the sarcastic Viceroy, *I presume, it must be England and America, that are conjointly named "the two countries," but the meaning of the language is greatly wanting in perspicuity.' However, Elliot's application for passports was peremptorily refused, as also another application he made on the same day, begging that servants, water and food supplies might be restored to the foreign community. He was reminded in reply that Mr. Dent had not yet been surrendered and that the Imperial Commissioner was determined to get possession of all the opium now in China. The foreign community, thus officially informed that they were prisoners, calmly prepared for the worst. But they were in a sad plight, for they were absolutely without any servants, without fresh water, without fresh provisions, and had to live, -at short rations, upon what they had in their cupboards. During the next few days, sundry Chinese officials overwhelmed Elliot with complaints that he was the cause of all the troubles, that Mr. Dent would have surrendered if Elliot had not -appeared on the scene, and that Elliot's preposterous notions of international equality had caused the present refractoriness of the foreign merchants and the delay in the delivery of the opium. When these complaints were found to be of no avail, the officials used threats, informing Elliot that the Imperial Commissioner Lin had hitherto taken no action because 'he cannot bear to destroy ere he has instructed,' and that therefore Elliot had been allowed a few days' grace, but he should not have servants or provisions, and the opium must be delivered -at once. These were no idle threats. The factories were surrounded tby masses of Chinese soldiery, all longing for plunder; THE OPIUM QUESTION. 93~ combustibles of all sorts were brought to the spot, and on the evening of March 2G, 1839, there was not a foreigner in^ the factories but was convinced that the Chinese were ready to do the worst. After an anxious night, spent in deliberation, and feeling constrained bj paramount motives affecting the safety of the lives .and liberty of all the foreigners at Canton, Elliot issued, at G o'clock, on the morning of March 27, 1839, a public notice to British subjects, requiring them to deliver- up to him all British-owned opium, either in their possession or under their control, holding him, on behalf of Her Majesty's- Government, responsible, and leaving it to Her Majesty's Government hereafter to define the principles on which the proof of British property and the value of British opium should be determined. Two days later (March 28, 1839), Elliot informed the Imperial Commissioner, that he was prepared to deliver up 20,283 chests of British-owned opium. In reply, Elliot was ordered by the Prefect of Canton to give further detailed information as to the places where the several amounts of opium were stored, and he was supplied with various instructions as to the arrangements to be made for the delivery of the opium. When Elliot, however, once more requested that servants and food supplies be restored to the prisoners, the Prefect informed him that no such indulgence could be allowed until the delivery of the opium had commenced. After several days spent in discussions of the mode of securing the delivery of all the opium on board the different ships, it was finally agreed by Commissioner Lin (April 2, 1839), thafe Mr. Johiiston, the Second Superintendent, should proceed under a guard of Chinese officials and, armed with written orders of Captain Elliot, bring all the ships up to the anchorage of Lankeet, in sections of two ships at a time, to discharge the opium there. Commissioner iLin then promised, that on. completing delivery of one-fourth of the opium, the compradores and servants should be restored to the prisoners; that on completing delivery of one-half of the opium, the passage boats^ should be allowed to resume communication with the ships;. ^4 CHAPTER VIII. that on delivery of three-fourths of the opium, trade should be re-opeued ; and, he added pompously, on delivery of the whole being completed, everything should return to the ordinary condition and a request should be laid before the Throne that encouragements and rewards might be conferred. But Lin further added, that, if there should be any erroneous delay for three days, the supply of fresh water should be cut off ; if for three days more there should be like delay, the supplies of food should be cut off, and if such delay should continue still three -days longer, the criminal laws should forthwith be maintained and enforced. Mr. Johnston having left Canton, the imprisonment of the foreign community, numbering over two hundred persons, •continued as rigorously as before, until x4pril 17, 1830, when the servants were tardily allowed to return to the factories and food supplies were again obtainable. Meanwhile, however, the prisoners were still guarded day and night by Chinese soldiers, posted at their doors with drawn swords and instructed to cut down any one who should make an attempt to escape. Both the merchants and Captain Elliot were repeatedly worried by demands to sign a fresh bond handing over to capital punishment any of their countrymen who should hereafter deal in opium, and professing abject submission to China's claim of supremacy. No one signed the bond and the confinement continued. The above detailed promises of Lin were by no means faithfully adhered to. The servants were not restored as soon as one-fourth of the opium was delivered ; the boats were not permitted to run when one-half was delivered ; and the promise fchat things should go on as usual on completion of the opium delivery Avas falsified by reducing the factories to a prison with one outlet, by the perpetual expuAsion of sixteen merchants, some of whom had never dealt in opium at all (as some clerks and a lad were included), and by the introduction of novel and unbearable regulations. Not until May 4, 1839, did the imprisonment of the foreign community at Canton come to an <end. On that day, trade was declared re-opened and two days THE OPIUM QUESTION. 95 later fifty foreign merchants, known to have had no direct <iealings in opium, were allowed to depart for AYhampoa en route for Macao. Elliot, however, and the other merchants were still detained in custody as hostages until the delivery of the opium was completed (May 21, 1839). Then Elliot was graciously allowed to leave, but the permission was coupled with the demand now made that sixteen of the principal British merchants should remain in custody as a punishment for dealing in opium. Elliot refused to leave without them, and, after protracted negotiations, he at last (May 27, 1839) obtained their discharge on their signing a bond, guaranteeing that they would never return to China. By the end of May the exodus of British merchants and British shipping from Canton waters was complete. American merchants remained and became a favoured class. Lin had gained a victory. He had succeeded in stopping for a time the trade in opium. But his seeming success had been gained only by driving British trade away from Canton in a manner eventually resulting in the establishment of a British Colony at Hongkong, which in turn deprived Canton of all its former commercial importance. He had also succeeded in obtaining forcible possession of over twenty-four million dollars worth of British-owned opium w^hich it took him wrecks (until June 1, 1839) to destroy with quick-lime in pits dug on the sea shore at Chinkau, near the Bogue, and the full value of which China had to repay a few years later. • 'This affair has been Avell managed,' wrote the Emperor to Lin, but the verdict of the vermilion pencil is not always . the verdict of history, and six months later Queen Victoria J stated, in her Speech from the Throne (January, 1840), that/ * events had happened in China which deeply affected the interests of her subjects and the dignity of her crown.' ) -«^ S=:=^^->^r^=^iif CHAPTER IX. Exodus from Macao and Events Leading up to the Cession of Hongkong. 1839 to 1841. M[f HE Imperial Commissioner Lin had been instructed by the Government of Peking to do two things, both of which w^ere equally impossible, viz. to extirpate the opium traffic, root and branch, but at the same time to secure the continuance at Canton of the legitimate foreign trade under the old regime. When Lin arrived in Canton, he found the opium trade stagnant and its worst features, the forced trade between Lintin and Whampoa, entirely cut off through the vigorous action, resorted to at the last moment, of the Cantonese Authorities. Had he confined himself to do the only thing possible, viz. to seek to initiate measures tending to bring about, in course of time, a moral regeneration of the Chinese nation, so as to reduce the demand for opium to the lowest possible minimum, and at the same time to introduce a moral reform of the mode of conducting the opium trade, so as to prevent the recurrence of its glaring abuses, he might have done some good and paved the way for an eventual peaceful solution of this complicated opium problem. But his instructions, based as they were on his own original violent recommendations to the Throne, pledged him to an extreme policy, impossible to carry out and necessarily resulting in giving the opium trade a new impetus, besides convincing at last even the people in England that, apart from the opium question, the legitimate trade itself could not be carried on, in a manner compatible with England's dignity, under the old conditions. EXODUS FROil MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. 97 For four months before Lin's arrival at Canton (Februarj% 18S9), the opinm market had been overstocked and hardly any sales had taken place. The great bnlk of the supply of 1838 had remained unsold, owing to the energetic measures taken in the inland districts, all through the southern provinces, to repress the consumption. The immense stock of the year 1839 was just commencing to arrive from India where, on the very day when over 20,000 chests were surrendered in Canton, sales were either impossible or ruinous, because the prices in China had fallen to between two or three hundred per cent, below the cost of production and charges. Under these circumstances, to rob the holders of opium of the stock which glutted the market, and to destroy over 20,000 chests of opium for which Elliot paid the owners at the rate of £120 a chest, by twelve months' bills on the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, was not to extinguish the trade but to give it a fresh fillip by relieving an overglutted market from the depressing weight of stocks. After March 24, 1839, when 20,283 chests of opium, which the holders could not have sold without ruin, were surrendeted to Lin, prices recovered and the opium traffic was carried on with greater vigour and yielded larger profits than ev'er. By binding sixteen men, among whom were some of the foremost English merchants, gentlemen of high culture and refined feelings, to abstain from all future participation in the opium trade, which promise they all adhered to honourably, Lin merely helped to drive the opium trade into the hands of a lower and less scrupulous set of merchants. Lin's opium policy was an utter failure. His policy with regard to the legitimate foreign trade was, moreover, equally unfortunate, because based on an utter mis- conception of the character and power of the English, whom Lin, like Napoleon, supposed to be nothing but a nation of shopkeepers, whose lives and fortunes depended upon the supply cf Chinese tea, silk and rhubarb. His utter disregard of the sacredness which Britain attributes to the life, the liberty and the property of others, his reckless assumption that civilised 7 ■98 CHAPTER IX. foreigners, temporarily residing in China, must submit themselves to the barbarous code of Chinese penal laws and to the corrupt judicial process of Chinese tribunals, his open and undisguised determination to hold one set of foreign merchants responsible with their lives for the doings of others not under their control, his absurd affirmation of the sovereignty of China over Great Britain and other foreign nations, and finally his persistent refusal to give to Her Majesty's Representative in China a ■dignified official status, all these measures of Lin, as the typical representative of Chinese mandarindom, served only to force upon the English people, aroused at last from their apathy by the startUng news of the imprisonment of the whole foreign community, the conviction that some serious alterations in British relations with the Chinese Empire w^ere necessary and that British commerce could never be safely carried on, and certainly could never flourish in a country where British property are alike at the mercy of a capricious, corrupt and inordinately conceited Government. Driven out from Canton, and feeling that British trade Avith China must henceforth be carried on within sight of British shipping aud close to the sea, on which Great Britain can hold her own against all comers, both Elliot and the British merchants now turned a deaf ear to all Lin's proposals for a reopening of trade, even under new regulations, at Canton or AVhampoa. Forty-two British firms signed (May 23, 1889) a Memorial addressed to Lord Palmerston, in which they complained of the insincerity of the Canton Authorities in their dealing with the opium trade which these Authorities had themselves encouraged and supported for so many years, and of the violent measures of Commissioner Lin which made it a matter of pressing necessity to place the general trade of British subjects in China upon a secure and permanent basis. British merchants had no wish now to return to Canton under any circumstances. Their eyes were turned in the direction of Macao. Even before the imprisonment of the foreign community at Canton had come to an end, Elliot had managed, with great difficulty and risks, to send a message from Canton (April 13, EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. 99 1839) to the Governor of Macao, throwing himself and all Her Majesty's subjects by anticipation under the protection of the Portuguese Government, and offering at the same time, on behalf of the British Government, immediate facilities on the British Treasury for the purpose of putting Macao in a state of effectual defence and of equipping some armed vessels to keep the coast clear. The Portuguese Governor, A. A. da Silveira Pinto, in reply (April 13, 1839), declined this offer on the ground that his very peculiar position compelled him to observe a strict neutrality as long as possible or until there should be evidence of the imminent peril which, he said, Elliot seemed to fear. Governor Pinto failed to understand that the imprisonment of the foreign community and of Her Majesty's Representative in China was in itself tantamount to a declaration of war. As soon as the Canton imprisonment came to an end, Captain Elliot {May 6, 1839) wrote to Lord Palmerston stating that access to Macao was now a matter of indispensable necessity for British trade in China, and that the settlement of Macao could easily he placed in a state of effective defence. He recommended that Lord Palmerston should conclude an immediate arrangement with the Government of Macao, either for the cession of the Portuguese claims to the place, or for its effectual defence and its appropriation to British uses by means of a subsidiary convention. By the time the Canton prisoners were free to leave and began to take refug<3 at Macao, Governor Pinto had reason to observe that Commissioner Lin's policy was as hostile to the interests of Portuguese as to those of the British merchants. Governor Pinto had ordered off all opium stored at Macao and sent it (3,000 chests) to Manila, where it was safe from Lin's clutches; but the revenue of Macao, previously amounting to $100,000 a year, chiefly levied on the opium trade, had now dwindled down to next to nothing, and, besides, the Chinese now began to blockade Macao on the land side and Commis- sioner Lin coolly proposed to take charge of the Portuguese fortifications. Under the influence of these circumstances 100 CHAPTER |.IX. Governor Pinto gave the British refugees at first a cordial welcome. It seemed, indeed, as if the Government of Macao would make common cause with the British in their hour of distress. But Commissioner Lin interfered. As soon as Elliot requested Lin to send a special deputy to Macao to confer with him as to the continuance of the trade, and asked for permission to make Macao henceforth the headquarters of British commerce in China, Lin set to work to turn the mind of Governor Pinto against the British. Lin now relinquished his claim to occupy the forts of Macao and promised the Governor to leave him in undisturbed possession of the settlement, on condition that the Macao Government should aid him in the suppression of the opium traffic and in driving out the English from the place. Lin was determined to force British trade back to- Whampoa and Canton, because he had pledged his word to the Emperor that, after extirpating the opium trade, he would soon be able to report the peaceful resumption of the regular British trade at Canton. There is no evidence to show that Governor Pinto entered into any definite understanding with Lin on the subject, but within three months after the arrival of the British refugees at Macao, they all felt more or less that they had ceased to be welcome guests, and that the Governor had fallen back upon his original position of strict neutrality. Lin was massing troops around Macao and had also ordered a camp to be erected opposite Hongkong on the point called Tsimshatsui, which, as part of the Kowloon peninsula, protrudes into the harbour of Hongkong. Lin's object was, whilst driving out the British from Macao, to disturb at the same time their shij)ping in Hongkong harbour, so as to compel the British merchants to come back into his loving arms at Canton. Whilst these measures were in course of preparation, an event happened, which caused a great deal of trouble to Elliot. Some American sailors and British lascars, belonging to the merchant ships which, for mutual protection and defence, had taken refuge in Hongkong harbour (since March 24, 1839), EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. IQl went on shore one evening (July 7, 1839) at Tsimshafcsni, and gob into a drnnken fray with the Chinese, in the conrse of which a Chinaman, named Lin Wai-hi, was killed. Elliot at once hastened to Hong-kong and held a strict inqniry, terminating in the criminal trial of some lascars by a British jury. But there was no evidence whatever bringing home the charge of manslaughter to any one. The Chinese Government had been invited by Elliot to send some officers to witness the trial, but Liu claimed the jurisdiction for himself, sent no officer to watch the case and made a great clamour demanding of Elliot, again and again, that he should snrrender the murderer or some British subject in his place. Lin, moreover, now demanded, in the most peremptory terms, that Elliot and all British nierchants should at once sign a bond declaring that hereafter British subjects charged with any crime should at once be handed over to the Chinese Government to be tried according to Chinese forms of proceeding (involving examination by torture both of the accused and his witnesses) and to be executed according to the methods in vogue in China. Poor Lin, he could not understand that the day for making such demands had entirely gone by, and that, by insisting upon them, he effectually defeated his own scheme of bringing British trade back to Canton. But he blindly rushed on in his mad oareer. He now ordered the Chinese sub-Prefect of Macao to withdraw all Chinese servants from British residents at Macao (July 21, 1889). Later on, he formally interdicted (August 15, 1839) the supply of provisions of any kind to British persons or ships. When British residents at ^Lacao supplied the places of their Chinese servants with Portuguese, Lin forthwith requested Governor Pinto to prohibit Portuguese subjects either serving the British as domestic servants or supplying them with food or drink, and issued edict after edict, ordering the departure of British subjects on pain of severe punishment, and declai:ing them all to be responsible with their lives for the surrender of the murderer of Lin Wai-hi. A provisional Committee of a British Chamber of Commerce had been formed at Macao 102 CHAPTER IX. (AugnsD 3, 1839), Mr. James Mathieson acting as Chairman, Mr. Scofcfc (the Secretary of the former Canton Chamber) as Secretary, and Messrs. J. H. Astell, Gr. Braine, W. Bell, G. Smith and Dinshaw Furdonjee as provisional Committee. Captain Elliot now consulted them and, acting in accord with their views, informed a public meeting of the British community at Macao (August 21, 1839) that, whereas the Chinese Imperial Commissioner had prohibited the Governor of Macao rendering any assistance to British subjects, he was unwilling to compromise Portuguese interests any further and proposed to leave Macao and to take refuge on board the ships in Hongkong harbour as soon as possible. Two days afterwards Captain Elliot and his family removed from Macao, Governor Pinto having made no declaration of his willingness that his English guests should remain. The whole British community meanwhile hastened to wind up their local business affairs and prepared for another exodus. The general excitement was increased by a disgraceful outrage, committed by the Chinese on the crew and a passenger (all British) of a small schooner {Black Jolce)^ P^jiii^ between Macao and Hongkong as a passage boat, when (with one exception) the whole crew were murdered and the passenger (Mr. Moss) horribly mutilated (August 24, 1839). The provisional Committee of the British Chamber of Commerce, in almost daily session after Elliot's departure, had frequent interviews with Governor Pinto, who was evidently in a great state of alarm, though he expressed his determination to afford the British community all the protection and aid in his power. However, on the evening of August 25, he told the Committee that he could not answer for the safety of British subjects remaining in Macao for more than eighteen hours longer. The Committee accordingly convened a public meeting the same night and it was resolved to leave Macao the following day. The nighb was spent in watching for an armed attack expected to be made simultaneously on all British houses by the Chinese soldiery. Nothing happened, however, and at noon on Monday, August 26, 1839, the second British exodus commenced. Men, women and EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. lOS children, with bag and bag-gage, were hurried through the streets of Macao amidst a terrible excitement of the whole population, expecting every moment a massacre by the Chinese soldiery. The refugees assembled on the Praya in the presence of Governor Pinto who had the whole of the Portuguese troops (some 400 Indian lascars and 500 Caffre slaves) under arms, and embarked hurriedly on board British ships, lorchas, schooners and boats of all descriptions, which immediately set sail for Hongkong harbour, a mournful procession, to seek refuge on board the ships at Hongkong. One might well suppose that now at last the time had come for the establishment of a British Colony on the island of Hongkong, but no such thought was entertained yet. Driven out from Canton, bowed out of Macao, forced to retreat to the ships anchored in the harbour of Hongkong, the British merchants looked back with regret to the flesh pots of Macao. The appearance of affairs at Hongkong was indeed depressing. On one side; of the harbour there was a well-nigh barren rock, unable to supply provisions for the two thousand British subjects now crowded together on shipboard in a starving condition, and on the other side they beheld a large Chinese camp in process of construction on Kowloon peninsula, with two shore batteries on Tsimshatsui, one at the present Craig Millar and the other near the site of the present Military Barracks, commanding the best portions of the anchorage. These were not encouraging sights. Provisions were obtainable with great diflftculty from Chinese junks and bum-boats, but prices were very high. No wonder that fresh negotiations now commenced with Governor Pinto. Captain Elliot, established on board the ship Fort William, which subsequently for many years graced the harbour of Hongkong as a receiving hulk, wrote to Governor Pinto (September 1, 1839), offering to send all the British subjects back to Macao, an I to place at the Governor's disposal H.M.S. Volage which had just arrived, and a force of 800 to lOOO men for the defence of the Portuguese settlement. Elliot remarked at the same time, with reference to certain Chinese 104 CHAPTER IX. official documents in his possession, that the action of the Chinese Government, in praising and thanking tlie Portnonese Authorities for ' assisting them in driving forth the British people,' was no doubt an infamous calumny, which nnist have been a so'n-ce of deep chagrin to the Governor. Here was another chance for the Portuguese Government of preventing, at the last moment, the establishment of a rival Colony at Hongkong, and of making the fortune of Macao. But Adriao Accacio da Silveira Pinto, Governor of Macao and its Depen- dencies, im^xilled no doubt by foolish instructions from Lisbon, slammed the door in the face of the British community. He replied (September 3, 1830), in stiff but stately terms, that he <;ould not cease to preserve the most strict neutrality betAveen the Chinese and British nations, and added that the British subjects, having retired of their own accord from Macao with a view of not compromising the Portuguese establishment, had by this step placed themselves under the necessity of not landing there again so long as all the difficulties now existing between the Chinese and the English should continue unsettled. When Governor Pinto sealed this letter, he sealed the doom of Macao's prosperity as a Colony and virtually established Hongkong. Nevertheless the time for Hongkong, though now seemingly near at hand, had not come yet. Elliot was, on the one hand, determined not to locate British trade again within the Bogne, but, on the other hand, he was averse to the idea of settling on the island of Hongkong, probably on account of its inability to furnish provisions and on account of the proximity of the Kowloon peninsula then occupied by Chinese troops. When Pliot, seeing the scarcity of provisions, went with Dr. Giitzlaff in two small boats (September 4, 1839) to induce the villager near Kowloon city to furnish the fleet wit/h provisions, three Chinese war junks and the battery at Kowloon pier (still in existence) opened fire upon them, which was gallantly returned by Elliot's boats, and the junks were driven off. As to the merchants, they likewise do not appear to have entertained any EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. 