= e TRAINING = 5 AN • CD I CO FANTRY COMPANY »CCONO EDITION, MAJOR E. KIRKPATRICK 2/6 n of Toronto T. J. 132+ ^ THE TRAINING OF AN INFANTRY COMPANY. CATECHISM ON FIELD TRAINING (INFANTRY). A series of Questions arid Answers on all subjects of field training, extracted from the latest official TRAINING MANUALS, together with miscellane- ous information, practical exercises and examples progressively arranged. T^evised and brought up to date by COL. H. O'DONNELL, p.s.c. (WEST YORKSHIRE REGIMENT). SIXTH EDITION. CONTENTS. Elementary — General Principles of Attack and Defence — Miscellaneous Tactica Operations — Warfare in uncivilised Coun- tries— Protection on the Line of March — Protection when at Rest — Methods of obtaining Information — Quarters, Camps, and Bivouacs — Field Engineering — Diary of Training. Fully illustrated with 30 pages of Plates and Diagrun-.s. One of the numerous Press Opinions. "The book is most comprehensive, for every branch of the soldier's life is touched upon, and every situation or emergency seems to be antici- pated. Colonel O' Donnell's publication is quite a military encyclopaedia." -Einf>ress, Calcutta. PRICE 3/- NET. From the Printers and Publishers, GALE & POLDEN LTD., WELLINGTON WORKS, ALDERSHOT, And at London and Portsmouth. The TRAINING 01- AN INFANTRY COMPANY By Major E. KIRKPATRICK, LA. 2ND EDITION. London: GALE 6? POLDEN, LTD., 2, AMEN CORNER. PATERNOSTER ROW, E.G. Nelson House. PORTSMOUTH fi? Wellington Works. ALDERSHOT. Obtainable from all Booksellers. T\\<) SHILLINGS & SIXPENCE (Net) I Copyright undar Act of 191 1 > ALDERSHOT : PRINTED BY GALE & POLDEN, LTD. WELLINGTON WORKS. 1914. P. 2103. P R K FACE This booklet has not been written for the use and benefit of officers and non- commissioned officers of long experience and proved skill in the profession of training men for battle. To such as these it may only provide an object of criticism, for in the course of years spent in turning recruits into trained soldiers they will have formulated to themselves, and adopted, some system of training which they found productive of the best results under their own guidance. But there are many at present, and at a future time, should certain circumstances arise in the life of the nation, there may be very many more who may not have such stores of experience to draw on, and yet may be faced with the problem of rapidly converting an untrained or only partially trained body of men into a force capable of acting successfully in real war, both in attack and defence against trained and disciplined troops. Again, it is written, not for officers commanding battalions, VI PREFACE nor for officers of cavalry and artillery, but only for officers commanding com- panies or other similar units of infantry, though it may, perhaps, be of use in training mounted troops for dismounted action. Meantime, while the pipes of peace are still smoking, it is hoped it may be of some use to officers and non-commissioned officers when the time comes to prepare schemes of company training and put them into execution. E. K. September, PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION. Since the above was written, the issue of new or amended Manuals of Training has necessitated a revision of the book, which is now presented in a form agreeable to the four-company organisation. The Empire is now confronted by those circumstances to which allusion was made in the Preface. E. K. September, CONTENTS PAGE LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ix INTRODUCTORY REMARKS I. — The Intention of the Book ... i II. — Making- the Best of their Com- panies to Train the Modern Man for the Modern Battle 4 III.— The Standard of Training- assumed to have already been acquired and its appli- cation to further Exercises 9 IV. — Ground for Training — Its Use and Influence — Palliation of the Lack of a Training- Ground ... ... ... ii V.— Company Organisation- Moral and the Personality of the Commander 16 VI.— Discipline —Moral and Means of Supervision 22 VII. — Organisation by Files and its Effect on Moral — Cohesion 27 VIII. — Method of Training 31 IX.— As to Scouts and Working Dress ... ... ... 37 A FEW PRESS OPINIONS UNI IH> SBRVH I- M,\(,.\/.l\ Kirkpatrirk i- the .uithoi of a -mall hook on "The Training »t an Infamiy Company." There have • many hook- ami pamphlet? of this kind — short knowledge — that one is a| 1 each iresh one with Mispicion and even with ;i version, hut Major Kirkp.in irk has much that is helpful to say, he well, and he show^ how much goud \vork may lie done even in the training of the emasculated companies such a^ our mill' -ften leaves us. Hisin-inu- tions cover a wide field, and there trust be few company officers who will not he grateful to the author for many valuable hint>. "UNITED SKRVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA." There are few junior officers of infantry who will not benefit by a study of this book. The thorough system of training elaborated in the seventeen exercises, which form the major portion of the book, is worthy of the attention of Regular as well as Territorial Officers. These elementary exercises deal with the essentials in the war training of the Infantry soldier, from the work of the individual in advance and retirement, and of the section in action and on protection duties, to the training of the company in attack and defence, and outpost. :i example of a system of training illustrating the ly of attention to detail in the early instruction of the soldier, this series of exercises is valuable, and their value is increased by the constant reference to training manuals. The author wisely recommends the study of all the official books referred to, as he recognises that his exercises and comments are only of value in so far as they illustrate and explain the principles laid down in training mam; THE TRAINING 01 INFANTRY COMPANY. I. \TROnrCTORY k KM. ARKS. The authorised handbooks of training rightly confine themselves to broad prin- ciples, and do not attempt to give detailed examples of their application, the idea being that officers should study these regulations and apply the principles by the light of local conditions and their own experience. Infantry Training and the Field Service Regulations are, how- ever, very pregnant little books, contain- ing, as they do, a summary of the whole of Modern Tactics, as far as they concern infantry and the combined action of all arms. Time and thought are necessary, if the principles contained in them are to be translated into such intelligent action that the men trained on the lines laid down may be capable of doing their duty in real warfare, without first undergoing a bitter and costly schooling of useless casualties or, perhaps, even of defeat. But if an officer is called on to achieve this result, being himself without much pre- vious experience in training, he will find himself faced with a task of great diffi- culty, and, with the best intentions, he may waste precious time, as well as his own and his men's patience and energy, in doing parades and exercises, which are either not indispensable, or of minor importance for the main object. As an extreme example, it would be better, in a hastily raised corps, to combine the disciplinary training of obedience to the word of command, with instruction in the use of their arms, by practice in smart work in aiming and firing, than merely to study precision in " sloping " and " presenting arms," which look well, but do not immediately affect fighting efficiency. For these reasons, it has occurred to me that I might do some of my brother officers in esse or in posse a service by setting out certain elementary exercises in training infantry soldiers, which I have found of value in bringing them up to a standard of battle training sufficiently high to need only battalion training and a baptism of fire to turn them into steady and reliable troops. It is not contended that these few examples are anything but concrete instances of the application of thr principles of the Training Manuals. I'hry are intended, as has been stated, merely for those who are short of time and experience} and, therefore, references to the manuals are given when the exercise illustrates some particular section of those works, and it is recommended that officers who intend to use these examples should look up and read the sections referred to before going on to the parade. Though this book is not meant for officers commanding battalions, I have one word to say to them, and it is this, that if they wish to have an efficient battalion they must let the company officers have proper opportunities of train- ing their companies, apart from the time of company training, when the whole company is struck off duty. If there are six parades a week, let three or four of them be company parades, ordered and carried out by the company commanders ; the balance will be quite enough to secure combination between the companies in battalion. On company parades, the battalion commander should supervise, but never interfere, unless things are being manifestly mismanaged. (See M.R., 2 (2 and 3)). The days • >f the one man battalion are gone for ever. The company is the thing that B2 matters; a good battalion can only be composed of well-trained companies. It is the work of the battalion commander to propound the general lines of training and to use the companies to the best advantage in combination, but the train- ing of the individual soldier must be in the hands of the man who is to lead him in war. II. On ordinary parades, the captain of an infantry company is seldom able to get together more than a fraction of his men. The calls on the company for men for duties and odd jobs, leave and