105 desire yet to settle on Hongkong. They now (September 7, 1H3'.)) addressed a Memorial to Lord Palmerston, which was signed by twenty-eight British firms, representing thirty-eight sea-going British ships assembled in Hongkong Bay. Bnt in this Memorial there is not a word as to the establishment of a British Colony. The memorialists complained of having been driven out from Canton and from Macao. They stated that tliey left Macao under a perfect conviction that such a course was imperatively necessary for the general safety. They also repeated their former declaration that, after the violent acts of Commissioner Lin, the return of British subjects to Canton would be alike dangerous to themselves and to the property of their constituents and derogatory to the honour of their country, ' until such time as the power of the British Government might convince the Chinese Authorities that such outrages would not be endured.' These last words appear to indicate that the British merchants expected speedy succour from home, the effective punishment of the Cantonese Authorities, and finally re-estab- lishment of the whole British community, on a new basis of international equality, at Canton or Macao. Hongkong had no chance yet. Meanwhile Commissioner Lin, after arranging for a re-opening of trade with Macao, on condition that the British should remain excluded from the port, and after strengthening the defences of Tsimshatsui, sec to work to cajole the American and other foreign merchants to remain in or return to Canton, and did everything he could to bring about a division among the British merchants and to set them against Elliot. Lin now looked upon Elliot as the only hindrance in his way, and accordingly charged him, in public proclamations, with all sorts of crimes, in order to arouse among the Chinese people a strong feeling against Elliot. Lin also directed the Magistrates of neighbouring districts to issue proclamations prohibiting, under severe penalties, the supply of provisions to the British 'fleet, iind commanding the people to fire upon British subjects whenever they went on shore. 106 CHAPTKR IX. In consequence of these proceeding's Captain Smith, in command of H.M.S. Volafje, gave notice of his intention of estab- lishing a blockade of the port of Canton (September 11, 1839), but when the Cantonese Authorities thereupon promised to withdraw the offensive proclamations, the blockade was suspended five days later. Negotiations now commenced afresh concerning Elliot's desire to bring the British community back to Macao. Captains Elliot and Smith had an intervicAv (September 24, 1839) with the Chinese Sub-Prefect of Macao, in the presence of Governor Pinto, endeavouring to find a basis of agreement between Elliot and Lin. Elliot was determined not to re-open trade inside the Bogue. Lin was equally determined not to let the British return to Macao. Accordingly it was proposed," on the Chinese side, as a compromise, that British trade should henceforth be conducted at Chuenpi, under the guns of the Bogue forts. Lin proposed also a series of new trade regulations, the leading ideas of which were that the Hong Merchants' monopoly of supervising and conducting the trade as responsible mediators should continue, and that cargoes sliould be at the risk of the ship until laid down at Canton, and at the risk of the Hong Merchants until shipped on board. This compromise w'ould have had a good chance of success, had not Lin coupled w4t1i it the impossible stipulation that every merchant, before participating in the trade, should sign a bond, agreeing that all British subjects in China should be subject to trial and capital punishment by Chinese tribunals according to the provisions of the Penal Code of China. Captain Elliot having asked a representative Committee of l^ritish merchants (Messrs. H. A^'-right, G. T. Braine, W. Wallace and Wilkinson Dent) to advise him on the subject of the proposed trade regulations, the Committee, after consultation v/ith the Hong Merchants, stated (October 22, 1839) that in their opinion a trade under the proposed new plan could not be commenced until the British community had returned to Macao. Individuals from among the British community indeed went back to Macao whilst these negotiations proceeded. A British ship (Thomas Coiitts), the EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OP HOXGKOXG. 107 master of which (Captain AVanier), acting under legal advice obtained in India, signed the bond of submission to Chinese criminal jurisdiction, entered the Bogue in defiance of Elliot's prohibition. The ship was admitted to trade and liberally treated by the Chinese who were anxious that other British skippers should follow the example of Captain Warner. When Elliot informed Lin of his inability to approve of British trade being re-opened on the projDosed basis at Chuenpi^ Liu sent to Elliot (October 2G, 1839) a peremptory demand that all British ships should leave the coast of China within three days, unless the bond of submission to Chinese criminal jurisdiction were signed at once. Captain Elliot, being aware that Lin followed up this demand by preparing numbers of fire- ships and assembling a large fleet of war- junks, to attack the British ships in Hongkong Bay, and considering the anchorage in Tungku Bay to be less liable to surprise by fire-ships, now ordered all the British ships anchored at Hongkong to remove to Tungku. But the commanders of thirty-five ships at Hongkong, and the heads of twenty British firms, together with the agents for Lloyds and for eleven Lisurance Offices, protested repeatedl}^ (October 2G and November 9, 1839) against this order. They Avere of opinion that Tungku anchorage was less safe and that, if Hongkong were deserted, the Chinese would occupy and fortify the Island. The merchant ships accordingly remained, for the present, anchored in Hongkong Harbour. Captain Smith (H.M.S. Volarje) was under strict injunctions from the Admiralty to avoid by all means possible any collision with the Chinese. Observing, however, the daily increase of troops in the neighbourhood of the shipping at Hongkong, and the erection of batteries approaching now the beach, he resolved to make a decided stand against further encroachments. Accordingly he proposed (October 28, 1839) to deliver at the Bogue forts a letter addressed to Commissioner Lin, demanding that the warlike and hostile proclamations should be withdrawn and British merchants allowed to reside at Macao. Captain Elliot, having agreed to this measure, went the same day on, 108 CHAPTEPt IX. the Volage which, tog-ether with H.M.S. Hyacinth (Captain Warren), proceeded forthwith to the Bogue forts, where Com- missioner Lin and Viceroy Tang were at the time inspecting the forts, fire-ships, and a fleet of twenty-nine powerfnl war- junks under the command of Admiral Kwan (a direct descendant of Kwan Ti, tlie god of war). On arrival at the Bogue on the morning of November 2, 1839, Captain Smith sent to Admiral Kwan a letter addressed to Commissioner Lin and Viceroy Tang. This letter, written in Chinese, contained a demand that, within three days, a proclamation should be published withdrawing tlie official orders for the destruction of English cargo ships, find permitting English merchants and families to reside on shore and to be furnished with servants and supplies nntil the commands of the Queen of England could be received for the adjustment of all difficulties. In forwarding this letter by an Interpreter (Mr. Morrison), Captain Smith informed the Admii-al that he would wait for the reply of Lin and Tang and that the boat conveying the reply should carry a white flag. Admiral Kwan civilly promised to submit the letter to their Excellencies, but expressed a wish that the two frigates should meanwhile move down a little further. Captain Smith im- mediately complied with this request to show his sincerity. Instead of forwarding a reply, however. Admiral Kwan twice sent for Mr. Morrison to visit him, which requests were refused, on the ground that Captain Smith's letter stated all that was needful. Next morning, in the course of the forenoon (November 3, 1839), the Chinese squadron, under Admiral Kwan, broke ground and stood out towards Her Majesty's ships, which were immediately got under weigh and directed towards the appro- aching force. As soon as the Chinese observed this proceeding, their squadron anchored in good order to tlie number of twenty-nine sail, and Her Majesty's ships were hove to, whilst a message was sent by Captain Smith to the war-junks, re(iuesting tliem instantly to return to the anchorage north of Chuenpi. In reply Admiral Kwan stated that, if the murderer of Lin 'Wai-hi were at once surrendered to hi;n, he would draw back EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. 109 his force to the Bogue, but not otherwise. The Admiral, at the same time, returned Captain Smith's original letter, addressed to Lin and Tang, without an answer. This was plain enough and forthwith ensued the Battle of Chuenpi. As it is tlie first naval engagement between Chinese and English ships of war that history knows of, a detailed account of it, both from Chinese and English sources, will be of interest. According to Chinese history the Battle of Chuenpi arose out of Elliot's sending two men-of-war to the Bogue with a petition that the Chinese should have mercy on the British ships at Tsimshatsui and not destroy them, so that he might wait for dispatches from England. Admiral Kwan returned the petition unanswered because the English refused to surrender the murderer of Lin Wai-hi. Just then five Chinese war-ships started to preserve peace on the seaboard, carrying red flags at their mast-heads. The English mistook these flags for a declaration of war, because in England a red flag means war and a white one peace, and ojDened fire. Admiral Kwan advanced foremost, leading on the forces in his own person, standing by the mast of his junk, and returning shot for shot. The figure-head of one English ship was knocked off by shots fron> Kwan's guns, causing the death by drowning of many European soldiers. When the Emperor read the 'account of this engagement, he wrote on the margin, 'Admiral Kwan ought to have known better than standing by the mast, whereby he compromised the dignity of his oflice in the eyes of his men.* At the time the Emperor bestowed on him, for his bravery, the title of Batulu, and ordered a statement of officers deserving honours and a list of the persons killed and wounded in the action to be prepared that they might receive the rewards enacted by law. The English account of the Battle of Chuenpi is somewhat different. The following is Captain Elliot's version. 'Captain Smith did not feel himself warranted in leaving this formidable Chinese flotilla at liberty to pass inside of him at night and ta carry into effect the menaces against the merchant vessels. 110 CHAPTER IX. Thinking that the retirement of the two ships of Her Majesty iVolcifje and Hyacinth)^ before a force moved out with the palpable intention to intimidate, was not compatible with the honour of the flag, he determined forthwith to constrain their return to their former anchorage. Therefore, about noon (November 3, 1839), the signal was made to engage, and the ships, then lying hove to, on the extreme right of the Chinese .force, bore away in a line ahead and close order, having the wind on the starboard beam. In this way, and under sail, they ran down the Chinese line, pouring in a destructive fire. The lateral direction of the wind enabled the ships to perform the same evolution from the opposite extreme of the line, running up it again with the larboard broadsides bearing. The Chinese answered with their accustomed spirit; but the terrible effect of our own fire was soon manifest. One war-junk blew up at about pistol shot distance from the Volage, a shot probably ■having passed through the magazine; three were sunk and several others were obviously water-logged. It is an act of justice to a brave man to say, that the Chinese Admiral's conduct was worthy of his station. His junk was evidently better armed and manned than the other vessels ; and, after he had weighed or, more probably, cut or slipped, he bore up and engaged Her Majesty's ships in handsome style, manifesting a resolution of behaviour, honourably enhanced by the hopelessness of his efforts. In less than three-quarters of an hour, however, he and the remainder of the squadron were retiring in great distress ffco their former anchorage ; and as it was not Captain Smith's disposition to protract destructive hostilities, or indeed to do more than repel onward movements, he offered no obstruction io their retreat, but discontinued the fire and made sail for Macao with the purpose to cover the embarkation of such of Her Majesty's subjects as might see fit to retire from that place.' We may add to this account that the Volage got some shot through her sails and the Hyacinth was a good deal cut up ill her rigging and spars; a twelve-pound shot lodged in her mizenmast and one went through her main yard, requiring it i EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. HI to be secured. The Nvretcbed gunnery of the Chinese hurt no one. Their guns and powder must have been good, from the distance they carried, but not being fitted for elevation and depression, all their shots were too high to have any effect except on the spars and rigging As soon as the news of the battle of Chuenpi reached the Chinese army encamped at Tsimshatsui, the shore batteries opened fire (November 6, 1839) upon the merchant ships anchored in Hongkong harbour, keeping up a rambling can- nonade for several days. There is a statement in the Chinese Annals that, in November, 1839, the English unsuccessfully attacked the fort north of Tsimshatsui, but that, as the wells had been poisoned, and they feared a night attack, they made off to their ships again. There is no evidence for the correctness of this statement. Owing, however, to the above-mentioned cannonade, the commanders of the merchant ships resolved to yield to Elliot's previous demands and removed the ships to Tungku. Hongkong was once more deserted. Ever since British merchants were excluded by Commissioner Lin from any direct share in the trade conducted at Macao and especially since his failure to induce them to resort to Chuenpi, and whilst Elliot prohibited their returning to Canton or Whampoa, a great deal of freighting business had been going on by means of trans-shipment of British cargoes to and from American and other foreign vessels. The anxiety of British shipowners and consignees to clear their vessels caused them to chafe under the restraints imposed upon them by the deadlock of understanding between Lin and Elliot. Only one English ship, the Royal Saxon (Captain Town), followed the bad example set by Captain Warner. But as the animosity of Lin extended only to loyal British merchants and ships, whilst the ships of other foreign nationalities were treated by Lin as neutrals and rather favoured because they signed the bond which Elliot so abhorred, a great demand arose for neutral ships, under the benefit of the bond, to carry cargo to and fro between the port of Whampoa and British ships at Hongkong or Tungku. 112 CHAPTER IX. Freights for this short route rose to §G per bale of cotton to be carried to Whampoa, and $10 per ton for Chinese produce from Whampoa to the British ships. This depreciation of the British flag and the enhancement of the value of other flags went to such lengths that one British ship after the other was- sold for nominal considerations, the American Consul especially giving his sanction to such transfers, offensive as they were to Captain ElHot. The total exclusion of British merchants from direct trade with China, which had been an accomplished fact for some time, was formally declared by an Imperial Edict published in Canton (November 2G, 1839), to the effect that, whereas the English had been vacillating iu their treatment of the opium question, it was no longer compatible with dignity to continue to jDcrmit their trade, and the English trade must therefore be entirely stopj)ed from after December G, 1839, and for ever. This state of things, continuing for twelve months longer to the gj'eat detriment of British commercial interests, formed eventually the most powerful cause resulting in a demand for the cession of Hongkong. For the present, however, Elliot strained every nerve to induce Lin to accede to his wish that British trade should be re-established, in some form or other, at Macao, but Lin, though once more earnestly entreated by Elliot (December IG, 1839) to consent to some compromise in this direction, proved inexorable. Even the Portuguese Governor of Macao joined Lin in his obstructive policy, and when Captain Elliot (January 1, 1840) asked Governor Pinto, in the name of Her Britannic Majesty, to permit at least the storing of the remainder of British cargoes in the warehomses of Macao upon the payment of the duties fixed by the regulations of the place, he met with an equally decided rebuff. In this unfriendly line of conduct, the Portuguese Governor went even farther. At the beginning of February, 1840, it happened that atrocious proclamations against the English were again posted on the walls of Macao. Captain Smith, seeing the lives of British subjects residing at Macao endangered by those placards, ordered H.M.S. Hyacinth to enter EXODCS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OP HONGKONG. H^ the inner harbour of Macao (February 4, 18-40), with a view to enable British subjects to take refuge on board. Thereupon both Governor Pinto and the Senate of Macao waxed wroth^ deckred their dignity offended, their neutraUty violated and sternly ordered the ship to leave immediately. Captain Smitb yielded and withdrew the Hyacinth on the following day. However the very lowest ebb of the honour and fortunes of British trade in China had now been reached, and a change was at hand. In England public opinion was now at last fairly aroused, thanks to the keynote struck by the Queen's Speech from the Throne (January, 1840) in which Her Majesty identified her interests and the dignity of the Crown with the fate of Elliot and the British merchants in China. Whilst regretting or condemning the opium trade as a whole, the British public clearly perceived that British trade with China must be re-organized on an entirely new basis. x\rrangements were quietly made by the Government to fit out an expedition to China. Lord Palmerston explained in the House of Commons (March 12, 1840) that the object of this expedition was not to commence hostilities but to open up communication with the Emperor of China. The good people of Great Britain did not want war with China and especially nob for the sake of the opium trade, but they were quite satisfied that, as an Order in Council (April 4, 1840) expressed it, satisfaction and reparation should be demanded from the Chinese Government on account of the late injurious proceedings of certain officers of the Emperor of China. The Chinese Government was meanwhile kept tolerably well informed of what transpired in England. Commissioner Lin had a great passion for keeping spies among the employes of British merchants and officers, and his intelligence department kept him supplied with translations of newspaper cuttings. Lin accordingly was able to inform the Emperor, long before the expedition arrived, 'that Elliot had applied for troops to be sent to China; that the Queen had directed Parliament to 8 114 CHAPTER IX. deliberate upon the matter; that the official body, civil and military, were in favour of war, whilst the mercantile interest was for peace; that discussion went on for several days without any definite result ; but that at last lots were drawn «iin the Lo Chan-sze Temple and three tickets were found in favour of war which was therefore resolved on ; that Pak-mak (Bremer), the Queen's relative by marriage, was ordered to take a dozen or so of war-ships under his command, to which were added twenty or thirty guardships from India.' The Emperor replied, after reading this report, ' What can they do, if we quietly wait on the defensive and watch their movememts?' Soon after, when Lin was asked (June 1, 1840) by some American merchants in Canton to allow their ships to clear with their cargoes as quickly as possible because the British expedition would soon arrive and blockade the port, Lin sneered at the idea of the English being daring enough or able to effectively blockade the Canton River. Lin, however, was too hot-tempered a man to wait quietly. Early in the year (January 16, 1840) he strengthened the defences of Tsimshatsui by building a new fort on the site of the present Water-police Station, and supplied the Bogue forts with some 200 new cannons of foreign construction, which he had no difficulty in buying in Canton from friendly foreign merchants. He was anxious to set foreigners to fight the English but could not manage it. He then purchased several foreign ships and had junks built in foreign style, fitted them up like men-of-war, and ordered their crews to be drilled in foreign fashion. But he was quick-witted enough to see, on witnessing some trial manoeuvres, that this plan would not work, and gave it up. So he turned all his attention to the plan he had commenced long before, in August, 1839, by starting a volunteer fleet, formed by engaging fishermen and pirates at ^6 a month each, with ^6 extra for each of their families, the funds being provided in the way common in China, viz. by compelling well-to-do people to give ' voluntary ' subscriptions for public purposes. But this volunteer fleet, let loose to EXODUS FROM MACAO AXD CESSION OP HONGKONG. 