fur- lough, and, in the Territorial Force, the private occupations of the men, allow of only a few being assembled on any one parade. This being so, there is a tempta- tion— sometimes yielded to by officers who have not much experience, to say to themselves : " This is rot ; what can I do without any men?" Such a question is the result of confusing the individual instruction of the men with the tactical practice of the leader in handling his company as a whole. The answer too often takes the form of an hour's close order drill or something similar, which may do some good, but not nearly as much as if the officer stoutly made up his mind to make the best of a bad job and took out those few men and did some practical training in field operations. The fewer men there are on parade, the more individual attention will the company commander be able to give them. He will be able to look at each man's work more carefully, talk to the men and get to know their characters as soldiers, spot who are likely to make good non-commis- sioned officers, and coach them far more than if the whole company were on hand at once. So do not turn up your nose at a company only twenty strong, but make up a scheme of exercises to be gone through, and, since the men who are not on parade to-day will be so to-morrow, arrange to do the same exercise on two, or, if needed, three, consecutive days, so as to catch all, or, at least, most of the men, and your non-commissioned officers, who are not usually so drawn on for off- parade duties, will become well ac- quainted with each exercise, learn what to do and how to run things, and so become both a help to you as instructors, and themselves gain authority and power of command from the knowledge of their own competency. It is quite likely that these exercises and the explanations given, may seem to some readers to be absurdly simple and need- lessly long-winded, while there is also a good deal of repetition. To this I will make early reply that they are written for officers who are not too proud to accept other people's advice in training a com- pany of young soldiers of the stamp which would be forthcoming if some cause* or other tempted or constrained into military service that great proportion of our male population who are at present quite ignorant of a soldier's work, and who, from apathy, or a hundred other causes, do not join the Territorial Force. Such men probably have never in their lives given a thought to soldiering. The majority of them are town born and bred, and have passed most of their lives among bricks and mortar. If they have ever looked carefully at the large or small features of a bit of country, it has been from an industrial, sporting, or, perhaps, sentimental, but never from a tactical, point of view. They have everything to learn in making use of ground for fight- ing. Their ideas of using modern arms are equally crude; the primitive fighting instinct will be uppermost in their minds, and would express itself in an incontinent desire to get to close quarters with their enemy, when bayonet, butt or hand grips *A cause now'exists, and the men have^come out. would seem the proper way to settle the matter. A very laudable desire it is this of wanting to close in — and one to be encouraged by every means, but how- ever brave troops may be, they cannot in general indulge their desire to attain close quarters and the resulting facilities of fighting by the light of their natural instincts unless they have first been suc- cessful in the fire fight — the strife of the arms of artifice — which is waged by bullet and shell at distances which Nature never contemplated. It is the artificiality of the fire fight which makes the task of turning town- bred men into skilful soldiers such a difficult and lengthy process. They must be led to look at ground in relation to its capabilities of increasing the effectiveness of their own fire and also of diminishing the result of that of the enemy, i.e., they must learn to select good fire positions and good cover. The problem of finding the latter for himself against a civilized foe begins, for the individual soldier, as soon as the enemy's rifle fire becomes effective and compels the use by his side of extended order; this is held to be on open ground about fourteen hundred yards from the enemy's infantry (I.T., 118 (4)). Prior to this the responsibility for cover rests with his leaders, as he 8 will then be in some close formation. Fire positions he must choose for himself as soon as his section commander ceases to be able to indicate his wishes, or to secure combined action by the whole unit. This will probably happen at about six hundred yards from the enemy, when individual fire is expected to replace controlled fire by sections. These two aspects of fighting — the use of ground, and the use of the rifle as a far-reaching weapon of almost absolute precision, if truly sighted and aimed— are foreign to our instincts, and the average man has to be trained till he is able to override his instinct and fight an artificial war, so as to work his way to charging distance. Some men need less training than others; a stalker in a deer forest is an adept in the use of cover, and in general, country-bred men should be easier to train than town-bred, but the majority of our men being the latter, we must lay ourselves out to teach them from the beginning this business of the fire fight, since success in this is usually necessary before the assault can suc- ceed (I.T., 121 (7)). This can only be done by training them in extended order and putting them through various exercises chosen for the purpose. Any exercise which does not in some way tend to fit men for battle is mere waste of time; aimless perambulations of an ex- tended line fall under this category, but are quite ot'trn to be seen on parade grounds. No amount of smartness in close order drill will compensate for a deficiency of field training. III. The exercises which I have drawn up, simple though they are, are of the nature of " Instructional Operations," as defined by T. & M.R., 40 (12), and it is pre- supposed that the men have received, or are in course of receiving, sufficient in- struction in the use of the rifle (musketry in all its branches), and of the bayonet (bayonet fighting), in drill in close order, and the drill grounding of extended order work, including signals (I.T., 90-96). We are then to consider ourselves to be at the stage in which the soldier is to be taught to work over broken country as directed in the latter part of para. '90, above quoted. But do not think the lessons learned at musketry instruction are to be forgotten and left behind by the men when they begin to work in ex- tended order across country. Demand from your men that the rifle shall be deadly, and, by unceasing supervision, IO breed a habit among them of aiming and firing in extended order, whether with or without blank cartridge, with the same exactitude as when firing their course of musketry on the range. Take the high standard — a hundred men's lives in one man's bandolier, instead of a hundred bandoliers for one man's life. The higher standard of the two is at least possible, though not common, but why nofc try and work towards it, so that when bullets are flying within decisive range of the enemy, it will be your men's fire, that is the deadly close-hitting kind, that makes afraid, and not the haphazard jet of bullets whose inefficacy lets unhurt familiarity breed tolerant contempt ? In the same way, when men are in close order at any time during a field parade, keep up the same smartness, and quick obedience to orders which are exacted in close order drills, in order that the men may become truly disciplined, and not merely so in appearance, so when they come under fire without being extended, as may happen in the early and distant stages of a fight, they will, as a matter of course, submit themselves to their commander's wishes, and ignore their own inclinations, which, just at the first ex- perience, even with very brave men, might be for an immediate and independent II rush in -;<»mr direction perhaps forward, perhaps in another direction — they will be "in hand," and free of the liability of raw troops to suffer from sudden panic or to become a mob, full of fight, per- haps, but still a mob, and as such, a force which cannot be controlled or used in furtherance of any general plan. IV. The want of a suitable and accessible bit of ground on which to train our men is one of the chief difficulties we have to meet in the United Kingdom, and, of course, it is greatest in the case of town corps, varying with the size of towns, while in large cities ground is not to be had at all, save at a distance of several miles from the men's dwelling places. Unfortunately, there is little doubt that the possession or lack of suitable training grounds has a great effect on the readi- ness, or otherwise, of troops to give a good account of themselves when they come under fire for the first time in their lives. The lack of it takes away reality from the work of the men in the ranks and cramps the initiative of their officers, who are given no opportunity to exercise their wits in figuring out practical situa- tions which might occur on service. 12 I can give no recipe for obtaining the use of ground, but from what I have just said I hope it is clear that the officer com- manding a battalion or company should use every blandishment or art of which he is capable to get the use of a stretch of ground, and also, if it is at a distance, and the attendance of the men at parades voluntary, he should try to provide facili- ties for getting them to and from the ground. The worst bit of country is better than the barrack square. The ideal ground is that which gives conditions suited to each phase of the training, the principal requirements being fire positions and cover, and these should occur so as to provide illustrations of the use to be made of them in individual training, and in the collective training of sections, platoons, and the larger units. Thus, for training individual men, good ground would be that with an irregular surface, giving many places twenty to fifty yards apart, which each man could use in firing and taking cover. The usual seaside golf course of hummocks, furze bushes, and occasional watercourses, is good to teach individual men over — I say teach, for we must not imagine that an enemy will be so kind as to leave easy ground like that in his front, if he can help it. For section or platoon training, 13 the surface should be similar, so that thr individuals should still be called on to look out for their own halting places, but, in addition, there should be a certain number of small features, hillocks, banks, and so on, one to four hundred yards apart, which will serve as fire positions and cover for the whole unit, and pro- vide the commanders with successive objectives, to which it will be their duty to bring their men in good order, and without needless exposure to the enemy's fire. When the company is training together, the ground should be similar, but of greater extent, both broader and larger, so that sections and platoons may be practised in supporting each other, some being halted in these fire positions, and covering by their fire the movements of the others who are in process of gaining fresh vantage points. And so on for larger units and the combined action of all arms; good ground for early instruc- tion is that whose features, from their nature and distance from each other, lend themselves to illustrate conditions under which the power of each unit and arm may be most profitably employed in con- junction with others. Troops trained over ground that gives the above advantages will acquire an eye for country. A know- ledge of the uses to be made of ground will be common to all ranks, so that when they find themselves fighting on bad ground, which does not give much cover or good fire positions, they will be the more apt to search for such cover and fire positions as are obtainable, while troops trained on flat and open ground would be much slower in making the best of a bad job. We are not concerned with anything more than a company; therefore, get for your own use, if you can manage it — failing help from higher powers — a bit of ground of some sort, golf course, common, city park, or what not. It need not be very extensive. Even if it gives only three or four positions suitable for occupation by a section working in conjunction with another, say, six hundred by three hundred yards, it will give room for use- ful instruction; but, of course, a larger extent is preferable, as giving room for more extended and varied exercises. If your training ground is of limited extent, it should, nevertheless, if possible, have a wide field of view on all sides beyond its own confines, and leave you the right to send a few men to take positions on the adjoining country, even if not allowed to manoeuvre about it, so that when carrying out your exercises you may be able to use men with blank cartridge to act as a skele- ton enemy, when such is needed. But if 15 you are not allowed to send men on to the neighbouring ground, the wide field t>f view will still enable you to indicate certain distant positions as supposed to be held by the enemy. By this means you will be able to use the whole area of your permissible ground to represent a bit of the battlefield, and escape having to place the supposed enemy absurdly close to your manoeuvring troops, e.g., at the edge of the training ground, or in some other position which makes heavy calls on the imagination. Britishers are not imaginative. Lastly, if all else fails, and you have nowhere to go except the flat parade ground, or even the drill hall, which in large towns is often very spa- cious, do not, I beg you, become dis- couraged and throw up all effort to get your men ready for field work. Do the exercises on the flat, limiting the extent of movements, if there is little room, and use flags or anything else to represent fire positions for sections and platoons, and let the men kneel or lie down between advances, if there is no cover. A great deal may be done in this way to lay a good foundation for extended order work. Your men will know the mechanism of it, and you will save much time when you do manage to have them out on a proper training ground. I.T., 107 (2), re- i6 quires company commanders, in preparing their schemes of training, to have regard to the ground at their disposal; do so, therefore, even if the ground aforesaid is only a parade ground, and make the most of it; it is better than sitting still and either doing nothing, or . only a weary round of company drill in close order. Of course, you must let the men know what you are driving at, or they will get bored and lose interest. V. Having got a company of men and ground to train them on, the first step is to organise that company for its battle training. A company is organised into four platoons, each under a subaltern, with a sergeant as his second-in-command (platoon sergeant). Each platoon has four sections, and the sixteen sections of the company are numbered one to sixteen. The men of each of the above units remain permanently in that unit. // possible, maintain this organisation on duties and fatigues, though this is often a counsel of perfec- tion, but quarter the men together, and insist on the maintenance of the organisa- tion, without deviation, on parades. Have lists made up of the men of each platoon and section, and let men who so wish, belong to the same unit. Once these lists IK- made up, see to it by means of the section commanders that these men fall in on parade together in the place in the company where their section is standing, no matter how few there are; if there are but two mon of onr section on parade, they should fall in as front and rear rank men of one file. Avoid disseminating the men of a platoon or section among other units in order to raise the latter to a size- able strength. Instead of this: sup- posing you have three weak platoons and < >ne strong one on parade ; of the four sections of one of the weak platoons, send two to each of the other two weak platoons. Tins will give you three platoons of, per- haps, unequal strength, but sufficient for work — and this without taking the respon- sibility of section commanders off their shoulders, and the cohesion of each unit is preserved. Some further suggestions on the subject of organisation will be put forward when speaking of moral. The officer who aspires to develop what- ever capabilities his men possess of becoming individually and collectively formidable in battle, must pay attention to much more than mere physical con- siderations. Napoleon's dictum, that the moral is to the physical as three to one is early dinned into the ears of the officer of C i8 Regulars, but may stand repetition in pages meant for the perusal of others. No officer can expect to get the most out of his men unless he directs his attention to the study of the psychical side of the training. There are two fields in which the study must be pursued. One is the officer's own personality, the other that of his non-commissioned officers and men. T. & M.R., 8, deals with the former, and should be read and pondered over. In battle good men have sometimes achieved victory in spite of the short- comings of their officers, but good officers, as well as men, are necessary for con- sistent success in the series of battles which make a campaign. Now, good officers, given time for training, will in- fallibly produce good men, provided the latter are of the average physique and courage. Therefore, study thyself, and try to see what you lack, in order to be- come a good officer. Cultivate your skill in handling your men by reading any books you can get; there are, unfortun- ately, not very many that deal with the work of such small units as com- panies or even single battalions. Go out into the country, or, if you have riot time, recall to yourself some bit of country you know, and import an enemy into the landscape. Perhaps a few rifle- '9 men are holding ground on the flank of a road along which your battalion wants to march, but cannot, without undue loss, until these riflemen are driven off; and your commanding officer tells you to do the driving. In imagination, or on the ground, decide what position you would hold, if you were the enemy, in order to make yourself as nasty as possible — though having no hope of being rein- forced— to the battalion trying to come along the road. Then settle in your mind what you, as commanding your company, would do to get rid of the annoyance. Be quite clear, what would you do ? Go at them bald-headed? There are times and enemies when this is the best way ; you would have to be fairly close, and the enemy not shooting very straight, and rather careful of his skin; or will you march a long way round till the enemy sees you are getting behind him, and so manoeuvre him out ? Then your battalion will be a long time waiting. Or will you look at t'he ground and find, let us sup- pose, a spot to which you will send a section or platoon to open a fire on the runny, while another works its way to a point you have noted from which fire can be brought to sweep crossways a little knoll, or some such supposititious feature which seems to form the enemy's left flank, and C2 to be occupied by ten