1]5 prej upon British shipping (since August, 1839) with war- junks and fire-ships, and to prevent disloyal Chinese traders from supplying the British ships with provisions, accomplished next to nothing. They burned, by mistake, the Spanish brig Bilhaino (September, 1839), captured here and there Chinese junks which supplied British ships with provisions, made sundry night attacks on British vessels by sending down upon them, with the tide, fire-ships chained together in couples, but they did not capture a single British ship or boat. Commissioner Lin then resorted to the usual Chinese appeal to sordid avarice and ordered the Magistrates of the neighbouring districts to issue proclamations offering rewards, not merely for the destruction of British men-of-war or merchant vessels, for which large sums of money were promised, but for the capture or assassination of individuals. Accordingly ii price of ^5,000 was put on Elliot's head, sums ranging from S5,000 to ^500 were offered for any English officer, according to gradation of rank, made prisoner, and one third of the money in each case for any British officer killed, also a reward of ^100 was offered for any British merchant made prisoner and %20 for any such merchant killed. But Lin's bounty and assassination schemes were nearly as fruitless as his volanteer scheme. No British officer was captured or murdered, and but few British civilians were made prisoners or assassinated, though secret ambushes were laid frequently and the poisoning of wells was a common practice. In June 18-10, the ships forming the expedition began to assemble in Hongkong harbour, and every day now brought some man-of-war or troopship or other from England or India. By the end of June there had arrived seventeen men-of-war among them three line-of-battle ships (the Melville^ Wellesley and Blenheim), with four of the East India Company's armed steamers (the Queen, Atalanta, Madagascar and Enterprise^ to which subsequently the Nemesis was added). There wx're also twenty-seven troopships, which brought three regiments (18th Royal Irish, 2Gth Cameronians and 49th Bengal Volunteers), 116 CHArTEU IX. a corps of Bengal Engineers, and a corps of Madras sappers and miners, abonb 4,000 fighting men in all. The expedition was under the command of Sir J. J. Gordon Bremer, subject to the orders of two Plenipotentiaries, viz. Rear Admiral, the Hon. George Elliot, and Captain Oh. EUiot, R.X., the former Chief Superintendent of Trade at Canton. The instructions which the Cabinet had given to the two Plenipotentiaries were, (1) to obtain reparation for the insults- and injuries offered to Her Majesty's Superintendent and to Her Majesty's subjects by the Chinese Government, (2) to obtain for British merchants trading with China an indemni- fication for the loss of their property incurred by the threats of violence offered by persons under the direction of the Government, and (3) to obtain a certain security that persons in future trading with China shall be protected from insult or injury, and that their trade and commerce be maintained upon a proper footing. It will be observed from the tenor of these general instructions, that the object of the expedition was not to make war against China, but to communicate with the Chinese Government (at Peking), in order to obtain official redress and indemnity for the past and commercial immunities and securities for the future. The means and mode of procedure now prescribed Avere exactly what so many former Canton residents and notably Mr. James Matheson had recommended in 183G. An appeal^ against the doings of the Cantonese Authorities, was to be made to a misinformed and misguided Emperor and negotiations were to be instituted with the moral support of the presence of an expeditionary force ready for war in case pacific measures should prove fruitless. Apart from the indemnity for the opium extorted by Lin, the opium question was not included in the l^rogramme, and very justly so, for in the reckoning which England had now risen up to make with China, virtually for two centuries of ill-treatment accorded to her merchants, the opium question was a mere accidental extra. Finally, it will also be observed that, among the objects of the expedition, the EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OP HONGKONG. HJ -cession of any portion of Chinese territory, or the formation of a British Colony in the East, was not inchuled. This was no donbt agreeable to Captain Elliot who, as we have seen, was inverse to the notion of appropriating Hongkong or any other island for the pnrposes of a Colony and merely looked for a safe trade station on the coast and preferably at Macao. The Indian Government suggested to the Plenipotentiaries that, immediately upon the arrival of the expedition in China, the Bogne forts should be razed to the ground, and the Island of Lantao (\V. of Hongkong) occupied as a commissariat depot, with might at some future time answer as a trade station. But, as the first object of the expedition was peaceful communication with Peking rather than war at Canton, the two Plenipotentiaries •agreed to abstain from any demonstration involving bloodshed as long as possible. However, to prevent any misunderstanding at Canton, Commodore Bremer was directed to give notice (June 21, 1840) that a blockade of the port of Canton, by all its entrances, would commence on June 28, and further, in order to have a jioint cCappiU for the expected negotiations in the North, €ommodore Bremer proceeded at once with an advanced force to take possession of the Island of Chusan, which was accordingly done (July 5, 1840) by the occupation of Tinghai. Admiral Elliot and Ca])tain Elliot, following (June 30, 1840) in the wake of Commodore Bremer with the remainder ■of the expedition, endeavoured first to induce the Authorities of Chehkiang (the province to which Chusan belongs) to forward -to Peking a dispatch signed by Lord Palmerston and addressed ito the Imperial Authorities at Peking, but eventually they proceeded, to Tientsin where the dispatch was delivered to the Viceroy of Chihli, called Kishen. According to Chinese history, Lord Palmerston's dispatch, after making certain statements intended to enlighten the Emperor as to the doings of the Cantonese Authorities, made the following demands, viz. -(1) payment of an indemnity for the value of the opium extorted •by Lin, (2) the opening of five treaty ports (Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Tinghai and Shanghai), (3) terms of official com- 118 CHAPTER IX. municatioii on the basis of international equality, (4) payment of the costs of the expedition, (5) a guarantee that one set of merchants, should not be held responsible for the doings of another, and (G) the abolition of the Hong Merchants' monopoly. It will be observed that here also neither the cession of Hongkong, nor the establishment of a Colony anywhere else, was included in the programme. But as the Governor General of India had referred to Lantao, and as the Plenipotentiaries, immediately after the capture of Tinghai, organized a complete civil, judicial and fiscal administration for the whole Island: of Chusan, as if it was to be a British Colony, the chances of Hongkong now seemed even farther removed than ever. The Emperor's eyes were opened at last when he perused Lord Palmerston's dispatch, and seeing that he had either to concede the British demands or go to war, he is said to have observed, as he laid down the dispatch, that 'Lin caused the war by his excessive zeal and killed people in order to close their mouths.' Lin's enemies at Court now poured into the Imperial ear all sorts of whispers, in consequence of which both Lin and Tang (the former Viceroy of Canton, now Viceroy of Fohkien) were degraded. Kishen Avas appointed Imperial Commissioner to arrange the Canton affairs, but he was hampered by the direction to consult Lin and Tang as to the measures to- be taken. Eleepoo, the Viceroy of Nanking, was also appointed Imperial Commissioner and directed to proceed to Ningpo (opposite Chusan) to settle the Chusan affairs. After various negotiations with Eleepoo, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries concluded at Chusan a truce (November 6, 1840) on an undefined general understanding that the peaceful negotiations, which had commenced, should be continued and concluded at Canton by Kishen, and that meanwhile the English would hold Chusan; as a guarantee. Whilst the Plenipotentiaries were occupied in the North, Commissioner Lin, though chafing under the blockade of the Canton River, continued at first his former course of egging on the scum of the people to acts of violence against the English EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. 119 and placarded the walls of Macao again with inflammatory denunciations directed against the English residents at that place. The Rev. V. Stanton, officiating as British Chaplain at Macao, was kidnapped on the shore (August 5, 1840) and kept under close confinement in a common prison in Canton, until he was released by Kishen (December 12, 1840). Owing to Lin's interference with the supply of provisions at Macao, four British gunboats shelled and captured the Chinese barrier fort near Macao (August 19, 1840) ; otherwise no serious movement of any importance took place near Canton until the conclusion of the truce. When the news of the Chusan truce reached Macao, disappointment, doubt and anxiety prevailed among the British community. As soon as the two Plenipotentiaries arrived, five British firms (Dent, Bell, Mcvicar, Gribble Hughes and Dirom) sent a joint address to Captain Elliot, inquiring, whether the truce of Chusan implied a suspension of the Canton blockade, whether it had been determined that British trade should in future be carried on outside the Bogue, or whether it be contemplated that English ships should enter the Bogue and trade be carried on, temporarily, at Macao. To this inquiry Captain Elliot replied from Tungku (November 27, 1840), declining to answer these questions on the ground that he was iojiornnt of the intentions of the Chinese Government. But, as Admiral Elliot, suffering under a severe illness, had to resign his post and to return to England (December 1, 1840), leaving to Captain Elliot the conduct of the negotiations as sole Plenipotentiary, it was generally assumed that Elliot would press for British trade to be conducted thenceforth outside the Bogue, business being conducted exclusively at Macao. Sir H. S. Fleming Senhouse partially succeeded Admiral Elliot in the command of the fleet, the command of the whole expedition remaining in the hands of Sir J. J. Gordon Bremer. At Canton, the Chinese officials and people were in a similar state of uncertainty and misgiving, until Kishen's arrival (November 29, 1840). When Elliot sent the steamer Queen^ 120 CHAPTER TX. under u flag of truce, to the Boone (November 20, 1840), to iiiinouiice Lis arrival and to deliver a dispatch by Eleepoo addressed to Kishen, she was fired upon by the Bogue forts, and the solid shot which the Queen dropped into the forts in return for the discourtesy were presented to Lin in great triumph, but an apology was tendered subsequently. In sending this apology the Chinese officials, for the first time, addressed Elliot in terms of proper respect. As soon as Kishen arrived in Canton, he was entreated by the officials, literati and gentry of Canton, not to give up a stone of their fortresses nor an inch of their territory, but to resume hostile operations at once. Kishen, however, had formed a better estimate of the power of foreign arms, strategy and discipline, and was honestly determined to make peace, yielding, however, as little as possible. But as he by this policy ran counter to popular feeling and lost the confidence and hearty co-operation of all his local subordinates, his position was extremely difficult. Negotiations were accordingly protracted from day to day and from week to week without any ground being gained. Elliot having asked for a 2)ort outside the Bogue, where British ships might load and unload their cargoes, Kishen thought of offering to Elliot either Amoy or Hongkong. But having been directed to consult Lin and Tang, the latter, a man of keen statesman-like foresight, urged 'that Amoy was the key of Fohkien, and that Hongkong, occupying a central position in Cantonese waters, would be a perpetual menace to the Cantonese Authorities if the English were to fortify the Island of Kwantailou (Hongkong) and the peninsula of Kowloon.' Thus Kishen found himself hemmed in at every step. Lin and Tang secretly counteracted his policy by their influence upon Kishen's local subordinates and Kishen noticed a mutinous spirit all around himself. Lin's intelligence department also would not serve Kishen with a good will and the latter was driven to confide all interpretation work to a man, Pao Pang, who was looked upon by the Chinese as a traitor and by Elliot as a menial, having been formerly Mr. Dent's favourite butler in the old factory days. EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. 121 At the beginnino- of January, 1841, Elliot found himself, after six weeks of negotiations, no nearer a settlement than he had been before. He determined, therefore, to bring matters to a crisis and sent to Kishen an ultimatum (January 6, ISll) to the effect that, unless some definite basis for an agreement was proposed by Kishen by 8 a.m. on the following day, Lhe Bogue forts would be taken possession of forthwith. No answer having been received next morning, the action, thenceforth to be known as the Second Battle of Chuenpi, commenced, at 9.30 A.M. on January 7, 1841, when the fleet attacked the two Bogue forts, Chuenpi (also called Shakok) on the East and Taikok on the AVest of the Bogue, whilst the troops (1,461 men all told) were landed in the rear of the forts and took them by assault. Within an hour and a half, eighteen Chinese war- junks were destroyed, some 500 Chinese soldiers were killed, some 300 more wounded, while the loss on the English side was 38 men wounded (mostly by explosions in blowing up Chinese .powder magazines), and none killed. At 11 o'clock the action was over and the British flag fluttered lustily in the breeze over the smouldering ruins of the Bogue forts. The Chinese historian gives the following account of the Second Battle of Chuenpi. 'Whilst the guns of the English fleet bombarded the two forts in front, a force of about 2,000 Chinef^e ti'aitors scaled the hills and attacked them in the rear. A hundred or more of these were blown up by exploded mines, but the rest, far out-numbering the garrison of GOO men, came .swarming up notwithstanding. Two or three hundred more were killed by our gingalls, but at last our powder was exhausted, and the steam-boats got round the forts and burned our fleet. The other three forts, farther up the river, commanded by Admiral Kwan, Rear-Admiral Li and Captain Ma respectively, had only a few hundred men in them, who could do nothing but regard each other with weeping eyes. Admiral Kwan sent Li to Canton to apply for more troops, but Kishen was obdurate and simply spent the night in writing out further peace proposals which he sent by Pao Pang to Elliot. Hongkong 122 CHAPTER TX. was now offered, by Kishen, in addition to the opium indemnity and the Chelikiang prisoners were exclianged for Tingliai.' Tiie last sentence of this Chinese account of the Second Battle of Chuenpi is of special importance, as it fixes the source from which the proposal to cede the Island of Hongkong; to the British Crown emanated. It was Kishen and not Elliot who proposed the cession. As to the 'Chehkiang prisoners' here referred to, there is some mistake here. Kishen's proposal was to cede Hongkong as a trade station (like Wharapoa) and in exchange for the Bogue forts and Chusan (Tinghai). Sul)- sequently, 'the Chehkiang prisoners,' that is to say, the crew and passengers of the troopship Kite^ which stranded (February 15, 1841) by accident on a shoal near Tinghai and fell into Chinese hands, were naturally surrendered by the Chinese when Tinghai was evacuated. After the capture of the Bogue forts, Admiral Kwan came with a flag of truce, begging for an armistice, in order to give the High Commissioner time to consider certain propositions he intended offering for Elliot's acceptance. The armistice Avas granted and shuffling negotiations recommenced. At last, on January 20, 1841, was concluded the Treaty of Chuenpi. By this Treaty, four preliminary propositions were agreed to by the Chinese and British Plenipotentiaries, to the effect, (1) that the island and harbour of Hongkong (not including Kowloon peninsula) should be ceded for ever to the British Crown, and the Chinese batteries on Tsimshatui dismantled in return for the demolished Bogne forts, (2) that an indemnity of six million dollars should be paid to the British Government in six annual instalments, the first being paid at once, (3) that direct official intercourse between the two countries should be conducted on a footing of international equality, and (4) that the trade of the port of Canton should be opened within ten days after the Chinese new year (therefore on February 1, 1841) and be carried on at Whampoa, until further arrangements should be practicable at Hongkong. All other details were to stand over for further negotiation. It must be added, however, that EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. 123 the first of the foregoing preUmiiiaries of peace was coupled with a proviso, subseqneutly disapproved by the British Grovernment, to the effect that ' all just charges and duties to the Empire of China, upon the commerce carried on at Hongkong, should be paid as if the trade were conducted at Whampoa.' These words indicate that the understanding which Kishen and Elliot, by a mutual compromise, attached to the cession of Hongkong at that time was, that Hongkong should be a hybrid cross between a treaty port of China and a British Colony, the soil being owned by Great Britain but trade charges levied by Chinese officials. Such a mixed constitution would have proved a source of endless friction between the two Governments, besides being a negation of the free traders ' desire of a free port. In notifying Her Majesty's subjects of the successful conclusion of the Chuenpi Treaty (January 20, 1800), Captain Elliot informed them that, pending Her Majesty's further pleasure, there would be no port or other charges to the British Government at Hongkong. Elliot, at the same time, offered the protection of the British flag to the subjects, citizens and ships of foreign Powers, that might resort to Her Majesty's possessions at Hongkong. He also exhorted British merchants to adopt a conciliatory treatment of the Chinese people and to show becoming deference for the country upon the threshold of which they were about to be established, and finally he expressed his gratitude to the officers and men of the expeditionary force, to whose bravery the result now accomplished was largely due. Immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Chuenpi, the British squadron withdrew from the Bogue and moved down to the S. W. Bay of Lantao, leaving behind H.M.S. Samaramj. whose commander (Captain Scott), thenceforth known as Governor of Chuenpi, Avas instructed to hand over to the Chinese Authorities the demolished forts of Chuenpi and Taikok. At the same time, H.M.S. ColinnMne was dispatched to Chusan, to recall thence the remainder of the expedition. On January 24, 1841, Commodore Bremer, having arrived at Lantao from Macao, directed Captain Belcher, in command 124 CHAPTER IX. ^of H.M.S. Sulphur (which has given her name to the Sulphur Channel) to proceed forthwith to Hongkong and commence its survey. Sir E. Belcher, accordingly, landed on Monday, January 25, 1841, at fifteen minutes past 8 a.m., at the foot of Taipingshan, and on the hill, noAV occupied by the Chinese recreation ground. Captain Belcher and his officers, considering themselves the J)ona fide firsb British possessors, drank Her Majesty's health with three cheers, the spot being thenceforth known as Possession Point. This was done unofficially and as an arbitrary preliminary to the survey of the Island. But the next day (January 26, 1841), when the whole squadron had arrived in Hongkong harbour, possession was taken of Hongkong more formally and officially by Commodore Bremer. On Tuesday, January 2G, 1841, the marines from all the ships were landed at the same place as the day before and official possession was taken of the Island by Sir J. J. Gordon Bremer in the name of Her Majesty Queen Victoria. Commodore Bremer was accompanied by his officers, and at the moment when the British flag was hoisted on Possession Point, the marines on the spot fired 2t, feu-de-jo ie, whilst all the ships-of-war in the harbour made the hills re-echo with the thunders of the first Royal Salute ever fired in Hongkong. Sir E. Belcher took tlie true position of Hongkong on a hillock, within a stone's throAv of the houses on Morrison Hill, as being in 22° ]()' 30" N. Lat. and 114° 08' 30" E. Long. He also determined the names and height of the principal peaks as follow, Victoria Peak (1,825 feet), High West (1,774 feet), Mount Gough 1,575 feet), Mount Kellett (1,131 feet), Mount Parker (1,711 feet) and subsequently Pottinger Peak (1,010 feet). It is obvious from the foregoing account of the acquisition of Hongkong, that the actual cession was a surprise to all concerned. Kishen had, at the last moment, reluctantly offered to cede Hongkong, and Elliot, though accepting it, because at the moment he could hardly do otherwise, took it unwillingly. To the British merchants, the leaders of whom in later years stated in a joint memorial to Lord Stanley (August 13, 1845) EXODUS FROM MACAO AND CESSION OF HONGKONG. 125 that 'such a settlement as Hongkong was never actually required by the British merchants,' this sudden establishment of a Colony was as unexpected as the birth of a child into a family generally is to the rest of the children. They could only \yonder how it had all come about, but they could not undo the fact. They had not been consulted about it. There it was: the newborn Colony of Hongkong. And as to the people of England—' What will they say about it at home?' was the anxious thought of both Elliot and the merchants, and none could foretell with certainty whether the new-fledged Colony would ever live to> celebrate its jubilee or indeed outlast the year of its birth. On February 3, 1841, ignorant as yet of the cession as a fait accompli, the Foreign Office dispatched instructions to Captain Elliot which seemed to him to furnish good cause for the expectation that the establishment of a trade station at Hongkon*^ might eventually meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government. This dispatch contained the following prophetic caution : * You are authorized to propose a condition that, if there be ceded to the British CroAvn an island off the Eastern Coast of China to serve as a commercial station for British subjects, the Chinese merchants and inhabitants of all the towns and cities on the Coast of China shall be permitted by the Chinese Government to come freely and without the least hindrance and molestation to that Island for the purpose of trading with the British subjects there established.' Un- fortunately for Hongkong, the injunction here wisely coupled with its probable cession was entirely neglected for years after the cession had been accomplished. Kishen offered Hongkong as a residence for foreigners but he did not intend it to become the Alsatia of China. Difficult as it may be to say, with prefect accuracy and in a few words, how Hongkong came to be ceded to the British Crown, this much Avill be clearly established by the above nar- rative, viz. that the ordinarily current accounts of the 'cession of Hongkong are inaccurate. It is evidently unjust to say,, what is commonly found stated in Continental and American 126 CHAPTER IX. histories of British intercourse with the Far East, that 'the EngHsh wanted Hongkong and they took it by force of arms.' But that is also an unwarranted inference which the •compiler of the Colonial Year Book (1890) has drawn from his view of the cession, by the allegation that ' the annexation of Hongkong affords a remarkable example of the aptitude of the English for grasping the requirements of any given condition of circumstances and meeting them accordingly/ It is to be feared, with all respect for British quickness of perception generally, that in the present case the lesson of the above chapter points rather in the opposite direction. CHAPTER X. Pre-British History of the Island of Hongkong. IDEOLOGICAL upheavals bad felicitously formed Hougkong ^^j of the toughest material and placed it just where the Continent of Asia — large enough for the destinies of China, Russia and Britain— juts out into the Pacific, as if beckoning to the rest of the world to come on. Small as a dot in the ocean, Hongkong was yet formed large enough for its own destiny : to act as the thin end of the wedge which shall yet ojxjn up China to the the civilization of the West ; to form Britain's Key to the East, as the combined Malta and Gibraltar of the Pacific ; to be China's guarantee of British support along the strategic line formed by India, the Straits Settlements and the China Sea. Previous to its cession to the British Crown, the Island of Hongkong was too little known to be accorded special notice either in the Annals or in the Topographies of the Chinese Empire, to which it belonged. Hongkong, and the opposite portion of the mainland of China, known as the Peninsula of Kowloon, together with the few tiny islets situated close inshore (Kellett Island, Stone- cutter's Island, Green Island, Tree Island, Aberdeen Island, Middle Island, and Round Island), all of which are at the present day comprised within the boundaries of the Colony, formed, since time immemorial, a portion of the Kwangtung (Canton) Province. The Island of Hongkong (covering an area of about 29 square miles) is situated, 7G miles S.E. of Canton, near the mouth of the Pearl River, the eastern banks of which are lined by the Tungkoon District (24 miles S.E. of Canton city) and the Sanon District (52 miles S.E. of Canton €ity), of which the Kowloon Peninsula and Kowloon City 128 CHAPTER X. Promontory from the south-eastern extremities, whilst Honglxong is separated from Kowloon Peninsula bj a channel of one nautical mile in width. For many centuries Hongkong formed a i^rt of the Tungkoon District, but when the eastern half of the latter wtis constituted a separate District, called Sanon, the territory now included in the British Colony of Hongkong came under the jurisdiction of the Sanon Magistrate who resides in a walled town on the Canton River called Namtau (or Sanon), and wha has under his direction a Sub-Magistrate residing at Kowloon city, a small fortified town, situated close to the British frontier, in the north-eastern corner of Kowloon Peninsula. The land- register, however, which forms the Domesday Book for the few arable and vegetable fields possessed by the Colony remained all along at Tungkoon. Thence used to issue from time to time the tax-gatherers to dun the villagers for the payment of the grain tax and to worry them into taking out licences for ground newly brought under cultivation. The fishing grounds also, all along the coast of Hongkong and Kowloon, were parcelled out, under special licences for which the Sanon Magistrate's underlings used to collect annual fees. The waters of Hongkong, with the beautiful, roomy and almost land-locked harbour, enclosed on the Korth by the Peninsula of Kowloon and its eastern Promontory, and in the South by the Island of Hongkong with its several bays, were under the special supervision of the Marine Constabulary Station of Taipang, a walled town in the north-eastern portion of Mirs Bay, some 30 miles to the North-east of Kowloon city. But when the Colony became British, the head-quarters of the Colonel in command of the Marine Constabulary stations of Taipang and Kowloon were removed to the citadel of Kowloon city. The above-mentioned administrative and executive arrange- ments date back, in their present form, no farther than the commencement of the present Tatsing (Manchu) Dynasty and notably to the reign of the enlightened Emperor Kanghi (A.D. PRE-BRITISH HISTORY OF HONGKONG. 