or twelve men, and which gives command over the rest of his position ? Then, while the second lot is on its way, you plan to lead the remainder a little way round, under cover, in order to get to fairly close range of the knoll, so that when the second party opens fire on it, and its defenders are hampered both by this fire and by that of those you first posted, you may surprise them by an outburst of fire from your reserve, and either drive them off their perch by cross-fire from three directions, or, if they do not shift, run in at them with the bayonet, trusting to get across the inter- vening space at the cost of a few casual- ties, when your superior numbers at that point should ensure your success even if they actually await the bayonet. Learn to consider quickly how many ways there are of doing such a job as the above, and to decide quickly and rationally which is the best. These schemes, involving only a company or two, will not be presented for your solu- tion by your battalion commander ; you must set them yourself, and their solution, and the thinking necessary thereto are the best methods an officer can get of training himself without having his men on the ground. In your mind's eye, put your company into every situation you can 21 think of, nnd get it out ;ig;mi, and you will li.ivr acquired ,in enormou- i capacity fur acting quickly .md rightly when your men ;uid your enemv are both on the ground. But beware of dealing in too short distances, or you may produce unreal pictures of war. Do not imagine mano-uvres ,it four hundred yards from the enemy when every m;in exposed would he hit in a few minutes. The clearness and on of thought you acquire will be reflected in the orders you give. Your men will give you their confidence when they see, as they are quick to do, that you know your job. There is nothing more disheartening for a subordinate, be he private or colonel, than to feel he is under control of a duffer, whose mistakes he will have to correct. This feeling saps dis- cipline, and quickly destroys the fighting value of a body of men. In peace train- ing, the men become sulky at being " bothered about," lose interest in their work, and wish themselves done with parade. In war, their personal characters usurp the control of their actions, and they become a mob in uniform. But in addition to possessing the confi- dence of the men in your tactical ability, vou should seek all other means to increase your influence over them. Gain their 22 respect in other ways, by honesty of pur- pose, by example, tact, devotion to duty, and so on. Gain their goodwill by watch- ing over their individual and collective interests, though in this you must play to the gallery sufficiently to let them identify you as the source of benefits received. Keep an even temper, and do not show anger without good cause. Personal at- tachment to their officer shows itself most when men's powers are taxed by hardship, fatigue, and danger; it is then a great auxiliary in maintaining discipline among the mass. VI. As regards the moral of the men, IT., i (4 to 10) must be referred to. You must introduce discipline— the habit of subordinating personal inclination to the orders of the superior promptly and without cavil. If your men are raw, you have to go slow just at first till they all know what is expected of them. Let them understand that orders are not given haphazard, but are invariably based on some good reason, which, being so, there is no need for reasons to be always stated, nor for recipients of orders to feel unhappy for want of them. If you can induce a feeling among the men that slackness on parade, slowness in obeying orders, and so 23 on, arc had form, and tend to disgrace tin- company, you will do well, and this good -.pirit \\ill enable you to enforce rlisriph- without having recourse to punishment, if you are vested with the power of inflict n it. I have already said that when in close order during tactical exercises, you should maintain discipline in the ranks. I now go further and say that you should main- tain it when the men are extended or detached from the company singly or in small groups. Evidently the discipline here needed is something more than mere mechanical obedience. What it is, is to be found in T. & M.R., 39 (4), and F.S.R. 12 (13), and IT., 116 and 117. Make the pjen understand that when they are ex- tended they must obey their unit com- mander's orders and signals as to fire and movement at once, and without hesi- tation, and must be always on the look-out for them. Allow no talking, except what relates to the business in hand, such as passing of orders or information, results of fire, and so on. Hold the men responsi- ble that if they are out of reach of the control of their leader, it is their duty to carry out the spirit of the orders under which they set out. To bring their responsibility home to them, you must make a point of calling men occasionally 24 to give an account of what they did when detached, and why they did it, so that they may pause for a moment if they are of the sort that take advantage of opportunity to sit behind a hedge and smoke a cigarette when they ought to be up and doing. Here you will naturally say that this is all very well, but how is one to look after men scattered here and there over several hundred yards of rough country ? Here come in the non-commissioned officers, of whom, so far, no mention has been made, and also your subaltern officers. Since success in battle will depend largely on the efficiency of fire unit commanders, and the normal fire unit is the section (I.T., 6 (4)), it is evident that the section commander is •a very responsible person, and much must be expected from him. Your subalterns and platoon sergeants you must use as your delegates in super- vising and leading the platoons to which they belong, except when they are needed to act specifically as platoon commanders, keeping themselves constantly on the move among the men, looking at the de- tails of the work, sighting of rifles, aiming, use of cover, choice of lines of movement, not lying down themselves nor participating in the operation as combatants. When you 25 wish to inve them prnrtice in setting themselves, turn the whole coinpnny lo OIK- of them ;nul net yourself as critie, or net .is siibnlteni under liis orders This is one menus of supervision. The next is your non-commissioned officers. They are in direct command, ,ind you must hold them responsible for their sections, hut when their units are acting in conjunction with others, it is evident they cannot act both as com- mn riders and instructors unless certain concessions are made, for if the non-com- missioned officers as well as the men of a section were to act as they would have to do under real fire, each non-commissioned officer might be able only to supervise a man or two on his right and left, the rest being too far off. Therefore, at the begin ning of an exercise, you should tell the non-commissioned officers whether, in addition to giving executive commands, they are to be at liberty to move about freely and act as instructors also. Need- less to say, in instructional exercises, and until the men are quite seasoned, you should let them do this, but, on the other hand, in exercises meant to illustrate actual conflict and the limitations imposed by the presence of an enemy, they should pay attention to those limitations so that they, as well as the men, may be prepared 26 to endure the disabilities imposed by Ser- vice conditions. Next comes yourself. Once you have given your subordinates your orders for any exercise, leave them to carry it through, and make yourself as ubiquitous as may be in supervision. Keep criti- cism for the end, and interference only for the prevention of absurdities. To make yourself ubiquitous, the best way is to use your horse, and make the noble animal do the running about with you on his back. You can then get through about six times what you can on your own feet, by cantering from one section to another, and you get a better view of the whole performance, but you must remember when correcting anything the men are doing that you are mounted, while they are probably kneeling or lying, and much that you see is invisible to them. Equip yourself with a pair of field glasses, and also with a megaphone, which latter should be about fourteen inches long, and carried by a strap over the shoulder, the strap punched so as to be capable of being made long or buckled up close under the arm, according as you need to use the megaphone, or wish to get it out of your way. Use your glasses to look at what sections and individual men in them are doing. They will reveal to you small 27 mistakes that escape notice at some distance with the unaided eye. Th<- iii<-g;i phone saves you a lot of small rx( iirsi<>ns to get to earshot of men, and also a ! shouting at a distance, which is fatiguing, and is apt to lead to exacerbation of tempers, both of the shouter and the listener. Moreover, it enables you to hear as well as speak from a distance. This is done simply by holding it aimed at the other man with your ear instead of your mouth at the mouthpiece. Use your whistle to call attention to orders or signals, carry it in your hand, not in your pocket, and put a loop in the cord and pass the loop over your middle finger, or von will be always dropping it. Instead of a cane, carry a small semaphore flag, and give your signals with it. This saves a good deal of arm-waving, and tends to smarten up movement, as it is more easily seen than the arm. By bringine all these aids into vour service, you will find that vou can make your influence felt, although the sections are separated bv the greatest distances which they are ever likely to be called on to take up in battle. VII. "Resides discipline, there are certain other moral influences which give strength 28 to an Army. These are indicated in I.T., i (4 and 5). The two mighty forces of religion and patriotism are not treated of here, as they have their roots not in any system of training, but in the upbringing of the youth of the nation, but there is one force which you, as a humble commander, can call into play, and that is shame — the dread of losing the respect of oneself and of one's comrades. During peace training you may make men dread the public shame of misbehaviour by the aid of those means of supervision which I have sug- gested, but in war the power to supervise is greatly curtailed, and it is very desirable to find something to replace it, and, at the same time, to supplement a too absolute reliance on the stoutness of men's hearts, for this may prove a broken reed when the troops are largely composed of un- seasoned soldiers. To a certain extent, the organisation oi the company into permanent sections pro- vides us with the substitute we desire, as the men of sections are likely to be cognisant of how their comrades behave when out of view of the rest of the company as long as the whole of the men of the section are in view of each other ; but this will not always be the case: for example, in wood fighting or in house fighting, both of which would assuredly occur if our men have to fight in Europe. In such fighting everything comes down to the pushfulness oi the individual soldiers, tor even sections will lose their leaders. Therefore let us carry the principle of the company organisation logically one step further, and make the men of a file as they fall in on parade in the section act in conjunction for the remainder of that parade. This arrangement is recognised in the last edi- tion of the Musketry Regulations, and has, at various times, been adopted in former drill books of our Army, and has given excellent results, while, if the present book does not prescribe it, at least it countenances it (I.T., 123 (12)), and I strongly recommend your introducing it into your company. It is likely to produce emulation in the fire fight among men whose hearts are in the right place, and in the assault it must pro- duce the advantages of combination, for two men coming on with the bayonet in conjunction are far more likely to do someone an injury than if they each came on independently, since in the latter case a cool and skilful antagonist might dispose of one and then the other, even as the Japanese are said to have stepped aside 30 when charged by the Russians, who, run- ning forward blindly and head down, fell an easy prey to their alert little enemies, and were bayoneted in succession as they arrived. The proof of this pudding is the eating thereof, and if your company ever happens to be alongside a company told off daily into haphazard sections, as is sometimes done, in spite of rules, you will then see the difference, even if it is only at manoeuvres. In close, order they may still look alike, but let them be extended in rough country, and you will see that yours is the blade of steel ; the particleis of its metal are co- herent ; it will bend, but not break. The other is of wrought iron, polished on the surface but of brittle material, and sure to fly to pieces in any rough usage. By this file organisation you will produce in the men in the ranks the highest degree of cohesion — the habit of regulating their own actions in accordance with the actions and needs of others in furtherance of one general aim. Having secured this cohesion among the men, you have still to produce it within the company as between platoons and sections. For cohesion is the coping stone of the edifice of efficiency, and rests on a basis of discipline, moral and training. It makes possible the application of the principle of mutual support which is indispensable in the attack t T SR , (4)), and it enables retirements and defensive action to be carried out without disorganisation, and- with the minimum of loss. Whenever sections act together, see to it that the non- i-ommissioned officers keep an eye on the movements of the others, and question them as to the extent their orders to their sections should be influenced by the needs and movements of the others. By this means they will be induced to check the inclination to play only for their own hands, and to remember always that their unit is part of a combination which can best attain success by acting accordingly. VIII. Training is the preparation of officers and men for the duties which they will carry out in war. These duties consist in the application of the principles contained in the training manuals, and it is your business to provide concrete examples. But in these days of long range arms com- bats take a very long time, and you cannot expect in a parade of perhaps one or at most two hours, and with a limited extent of ground, to carry out all the varied phases of an operation which, in warfare, would take anything from six to eighteen hours to complete, and would extend over perhaps five or six miles of country, even i-f we limit ourselves to the extreme ranges of heavy artillery, and take no account of movements not within the range of possi- ble fire. Therefore, in your training, you must be analytical, choosing for one parade such phase or phases as you have time and ground for, and doing the others later on. When your company knows all it can be taught thus piecemeal, it will be early enough to try to get time and ground to perform continuous operations. For instance, infantry in the attack will usually have to go through three phases : first, the advance to fire positions ; second, the fire fight (IT., 121 (6)); and, third, the assault, which latter must be divided into the charge and the steps which follow it according as it is success- ful or not. You will have to train for these three phases. The first, against an enemy armed with guns and rifles, would consist in opening out from column of route into little columns — sections or platoons — and moving forward in this formation, the main object being to escape being smashed to pieces by his artillery fire before being able to do him any damage (IT., 118 (3)). Later, you 33 would conic under In, ntle lire, and little columns must scatter out into of men in extended Older (I.T., Il8 (s) ). These movements seem, and are, very - but still they must be practised in peace if tin o be done coolly and without confusion in time of war when the first intimation of the necessity for opening out may be the shriek and crash of what will be to most of the men the first shrapnel they have ever seen, and withal aimed at themselves. This phase requires the presence of all four platoons of the com- pany, and so may be kept over till the men have been trained in the phase which it precedes, namely, that of the fire fight. The fire fight begins when the attacking infantry have got as far forward as they can without having to reply to the enemy's fire, and it is quite distinct from the pre- ceding phase of passive endurance. Suc- cess in the fire fight is an absolute neces- sity for a successful assault. Possibly your enemy has prepared your success before war broke out by abstaining from training his men in musketry, but even if his shoot- ing is inferior, the fire fight will call into play all the qualities and skill of which your men are possessed, both individually and collectively. Accordingly you should practise them in the fire fight from the D 34 opening of their fire up to the assault, first individually and then collectively. The assault can be dissected into the fixing of bayonets with as little cessation of fire as possible, the charge itself, fol- lowed, according as it is held to have been successful or not, by the rallying of the troops, pursuit of the enemy by fire and strengthening of the captured position, or the withdrawal or such mitigation of the results of failure as may fairly be at- tempted Thus, by considering the attack as made up of phases as above, it is, I think, possible and instructive to practise each one of them separately, on a short parade, and on limited ground, by placing the men in the order in which they would be at beginning of any one phase, and carrying on from there. Before beginning any exercise, call your non-commissioned officers out to the front, and explain to them and to the men, in very full detail, what the exercise is in- tended to be, what points particularly require attention, how you want it done, and the sequence of events, if it involves combined action between the different units ; whether the company is supposed to be acting by itself or as part of the battalion, and, if the latter, whether your side are having the support of artillery fire or not, where the enemy is, and what he 35 is, i.e., is he infantry only, or has he cavalry and guns, what he is supposed to he doing, attacking, defending, retiring, inarching, or what. Deal with all such points hefore you start, otherwise you will find your non-commissioned officers and men filling in tlu4 blanks each according to AH bent of imagination, and everyone in consequence playing at a different game. >e thus able to define the scope and arrangements of the exercise, you must have it clearly planned out in all detail in your head. This you should do if possible the day before the parade, so that you will have the thing well thought out, and events marshalled in logical sequence. At all exercises, if possible, have the enemy represented by a skeleton force, as directed by T. & M.R., 48, a few actual men with blank cartridge, and a red range flag or two to