12^ 1662 to 1722), who took quite an exceptional position in that he positively encouraged foreigners to come to his Court and systematically favoured foreign trade. During his reign the water-ways of Hongkong which, with the Kap-shui-moon and Sulphur channels in the West, and the Ly-ee-moon pass in the East, formed all along the natural highway of commerce, con- necting Canton and the South-west coast with the ports of Swatow, Amoy, Foochow and Shanghai on the East coast of China, rose into commercial importance. As to the history of Hongkong previous to the rise of the Tatsing Dynasty (A.D. 1644) very little is known. There is, however, on the Kowloon peninsula, and within British territory, an ancient rock inscription, on a large loose- lying granite boulder, which crowns the summit of a circular hill, jutting out into the sea, close to the village of Matauchung, directly West of Kowloon city. This inscription, consisting of three Chinese characters (Sung Wong T'ong, lit. Hall of a King of the Sung) arranged horizontally, \^as originally cut about half an inch deep in the northern face of the boulder. The Chinese Government believe it to be a genuine inscription, about 600 years old. The original characters, having become nearly effaced in course of time, were renewed at the beginning of the present century (1807) by order of the Viceroy of Canton, the date of this restoration being recorded by a separate inscription the characters of which are arranged perpendicularly. The memo- ries attaching to this inscription and to the whole hill, which still shows the outlines of the original entrenchments, are so sacred in the eyes of Chinese officials and literati, that excavations and quarrying were prohibited in that locality under the severest penalties. When the Peninsula was leased and subsequently ceded to the British Crown, the Chinese Government specially stipulated that the rock inscription and the whole hill should remain untouched. Nevertheless, quarrying has occasionally been attempted there since the locality came into British possession. Chinese history states that, when the Sung Dynasty was overturned by the invasion of the Mongols under Kublai Khan^ 9 130 CHAPTER X. who subsequently seated himself on the throne of China (A.D. 1280), the last Emperor of the Sung Dynasty, then a young child, was driven with the Imperial Court to the South of China and finally compelled to take refuge on board ship, when he continued his fli2:ht, accompanied by a small fleet. Coasting along from Foochow, past Amoy and Swatow, he passed (about 1278 A.D.) through the Ly-ee-moon into the waters of Hongkong. After a short stay on Kowloon Peninsula, he sailed westwards until he reached Ngaishan, at the mouth of the West River (South-west of Macao). But meanwhile the Mongols had taken possession of Canton and hastily organized a fleet with which they hemmed in the Imperial flotilla on all sides. The Prime Minister (Luk Sau-fu), seeing all was lost, took the youthful Emperor on his back, jumped into the sea (A.D. 1279) and perished together with him. Within a few months previous to this event, the Imperial Court had rested for a while in the little bay of Kowloon, called Matauchung. Tradition says that Kowloon city and the present hamlets of Matauchung and Matauwai were not in existence at the time, and that the Imperial troops were encamped for a time on the hill now marked by the inscription, whilst the Court were lodged in a roughly constructed wooden palace erected at a short distance from the beach, on the other side of Matauchung creek, at a place now marked by a temple. There, it is said, the last Emperor of the Sung resided for a while, on ground now British and in sight of Hongkong, waiting for news from Canton concerning the movements of the Mongols, and hoping in vain to receive succour from that treacherous city. Tradition further states that, ever since the downfall of the ♦Sung (A.D. 1279) and all through the reign of the Mongol Yuen Dynasty (A.D. 1280 to 1333), Hongkong was a haunt of pirates. The bay of Shaukiwan (close to the Ly-ee-moon pass) and the bay of Aberdeen (close to the Lamma channel) were specially dreaded by peaceful traders, because piratical craft used to issue thence plundering or levying black-mail on passing junks. These pirates, it is said, were generally engaged in fishing whilst men PRE-BRITISH HISTORY OF HOXGKOXG. 131 stationed on the hill tops kept a look-ont for merchant vessels. The descendants of these piratical fishermen gave, in subsequent years, an endless deal of trouble to the British Government. It was this piratical predisposition of the fishermen residing in the neighbourhood of Hongkong that had caused the early Portuguese navigators to give these Islands the general name Ladrones. During the reign of the native Ming Dynasty (A.D. 14G8 to ] 028), a period of comparative peace and order ensued whilst the fishing vessels of Shaukiwan and Aberdeen confined their depredations to the regular levy of a small fee, willingly paid by junks benefitting by the short cut afforded by the Ly-ee- moon and Lamma channels or by the safe anchorage which some of the bays of Hongkong provided in case of an approaching typhoon. Both the Peninsula of Kowloon and the Island of Hongkong now began to be peopled by peaceful and industrious settlers from the neighbouring Tungkoon District. The town of Kowloon was formed about this time by settlers speaking the Cantonese dialect, called Puntis (///. aborigines). These Puntis, after denuding the hill sides of all available timber or firewood, took possession of all arable ground to be found on the territory now British, and took out licenses for such fields from the 'Tungkoon Magistracy. Thus the hamlets of Matauwai (near Kowloon city) with Kwantailou (Eastpoint) and Wongnaichung (on the Island of Hongkong) were among the first to be formed, and to them were added later on the hamlets of Sookonpou (Bowring-town), Tanglungchau and Pokfulam. Some of the fishing villages, Chikchu (Stanley), Shekou (between Cape Collinson and Cape D'Aguilar), and Yaumati (on Kowloon Peninsula) now rose also into importance. Among the people then residing on Hongkong a number of families of the Tong clan held all the best pieces of ground and the members of this Tong clan looked upon themselves as the owners of Hongkong. Some time, however, after the Puntis had occupied the best portions of Kowloon and Hongkong, settlers from the Xorth-east -of the Canton Province, speaking a different dialect, called Hakkas {lit. strangers), began to push their way in between Punti 132 CHAPTER X. settlemerjts. These Hakkas cut the grass from the hill sides for fuel, made charcoal as loug as there was any timber left, formed vegetable fields on hilly or swampy ground neglected by the Puntis, started granite quarries, or worked in the Punti villages as blacksmiths or barbers. Thus the Hakka villages of Mongkok, Tsopaitsai, Tsimshatsui and Matauchung were formed on Kowloon Peninsula, and on Hongkong Island the hamlets of Hungheunglou, Tunglowan, Taitamtuk, Shaiwan, Hoktsui, Wongmakok, and Little Hongkong. Similar hamlets were formed by the Hakkas at the quarries of Taikoktsui, Hokiin, and Tokwawan on Kowloon, and at the quarries of Tsattsimui, Shuitsingwan, Wongkoktsui, and Akungngam on the Island of Hongkong. Thus it happened that, ever since the Ming Dynasty, two distinct tribes of Chinese, differing from each other in language, customs and manners, formed the native population of Hongkong and Kowloon. As a rule, the Puntis were more intelligent, active and cunning, and became the dominant race, whilst the Hakkas, good-natured, industrious and honest, served as hewers of wood and stone and drawers of water. But from the first advent of the British and all through the wars with China, the Puntis as a rule were the enemies and the Hakkas the friends, purveyors, commissariat and transport coolies of the foreigners, whilst the fishing population provided boatmen and pilots for the foreign trade. Later on, a third class of natives, speaking another dialect (Tiehchiu, or Swatow dialect), settled at Shaukiwan, Tokwawan, Hunghom and Yaumati. These people, generally called Hoklos, were all seafaring men, bolder in character than either Hakkas or Puntis, and specially addicted to smuggling and piracy. Among all the pirates on the coast, these Hoklos Avere most dreaded on account of their ferocious and daring deeds. In later years, these Hoklos supplied the crews of nearly all the salt smuggling and opium smuggling boats, the terror of the Chinese revenue cruizers. After the downfall of the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1628), the scattered remnants of the Ming army, still hoping to retrieve the il i PRE-BRITLSH HISTORY OF HONGKONG. 133 fortunes of the Ming and to expel the Tsing (Manchus), took refuge on the Island of Hongkong (about A.D. 1G50). Thereupon the Emperor Kanghi issued an Edict, cancelling aU leases issued for Hongkong and calling upon all loyal subjects of the Tatsing Dynasty to withdraw themselves and all supplies of provisions from the Island, until all the rebels who had taken refuge there were starved out and exterminated. All the agricultural settlers, Puntis and Hakkas left Hongkong forthwith — an exodus which, in the history of British Hongkong, was repeated several times — until the rebels had been dislodged and order restored, when they returned and had their licenses renewed. Chinese tradition has nothing further to say of Hongkong, except that, at the beginning of the present century (A.D. 180G to 1810), the present Victoria Peak (1,774 feet high) formed the look-out and the fortified head-quarters of a pirate, named Chang Pao, famous in popular local history for his daring exploits until, having conquered several districts bordering on the Canton River, he was bought over by the Viceroy of Canton and entered his service. As to the name of Hongkong, the Chinese are not in the habit of naming an island, as a whole, apart from any prominent place or feature of it. Previous to the cession of Hongkong, there was no term in existence designating the Island of Hongkong as a whole. The principal port on the South of the Island, now known as the port of Aberdeen, was always known among Puntis, and fishermen especially, as Heung-kong {lit. port of fragrance) and is so known among the natives generally to the present day when referring to the anchorage ^s distinct from the village of Shekpaiwan (Aberdeen village) and the village of Aplichau (Aberdeen Island). The Hakka village of Heung-kongtsai (Little Hongkong) is situated two miles farther inland. The stream which, by a pretty little waterfall, falls into the sea at Aberdeen village (at the present paper mill), has nothing to do with the native term Hongkong, but it attracted European vessels which used to replenish their -empty water-casks there. T'hese European mariners, mistaking 134 CHAPTER X. the name of the anchorage for that of the whole Island, marked the Island of Hongkong on their charts accordingly, and in subsequent years, on the occasion of the Treaties of Chuenpi (A.D. 1841) and Nanking (A.D. 1843), the term 'Hong Kong* was adopted as a designation of the whole Island and thus passed into general use, both among foreigners and natives, and finally the term ' Hongkong ' was used as a designation of the whole Colony (including Kowloon). Along the northern shore of Island there used to be, previous to the British occupation, a narroAV bridlepath leading, high above the beach, across rocks and boulders, all the Avay from Westpoint to a hamlet near Eastpoint called Kwantailou^ described in the first census (May 15, 1841) as a fishing village w^ith 50 inhabitants. This path was used by the crews of trading junks, in cases of wind and tide being unfavourable, to track the junks along by a towing line attached to the peak of the foremast. Now this hard-trodden path standing, to an observer from the opposite shore, clear out from the grass-grown hillside, like a fringe or border along the skirts of the hill, was by the natives called Kwantailou (Jit. petticoat string road), and the hamlet at which this path ended was naturally called by this- same name. But among the Hakkas, the Island of Hongkong^ or rather this northern portion of it, is to the present day called by the same name Kiuntailou. The name of the Kowloon peninsula, which covers an area of four square miles, is derived from a series of nine peaks or ridges (Kau-lung, lit. nine dragons) which form the northern background of the panorama spread out before an observer standing on the northern slope of the Island of Hongkong. After these nine dragons, both the city of Kowloon (which is in Chinese territory) and the Peninsula of Kowloon (ceded to Great Britain in 1861) are named. Previous to the British occupation of Hongkong, the population of it probably never exceeded, at any one time, a total of 2,000 people, including Puntis, Hakkas and Hoklos? whether ashore or afloat. CHAPTER XL Coxfir:\iation of the Cession of Hongkoxg, 1841 to 1843. ^ra^EFORE entering now upon the modern history of Hongkong, ^^ it is necessary briefly to sketch first of all the history of those political events which, directly connected with the Treaty of Chuenpi, and of the cession of Hongkong, brouglit about eventually the confirmation of the cession by the Treaty of Nanking (August 29, 1843). For the latter, thougli not alluding to any previous cession, was virtually but a ratification of the action taken by the representatives of the British Government in taking possession of Hongkong (January 26, 1841) under the Treaty of Chuenpi. Up to the day when the Island of Hongkong was taken possession of, the Imperial Commissioner Kishen appears to have acted in perfect good faith, honestly determined to make peace and to abide by the promises he had made at Tientsin, and by the purport of the truce concluded by Eleepoo at Chusan and confirmed by his own Treaty of Chuenpi. But on the day when Sir J. J. Gordon Bremer took possession of Hongkong (January 20, 1841), believing, with Elliot, that an era of peace was now being inaugurated, Kishen received an Imperial Edict which virtually nullified the Tientsin promises, the Chusan truce and the Chuenpi Treaty, and indicated a complete reversal of that policy which had been initiated by the Emperor whilst the British fleet threatened Tientsin and Peking, The force of Lord Palmerston's arguments, as set forth in his dispatch, was in the fleet which presented the dispatch and not in the text of the latter. The order which Kishen now CJanuarv 20, 1841) 136 CHAPTER XI. received was, ' Let a large body of troops be assembled f\nd let an awful display of celestial vengeance be made.' With these orders in his pocket, Kishen went down next day (January 27, 1841) to the Second Bar Pagoda where, with beaming countenance and a pleasant smile on his lips, he held a levee and entertained Elliot and a select company of British officers at lunch, pretending the utmost cordiality and the frankest determination to carry out the stipulations of the Treaty of Chuenpi. EHiot and the British officers were all completely deceived. Whilst Kishen were pleasantly chatting with his guests near the Bogue, another Edict issued at Peking, in which the Emperor, referring to the j)roposed cession of a port, stated that a glance at these memorials filled him with indignation and grief, that Kishen had deceived him by soliciting as an Imperial favour what the barbarians demanded by force. One more chance was, however, given to Kishen, to amend his craven conduct, by driviuii' off and destroying those foreigners : ' Let him proceed immediately to take command of all the officers and subalterns and lead them on to the extermination of these barbarians, thus hoping to atone for and save himself.' Other Edicts were issued within the next few days ordering the immediate recapture of Chusan, and the dispatch of picked veteran soldiers from Hupeh, Sszechuen and Kweichou to Canton. Three special Commissioners (Yikshan, Lung AVan and Yang Fang) were ordered to proceed to Canton to organize and superintend a war of unconditional extermination. Xo question of opium was now raised. The 'hateful brood of barbarians' were to be destroyed, one and all, by any means, foul or fair. On the day when one of these Edicts was issued at Peking (January 30, 1841) and dispatched so as to reach Kishen in 12 days, Elliot issued a circular to Her Majesty's subjects in China stating that * negotiations with the Imperial Commission proceed satisfactorily.' However, Avhen Elliot had his next interview Avith Kishen (February 13, 1841), he had heard a whisper of the contents of the Edict which had reached Kishen two days before (February 11, 1841) and put a few searching CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 137 questions to him. Meeting with evasive answers, Elh'ofc found his worst suspicions confirmed, and prepared once more for war. Five days later (February 18, 1841) the Chinese themselves commenced hostilities by firing on a boat of the armed steamer Nemesis from a fort on Wangtong island. Next day the British squadron began to assemble at the Bogue. Kishen having formally declined to carry out the stipulations of the Chuenpi Treaty, war was declared, and the Cantonese Authorities com- menced it by the issue of proclamations offering ^50,000 for Elliot or any other 'rebellious ringleader' (February 25, 1841). A landing having been effected by the English, beyond the reach of the Chinese guns, on South-Wangtong (February 25, 1841), a battery was erected there during the night, and at daybreak (February 2^, 1841) commenced the Third Battle of the Bogue, by an attack on the batteries of North- Wangtong and Aneunghoi. In the space of a few hours the Chinese positions were carried, 300 guns spiked, 1,000 prisoners made in the forts, -and about 250 Chinese killed and 102 wounded. Admiral Kwan, the descendant of the god of war, was among the killed. After compelling the prisoners to bury the dead, the victors allowed them all to depart in j^eace. Next day (February 27, 1841) the fleet proceeded to attack an entrenched camp, situated on the left bank of the river, just below Whampoa. It was defended by 100 pieces of artillery and garrisoued by 2,000 men of the elite of the Hunan troops, who offered a brave and determined resistance in a hand to hand fight. But British discipline and pluck scattered them and the camp was carried. An old British ship {Cambridge) which the Chinese had purchased under the name Chesapeake, and fitted out as a frigate, was also captured and blown up, after great slaughter. As the troops advanced beyond Whampoa, destroying battery after battery, the European merchant ships came up to Whampoa apace and resumed trade on the day (March 1^ 1841) when the fleet, by carrying the enemy's works at Liptak and Eshamei, approached Canton city. Major-General Sir Hugh Crough, having arrived (March 2, 1841), took command of the 138 CHAPTER XI. land forces, whilst Captain the Hon. Le Fleming Senhouse commanded the fleet as Senior Naval Officer, in the absence of Commodore Bremer. A masked battery on the N.E. end of Whampoa Island was carried (March 2, 1841) and when Liptak (Howqua's Folly) was occupied (March 8, 1841) by the advanced squadron, the Acting Prefect of Canton city (Yue Pao-shun) came with a flag of truce, begging for a suspension of hostilities for three days. Negotiations commenced but came to nothing. The armistice having expired at 11 a.m. on March 0, 1841, the works in advance of Howqua's Folly were captured at once. Elliot, seeing the city in the power of the fleet anchored close to its southern frontage, assumed that all opposition was now subdued, and issued forthwith a proclamation to the people (March 6, 1841) stating that the Emperor's bad advisers were responsible for the proceedings, that the war was with the Chinese Government, and that the people and the city would be spared, if trade were quietly resumed without further opposition. Trade indeed did Nourish all through this month in spite of the hostilities between the troops, the war being so far only a contest between the naval and military forces of the two countries. But the Chinese officials secretly continued their policy of extermination without flinching. Kishen was arrested by Imperial orders, loaded with chains and thus carried off from Canton (March 12, 1841) to be tried in Peking. On the same day, the first merchant ship, since the raising of the blockade, left Whampoa with a full cargo. Business continued to increase there steadily. Observing, however, acti\'e preparations for a resumption of hostilities in the S.W. of Canton city, the British commanders resumed hostilities (March 13, 1841), when seven batteries, ob- structing the inner passage (Taiwong-kau) from Macao to Canton, being armed with 105 cannons, were captured by the armed steamer Nemesis (Captain Hall), and the fort in the Macao- passage, near Canton, was captured by H.M.S. Calliope (Captain Herbert). A lull of quiet now ensued and lasted for a few days. COXFIRMATIOX OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 139 But on March IG, 1841, a flag of truce having been fired upon by the Chinese, the enemy's works on Fatee and Dutch Folly were attacked and captured and a large flotilla of war junks was destroyed. By this action the western as well as the southern portions of Canton city were brought under the guns of the squadron. The factories also were occupied by British troops (March 18, 1841) and the whole city was now at the mercy of Captain Elliot. But for the second time the city was spared, without a ransom, on condition that the hostile preparations should be discontinued and trade resumed. One of the newly appointed Special Imperial Commissioners, Yang Fang, who, to the chagrin of the Emperor, had boldly recommended that ' a haven for stowage should be allowed to the foreigners,' had already arrived in Canton. He now concluded with Elliot a formal Convention (March 30, 1841). The terms of this Convention were, (1) that the British ships of war remain near the factories, (2) that the Chinese discontinue further preparations for war, (3) that foreign merchants may at once return to the factories and that foreign ships may continue the legitimate trade at Whampao, paying the usual port charges and other duties to the Chinese Government. Yang Fang and the Viceroy (Eliang) issued forthwith a joint proclamation stating that Elliot had assured them that 'all he wanted was trade and nothing else.' Accordingly they exhorted the people, by all means to continue trading with foreigners without fear. At the same time the two officials reported to the Emperor, that Elliot, in saying all he wanted was trade and nothing else, had renounced his claim to Hongkong as well as his former demand of an indemnity for the opium surrendered to Lin, and that the British fleet would retire from Canton as soon as an Imperial Decree authorizing resumption of trade with the barbarians was received. Things now appeared to go on quietly. The Chinese officials, however, continued their warlike preparations, and secretly stirred up the people to join in the war of extermination. The continuance of the trade kept them in funds. So the foundries 140 CHAPTER XI. at Fatshaii were working day and night, casting new cannons and tnrning out, under foreign superintendence, a number of five-ton guns, which were forthwith placed in position for an attack on the British fleet, but, in the absence of proper gun carriages, in a manner which left the guns unworkable. Masked batteries were also erected on the sly along the river front, and new fleets of war-junks and fire-ships were collected in the creeks connecting Fatshan with Canton. Meanwhile, however, trade continued briskly as if all were peace, although a Mr. Field and two young officers of H.M.S. Blenheim were assassinated (March 20, 1841) on their way to Macao. Elliot himself took up once more his residence in the factories (April 5, 1841) where he had been a prisoner but a year before. He did so partly to disarm suspicion as to the good intentions of the English and partly to keep himself informed of what was going on in Canton city, where Lin was still residing as adviser of the Commissioners who were daily expected. As soon as Yikshan, the Chief of the Commission, arrived in Canton (April 14, 1841), together with Lung Wan, the second Commissioner, and the new Viceroy, Kikung, a secret conclave was held between them and Yang Fang, the third Commissioner, and Lin. They all agreed that Canton was defenceless, that there were not sufficient troops to dislodge the British from their present position, and that therefore they should all make a show of friendly relations until the British foi^ces had left Canton, as they intended doing, to prosecute the war in the North, but that, as soon as the expedition had left, they would block up with piles and stone junks every single outlet of the Canton River and re-build every fort, ready to assume the offensive once more. This scheme they confidentially reported forthwith to the Emperor. But Elliot, who generally had good information, heard something of this plan (May 14, 1841) and at once ordered the expedition, which was to have started for Amoy and Xingpo the next day (May 15, 1841), to be postponed indefinitely. H.M.S. ColumUne also had brought news (May 10, CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 141 1841) that Eleepoo had, like Kishen, fallen iuto disgrace, and that Yuekien, one of the most violent enemies of the English, had replaced him as Imperial Commissioner at Niiigpo. Elliot was waiting for the Chinese to strike the first blow. But when he found that the Shameen battery, which had been carried and dismantled in March, was about to be re-armed, he called upon the Cantonese Authorities to stop this and every other warlike movement at once. Finding that they evaded his demands. Captain Elliot forthwith (May 17, 1841) sent for troops from Hongkong. Next day (March 18, 1841), the British forces (consisting of 2, GOO combatants) started from Hongkong for Canton, leaving but a small portion of the 37th Madras Native Infantry to protect the settlement at Hongkong. The Cantonese Authorities meanwhile continued to pretend friendly feelings, whilst heavy masses of picked troops from other provinces were daily pouring into the city. To mislead Elliot and the foreign merchants, the Acting Prefect issued (May 20, 1841) a proclamation urging the people, who were^ leavhig the city in large numbers in dread of the approaching conflict, to remain quiet in their lawful pursuits and to continue trade with foreigners without alarm or suspicion. Unbeknown to Yang Fang, who as an experienced soldier knew the strength of the British forces and accordingly counselled patience, Yikshan made secret arrangements for a simultaneous night-attack on the British fleet, by means of fire-ships. Elliot received information of the