roughly define the enemy's position. Use for this purpose old sol- diers, if you have them, or, at least, men who have already performed the exercise you mean to do, and it is better to take one or two men from each platoon than to send off a whole section, and so break up the company organisation. Six or eight men are quite enough to. form any skeleton enemy that is needed for a com- pany to manoeuvre against. You must give the skeleton enemy definite orders as D 2 36 to what they are to represent, where they are to go, and what to do and not to do. If they are given at all a free hand, especi- ally if under the enterprising British subaltern, they are very apt to indulge in far-reaching manoeuvres, and subject you to sudden raids and onslaughts which up- set your scheme for the parade, and leave you no enemy at the very point you wished to have him. If you cannot arrange for a skeleton enemy, at least never fail to indi- cate some position as supposed to be held by an enemy. If your exercise ground is Jimited in extent, fix the enemy's position outside it, regardless of whether you have, or have not, licence to traverse the inter- vening space, so as to avoid carrying out your exercise within impossibly close range of the enemy. In default of a skeleton enemy to provide you with a target, tell your men to aim at any members of the public who are about the enemy's position. This is better than snapping at inanimate objects, as it gives more interest and so keeps up careful aiming. As regards the general method of training, follow com- monsense and the manuals, and work from individual up to collective, bearing in mind always that collective work is built up of the work of the individuals who throughout have to be kept up to the collar by the various arts which I have touched on. The of the iron hand tli.it is ,hown the better, IX. I make no nirntion of scouts, as they are i lists. They must be selected after you have got to know all the men of your company and their capabilities. Their training as scouts cannot be carried out by you personally at the same time that you arc training1 the company. To be really of use, it will be a whole-time job for one officer, and you will either have to turn them over to one of the subalterns, or go with them yourself, preferably the former, if the subaltern is capable. When they are trained and fall in on parade as scouts in their sections, it is a good plan to have places permanently reserved for them as third files from the left of sections (the blank file's place) so that they can leave the ranks without disturbing the formation for forming fours. As regards dress one thing is quite certain, and that is that with only one suit of uniform men cannot appear clean and smart off duty in it, and yet use it for field work with all the lying down and knockabout wear involved. In time of national danger, appearances will go to the wall, and men will do their work at the expense of the fit of their one and only suit of uniform. EXERCISE I. INDIVIDUAL ADVANCE IN EXTENDED ORDER. The exercise portrays what men will have to do when the rifle fire of the enemy becomes effective, and necessitates exten- sion of the small columns which are used to dodge his shell fire (T.T., 1 18 (3) ). This will be somewhere over one thousand yards from the enemy, and perhaps fourteen hun- dred may be taken as a maximum. From the point at which extension from the small columns is made up till the time of the assault, a line of men in extended order is the suitable formation, unless there is some covered way leading- forward which can be traversed in file or other formation. Once the advance has begun it should be carried through as quickly as possible without exhausting the men too much, and fire should not be opened until it is abso- lutely necessary to neutralise that of the enemy, firstly, because it lessens the speed of the advance and so increases the time during which the attackers are exposed to the enemy's fire ; secondly, because once 30 men sl.irl firing it is more difficult to lead them forward ; and, tliirdly, l>eeausc it uses up cartridges whose value and difficulty of replacement increases at every yard nearer the enemy's position. The exercise is then to tram men to gain ground to the front with the minimum of exposure to the enemy's fire, and as quickly as may be, firstly, without firing, ana, sccoiidlV, while firing themselves, but in tin- latter case speed must be subordinated to the development of a fire of sufficient accuracy and volume to largely neutralise that of the enemy, for at this stage of the battle advances under fire will only be possible if it is inaccurate ; and the only in means of causing it to be inaccurate is by disturbing the enemy's nerves and aim by bringing to bear on him the fire both of supporting troops and of the firing line itself (IT., 118 (6)). The regulations do not encourage the opening of fire by units less than two platoons at ranges over one thousand yards as the results do not compensate for the delay. Under one thousand and up to six hundred it is desired that fire should be controlled and directed, i.e., the lit, and the target should be speci- fied by commanders (I.T., 116). Under six hundred yards it is recognised 40 that individual fire gives good results, and, moreover, control becomes almost impossible. Divide your exercise accordingly. First, teach merely the advance without firing, letting the men know that they are not to fire, as a rule, without orders under six hun- dred yards, and then let them advance firing at each halt behind cover, choosing their own target and times of firing as they would do in the stage of " close fire," i.e., six or perhaps eight hundred yards up to assaulting distance, which latter is about two hundred yards from the enemy's line of defences. This parade is one that can be done with very few men present, but it is necessary to form them up into sections with a large proportion of non-commissioned officers. Keep the men in their proper sections, but, if necessary, join two or three together, so as to form sections with three or four non- commissioned officers to each. Thus, if you form four sections, they should each be in reality a boiling down of the platoons. In future exercises I will also suppose that you thus concentrate your men, keeping the members of each section together, and form them into sections of size suitable to the work of the day, and no further allusion will be made to this. faking the men on to th< Around, you should choose a point on it from which you intend In sl.irt your ad- vanee. Some fourteen hundred 01 yards from this choose a position for your skeleton enemy, who will consist of three or lour old soldiers with forty rounds of blank eaeh. If men are not available, put up a few red range flags. Whichever are used, put them into some position that an enemy might reasonably occupy ; do not simply dump them down on to the ground. The skeleton enemy must be told to show up occasionally, and to open a slow but regular fire as soon as they see your men advancing, but only to keep it up as long as your men show themselves in making their advance. A complete cessation of fire will denote that your men are making such good use of cover as to be invisible to the enemy. Let your men also know that these instructions have been given, and that such an advance is the ideal to be sought for, provided always that it is not absurdly slow. If neither men nor flags are available you must make believe and point out a supposed position at a supposed distance. I have already pointed out the advantages of having a skeleton enemy to work against. In front of your starting point, and about 42 four hundred yards from it, decide on some point at which you will let the men halt after they have made their way across the intervening space. Here I will refer you to the diagram. The line AA-' is your start- ing point, CC' the enemy's position. Your exercise consists in showing individual men how to gain ground from AA' as far as BB', distant about four hundred yards from A A', with the minimum of exposure to the enemy's aimed fire. Draw up the sec- tions, supposing there are two, on the line AA ', fifty to one hundred yards apart, and let the men sit down facing away from CC' and, if possible, under cover, so that they may not see how their comrades negotiate the course. Space the available non-commissioned officers of each section along the course from A to B and A' to B ', with orders to supervise and criticise the advance of each man within the limits of their beats. Allow a belt of twenty to thirty yards broad from A to B and from A' up to B', within which men must seek their cover. This belt is made broad here to afford instruction, but when the men work together in their sections, it will be much narrower, as they will then be ex- tended at intervals of five or six paces only. Start off one man at a time from each sec- tion to cross from AA' to BB', to move as if under fire from the enemy in rushes from 43 one cover I- • .mother. A-. soon as .1 in. in reaches I»B he may fall out and watch the movements «•!" the remainder. Do not off ;i fresh III;HI until the preceding one has nearly reached BB', so that your non-com- missioned officers may have good oppor- tunity to look ;it each man as he goes. As for yourself, In' active in supervising both sections, using your horse if you have one. The following are points to be attended to: — Before leaving their cover, men must deride where their next halting place is to he, and make for it quickly, and with derision. There must be no emerging into the open, and then looking about for a bit of cover to go for. The length of each rush should not be enough to let the enemy have time for deliberate aim — fifty yards or so is quite the limit for this. If there is no cover the men must lie down flat be- twrcn each rush. Occasionally it is advisable to make a long rush from one good position to another at sprinting pace without stopping at all (T.T., 121 (12)), so this should be practised some- times, the non-commissioned officers at that part of the beat being ordered to tell the men what is needed. Once a man has de- cided on his next halting place, and is in wind, he should leave his cover with a jump. The slow uprising of a figure is .sure to draw the enemy's attention, and DIAGRAM I. FOR EXERCISES I. & II. CC = Enemy's position about 1400* from AA'. Enemy being represented by men with blank cartridge or flags. « -.