proposed movement and immediately issued a circular (March 21, 1841) warning Her Majesty's subjects and all other foreign merchants in the factories to retire from Canton before sunset. At 11 p.m. the attack commenced from the western fort (Saipaotoi) near Shameen, where a new five-ton gun had been mounted. A series of fire-boats came suddenly, with the tide, down upon the British ships. The crews of these fire-ships^ carried stink-pots and fire-balls and were armed with long boarding pikes. The moment the first of these fire-ships were hailed and fired into by the British sentries, the Chinese forts and masked batteries along the river front opened fire on the 142 CHAPTER XI. British ships anchored in the river and the Hunan and Szechnen troops attacked the untenanted factories and plundered them. Yang Fang only heard of the attack when it had commenced. He stamped and swore, but it was too late. The attack entirely miscarried, because the British ships were all on the alert and prepared for it. They immediately poured shot and shell into the fire-ships, the moment they came within » easy range, and then turned their guns on the batteries which were speedily silenced. Next morning all the Chinese batteries within range of the ships were carried by assault and a flotilla of over 100 war-junks and fire-ships was captured and burned (May 22, 1841). The next two days the British forces prepared for a concerted attack on Canton city. On May 24, 1841, after firing a royal salute in honour of Her Majesty's birthday, the afternoon was spent in collecting large numbers of barges for the transport of the troops in shallow water, in replying to occasional shots fired from masked batteries in the suburbs, and in moving troops to their appointed stations. In the evening, nearly 2,000 men were conveyed in large covered barges, collected by Captain Belcher, up the northern branch of the river from Shameen towards the North-west gate of the city. After landing, near the village of Tsinghoi, the guns and artillery during the night, and reconnoitring the neighbourhood at daybreak, a start was made, under the command of Major-General Burrell, at 9 a.m. {May 25, 1841). The troops marched across the swampy paddy-fields in the direction of the North-west gate, driving the village volunteers before them, attacked and carried at the point of the bayonet the four outlying forts outside that and the North gate, and took by assault, though not without considerable loss of men and officer?, a strongly entrenched camp which was protected by the guns on the city walls. At the same time an attack was made on the southern suburbs. Major Pratt, with the Cameronians, took possession of the factories, whilst the ships in the river bombarded the Tartar General's head-quarters. Yikshan and Yang Fang were entirely disconcerted by these movements. They had not expected the city to be attacked in CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 143 the North-west, where its fortifications were strongest, but had prepared for an assault in the South and especially in the East. The bombardment also caused a great panic in the city, while the Chinese five-ton guns could not be brought to bear upon the British ships so as to reply to their fire. The following day (May 26, 1841) the rain poured down in torrents and put almost a stop to the movements of both sides. The British troops were waiting for fresh supplies of guns and ammunition, but before nightfall all preparations for the assault of the city walls were completed aud fifteen pieces of artillery in position before the northern gates. Next morning (May 27, 1841), at the very moment when the attack was going to be sounded, a sudden stop was put to the movement of the troops, to their intense disappointment. The news came that Elliot had concluded a treaty of peace. This Treaty of Canton, arranged between Elliot, Yikshan and Kikung (May 27, 1841) was based on the following stipulations, viz. (1) that the Tartar troops and the braves from the other provinces (between whom and the volunteers there was a deadly feud), amounting to about 35,000 men, should immediately evacuate the city without display of banners ; (2) that the Imperial Commissioners should leave the city within six days and proceed to a distance of at least 60 miles ; (3) that the British forces would not leave Canton nor retire beyond the Bogue, until the following payments had been made, viz. ^6,000,000 as a ransom of the city to be paid within one week, $300,000 compensation for the pillage of the factories, Jll 0,000 for Mr. Moss and the other sufferers by the attack on the British schooner Black Joke, and |25,000 for the owners of the Spanish brig B'dhaino ; (4) that a promise be given, not to re-arm any of the fortified places at the Bogue or inside the river, and to stop all further warlike preparations until affairs should be settled between the two nations ; (5) that trade should at once be resumed at Canton and Whampoa. It will be noticed that Elliot did not expressly include among the stipulations of this Treaty either the confirmation 144 CHAPTER XL of the cession of Hongkong (which, he no donbt supposed,, required no further confirmation), or compensation for the opium surrendered to Lin (which he considered settled by his drafts on the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury). As to a war indemnity, he no doubt reserved that for the reckoning yet to be made with the Imperial Government, the real instigators of the war. The Manchu Annals incorrectly state that Elliot demanded and obtained ' the opium money ' in addition to a * war indemnity,' and make the further doubtful assertion that Elliot first proposed to Yikshan to exchange Tsimshatsui and Kowloon for the Island of Hongkong, but that, when Yikshan pointed out that the Emperor had not yet been invited to agree to the cession of Hongkong, Elliot consented to let the question of Hongkong stand over for discussion (with the Imperial Government). The Annalist accordingly blames the Commis- sioners for omitting, in their reports to the Throne, all reference to the payment of the opium indemnity and to the cession of Hongkong. The advantages gained by this ten days' campaign and the consequent Treaty of Canton were very great. The removal from the scene of those troops which alone had stood the British fire, and which had drawn upon themselves the ill-feeling of the Cantonese so as to cause danger of civil war in the city, was a decided advantage. The expulsion of the Imperial Commissioners, who had been the prime movers in all hostilities, was calculated to make them comparatively harmless, while the temporary crippling of the provincial exchequer deprived them, at least for a time, of the sinews of war. But the greatest advantage gained by the Canton Treaty was the speedy termination of the campaign which, within a few weeks after the first blow was struck, set the British troops free, just when the summer was coming on, to operate in the North. On the day after the conclusion of peace (May 28, 1841), it happened that the third company of the 37th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Hadfield and two subalterns, Devereux and Berkeley, having lost their way, were surrounded, CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 145 late in the evening and far from the main body, by masses of Chinese vokmteers. Seeing that the mnskets of the company (none of which had percussion locks), being soaked with the rain, persistently missed fire, these volunteers attacked our men with long spears and pruning hooks, against which the bayonets were at a fearful disadvantage. But there this little company of sepoys, between fifty and sixty strong, stood undaunted for several hours, formed in square, unable to fire their muskets, but bravely repelling the continued attacks of some two thousand Chinese until at last two companies of Royal Marines came to the rescue and scattered the vokmteers. Yet the rescued company lost only one man killed (hacked to pieces in their sight) and fifteen (including Ensign Berkeley) wounded. This rencontre, between that one company of Madras Native Infantry and a few thousand volunteers near the village of Samyuenli, was vastly exaggerated by the Chinese officials and reported to the Emperor in glowing colours as * the Battle of Samyuen Village,* whereupon the Emperor sarcastically remarked that the Canton yokels appeared to have accomplished more than the whole of the regular armies of China. These remarks of the Emperor gave subsequently an immense impetus to the Fatshan-Canton volunteer movement. Five months later (October 30, 1841), Her Majesty the Queen expressed her entire approbation of the operations against Canton, but Captain Elliot, to whom the credit of the conclusion of the Treaty is due, appears to have received neither approbation nor thanks at the hands of his country. His Treaty of Chuenpi, by which he gained the territory of Hongkong for Her Majesty's possession, remained ignored by both Governments. The six million dollars which he recovered by his Canton Treaty *in diminution of the just claims of Her Majesty's Government,* and which covered the amount of the bills drawn by him on Her Majesty's Treasury in payment of the opium surrendered to Lin, was not applied to that purpose, but his bills were left dishonoured and the opium compensation question allowed to stand over for some years longer, while Her Majesty immediately 10 146 CHAPTER XI. allowed twelve months' fall batta to the naval and military forces in Cliina out of those six million dollars. Elliot may have been to blame for the trust he reposed in Kishen's willingness or ability to carry out the stipulations of the Chuenpi Treaty, for the haste with which he withdrew the British troops from Chusan (though the frightful mortality rate which reigned there may be his excuse), and for his omission to secure the approval of the Emperor before thus carrying out his part of the stipulations. But such errors of judgment ought to have been balanced by the consideration of the many years' faithful and approved service which he had rendered to his country under the most harassing and painful circumstances, and by the heroism he displayed in hurrying to the rescue of his imprisoned countrymen at the risk of his life in 1839. All honour is due to the memory of brave Captain Elliot. Strange to say, Commodore Bremer returned (June 18, 1841) from Calcutta with the news that he had been appointed Joint Plenipotentiary, though, if telegraphic communication had then existed, Ehiot would have been informed long before (May 14, 1841) that both he and Bremer had already been superseded. A few weeks after Commodore Bremer's return, he was, together with Captain Elliot, shipwrecked in the great typhoon (July 21, 1841) and they escaped but by a hair's breadth capture and probable assassination by Chinese pirates or soldiers. Captain Elliot left China for Europe (August 24, 1841) disappointed and unjustly dishonoured, together with Commodore Bremer. There is a singular coincidence in the fact that the fate of Sir George Eobinson, who first recommended the annexation of Hongkong officially, and who was curtly recalled for it, befell also the man who, against his own will perhaps, had procured the formal cession of Hongkong. Sir Henry Pottinger, Baronet, a Major-General in the East India Company's service, had been selected (May 15, 1841) to be Her Majesty's Sole Plenipotentiary and Minister Extraordinary, to proceed to China on a special mission to the Chinese Government. He had, at the same time, been commissioned f CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 147 to act as Chief Superintendent of the trade of Her Majesty's subjects with that country and invested with full power to negotiate and conclude a Treaty for the arrangement of the differences subsisting between Great Britain and China. For the latter purpose, Major-General Sir Hugh Gough and Admiral Sir William Parker were associated with him as respective Oommanders-in-chief of the military and naval forces in China. Sir H. Pottinger having arrived at Macao (August 10, 1841) together with Sir W. Parker, by the steam-frigate Sesostris, and called on Governor Pinto, held forthwith several conferences with Captain Elliot, Sir Hugh Gough and Mr. A. R. Johnston. He next dispatched (August 13, 1841) his Secretary, Major Malcolm, to Canton, to deliver to the Imperial Commissioners and to the Viceroy dispatches announcing his arrival as Sole Plenipotentiary, and w^arning the Chinese Authorities that the slightest infringement of the terms of the truce, concluded by the Treaty of Canton, would lead to an instant renewal of hostilities in the Canton Province. The arrival of these dispatches, and the plain warning thus given to the Chinese Authorities, caused great excitement afc Canton. The literati and gentry viewed . the attitude of .superiority and the tone of undisguised severity, which Sir H. Pottinger had adopted in these dispatches, so utterly at variance with the polite and humbly respectful style of Elliot's communications, as a studied insult and unbearable disgrace. The popular feeling, thus aroused, vented itself at the next public examination of graduates (September IG, 1841), when the Acting Prefect (Yii Pao-shun) was hooted by the students and driven out of the examination hall as a public traitor. The people now made common cause with their officials, though they hated them, and the officials, egged on by the literati to defy Sir H. Pottinger's warning, waited only for a diminution of the forces at Hono-kong when they re-built most of the forts inside the Bogue. But when they attempted (September, 1841) to re-arm the Wangtong forts, close to the Bogue, H.M.S. Royalist, forming part of the small squadron under the command 148 CHAPTEU XL of Captain Xias (of H.M.S. Herald), immediately destroyed the works without ado. On the day of his arrival at Macao (August 10, 1841), Sir H. Pottinger issued a Gazette Extraordinary to inform Her Majesty's subjects at Macao and Hongkong of his appointment and the nature of his commission. Two days later he intimated (August 12, 1841) that the primary object of his mission was to secure a speedy and satisfactory close of the war, and that no consideration of mercantile interests would be allowed to interfere with that object. In the same notification he referred to * the well-understood perfidy and bad faith ' of the Cantonese Authorities, and warned British subjects of a probable interrup- tion of the present truce, cautioning them against putting' themselves or their property in the power of the Chinese officials. As to the occupation of Hongkong, Sir H. Pottinger stated, at the close of this notification, that the arrangements made by his predecessor with reference to Hongkong should remain in force ' until the pleasure of Her Majesty regarding that Island and those arrangements should be received.' These words plainly intimated that the Chuenpi Treaty and the cession of Hongkong, and especially the. act of formally taking possession of the Island in the name of Her Majesty, had so far been neither disapproved nor formally approved by Her Majesty's Government. Things were left in statu quo and that meant, to all practical intents and purposes, tacit provisional confirmation of the cession of Hongkong. On August 21, 1841, the expedition started from Hongkong, the ships being all cleared for action. A descent was made first upon Amoy. The forts, town and citadel of Amoy, together with the fortified island of Kulangsoo, were captured (August 26, 1841). Leaving a small garrison at Amoy, the expedition proceeded to Chusan, where Tinghai fell into the hands of the English after a noble resistance (October 1, 1841). In taking possession again of the whole island of Chusan, Sir H. Pottinger notified (October 2, 1841), by a public circular, that under no circumstances would Chusan be restored again to the Chinese CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 14^ Oovernment, until the whole of the demands of England (as previously made at Tientsin) were not only complied with but carried into full effect. The fortified towns of Chinhai (October 10, 1841) and Ningpo (October 13, 1841) were next occupied. At Chinhai a most obstinate resistance was offered by the Chinese troops. When the Imperial Commissioner Yue-kien, who had previously tortured and murdered an English prisoner (Captain Stead), saw that all was lost, he committed suicide rather than surrender himself into the hands of the English. The transport Nerhudda having been wrecked on the Formosau coast (September 2G, 1841), nearly the whole of the crew and passengers were murdered by Chinese officials in prison. The same scenes occurred after the wreck of the British brig Anne. These dastardly deeds, for which a Manchu Brigadier called Tahunga was chiefly responsible, were reported to the Emperor, and gloated over all through the Empire as great victories gained in battle, and Tahunga was promoted in consequence. On receiving the news of the fall of Tinghai, Chinhai and Ningpo, the Emperor immediately ordered the defences of Tientsin and Taku to be strengthened (November 1, 1841) and a])pealed to the whole nation to rise against the English and continue unsparingly the war of extermination (November 15, 1841). Kisheu was now pardoned and called into service again as assistant to Yikking, who was dispatched (December 1, 1841) as Imperial Commissioner to recover Chinhai at any cost. A lull now ensued in the proceedings. The Chinese felt that the supremacy of China over the rest of the world was at stake and carefully prepared for the struggle which was to decide the question for ever. The British expedition also was waiting for reinforcements, as sickness had made great havoc among the troops. Sir H. Pottinger meanwhile returned to Hongkong and Macao where he learned that the Cantonese had, for months past, been straining every nerve to prepare .for an early renewal of hostilities. The Imperial Commissioner Yikshan had enrolled (October 8, 1841) large bodies of paid village volunteers for the defence of Canton city, to the great annoyance 150 CHAPTER XI. of the citizens. Sfconeboats had been scuttled at Howqua's Foll^ and in Blenheim Reach, to obstract access to Canton. The Chinese gunpowder factories — one of which, near Canton city^. blew up by accident (January 12, 1842) — were working extra time. The cannon foundries at Fatshan were turning out superior kinds of brass guns of a foreign pattern. Six new forts had been constructed under foreign advice, and an army of 30,000 men was under instruction in the use of musket and bayonet. Sir H. Pottinger stopped the seizure of Chinese vessels which had been ordered by the officer (Captain Nias) who, after the death at Hongkong of Sir Humphrey Le Fleming Senhouse (June 13, 1841), had succeeded to the post of Senior Naval Officer. But Sir H. Pottinger at the same time warned the Cantonese Authorities repeatedly that the least attempt to rebuild the Bogue Forts would bring upon Canton a most severe chastisement. During the month of March, 1842, the struggle was to be renewed. For months previous to that date the Provincial Authorities up and down the coast made extensive preparations with a view to resume the combat, in March, by simultaneous attacks upon the British positions at Hongkong, Chinhai and Ningpo. As to Hongkong, it appears from Chinese records that Yikshan had secretly reported to the Emperor, that Hongkong had but a feeble garrison of Indian trooj)S, and that among the large Chinese population that had flocked to that Colony, he had secured the services of 3,000 Chinese residents of Hongkong: who had promised to rise against the foreigners at the proper time, whilst the remainder of Chinese residing in the Colony were all desirous to return to their Chinese allegiance. To provide a popular leader for this movement, the Emperor selected. Kiying for the purpose of organizing a sudden massacre of all foreigners at Hongkong. At the same time, a Censor, Soo Ting-kwai, reported to the Throne, that the moment was propitious for a general attack on the British positions in China,, because the Nepaulesc had commenced war against them in. CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. - 151 India and the British commanders in China had thereby been compelled to send many of their ships to India to rescue their countrymen there. Kiying was accordingly ordered by the Emperor to proceed immediately to Canton, with a view to direct the attack to be made on Hongkong, but soon after he had started he was recalled again, because the Emperor had learned that Nanking was threatened by the British forces. The preconcerted attack on the British positions at Ningpo and Chinhai was now made at once (March 10, 1842) but failed. Not only were the assaults immediately repelled, but the British forces now resumed the offensive, capturing the district cities of Tszeki (March 15, 1842) and Chapu (May 18, 1842) and moving northward in the direction of Nanking. Through the recall of Kiying and the advance of the British forces, the intended rising in Hongkong came to nothing. Rumours of a proposed attack on Hongkong were repeatedly referred to in the local papers (April 21 and July 28, 1842) but found no credence among the European community. Nevertheless Admiral Cochrane and General Burrell deemed it prudent (about the middle of July) to make a counter-demonstration by proceeding with a small squadron up the Canton River as far as Whampoa. This measure had the desired effect. But the British residents of Hongkong never knew what a serious danger they had escaped. Yikshan and the Viceroy of Canton commenced (since February, 1842) negotiations with the French, or, if the Manchu Annals (partly translated by Mr. E. H. Parker) are to be trusted, had offers to build war-ships for use against the English thrust upon them. Yikshan and Kikung had several interviews with M. de Challaye, the French Consul at Canton, and Colonel de Jancigny (the latter having just arrived on a commercial mission to China). Possibly, the aim of M. de Challaye was merely to tender the mediation of the French Government with a view to arrange terms of peace, whilst M. de Jancigny was looking for orders for French manufacturers of warlike stores. Yikshan reported to the Emperor the offers of assistance he had received from the French, but added, ' the enemy's designs 152 CHAPTER XI. are unfathomable and possibly they are really assisting the English in an underhand way and acting as spies on us for them.' The Manchu Annalist further states that 'the French hung on from February to June (1842) awaiting our commands and at last, in June, proceeded to Wusung, but the English were already far up the Yangtsze.' But, whilst the Cantonese officials distrusted this first syndicate represented by Colonel de Jancigny, a wealthy private citizen of Canton, Poon Sze-shing, received permission from the Emperor to employ Colonel de Jancigny to order out from France a number of war vessels, gnns, and torpedoes (then quite a novelty), for use against the English, and to re-organize, with de Jancigny's advice, the whole Cantonese navy. These intrigues were, however, too late in the field. Whilst the Cantonese were wasting public and private funds in purchasing new and expensive munitions of war, the English expedition in Central China made a speedy end of the war. After the fall of Wusung (June 16, 1842) and Shanghai (June 19, 1842) the Chinese Commissioners offered terms of peace. Sir H. Pottinger, who had rejoined the expedition (June 22, 1842), informed them what the demands of England were, but declined entering upon any negotiations with the Commissioners until they had received the authority of the Emperor to concede those demands. Sir H. Pottinger also issued a public proclamation (July 5, 1842) in which he informed the Chinese people of the real points at issue between England and China. This proclamation brought forward four complaints and three demands. The complaints were, (1) that, whilst English merchants had for two centuries patiently suffered continuous ill-treatment at the hands of Cantonese officials, this systematic ill-usage exceeded all bounds when Commissioner Lin, in 1839, instead of seizing the actual offenders, Chinese and foreign, implicated in the opium traffic, forcibly confined an English officer and English merchants and threatened them with death, so as to extort from them what opium there might be in China at that time, in order to gain favour with the Emperor; (2) that i CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 153 the Ministers at Peking, *men without truth or good faith,' after concluding a truce and sending Kishen to Canton to arrange terms of peace, suddenly changed their minds, replaced Kishen by Yikshan and commenced a war of extermination, thus compelling the English to take the Bogue Forts, to bring Canton itself to submission, and to take from it a ransom for the punishment of such ill faith ; (3) that the High Commissioner Yuekien and other high officers, like Tahunga, had tortured and killed shipwrecked Englishmen, reporting such brutal outrages committed on defenceless individuals to the Emperor as victories gained in battle ; and finally (4) that the Cantonese Authorities, seeking to confine to themselves the profits of the foreign trade and extorting, through the Hong Merchants, illegal payments from the foreign merchants, disguised everything under false statements to the Emperor. The demands which the English nation was thus in justice entitled to make were (1) compensation for losses and expenses, (2) a friendly and becoming intercourse on terms of equality between officers of the two countries, and (3) the cession of insular territory for commerce and for the residence of merchants and as a security and guarantee against future renewal of offensive acts. This appeal to the conscience of the nation, and this impeachment of the Manchu Government at the bar of public opinion in China, had a very great effect. It was, as many Chinese