«-— c- te* teS. -ferf- -tefr E^SSa. BB'= line at which men halt after advance from AAI BB'to CC' is about 1000." B u-::- ^f^0 B' -, ;--T- -f" x One N.C.O. <.. 30 Yards....,, ...Ij.. Belt within which men One N c Q may choose cover. '* Crosses are f ••-•« ^ available cover. S /\ One N.C.O. x / Chain dot line is «. ..A.... ..A---- ~i :^-:.,-A' f-^f ^ 50 -100 yards _v.. _..[^... Sections turned ^"^ away from CC' AA'=Starting points 1400 yards from enemy's position. Men start from A A to cross to BB without exposing themselves to the enemy at CC.' Crosses indicate cover, and the chain dotted lines routes by which men may advance. A A' to BB' is about 400X 45 make- In- lnv more accurate than it would !><• it no intimation wnv given him. Simi- I.irix, on reaching COVCf, mm should tail down quickly, and not lower themselves slowly to earth. Insist on a careful choice of cover, a very small depression or elevation, even six inches, is enough to give cover from view, and therefore helps in escaping aimed fire, but in peace time men will not take trouble over apparently trifling things like this un- less it is rubbed into them by close super- vision. Noticeable objects should be avoided as the enemy may have taken their range, and they help him to define a point on which to concentrate fire. If a man makes mistakes and shows indecision at any part of the course, call him back to the last cover he left, and let him start again from there after pointing out what he has done wrong. II. The advance combined with individual fire. The second part of the exercise is done in the same way as the first, the men ad- vancing and taking cover as before, but now using their rifles. They have to be taught to use the cover to advantage, both protection and as an aid to their shoot- ing, and to take pains in searching for a 46 good target, and in their sighting, aiming and firing. For purposes of instruction, six hundred yards is rather a short range to open fire at, and I recommend your making a start at eight hundred or so, i.e., two hun- dred yards beyond BB ' towards the enemy, working up to four hundred. This necessi- tates judging distance at beyond the practi- cally point-blank ranges of the Lee- Enfield rifle, and makes the men use their eyes keenly to spot the enemy, while it avoids a certain amount of unreality which is apt to attach to instructional movements carried on in front of a skeleton enemy at the deadly short ranges under three hun- dred yards. Points which should be considered are : — To fire from the right and lower edge of any cover, not over the top. Make .the men keep a count of the num- ber of times they snap over the course (i.e., cartridges used), and report to the non- commissioned officer at the finish of their course. Let the men do their own judging dis- tance, and let non-commissioned officers drop at once on any man who either fails to do so, or forgets, as they often do, to adjust the backsight. Cultivate a habit among the men of look- ing about for different targets, not firing 47 onl\ straight in [runt uf themselves, l»iit on thnr nidi! ;in (n), and also get tlu1 riistnm of watching for the enemy all along his front. These two exercises of advancing with and without firing are the groundwork of the fighting efficiency of the soldier in the attack, and will be found to call for c natural and acquired qualification the in- dividual possesses. Good shooting, quick judgment, activity, wind, and everything else are needed if the work is done with full observance of the conditions which would exist under fire. Put the men through exercises of this sort several times, and, if possible, on different ground, till they acquire quickness in choosing cover and the arts that make an expert fighter. Con- fidence in themselves will come with the skill they acquire, and with confidence comes decision of mind, which is really more important than bodily efficiency. If you have time, a useful rider to this exer- cise is to work the men by pairs, as is re- commended in the Musketry Regulations for the observation of fire, and so introduce them early to the use of the file organisa- tion which T have advised you to adopt. 48 EXERCISE II. RETIREMENT BY PAIRS. A sound provision against panic among young troops is to accustom them to regard a retirement as all in the day's work, and not as an exceptional undertaking which their anxiety may invest with possibilities of disaster. The essence of successful re- tirement in face of an enemy lies in the continuous opposition, or appearance of it, offered to the enemy by one portion of the troops, while others draw off to take post to cover the withdrawal of the rearmost portion. IT., 137, gives the idea in few words. It does not mention individual training in this, but it is useful to put men through the movements, both to cultivate cohesion in the ranks, and as a tactical exercise. It may happen in war that an extended line has to give ground when engaged with the enemy, and this under so heavy a fire as to make movement except over short distances impossible without great loss. Such a withdrawal would mean that the troops are in a very tight corner, and would test them very highly, but that is another matter. It may happen, and 49 M he i A v Ithd light perhaps be M! In the alternate movement of in fill's covered by the fire of tlie others, until sueh .1 distance from the y h.id been ohtaim > tions or companies to take up the :i. Up to that distance it will he simply a '1 of what was done in 1, hut. worked hy files a front rank man and his rear rank man, one ; luck a short distance, and the oilier Imn^ to cover the movement. Again, on patrol or otherwise detached may have ;rc to avoid capture1, or for many other reasons, when they might not be under close and heavy fire, but still would be under the necessity of preventing the enemy closing in on them or surrounding them. In this case, the length of each withdrawal \vould be much longer than in ise; one man would fire while i her made off perhaps two or three hundred yards at his best speed. Train for both contingencies ; it can be done in one and the same parade. Skeleton enemy as usual. For the withdrawal under . fire, let the sections sit down and fall out at BB' (Diagram I.), and put out missioned officers between R\ and B' A' as before. Call out the men by files, tell them to work back to A and A', E 50 one firing, the other retiring. As a rule they should retire past each other before halting. The same points must be observed as in Exercise No. I, and the quicker they are in movement the better, but they must be taught to go in quick time also when so ordered (IT., 137 (4)). For the retirement of a file as on patrol, do exactly the same, but you should work over six hundred yards of ground or so to correct any tendency to import the short rush into this exercise, which would be out of place, and also to let men have more practice in looking for suitable fire posi- tions from which they can both fire on the enemy, and from which they can get away when their turn comes, a point they often neglect at first. The different nature of the two exercises must be made quite clear. At this exercise you should bring before your men the need of using all sorts of ruses in a retirement, the use of rapid fire just before withdrawing, the sham with- drawal acted by ceasing fire, and retiring a few yards, but only to halt and re-open fire after a few seconds if the enemy has been tempted to expose himself, thinking the coast clear, the real withdrawal effected so carefully that the enemy is not sure whether you are there still or not, and so on ; and make them put their own ideas of i ,ind tell them if they i)le on service or ir ;ill " m.miruvrr slinn anything th;it could not be done o: E2 5.2 EXERCISE III. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING IN USE OF FIRE AND FIRE DISCIPLINE. Early lessons in fire discipline can be given in single rank on the parade ground, but the open country and extended order are wanted for training men to the fullest extent under service conditions. Only in the open country can be got the variety of targets, ranges and the visual training which are necessary for a complete educa- tion. Men must be taught, and taught again, that the taking up of extended order, and movement over all sorts of ground, in no way mean that they are to pass at once beyond the control of their unit leaders, or that it is optional to continue to take any sort of pains with their shooting just because their non-com- missioned officers cannot stand over them, but have to shout orders from a distance. This exercise consists in advancing and retiring in extended order with fire and the use of cover when halted ; but to allow for more prolonged shooting prac- tice and closer supervision than are possible when carrying out an attack or retire- men! 'In' li, ih are 1' .nid • h'ltdd .it fir-t l>e made in quirk time. Put "lit your ^k«-lrt<.n enemy 00 i tr. 