themselves acknowledged, a truthful exposition of the real issue of the conflict between China and England, caused by the treatment accorded to foreigners at the hands of Chinese officials, who acted on the supposition of China's absolute supremacy and in defiance of international equality. Moreover, this proclamation, whilst justifying the cession of Hongkong and the occupation of Chusan, gave to the opium question that accidental and extraneous position which it really occupied in the history of this first Anglo-Chinese war. Whilst the British forces were steadily advancing towards Ohinkiang and Nanking, the minds of the Chinese officials and people in the North were filled with dread. The superiority 154 CHAPTER XI. of British strategy, arms and discipline, over the best Chinese military resources and efforts, were painfully obvious to the whole nation. All through the maritime provinces, public opinion now began to turn in favour of making peace with the English, the people having to their surprise noticed that the English confined their warHke operations to retributive dealings with the Government troops and spared the people themselves as much as possible. Yikshan now wrote to the Emperor that the Cantonese were all in league with the foreigners. A feeling of despair began to take possession of the statesmen, officials and military leaders of China, and a positive panic fell on them when a total eclipse of the sun, the usual presage, according to Chinese superstition, of national disaster, occurred (July 8, 1842) during the advance of the English fleet on Nanking. With the capture of Chinkiang (July 21, 1842) the key to the Grand Canal, the principal channel of the food supply of North-China, fell into the hands of the English. Kiying, Eleepoo and Niu Kien now (July 22, 1842) offered terms of peace again, but were once more told to go and get first of all the Emperor's approval of the British demands as a whole, and then they might come and discuss details. The expedition steadily continued its onward move towards Nanking. On August 9, 1842, the troops were landed a few miles from Nanking, a reconnaissance was made, and two days later everything was in readiness for an assault on Nanking city (August 11, 1842), when an armistice was applied for and granted for the purpose of obtaining tlie Emperor's sanction of the formulated British demands, in order to conclude on that basis a formal treaty of peace. The stipulations were forwarded (August 13, 1842) to Peking by special messenger, and, on his return with the Emperor's approval, the Treaty of Nanking, between Her Majesty the Queen of England by Sir H. Pottinger on the one side, and the Emperor of China by the Commissioners Kiying, Eleepoo and Niu Kien on the other side, was solemnly concluded (August 29, 1842). Major Malcolm started next day for London, with one copy of the Treaty, to lose no time in obtaining Her Majesty's signature, COXFIRMATION OP THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 155 whilst another copy was immediately forwarded to Pekino; and returned thence with the Emperor's signature a fortnight later (September 15, 1842). The demands agreed to by the Treaty of Nanking were: (1) peace and friendship between China and England; (2) the^ opening of five ports, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, for the residence of British merchants, and their families, under the extra-territorial jurisdiction of British; Consular officers ; (3) the cession of Hongkong ; (4) payment of an opium indemnity of six million dollars ; (5) payment of the Hong Merchants' debts, amounting to three million dollars ; (G) payment of twelve million dollars war expenses; (7) all payments to be made, with interest at 5 per cent., within fixed: periods ; (8) release of all prisoners of war ; (D) a general amnesty in favour of all Chinese who had served the English during the war; (10) a fair and regular tariff of export and import duties and transit charges; (11) fixed terms of equality to be used in official correspondence ; (12) withdrawal of British troops from banking, Chinkiang, Chinhai, Chusan, and Kulangsoo on certain conditions; (13) ratifications of the Treaty to be exchanged as soon as possible. This Treaty is more noteworthy for the stipulations omitted than for those included in it. The prohibition or legalisation of the opium trade was not referred to. The war had not been undertaken for the sake of opium. China was therefore justly left free to settle the opium question at her own sweet will. More remarkable is the omission to- secure for Chinese settlers on Hongkong freedom of commercial intercourse with the mainland of China, in the sense of the Foreign Office instructions of February 3, 1841. Mandarindom was lefc unaccountably free to make or mar the fortunes of Hongkong as a settlement for Chinese. Whilst negotiating the provisions contained in the third article of the foregoing Treaty, Sir H. Pottinger was informed by the Commissioners, that the cession of Hongkong had some time ago been approved by the Emperor, and needed no further confirmation. Sir H. Pottinger, however, wished the cession 156 CHAPTER XI. of Hongkong to be discussed de novo, and informed the Commissioners, as he himself subsequently (January 21, 1843) stated in writing to a Committee of British merchants, that, *the British Government holding Hongkong could not in any way disadvantageously affect the external commerce of China, because the English Government had no intention of levying any kind of duties there,' and that * Hongkong was merely to be looked upon as a sort of bonded warehouse in which merchants could deposit their goods in safety until it should suit their purposes to sell them to native Chinese dealers or to send them to a port or place in China for sale.' This is a point of considerable importance, as it indicates that the free-port character of Hongkong was the preliminary understanding on which the third article of the Nanking Treaty and the cession of Hongkong to the British Crown was now based. The future discontinuance or continuance of the freedom of the port of Hongkong is therefore by no means an open question left to the discretion of the Colonial or Imperial British Governments, but the latter is absolutely bound by the Nanking Treaty, as negotiated by Sir H. Pottinger, to maintain the freedom of the port from all export or import duties of any sort. It was on this understanding that the Chinese Govern- ment issued, with Sir H. Pottinger's express approval, an edict allowing free and unrestricted intercourse to all vessels from treaty ports in China to Hongkong, and vice versa, on payment of the export or import duties, as well as anchorage or harbour charges, legally due at the ports to which goods may be carried or from which they may be shipped within the Chinese Empire. The Chinese Government having thus acted on the promise of Sir H. Pottinger that Hongkong should remain a free port, the British Government would seem to be bound in good faith to maintain the freedom of the port inviolate. The Article referring to the cession of Hongkong runs thus : ' It being obviously necessary, and desirable, that British subjects should have some port whereat they may careen and refit their ships when required and keep stores for that purpose, CONFIRilATIOX OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 157 His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, &c., the Island of Hongkong, to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic Majesty, her Heirs and Successors, and to be governed by such laws and regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, &c., shall see fit to direct.' The reason here given why Hongkong should be ceded is rather curious. It appears to be rather Elliot's than Pot- tinger's view of the rakoii iVetre of a British possession called Hongkong. We should not be surprised to find that the English rendering of this third Article of the Nanking Treaty is a literal translation of the Chinese text of the corresponding Article of the Chuenpi Treaty. If it was ' obviously ' necessary in 1843, that English merchants should have dockyards and dockyard stores in a separate locality on the Chinese coast, it is very strange that Lord Palmerston and the Cabinet, that Parliament and the nation, could not be brought to see it, though the Mathesons, and Stauntons, and Kobinsons and others did everything to demonstrate that necessity and desirability from 1833 to 1836. Moreover, it was obviously a sort of bonded warehouse, with dwelling houses, out of the reach of the avarice, corruption and oppression of Chinese officials that was needed, far more than dockyards and dockyard stores. And it was a Colony rather than a mere trade station or dockyard that Hongkong had become by the time, when this curious third Article of the Nanking Treaty was drafted. Chastised and humbled as China was by the terms of the Treaty of Nanking, one might suppose that now at last the Chinese had been taught to surrender, once for all, their claim of supremacy over all foreign nations. But the popular Chinese theory, that *as there is but one sun in the heavens, so there can be but one supreme ruler over all under heaven,' which proposition all mankind ought indeed to be ready to assent to in a religious sense, was so ingrained in the diplomatic mind and language of China, in the sense of China's political supremacy, that, within four months after the conclusion of the Nanking Treaty, the Emperor issued an Edict (December 24^ 158 CHAPTER XI. 1842), ordering Eleepoo 'to meet Pottinger and immediately explain to him that the Celestial Dynasty has for its principle, in fioverning all foreigners without its pale, to look upon them with the same feeling of universal benevolence with which she looks upon her own children.' To this non plus ultra of diplomatic cant — for cant it seemed to be in view of the Emperor's rejoicing over the destruction of life caused in Hongkong by the typhoon, and in view of the wholesale murders committed by Tahunga and approved by the Emperor — Sir H. Pottinger replied in good earnest. He at once informed the Emperor, that his Koyal Mistress, the Queen of England, * acknowledges no superior or governor but God, and that the dignity, the power, and the universal benevolence of Her Majesty are known to-be second to none on earth and are only equalled by Her Majesty's good faith and studious anxiety to fulfil her Eoyal promises and engagements.' After this castigation, thus quietly administered by Sir H. Pottinger, the Chinese officials were not only careful to exclude from diplomatic correspondence their usual stock phrases of Chinese political supremacy, but the Yiceroy Kikung actually employed the phrase *the two countries' which, in Elliot's time had provoked the ire and sarcasm of Viceroy Tang, and wrote to Pottinger (April 16, 1843) frankly admitting that * the two countries are now united in friendship.' The news of the conclusion of the Nanking Treaty was received throughout China with a sigh of intense relief. Everywhere the preparations for war were immediately dis- continued. In fact the official measures taken everywhere along the coast indicated plainly that the Provincial Authorities were sincerely determined to abide by and carry out the provisions of the Treaty in good faith. In Canton, the militia was disbanded (October 13, 1842) and all temporary forts were dismantled. There was indeed a brief popular outburst of •excitement in Canton (November, 1842), when it was rumoured that building lots in the Honan suburbs would be appropriated for dwelling houses for foreign merchants and their families. p CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 159 and a mob made an attack upon the factories and partially burned them (December 7, 1842). But the excitement was all over the very next day, when Sir Hugh Gough Avent up to Canton to investigate the state of things. Within a fortnight after this ebullition of popular temper, it was so evident that China meant to abide by the Nanking Treaty, that the military and naval forces were sent back to England, and over 50 transports and ships of war left Hongkong harbour (December 20, 1842) homeward bound. The war was over. The piping times of peace had come, and now it was the mission of Hongkong to smooth down the animosities of the past and to cement friendship between the two countries in the future. Sir H. Pottinger at once set to work (January, 1843) to complete the remainder of his successful diplomatic mission, by settling the details of tariff duties and trade regulations. For this purpose he had frequent consultations with a representative Committee of British merchants consisting of Messrs. A. Matheson, Q, T. Braine, W. Thomson, D. L. Burn, and W. P. Livingston. After the death of Eleepoo (March 4, 1843), Kiying was apjjointed Chief of the Imperial Commission, and it was at once foreseen that he would heartily work together with Pottinger in settling all details. The Viceroy of Canton (Kikung) also kept up friendly relations and cordially accepted Pottinger's offer (April IG, 1843) to co-operate with him in putting down the wholesale smuggling (partly in English craft) then going on, with the connivance of the Hoppo's underlings (as the Viceroy himself admitted), on the Canton River. Previous to Kiying's arrival, the two other members of the Imperial Commission, Wang An-tung and Hienling, visited Hongkong (May 11, 1843) were freely introduced to Hongkong society, dined twice with Sir H. Pottinger, drove out in a carriage (the first that passed the gap) to the Happy Valley, spent an evening at the Morrison Education Society's Institution (on Morrison Hill), attended a parade of artillery under Major Knowles, witnessed the investiture of Sir W. Parker, by Sir H. Pottinger, as Knight Grand Cross of the Bath, and returned to Canton thoroughly charmed with 160 CHAPTER XI. English civilization. Immediately after Kiying's arrival (June 4, 1843), Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, who had meanwhile returned from London with Her Majesty's signature and the Great Seal of England affixed to the Nanking Treaty, proceeded to Canton (June 6, 1843) and invited Kiying to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty at Hongkong. Kiying acceded to the request, repaired to Hongkong (June 23, 1843), with Hienling and Wang An-tung, and the exchange of ratifications was solemnly performed (June 2G, 1843) at Government House (then situated ou the spur above the Gaol). A guard of honour was in attendance, a large number of residents was present, and at the moment when the ratifications were exchanged, a royal salute was fired and responded to from the forts and shipping. Next, Her Majesty's Proclamation, declaring Hongkong to be a possession of the British Crown, was read by Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, in the presence of the Imperial Commissioners. Subsequently, Kiying having retired, the Royal Warrant was read, appointing Sir H. Pottinger Governor of Hongkong and its Dependencies. A large dinner party, given in the evening,, concluded the festivities. Four months afterwards a Supplementary Treaty, concluded by Sir H. Pottinger and the Imperial Commissioners, w^as signed (October 8, 1843) at the Bogue (Foomoonchai), by Kiying and Sir H. Pottinger on behalf of their Majesties, the Emperor of China and the Queen of England. Besides providing all the detailed trade-regulations to be observed at the five open ports- of China, this Supplementary Treaty, the stipulations of which were to be as binding and of the same efficacy as if they had been inserted in the original Treaty of Nanking, contains several articles specially referring to Hongkong. The extradition of criminals was provided for by Article IX, which stipulated that all Chinese criminals and offenders against the law, who may flee to Hongkong or to British ships of war or to British merchantmen for refuge, should be delivered up on proof or admission of their guilt. Article XTV provided, for the purpose of effectually preventing piracy and smuggling, that CONFIRMATION OF THE CESSION OF HONGKONG. 161 an officer of the British Government should examine the registers and passes of all Chinese vessels visiting Hongkong to buy or sell, and that any Chinese vessel arriving in Hongkong without such register or pass should be considered an unauthorized or smuggling vessel, forbidden to trade, and to be reported to the Chinese Authorities. Article XV provided for the recovery of debts, incurred by Chinese residents of Hongkong, through the English Court of Justice, or, if the debtor should flee into Chinese territory, through the British Consul at an open Treaty port. Article XVI provided that the Hoppo of Canton should furnish the corresponding British officer in Hongkong with monthly returns of passes granted to Chinese vessels to visit Hongkong, and that the British officer in Hongkong should forward similar monthly returns to the Hoppo. Article XVII provided for small craft plying between Hongkong, Canton and Macao, being exempt from all port charges if they carried only passengers, letters or baggage, to the exclusion of all dutiable articles. Those of the foregoing articles, which referred to a British officer doing in Hongkong the work of the Chinese revenue preventive service, and which would have practically confined Chinese trade with Hongkong to trade between the five open ports and Hongkong, were disapproved by the Home Government as much as by the local mercantile community. No such British officer was ever appointed, and fifteen years later (June 26, 1858) the whole Suj)plementary Treaty was formally abrogated. The object aimed at by those two Articles (XIV and XVI), the Chinese Government sought later on to attain by the so-called Custom's Blockade of Hongkong, and the duties, assigned by those two Articles to a British officer, are at the present day discharged by the English staff of the Kowloon Imperial Maritime Customs Office, established in Hongkong. As regards that Article of the Nanking Treaty which provided for the payment by the Chinese Government of an opium indemnity amounting to six million dollars, the London Gazette of August 25, 1843, gave notice to those entitled to II 162 CHAPTER XI. compensation, being holders of the certificates given, in 1839, by Captain Elliot for British-owned opium, that they might apply, on or after August 80, 1843, for payment at the Treasury Chambers, at the following rates, per chest, viz. : Patna, £66 7s. ly.; Malwa, £G4 lis. '2d.; Benares, £61 lis. 3^^. ; and Turkey, £43 3s. bd. This arrangement, based on the average l^rices realized in Canton daring 78 days, from September 11 to November 27, 1838, caused much dissatisfaction, as it was alleged that the merchants thus received, after four years' delay, scarcely one half of what they originally had paid for the opium directly to the East India Company, besides losing four years' interest on their capital. But on the other side it might have been urged, that, at the time when the opium was taken possession of by Commissioner Lin, the market was overstocked, sales impossible, and, if Lin had not destroyed the opium but returned it to the merchants, they could not have sold it for anything like what they finally received for it." CHAPTER Xir. f The Administration of Captain Elliot. Jannarij 26 to Aiigicst 10, 1841. JpPAVING, in the preceding chapter, given an outline of the ^^ political events connected with the cession of Hongkong to the British Crown, we now take up the thread of its internal history. On the very day when the Treaty of Chuenpi was concluded (January 20, 1841), Captain EUiot issued a circular at Macao, addressed to Her Britannic Majesty's subjects, informing them that the Island and Harbour of Hongkong had been ceded to the British Crown. The news of the cession of Hongkong was conveyed to England by the steamship Enteiyrise which left China on January 23, 1841. Captain Elliot explained in his circular of January 20, 1841, that Her Majesty's Government had sought for no privilege in China for the exclusive advantage of British ships and merchants, and that he therefore only performed his duty in offering the protection of the British flag to the subjects, citizens and ships of foreign Powers that might resort to Her Majesty's Possession at Hongkong. A general invitation was thus given to all the merchants of other ■countries to utilize the proposed new British trade station for commercial purposes. At the same time, Captain Elliot expressly stated that all just charges and duties to the Chinese Empire were to be paid as if the trade were conducted at Whampoa. The Chinese Government was left at liberty to deal with Hongkong by levying, outside the port and boundaries of the Colony, charges and duties on exports from or imports into Chinese territory. This was probably all that Elliot intended. 1()4 CHAPTER Xir. and in these respects he simply gave to Hongkong the same position wliich Macao had so long maintained. The Island of Hongkong having been formally taken possession of, for the purposes of a trade station, in the name of Her Majesty Queen Victoria (January 20, 1841), Captain Elliot, as Chief Superintendent of the trade of British subjects in China, and holding full powers under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, to execute the office of Her Majesty's Com- missioner, Procurator, and Plenipotentiary in China, issued on January 29, 1841, his first local proclamation (the original of which is, however, dated February 2, 1841). In this proclamation. Captain Elliot, after making due reservation of Her Majesty's rights, royalties, and privileges, declared that the Government of the Island should be exercised, pending Her Majesty's further pleasure, by the person filling the office of Chief Superintendent of the trade of British subjects in China. The next point in Captain Elliot's proclamation of January 29, 1841, was that it established two different systems of government and two separate codes of law for the administration of justice- in Hongkong. Natives of the Island, and all natives of China resorting to Hongkong, ^vere to be governed, pending Her Majesty's further pleasure, according to the laws and customs of ChmaT^very description of torture excepted. But all persons other than natives of the Island or of China, should fall under the cognizance of the Criminal and Admiralty jurisdiction at the time existing in China and enjoy full security and protection according to the principles and practice of British Law. This natural bifurcation reflected, at the first formation of the settlement, the fundamental incompatibility of the Chinese and European systems of civilization, by creating two separate forms of government and two separate codes of law, corresponding with the two separate communities, Chinese and European, which were about to settle at Hongkong and which immediately proceeded to divide the town into separate European and Chinese quarters. Bub regarding this bifurcation, thus provisionally introduced, the pleasure of Her Majesty was subsequently made THE ADMINISTRATION OF CAPTAIN ELLIOT. 165 known, from time to time, gradually extending, by special Ordinances and executive Regulations, the sphere of English forms of government and the application of English Law. This was, however, done cautiously and gradually, in proportion as the two local communities, European and Chinese, were, by the slow process of the interaction of English and Chinese modes of thought, life and education, brought a little nearer to each other. This process (though hardly perceptible) is still going on at the present day, but executive regulations and legal enactments have all along proved utterly futile whenever they went too far ahead of the successive stages reached by this extremely slow process of race amalgamation which depends more on the silent influences of English edacation, English speaking and English modes of living than on the exercise of the rights and powers of the Crown. The Chinese, though the most docile people in the world when under fair government, proved utterly intractable whenever the Executive or the Legislature of the Colony rushed into any unreconciled conflict with deep-seated national customs of the Chinese people. By a second proclamation — issued conjointly by Sir J. J. Gordon Bremer, Commander-in-Chief, and by Captain Elliot, as Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, on February 1, 1841 — all natives of China, residing in Hongkong, were informed that they were all, by the fact of their residing on the Island, which was now part of Her Majesty's Dominions, subjects of the Queen of England, to whom and to whose officers they must pay duty and obedience. Moreover, it was added, that "'the inhabitants are hereby promised protection, in Her Ma- jesty's gracious name, against all enemies whatever and they are further secured in the free exercise of their religious rites, ceremonies and social customs, and in the enjoyment of their lawful private property and interests.' It must be noted that, in the case of this stipulation, not only is the usual reservation * until Her Majesty's further pleasure' omitted, but for it is substituted the positive affirmation that this promise was given * in Her Majesty's gracious name.' Anyhow, Her Majesty never. 166 CHAPTER XII. in the whole history of the Colony, made her pleasure knowa contrary to the just principles of religious and social toleration here guaranteed to Chinese semi-civilized pagans, who were thereby, more than by anything else, induced to flock to- Hongkong and settle on the Island. The same proclamation added, to the statement of the previous proclamation concerning the rule that Chinese in Hongkong should, until Her Majesty's further pleasure, be governed according to Chinese laws, customs and usages (every description of torture excepted), the (detailed IDrovision that, pending Her Majesty's further pleasure, the Chinese in Hongkong should be governed by the elders of villages (Tipos), subject to the control of a British Magistrate. Regarding this point Her Majesty's further pleasure was made known many years after (Ordinance 8 of 1858), when an attempt was made to improve the working of the Tipo system by giving them official salaries. Some years later, when this measure proved fruitless, the Government discarded the Tipo system altogether. Yet, although this system is now officially not recognized and has been replaced by the Registrar General's Office, the Chinese secretly adhere to their own system faithfully. The Chinese people in town are at the present day under the sway of their own headmen (the Tungwa Hospital Committee), and the people in the villages are ruled by their elders, as much as ever. As regards commerce, this same proclamation stated that 'Chinese ships and merchants resorting to the port of Hongkong for purposes of trade, are hereby exempted, in the name of the Queen of England, from charge or duty of any kind to the British Government,' but, it was added, that the pleasure of the Government w^ould be declared from time to time by further proclamations. According to a (seemingly incorrect) statement resting on the authority of Commander J. Elliot Bingham, who was at this time First Lieutenant of H.^I.S. Modesto, the terms of the- Chuenpi Treaty included also the surrender by the Chinese, as neutral ground, of 'the peninsula of Kowloon' meaning THE ADMINISTRATION OF CAPTAIN ELLIOT. 167 probably only Tsimsbatsui). Mr. Bingbam also states tbat, wben fcbe Cbuenpi Treaty was disavowed by tbe Imperial Government, it was seized by the British troops * by right of conquest,' a garrison being kept in * Fort Victoria* (probably on tbe site of the present Barracks), where many commissariat and other stores were deposited. During the course of February, 1841, numerous parties of British and foreign merchants and missionaries came over from Macao to prospect the capabilities of Hongkong and to select sites for warehouses and residences. By the end of March and the beginning of April, 1841, shanties, labourers' matsheds, roughly-built store-houses (called godowns), Chinese shop-keepers^ booths, European bungalows and houses of all descriptions began to rise up. The first buildings erected in Hongkong are said (on the evidence of Mr. W. Rawson) to have been the so- called Albany godowns (near Spring Gardens) of Lindsay & Co. Next rose up the buildings at East Point, where Jardine, Matheson & Co. established themselves. Later on buildings were erected in the Happy Valley and here and there along the hill side as far as the present centre of the town. While the MiUtary and Naval Authorities commenced settling at AVest Point, erecting cantonments on the hill side (on the site of the present Reformatory and later on above Fairlea) and large Naval Stores (near the shore in the neighbourhood of the present Gas Company's premises), the Happy Valley was at first intended by British merchants for the principal business centre. However, the prejudices of the Chinese merchants against the Fungshui (geomantic aspects) of the Happy Valley and the peculiarly malignant fever which emptied every European house in that neighbourhood almost as soon as it was tenanted, caused the business settlement to move gradually westwards. Hill sites, freely exposed towards the South-west and South-east, as well as to the North, were soon discovered as being less subject to the worst type of malarial fever, and were accordingly studded with frail European houses mostly covered at first with palm- leaves. A number of wooden houses were imported from 168 CHAPTER XII. Singapore and erected on lower storeys of brick or stones. But at first the only substantial buildings erected by private parties were a house and godowns built at East Point by order of Mr. A. Matheson who foresaw the permanency of the Colony at a time when most people doubted it. The native stone masons, brick-layers, carpenters and scaffold builders, required for the construction of roads and barracks (by the Engineer corps of the Expedition) and for the erection of mercantile buildings, were immediately followed by a considerable influx of Chinese provision dealers (who settled near the site of the present Central Market, soon known as 'the Bazaar'), and by Chinese furniture dealers, joiners, cabinet makers and curio shops, congregating ■opposite the present Naval Yard, and along Dhe present Queen's Road East, then known as the ' Canton Bazaar.' The day labourers settled down in huts at Taipingshan, at Saiyingpun and at Tsimshatsui. But the largest proportion of the Chinese population were the so-called Tauka or boat people, the pariahs of South-China, whose intimate connection with the social life of the foreign merchants in the Canton factories used to call forth an annual proclamation on the part of the Cantonese Authorities warning foreigners against the demoralising influences of these people. These Tan-ka people, forbidden by Chinese law (since A.D. 1730) to settle on shore or to compete at literary examinations, and prohibited by custom from intermarrying with the rest of the people, were from the earliest days of the East India Company always the trusty allies of foreigners. They furnished pilots and supplies of provisions to British men-of- war, troopships and mercantile vessels, at times when doing so was declared by the Chinese Government to be rank treason, unsparingly visited with capital punishment. They were the hangers-on of the foreign factories of Canton and of the British shipping at Lintin, Kamsingmoon, Tungku and Hongkong Bay. They invaded Hongkong the moment the settlement was started, living at first on boats in. the harbour with their numerous families, and gradually settling on shore. They have maintained ever since almost a monopoly of the supply of pilots and ships' THE ADMINISTRATION OF CAPTAIN ELLIOT. 169 crews, of the fish trade and the cattle trade, but unfortunately also of the trade in girls and women. Strange to say, when the settlement was first started, it was estimated that some 2,000 of these Tan-ka people had flocked to Hongkong, but at the present time they are about the same number, a tendency having set in among them to settle on shore rather than on the water and to disavow their Tan-ka extraction in order to mix on equal terms with the mass of the Chinese community. The half-caste population in Hongkong were, from the earliest days of the settlement of the Colony and down to the present day, almost exclusively the off-spring of these Tan-ka people. But, like the Tan-ka people themselves, they are happily under the influence of a process of continuous re-absorption in the mass of the Chinese residents of the Colony. In addition to this spontaneous influx of Chinese provision- dealers, artizans, labourers and boat-people, there commenced also, early in 1841, a natural trade movement, which, if war-times had been protracted or if the Chinese Mandarins and the policy of the Hongkong Government had permitted its continuance, would have resulted in the gradual transfer to Hongkong of the larger portion of the Macao and Canton junk-trade and made Hongkong the trade centre of the whole coast of the Canton Province and the great depot of the entire China trade. We have on this point the valuable evidence of Mr. A. Matheson (given before the Select Committee of the House of Commons x>n May 4, 1847). * Prior to our taking possession of Hongkong, and for some time after, all the native traders between Canton and the East Coast passed through the harbour, and generally anchored there. When the first Europeans settled in Hongkong, the Chinese showed every disposition to frequent the place; and there was a fair prospect of its becoming a place of considerable trade. The junks from the coast made up their cargoes there, in place of going to Canton and Macao; these cargoes consisted of opium, cotton shirtings, a few pieces of camlets, and other woollens, and Straits produce, such as pepper, betel-nut, rattans, &c.' Mr. William Scott, another former Canton 170 CHAPTER XII. and Hongkong merchant, gave simillar evidence (May 18, 1847) to the effect that, in the first instance, there was no disinch* nation whatever on the part of the respectable Chinese shopkeepers, and other useful people, to come to the Colony. Lieutenant- Colonel Malcolm's evidence (June 1, 1847) confirms the foregoing statements. * In a few months,' he said, ' an extensive trade sprung up and immense quantities of piece goods were sold on the island, which were transported to the mainland in native boats. Small vessels were passing hourly between Canton and Hongkong carrying the goods which were sold by sample at the former place, and daily vessels were coming from the north to obtain supplies for the other ports.' Both Mr. A. Matheson and Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm further stated that this prosperous state of things, brought on rather suddenly,, continued until an equally sudden reaction set in about two years later (in 1843). In our own opinion, this early trade movement was simply the natural result of the interference caused by the war of 1841 with the junk trade of the Canton river. The junk trade having once gravitated towards Hongkong, it took some time, after the declaration of peace in 1842, to return to its original channel. But, certainly, had the free trade policy been maintained in Hongkong, a large share of the junk trade might have been retained in the Colony. With the return of the troops from Chusan, the harbour of Hongkong began to be crowded again with men-of-war and troopships, and a Naval Court of Inquiry was held in Hongkong, (April 25, 1841) to accertain the causes of the extraordinary rate of mortality which had decimated the troops stationed at Chusan in 1840. An augury of the rapid progress which the new settlement of Hongkong was expected to make, was the appearance (May 1, 1841) of the first Hongkong Government Gazette. In the first number of this Gazette (printed yet at Macao) Captain Elliot, as charged with the Government of Hongkong, notified that, pending Her Majesty's further pleasure, he had appointed (April 30, 1841) Captain W. Caine (2Gth Cameronian Regiment) Chief THE ADMINISTRATION OF CAPTAIN ELLIOT. 171 Magistrate of the Island of Hongkong to exercise authority, for the preservation of the peace and the protection of hfe and property, over all non-Chinese inhabitants (those of the Army and Navy excepted) according to the customs and usages of British police law, and over all Chinese inhabitants according to the laws, customs and usages of China, as near as may be, every description of torture excepted. But all cases requiring punishments exceeding a fine of §400, or imprisonment of over 8 months, or, in case of flogging, more than 100 lashes, or capital punishment, were to be remitted to the judgment of the Head of the Government. Captain Caine was at the same time appointed Superintendent of the Goal, which had been hastily constructed, but as all minor offences committed by the Chinese were punished by a free resort to bambooing, the Gaol, small as it was, was never crowded while this rough and ready system of adminstering justice by means of the bamboo continued in force. The next Gazette (May 15, 1841) published the first Census of Hongkong. By some clerical blunder, however, the hamlet of Stanley, whhich never counted more than a few hundred inhabitants, was put down as having 2,000 Chinese inhabitants, and accordingly received the false description of 'the capital (of Hongkong^, a large town.' It never was anything of the sort. Correcting this first Census table accordingly, we find that there were in Hongkong, in May 1841, altogether 5,650 Chinese residents, viz. 2,550 villagers and fishermen, scattered over 20 hamlets among which Shaukiwan and Wongnaichung take a prominent place, 800 Chinese in the Bazaar, 2,000 Chinese living in boats on the harbour, and 300 labourers from Kowloon. The Census also states that at that time the population of Tsimshatsui (not included in the Census) amounted to 800 Chinese. One of the most important measures of Captain Elliot's regime was the declaration of the freedom of the port which constituted in fact the most powerful incentive to bring trade to Hongkong. By a proclamation issued at Macao (June 7, 1841), Captain Elliot informed the merchants and traders at 172 CHAPTER XII. Caiiton and in all parts of the Empire, that they and their ships have free permission to resort to and trade at the port of Hongkong where they will receive full protection from the High Officers of the British nation and that, ' Hongkong being on the shores of the Chinese Empire, neither will there be any charges on imports and exports payable to the British Government.' By these words Captain Elliot appears to assign, as a raison d'etre of the port of Hongkong, the topographical fact that Hongkong is situated within the waters of China. It is just possible, though we have no further grounds for the inference, that Elliot may have cherished the notion that the Chinese Government were justified in levying, outside the limits of Hongkong, in Chinese waters, duties on all goods entering or leaving the harbour of Hongkong. If so, he virtually treated Hongkong as an open port of China, whilst admitting the Island to be Her Majesty's Possession. Sir Henry Pottinger subsequently rectified this assumption by a clear distinction of the British Possession of Hongkong from the five ports of €hiua, opened by the Nanking Treaty. That Elliot now had reason to believe that a permanent settlement on Hongkong Island would eventually receive the formal sanction of the Home Government, appears from the fact that he now advertized (June 7, 1841) a sale, by public auction, 'of the annual quit-rent of 100 lots of land, having water frontage, on Saturday the 12th instant, as also of 100 town or suburburban lots.' As many merchants had purchased land from natives. Captain Elliot notified them at the same time that arrangements with natives for the cession of laud were to be made only through an officer deputed by the Government and that all native occupiers of land would be constrained to establish their rights. It was originally intended to dispose by this first land sale of a sufficiently large number of lots, situated both North and South of the present Queen's Road, which had been already roughly staked out by this time. But it was found impossible to survey and stake out, in time for the sale (though postponed from 8th to lith June), more than 40 lots, all situated THE ADMINISTRATION OF CAPTAIN ELLIOT. 173 along the shore, North of Queen's Road, and having each a sea frontage of 100 feet. Six of these lots were reserved for the Crown, one remained unsold, but the remaining 33 lots, put up at an upset price of £10, Avere sold (June 14, 1841) at an average rate of £71, prices ranging from £20 to £265 per lot. Those 33 lots amounted in the aggregate to an extent not mucli exceeding nine acres. The annual payment bid for them was £3,032. This amounts to an average of £7 85. C^d. per 1,000 square feet, a price which is equal to a rate of more than £323 per annum for the acre. The principle of the sale was somewhat undefined, but it was understood to be an annual rate of quit rent, if that tenure should be sanctioned by the Home Government, coupled with the condition of prepayment of one year's rent, and a deposit of $500 (which, however, was never claimed by the Government) as a guarantee that the purchaser would, within six months, spend at least $1,000 on buildings or other improvements of the lot. There are on record several criticisms of this first land sale. Sir H. Pottinger stated (March 27, 1841) that the tenure which Captain Elliot proposed to obtain was wholly unprecedented and untenable, and later on (November 19, 1844) he added that Captain Elliot had not been armed with any authority to dispose of the pubHc lands. Mr. A Matheson (May 4, 1847) gave it as his opinion that, had a sufficient number of sea frontage lots been put up for sale, the rate would not have much exceeded the upset price of £10, but that, owing to the number of lots being quite disproportionate to the number of competitors, a keen competition drove the price up to £100 and upwards, for some lots, and that the average of this was afterwards (unjustly) retained by the Government as the standard of value. The purchasers, somewhat sanguinely but honestly believed themselves entitled to receive eventually a perpetual lease at the prices at which they had bought the land, because Captain Elliot wrote (June 17, 1841) to Jardine, Matheson & Co. and to Dent & Co., declaring his purpose 'to move Her Majesty's Govern- ment either to pass the lands in fee simple for one or two years purchase at the late rates or to charge them in future with 174 chaptf.:r xn. no more than a nominal quit rent, if that tenure continues to chtain^ When later on (April 10, 1843) it was understood that the Government would only grant leases for 75 years, the Hongkong merchants had a real grievance which they thenceforth nursed industriously until they brought it before Parliament in 1847. The purchasers of those lots, who may be considered as the first British settlers on Hongkong, were the following firms or individuals, viz. : Jardine, Matheson & Co. ; Heerjeebhoy Kustomjee ; Dent & Co. ; Macvicar & Co. ; Gemmel & Co. ; John Smith; D. Rustomjee; Gribble, Hughes & Co.; Lindsay & Co. ; Hooker and Lane ; Holliday & Co. ; F. Leighton & Co. ; Innes, Fletcher & Co. ; Jamieson and How; Fox, Rawson & Co.; Turner & Co. ; Robert AVebster ; R. Gully ; Charles Hart ; Captain Larkins ; P. F. Robertson ; Captain Morgan ; Dirom & Co. ; Pestonjee Cowasjee ; and Framjee Jamsetjee. This sale was followed by the erection of godowns and houses, and the building of a seawall, the road alongside of which was thenceforth (in imitation of Macao parlance) called the Praya. The following places were the first to be utilized for commercial buildings, and private residences of merchants, viz. : West Point, the Happy Valley, Spring Gardens, the neighbourhood of the present Naval Yard (Canton Bazaar) ; the sites now occupied by Butterfield and ♦Swire, by the Hongkong Hotel, by the China Mail, by the Hongkong Dispensary (which can trace back its history to 1841); the slope below Wyndham Street ; Pottinger Street, Queen's Road Central (the Bazaar) ; the site below Gough Street enclosed by a ring fence (Gibb, Livingston & Co.); Jervois Street (where the first Chinese piece goods trade settled), ending in the Upper Bazaar ; the Civil Hospital site ; and Saiyingpun. Captain Elliot, whose attention and presence was required by the troubles brewing at Canton, consequent upon the disavowal of the Chuenpi Treaty, appointed Mr. A, R. Johnston, the Second Superintendent of Trade, to be Acting Governor of the Island of Hongkong. Mr. Johnston accordingly assumed charge of the local Government on behalf of Captain Elliot THE ADMINISTRATION OP CAPTAIN ELLIOT. 175 (June 22, 1841), assisted by Mr. J. R. Morrison, the Chinese Secretary. How little these three men, trained in the East India Company's service, understood the important bearing which the maintenance of free trade principles had on the future welfare of the new Colony, appears from the fact that in one of his earliest dispatches Mr. Johnston forwarded (June 28, 1841), with Captain Elliot's approval, a recommendation framed by Mr. Morrison to impose in England a differential duty of a penny per pound on tea imported from Hongkong. Happily the sinister suggestion was not listened to. But a mournful time now set in at Hongkong. With the progress made in terracing the hill sides, in road making, and excavating sites for houses, a peculiar malarial fever spread everywhere, thence- forth known as Hongkong fever. This fever arose wherever the ground, having been opened up for the first time, was exposed for some time to the heat of the sun and then to heavy rains. The troops encamped at West Point, above the present Fairlea (where the cantonment lines can still be traced) and below it, suffered most particularly. But the Chinese settlers at the foot of the same hill in the district called Saiyingpun {lit. Western English Camp) suffered likewise severely. Deaths now became frequent occurrences also among the European community, hospitals had to be hastily constructed, and the first cemetery (near the present St. Francis' Chapel, above Queen's Road East) began to fill. The death, by fever, of the Senior Naval Officer, Sir H. le Fleming Senhouse (June 13, 1841) cast a gloom over the whole community. Moreover, this outburst of sickness was but the precursor of a terrific typhoon which soon after swept over the Colony. During the night from July 21st to 22nd, 1841, the harbour and the new settlement on shore presented a weird scene of heart-rending disasters. The overcrowded and badly built hospi- tals were all levelled to the ground, mat houses, booths and shanties were shattered and their fragments whirled through the air. Almost every bungalow or house on shore was unroofed, C foreign ships were totally lost, 4 were driven on shore, 22 176 CHAPTER XII. were dismasted or otherwise injured, and the loss of life amono: the Chinese boat population was very great. The general impression among foreign residents during that dreadful night was that ' the last days of Hongkong seemed to be approaching.* Nevertheless, as soon as the typhoon was over, everybody set to work with unabated energy to repair the damages. The sick were sent on board improvised floating hospitals, the barracks, mat houses, bungalows, godowos, booths and huts were speedily made habitable again. When the typhoon recurved and, during the night of 25th to 26th, again burst over Hongkong, and levelled once more to the ground every frail structure, the residents of Hongkong had learned a valuable lesson : they now commenced to build a new style of godowns, such as should stand a typhoon, and houses which combined with spacious verandahs also strong walls and substantial roofs. There was little loss of life during the two typhoons among the European community. The Chinese boat people were the principal sufferers. Nevertheless His benevolent Majesty, the Emperor of China, rejoiced when he heard the news. Kikung and Eliang, the Viceroy and Governor of Canton, sent a hasty memorial to Peking, stating that at Hongkong innumerable foreign ships had been dashed to pieces, that innumerable foreign soldiers and Chinese traitors had been swept into the sea, that all their tents and matsheds, the new Pray a, and so forth, had been utterly annihilated and that the sea was literally covered with corpses. On receipt of this news, the Emperor went forthwith in festive procession to the temple of the dragon god of the seas, and solemnly returned thanks for the destruction of Hongkong. An Imperial Edict, published with rejoicing all over the Empire, also proclaimed the judgment that had fallen on Hongkong, with the same display of inhumanity, contrary to the leading principle of Confucian ethics which declares humaneness to be the essential characteristic of civilized humanity. This typhoon, by which Captain Elliot and Commodore Bremer were overtaken on their way (in the cutter Louise) from Macao to Hongkong, and themselves shipwrecked and THE ADMINISTRATION OF CAPTAIN ELLIOT. 177 well-nigh captured by the Chinese, was followed a few weeks later by a conflagration (August 12, 1841) which destroyed the greater part of the Bazaar. The very first period in the history of Hongkong brought thus to the front the three great enemies of local prosperity, fever, typhoons and conflagrations. Never- theless the settlers persevered and the number of inhabitants steadily continued to increase from month to month. The provisional Government also continued to perfect its organization. A Harbour Master and Marine Magistrate was now appointed,. in the person of Lieutenant W. Pedder, R.N., with Mr. A. Lena as Assistant Harbour Master. The hill, on which the Harboar Master established his quarters, has ever since been known as Pedder's Hill. The Public Works Department was organized by the appointment of Mr. J. R. Bird as Clerk of Works. Finally arrangements were made for the establishment of a Civil Hospital for foreign seamen. This was done under the influence of the generous offer of a donation of $12,000 by Mr. Herjeebhoy Rustomjee (June 23, 1841), and the arrangements were placed under the direction of a Committee consisting of Messrs. A. Anderson (Assistant Surgeon to H.M. Superintendents), James Mathcson and J. R. Morrison. Unfortunately, however, the Committee neglected to secure payment of the donation. On July 29, 1841, H.M.S. Phlerjeton arrived in Hongkong with dispatches informing Captain Elliot of the disapproval of the Chuenpi Treaty by Her Majesty's Government and of the appointment of Sir H. Pottinger as Plenipotentiary. Captain Elliot's administration ended on August 10, 1841. A fortnight later he left Macao, with his family, accompanied by Sir J. J. Gordon Bremer, en route for Europe (August 24, 1841). As he embarked on the Atalanta, a Portuguese fort fired a salute of thirteen guns, but we read of no public address presented to him, nor of any honours bestowed either by the Hongkong community or by the Government on the man who found Hongkong a barren rock and left it a prosperous city. The new settlers on Hongkong, feeling the grievances they had in connection with Elliot's attitude towards the opium trade 12 178 CHAPTER XII. trade and his dishonoured Treasury bills, and subsequently learning the disavowal by the (government of his land sales, were unable at the time to do justice to Elliot's real merits. They indeed gave to wliat was once the most romantic glen on the Island the name ' Elliot's Vale,' but in later years, when it was shorn of much of its beauty, called it ' Glenealy.' Early in 1842, Sir Robert Peel, who soon after appointed Elliot as Consul- General for Texas (June 1, 1842), did some tardy justice to Elliot's memory by stating in the House of Commons, *that, without giving any opinion on the conduct or character of Captain Elliot, during the occupancy of his difficult and embar- rassing position at Canton, he nevertheless was disposed, from his intercourse with him since he returned home, to repose the highest confidence in his integrity and ability.' CHAPTER XIIL The Administration of Sir Henry Pottinger. August 10, 1841, to 3Iaij 8, 1844. (i^IR Hemy Pottinger arrived (August 10, 1841) in Macaa ^g^ after what was then called ' an astonishingly short passage ' of sixty-seven days, by the overland route. It is stated that his arrival was warmly hailed by all the British residents. No wonder, for with his advent as Her Majesty's Sole Plenipotentiary and Minister Extraordinary to the Court of Peking (charged also with the duties of the Chief Superintendeucy of Trade) <loubts, as to the permanency of the British occupation of Hongkong, began to vanish, ^ot that he proclaimed the Queen's approval of the cession of the Island, or that he came to undertake the Government of the new settlement. But Sir Henry at once gave to those that met him the impression that the days of vacillation and yielding to Chinese cunning and duplicity were over, and that England was going now simply to state its grievances, formulate its demands and insist upon immediate redress. Sir H. Pottinger did not disturb Mr. Johnston in his office of Acting Governor, and that meant a good deal. As the latter had now ceased to be Superintendent of Trade, Sir Henry appointed him Depnty Superintendent. But what confirmed the general belief now gaining ground that Hongkong would never be surrendered by the British Government, was an announcement which Sir H. Pottinger made in a Notification issued at Macao (August 12, 1841) stating that 'the arrangements which had been made by his predecessor (Captain Elliot), connected with the Island of Hongkong, should remain in force nntil the pleasure of Her Majesty regarding that Island and those 180 CHAPTER XIII. arrangements should be received.' Mr. Johnston accordingly continued his duties as Acting Governor, whilst Sir H. Pottinger went North with the expedition, and occupied towards Sir Henry the same position which he had previously held in relation to Captain Elliot. In fact, Mr. Johnston acted 'on behalf of Sir H. Pottmger as Governor of the Island nntil Sir Henry himself assumed the Government of the Colony. Abont noon on August 21, 1841, Sir H. Pottinger arrived in Hongkong by the steam-frigate Queen. He landed immediately, visited all the departmental offices, inspected the public works and expressed himself much pleased with the appearance and evident progress of the new Colony. In consequence of dispatches which arrived just then, he directed Mr. Johnston to discontinue all further grants or sales of land, but allowed Captain Elliot's arrangements to remain as he found them. He gave orders for the expedition to start for the North at once, leaving behind seven war-vessels, with the steamer Hooghly under the command of Captain J. Nias, C.B., to guard the harbour and mouth of the Canton River, whilst Major-General Burrell, with a garrison consisting of a wing of the 49th Regiment, the 37th Madras Native Infantry and the Bengal Volunteers, was to see to the defence of the Colony. Literally overwhelmed and oppressed with the variety of affairs that demanded instant attention, Sir H. Pottinger returned in the evening on board the Queen, paid another hurried visit to some of the Government offices next morning and then started (August 22, 1841) to overtake the expedition, having spent in the Colony barely twenty-four hours. The work of organizing the administrative machinery of the Government now continued unchecked. A Colonial Surgeon's Department, under Mr. H. Holgate, was established (August, 1841) but subsequently disallowed. A Notary Public and Coroner was appointed (September, 1841^ in the person of Mr. S. Fearon, who acted also as Interpreter and Clerk of Court. Captain G. F. Mylius took charge of the Land Office (September, 1841), Avith the able assistance of Lieutenant Sargent who acted as land surveyor and made the first map of building lots. A small i THE ADMINISTRATION OF SIR H. POTTINGER. 181 .s^ranite Gaol building, on the site now occupied by Victoria Oaol, was completed, and the erection of a Court House near the site of the present Masonic Hall was commenced (October, 1841). At the same time Colonel Burrell constructed a fort on Kellett Island for the protection of the eastern section of the harbour, destroyed two masonry forts erected by the Chinese at Tsimshatsui in 1839, and constructed in their place two batteries for heavy pieces in the same locality. On the arrival of the French Frigate Erifjone (December 8, 1841), which brought Colonel de Jancigny on a commercial mission to China, the port was for the first time saluted. The American men-of-war delayed this courtesy for several years longer. The progress of Hongkong was furthered by disturbances which occurred at Canton (December 14, 1841), causing a number of European merchants to remove their offices from Canton to Hongkong, and by the blockade of the Canton River by Captain Nias' Squadron (December 1, 1841) Avhich caused numbers of salt junks to resort to Hongkong and to make the Colony, for some time after, the centre of a considerable trade in salt. On his return from the North (February 1, 1842), Sir H. Pottinger at once countermanded this blockade and ordered restoration to be made to the Chinese whose junks and cargoes had been sold by auction. He also discovered to his great annoyance, that tlie Acting Governor, Mr. A. R. Johnston, under a misconception of the hurried instructions given to him on August 22, 1842, had framed rules for fresh grants of Crown-land and had allowed additional lands to be assigned to applicants. Sir H. Pottinger, therefore, now renewed his prohibition against granting land to general applicants. Nevertheless, he did make some grants to persons chiefly in the employ of the Government and also to some of the charitable institutions such as the Morrison Education Society, the Medical Missionary Society (Dr. Hobson), the future St. Paul's College, and the Roman Catholic Church. AVithout reference to Elliot's former declarations of the freedom of the port, Sir H. Pottinger issued (February C, 1842) .a proclamation notifying that, pending the receipt of the Queen's 182 CHAPTER Xlir. gracious and royal pleasure, the harbour of Hongkong (like that of Chusan) should be considered a free port and that no manner of customs, port duties or any other charges, should be levied on any ships or vessels of whatever nation or on their cargoes- He then proceeded (February 15, 1842) to Macao and removed the whole establishment of the Superintendency of Trade from thence to Hongkong (February 27, 1842). The staff of this Department (under Mr. A. R. Johnston, as Deputy Superin- tendent), consisted of E. Elmslie (Secretary and Treasurer),. J. R. Morrison (Chinese Secretary and Interpreter), L. d'Almada e Castro, A. W. Elmslie, and J. M. d'Almada e Castro (Clerks), Rev. Ch. Giitzlaff and R. Thom (Joint Interpreters), J. B. Rodriguez, W. H. Medhurst, and Kazigachi Kiukitchi (Clerks). These two measures of Sir Henry, the removal of the Superin- tendency to Hongkong, and the encouragement he held out, by the confirmation of the freedom of the port, to Chinese and foreign vessels to resort to Hongkong, were generally viewed, in combination with the purchase of the Commissariat Buildings, and the large sums now spent in the erection of barracks, hospitals, naval and victualling stores, as an indirect intimation that the settlement on Hongkong would sooner or later receive official recognition as a British Colony. Even the news of the debate which took place in the House of Commons on the subject (March 15, 1842), unsatisfactory as it was, did not shake the faith now generally placed in the future of Hongkong. For the words of Sir Robert Peel (who had meanwhile stepped into the place of Lord Palmerston) 'that, really, during the progress of hostilities in China, he must decline to commit the Government by answering the question as to what were the intentions of the Government regarding the Island of Hongkong,' were read by the residents in the light of the above measures of Sir H. Pottinger. Ever since this belief in the permanency of the British occupation of Hongkong gained ground, some of the leading British merchants, instead of merely opening branch offices at Hongkong, began to break up their establishments at Macao THE ADMINISTRATION OF SIR H. POTTINGER. 183 and Canton and to remove their offices to the new settlement. Contrary to the views of a minority which stubbornly preferred Canton, they expected that Chinese trade would speedily gravitate towards Hongkong, if but the freedom of the port were strictly and vigorously maintained by the Government. Indeed, the experience of the Colony's first eighteen months fully bore out the soundness of their views. As soon as the rumour of the- expected permanency of the new settlement began to spread abroad, there set in a rapid and steady influx of Chinese traders as well as artizans and labourera flocking together in Hongkong from all the neighbouring districts, and business was flourishing. In October 1841, the total population of Hongkong, including both the troops and residents of all nationalities, was estimated to amount to 15,000 people, three times the amount at which the population stood six months previous. With the advent of the cool season (October, 1841) sickness was noticed to decline all of a sudden and the spirits of the community were considerably cheered by the appearance, on the new Queen's Road, of the first carriage and pair imported from Manila, as a sign of the coming comforts of civilization. A fresh indication of the intentions of the Government to retain permanent possession of Hongkong, was given by a Notification of Sir H. Pottinger, which appeared in the first locally printed newspaper, the Friend of China and Honglcong Gazette^ issued on March 24, 1842, under the editorship of the Rev. J. L. Schuck and Mr. James White (subsequently M.P. for Brighton). In this Notification (dated Hongkonsr Government House, March 22, 1842) Sir H. Pottinger announced his intention of appointing a Land Committee to investigate claims, to mark off boundaries, to fix the direction and breadth of the road, now for the first time called * Queen's Road,' and other public roads, to order the removal of encroachments, and to assign new locations for dwellings of Europeans and Chinese. At the same time. Sir H. Pottinger expressly notified that no purchases or renting of ground from the natives, formerly or now in possession, would be recognized or confirmed. 184 CHAPTER XIII. unless the previous sanction of the constituted Authorities should have been obtained, ' it being the basis of the footing on which the Island of Hongkong has been taken possession of and is to be held pending the Queen's royal and gracious commands, that the proprietary of the soil is vested in and appertains solely to the Crown.' The same principle was also applied to reclamations of foreshore. But the fact that Sir H. Pottinger referred in a public document to an officially recognized and defined footing on which the Island had been taken possession of, convinced everybody now that the formal recognition of Hongkong as a British Colony had already been decided upon and was only delayed pending diplomatic and war-like dealings with the Peking Government. The promised Land Committee, consisting of Major Mal- colm, Captain Meik, Lieutenant Sargent, Surgeon ^Y. Woosnam, and Captain J. Pascoe, w^as appointed (March 29, 1842) and instructed to recommend the amount of remuneration to be given to native Chinese, for ground which was in their possession previous to the British occupation of the Island and w^hich had been appropriated, to select spots for public landing places, to define the limits of cantonments, to fix the extent of the ground to be reserved for H.M. Naval Yard and for private commercial ventures in the shape of patent slips, and finally to recommend a watering place with a good I'unning stream of water to be reserved for the shipping. The points previously mentioned and not now included in the instructions of the Committee were no doubt left to the discretion of the Land Officer, Captain Mylius, who had been provided with a new Assistant, Mr. E. G. Reynolds. The separation of the Land Office from the Public Works Department was, however, soon after disapproved (May 17, 1842) by the Home Government. Another important problem which Sir H. Pottinger now took in hand was the regulation of the currency of the settle- ment. For this purpose he took the dollar for a standard and fixed the rate at which Indian coins and Chinese copper cash were to be accepted as legal tender. A proclamation (March THE ADMINISTRATION OF SIR H. POTTINGER. 185 29, 1842) stated, that two and a quarter Company's rupees should be equal to one dollar; one rupee and two annas (or half a quarter) equal to half a dollar ; half a rupee and two annas equal to a quarter dollar; 1,200 cash equal to one dollar; 600 cash equal to half a dollar ; 300 cash equal to a quarter dollar ; 538 cash equal to a rupee; 260 cash equal to a half a rupee; and 138 cash equal to a quarter of a rupee. Subsequently (April 27, 1842) Sir H. Pottinger issued, at the suggestion of the leading English firms, a further proclamation declaring Mexican or other Republican dollars to be the standard in all matters of trade unless otherwise particularly specified. Sir H. Pottinger organized also a Post Office (under Mr. Fitz Gibbon, succeeded by Mr. Mullaly and R. Edwards), which was to receive and deliver, free of any charge, letters or parcels. This office was located on the hill just above the present Cathedral, and the communication between the office and the ships was under the charge of the Harbour Master. The erection of substantial barracks on Cantonment Hill (S. of present Wellington Barracks) and at Stanley and Aberdeen, was also taken in hand and pushed on vigorously. All these measures of Sir H. Pottinger contradicted the rumour which was persistently going about that the cession of Hongkong was not officially recognized and that the Government was prepared to relinquish Hongkong in case the Chinese Government should, in the coming negotiations, raise any serious objection on that score, and to be satisfied in that case with the opening of some treaty ports. That the Home Government had at this time, in order not to prejudice the pending negotiations with the Chinese Government, left the question of the permanency of the new Colony in abeyance, is evident from the fact that in June, 1842, just before leaving Hongkong to rejoin the expedition, Sir H. Pottinger received a dispatch from the Earl of Aberdeen 'directing that this Island should be considered a mere military position and that all buildings &c., not required in that light, should be discontinued.' Sir H. Pottinger, however, knew perfectly well that the necessities of British trade would 186 CHAPTER xrii. be snre to bring sooner or later a ratification of the cession of Hongkong, regarding which he stated in a dispatch to Lord Stanley (July 17, 1843) that he had always been of opinion that the sole or at least chief object of it was to secure an emporium of trade. The fact that Sir H. Pottinger's measures all rested on the assumption that the occupation of Hongkong would never be annulled, gave a fresh impetus to the growth of the settlement. In March, 1842, the population, then estimated at over 15,000 people, was stated to include 12,3f)l Chinese, mostly labourers and artizans, attracted to Hongkong by the high wages obtainable here, and numbers of large buildings were reported to be in course of erection. The Central Market, then South of Queen's Road, opposite its present site, was formally opened (June 10, 1842) and farmed out to a Chinaman (Afoon); all the roads were improved and extended, a good road, in the direction of Stanley, completed as far as Taitamtuk (June, 1842), and a picnic house built at Little Hongkong by Mr. Johnston, Major Caine and a number of other private subscribers. Apart from all these signs of material progress, there are also evidences of the higher interests of religion and education receiving now recognition and attention in Hongkong. The building of a Roman Catholic church was commenced, in June 1842, on a site in Wellington Street granted by Grovernment. A Baptist chapel was opened in Queen's Road (July 7, 1842) by the Rev. J. L. Schuck, by subscriptions obtained from the foreign residents and visitors. The Morrison Education Society of Canton and Macao, which for years past had supported various Mission Schools in the Straits and in China by money grants and (in 1841) started at Macao a training school (under Mr. and Mrs. Brown), now arranged to remove its establishment to Hongkong and commenced (October, 1842) building a large house on Morrison Hill on a site granted by Sir H. Pottinger (February 22, 1842), who became the patron of the institution (April 5, 1842). In autumn 1842, a Naval Chaplain, Mr. Phelps and Mr. A. R. Johnston started a subscription by means of which a room was erected on the site of the present Parade ground THE ADMINISTRATION OF SIR H. POTTINGER. 187 for occasional services in connection with the Church of England or any other Protestant denomination. When the news of the conclusion of the Nanking Treaty and the consequent confirmation of the cession of Hongkong reached the settlers (September 9, 1842), no particular rejoicing took place, for the recognition of the cession had all along been to the local community a mere question of time or of official etiquette. The merchants were yet unaware of the serious crisis now at hand for the commerce of the Colony in consequence of the cessation of the war and the opening of five Chinese ports.. On the contrary, the expectation appears to haVe been entertained that these measures would forthwith enhance the prospects of the Colony. ' We are nearly bewildered,' apostrophized the Editor of the Friend of China (September 22, 1842), 'at the magnificence of the prosperous career which seems now before us. Our Island will be the single British possession in China. What more in praise of its prospects can we say than this ? Already we hear of teeming projects fraught with good for our Island.' The conclusion of the war and the departure of the fleet and troops, which considerably desolated the harbour, aifected for the present the social life of the community far more than its commerce, which continued in its old grooves yet for a little while longer. With the return to Europe of the expeditionary forces, which left behind (December 24, 1842) only 700 men as a garrison, the settlement now entered at last upon its normal condition of a purely commercial community. Consequent upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanking, the British Government took immediate steps for the formal organisation of a distinctly Colonial Government at Hongkong, by transferring the management of local affairs from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. The Superintendency of Trade and the direction of the new Consular Service in China, subject to the Foreign Office, were, however, for the present combined with the office of Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony. On this basis an Order in Council was issued (January 4, 1843) establishing in Hongkong the Court of Justice, with 188 CHAPTER XIII. Criminal and Admiralfcy Jurisdiction, which nominally had existed, since the time of Lord Xapier, in Chinese waters, under an Order of the Privy Council of December 9, 1833. This Court was now endowed with jurisdiction over British subjects residing within the Colony or on the mainland of China or on the high seas within 100 miles of the coast thereof. Three months later (April 5, 1843), the Privy Council issued Letters Patent, under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, erecting the settlement on the Island of Hongkong into a Crown Colony by Charter, and on the same day a Royal Warrant was issued, under the Queen's Signet and Sign Manual, appointing the Chief Superin- tendent of Trade, Sir Henry Pottinger, Baronet, K.C.B., as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Hongkong and its Dependencies, to enact laws and to govern the Colony with or without the assistance of a Council. A grand ceremony was performed at Government House on May 20, 1843, when Sir WilUam Parker, by order of the Queen, invested Sir H. Pottinger with the insignia of a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. When the ratifications of the Nanking Treaty were exchanged (tlune 26, 1843) between Sir H. Pottinger and the Chinese Commissioners who had come to Hongkoni^ for the purpose, the Charter of Hongkong and the Royal Warrant were read out at Government House before a large assembly of residents, and subsequently published (June 29, 1843) by proclamation in the Gazette. The same proclamation fixed the name of Her Majesty's new possession as ' the Colony of Hongkong,' (not Hong Kong, as previously used), and the name of the city as * Victoria.' The Governor, having previously (June 17, 1843) sworn in Mr. Johnston (Deputy Superin- tendent of Trade), Major Caine (Chief Magistrate) and Mr. C. B. Hillier (Assistant Magistrate), as the first Justices of the Peace, now appointed 43 more persons, among whom there where 15 officials, as additional Justices of the Peace. As these unofficial Justices represent the leading merchants of this earliest period of the Colony, we append their names. They were, A. Jardine, A. Matheson, W. Morgan, W. Stewart^ THE ADMINISTllATIOX OF SIR H. POTTINGER. 189 O. Braine, J. Dent, F. C. DrnmmoDd, D. L. Burn, W. Le Oeyb, P. Dndgeon, T. W. L. Mackeau, H. Dundas, C. Kerr, J. F. Edger, A. Fletcher, J. A. Gibb, W. P. Livingston, ^V, Gray, H. R. Parker, J. Holliday, J. Wise, J. A. Mercer, P. Stewart, J. White, A. AYilkinson and J. M. Smith. The office of Deputy Superintendent of Trade having been abolished, Mr. Johnston was now appointed Assistant and Registrar to the Superintendent of Trade, with about the same staff as before. The Colonial Governnienc was now organized as follows : — Sir H. Pottinger (Governor), Captain G. T. Brooke (Military Secretary and A.D.C.), Captain T. Ormsby (Extra A.D.C.), Major-General G. C. D'Aguilar (Lieutenant Governor), Lieuten- ant-Colonel G. A. Malcolm (Colonial Secretary), R. Woosnam (Deputy Colonial Secretary), Ch. E. Stewart (Treasurer and Financial Secretary), J. R. Morrison (Chinese Secretary and Interpreter, afterwards succeeded by Rev. Ch. Giitzlaff), Rev. V. Stanton (Colonial Chaplain), R. Burgass (Legal Adviser), A. Anderson (Colonial Surgeon), L. d'Alraada e Castro (Chief Clerk), D. Stephen (Book-keeper), Major W. Cainc (Chief Magistrate), Ch. B. Hillier (Assistant Magistrate), D. R. Caldwell (Interpreter), Lieutenant W. Redder (Harbour Master), A. Lena (Assistant Harbour Master), A. T. Gordon (Land Officer and Civil Engineer), Ch. St. George Cleverly (Assistant Surveyor), W. Tarrant (Assistant to Land Officer), M. Bruce (Inspector of Buildings), and F. Spring (Postmaster). An Executive Council was formed, consisting of the Hon. A. R. Johnston and the Hon. W. Caine, and a Legislative Council, from which for the present unofficial members were shut out, was constituted. It consisted of the Hon. A. R. Johnston, the Hon. J. R. Morrison (who died soon after, greatly lamented), and the Hon. W. Caine, with R. Burgass (the Governor's legal adviser) as Clerk of Council. A public seal was supplied to the Colony from England (September 5, 1843) and Her Majesty's approval was obtained (December G, 1843) 'for the above-mentioned appropriation of the name Victoria for the rising city of Hongkong. 190 CHAPTER XIII. During the year 1843, the religious and missionary agencies in the Colony bestirred themselves considerably in the general interest. Funds had been raised in 1842 for the erection of a Colonial Church, at first intended to be a sort of Union Church for both Churchmen and Nonconformists. A Colonial Chaplain having been appointed in England at the request of the local Government, which disapproved the proposed union, services were conducted (since June, 18-43) by Naval Chaplains in a temporary structure now called the 'Matshed Church,' and a building (the present St. John's Cathedral) was ordered to be commenced at Government expense and meanwhile dedicated to St. John (October 17, 1843), though building operations were delayed for several years as the Home Government postponed its sanction. It was, however, locally decided that the Colonial Chaplain should have sole charge of the Church. The Chaplain, Rev. V. J. StanDon, preached his first sermon in the Colonial Matshed Church on December 24th, 1843. The R. C. Prefect Apostolic, Fra Antonio Feliciani, consecrated the building erected by him at the corner of Wellington and Pottinger Streets as the R. C. Church of the Conception, on June 18tli, 1843, when a Seminary for native clergy was opened in connection with it. The Mohammedans built (in 1843) a Mosque on the hill thence- forth called Mosque Gardens (Moloshan). The Chinese, who had already four temples from 75 to 100 years old, viz. one at Aplichow (dating from 1770 A.D.), one at Stanley, one in Spring Gardens (Taiwongkung), and one at Tunglowan (Causeway Bay), commenced building their City Temple (Sheng-wong-miu) on the site of the present Queen's College. The American Baptist Mission, under Dr. Deane and Dr. Ball, started in 1843 a Chinese (Tiechiu) Church in the Upper Bazaar (Sheungwan Market). In addition to the establishment of the Morrison Education Society's School on Morrison Hill (opened November 1, 1843), Dr. Legge of the London Missionary Society transferred to Hongkong the Society's Malacca College, opening (November, 1843) a Pre- paratory School and a Seminary for the training of Chinese ministers, which was (in autumn 1844) located on the London THE