'Hi, so as to allow i change of targfetS, and do not li;i\c them all in light 1 in- . -hall call '^hting. the s work independently of each other under their section commanders, who, with the other non-commissi' officers, will have to act both as manders and instructors. Bring the n^ up to about twelve hundred yards from the enemy; get them into a line with intervals between them, i.e., spares uring from the flank of one to the flank of the other, sufficient to admit of •ion being extended to two or three paces between men witnout its flank men coming too close to those of other e.g., with two sections of eight fde, i.e., sixteen men each; you must room for hnlf of (\-uh to extend to s towards the other, and keep a fair interval; that is, from the centre of each of the above sections ot eight men in each rank you want 8^2 fhalf the number in the front rank) x 2 (two ranks) X2 ft wo pares extension) = 16 paces for • .he line extended and an interval of, say, ^o yards, which gives 46 yards between 54 each section centre to centre. Now, let the section commanders order the men tc extend, lie down, take cover and open fire. The unit commander, the non-com- missioned officer in charge of the section, is to name the target and distance and also the rate of fire, rapid or slow, at all dis- tances over six hundred yards from the enemy (IT., 116 (5)), unless it is desired on occasion to train men to do this for themselves. After fire has been delivered, direct section commanders to proceed with the exercise, giving orders for ad- vancing, halting and firing, the advance to be made from cover to cover as in Exercise No. I, but in quick time. Your- self supervise in chief, and tell tion commanders when you want to give orders as to the firing or movement, and let them give the executive commands, after which you and they should pass along the lines and scrutinise each man's actions in carrying out the orders, ques- tioning them, and repealing hints you may have given when telling them the object and methods of the practice, if they appear not to be giving them effect. The value of the practice depends on the orders you give as to the firing and the following are suggested : — (a) Switching the fire of all the rifles on to different parts of the enemy's posi- lion, somrti:, .ighl in front, hut in's extii . 1C 11, ink',. This is to introduce the use of enfilade fire (i i)) and the h;i1>it < >f giving sup- port In' fire to other units (F.S.R., 105 (4)), by concentrating the fire on to particular targets. (£) Distributing the fire laterally along hole or a part of the enemy's front (I.T., 116 (10)). This may be done by giving the section a particular extent of the enemy's front, e.g., " from the dry tree to the gate in the hedge." The section com- ler then allots those of the enemy, who can be viewed within his bit of front to individual men, or preferably files of men, who are to treat them as their espe- cial charge and keep on firing at them till otherwise ordered, or till the enemy shifts. Of course, if there is not enough of the skeleton enemy to give each file in the section a live antagonist (and there won't be on your parades), the com- mander must indicate bits of cover which individual men of the enemy might be expected to use and tell his men to fire at these spots. This is a most important practice, and needs a good deal of atten- tion and application before the men get really quick at it. It means, of course, that on service you will make it your business to allow as few of the enemy's 56 riflemen as possible to be free of the dis- traction of having some bullets landing about them, to upset their nerves and aim. Unless some plan is adopted to do this all along his line, it is all too probable your men will be exposed to some accur- ate fire from rifles held in steady hands, and even one rifle so held has, to my knowledge, caused a loss of eleven men in as many minutes. This lateral distri- bution is rather difficult, but it is easy, compared with the concomitant task of spotting where the men of the enemy are hidden, if they really try to hide, at any- thing but the shortest fighting ranges. The only remedy for this is for each pri- vate to carry field glasses of sorts; you will not get them from Government, but if any of your men are keen enough to go in for spotting a hidden enemy for themselves with glasses and would bring their own to parade, forbid them not, but encourage it. I have been told that in some of the yeomanry corps in the .South African war nearly every trooper raised somehow and somewhere a pair of glasses • — some were mother o' pearl and silver- mounted, but did the spotting all right in spite of that. (V) Passing orders and changing tar- gets. Under heavy fire non-commis- sioned officers will not be able to 57 the line, ;md orders iiiusl be passed either hy word of UK. nth Or by written messages passed from hand to h, ind ; the former is apt to be slow, ;ind tli •• orders i^irl >lrd en route unless pra< • •hand ; the latter is not very practical as men in action are too busy to read bits ot paper or trouble themselves to sec that they are passed on (I.T., 119 (4)). To practise the verbal method while the men are engaged in firing at any particular target, give orders to one man in a low tone (you would have to speak loud if ball cartridge were being used) to fire at some other target, and to pass the word. The man then tells his neighbours on each side, and yourself and a non-commissioned officer then follow the order each way, and when a man varies it admonish him to re- peat just what he got from the last speaker, no more and no less. In a little time the men will become exact in taking and pass- ing messages. This method should be con- fined to directions about firing ; orders for movement should invariably be given by commanders by word themselves or signal, and men should not be allowed to repeat these, as it may lead to grave mistakes on service, as a signal may be seen and acted on by someone for whom it was not in- tended. ( o unpany or to Like fresh ordcr^ in the iinniniiiiii <>f time. I'he usual tiling seen i^ that after the ;lt the ground is covered Nvilh a mix- ture of men of all companies staring abunt, and apparently thinking the show at an end, whereas on service this is the very time you may expect either a counter- k by infantry or a burst of artillery fire directed on the lost position. To repeat the orders of the assault : "Rapid Fire; Fix Bayonets; Charge; Halt and Take Cover; Commence Fire; Rally and Close Under Cover," and be ready for further happenings. 64 EXERCISE V. THE SECTION AND PLATOON IN THE ATTACK. Having trained the individual men in the work needed of them, the next step is to make use of that individual skill to the best effect in combination under orders of a commander. The section is the lowest unit recognised for training (I.T., 107), and it also is the normal unit used in firing (I.T., 6 (4)). When the company is ad- vancing in the attack, or retiring, its sec- tions and platoons will often be widely separated from each other, and the com- pany commander cannot look after each one in detail, so that the platoon commanders, and under them the sec- tion commanders, must be fully com- petent to lead their men without super- vision, in accordance with the general intention given them before the com- pany opened out. So the training of men in combination must be accompanied by the training of your section and platoon commanders. The duties of fire unit commanders are laid down in I.T., 116 (5), and those of 65 'inm;m ,ind I 2j e you proceed with this isr h.ive up these non-commissioned officers and devote ten minutes to an ex- ;on of what is contained in the above p.inigniplis. Dilate on them, and show how neglect of those duties hampers the company commanders. At the same time, desire them to maintain among the men during sectional exercises the standard of individual training which was obtained in the preliminary exercises. Unless they do so the men will soon cease to apply what they then learnt, and so forget it in battle until the occurrence of casualties impresses its value afresh in their minds. Also give them the gist of what follows as to the advance and description of fire phases. The exercise gives commanders the opportunity of doing what they will have to do when the company is attackir.g or retiring, but without their having to keep an eye on the movements of the other platoons. The men should now be extended at full intervals as on service, five or six yards apart, this being held to be the most that is needed. Put out the skeleton enemy in groups, one group as objective of attack for each section or platoon on parade, and the groups sufficiently apart to nt them interfering with each other when extended as above, for they are to act F 66 independently. Take up the advance as if at fourteen hundred from the enemy, when his rifle fire on open ground would compel you to change from small columns of sec- tions or platoons into the line of extended men (I.T., 118 (5)). The advance up to assaulting distance, from fourteen hundred yards, consists (I.T., 121 (7)), in the first place, of an advance to fire positions. Now Musketry Regulations lay down that fire by less than two platoons is of little effect over one thousand yards, so do not encourage commanders to open fire till one thousand yards at least, and use the space fourteen hundred to one thousand yards for instruction in getting their sections or platoons forward as quickly, and with as little exposure, as possi- ble. Secondly, the advance consists of a fire fight combined with further advances up to the assaulting position. In this fire fight controlled collective fire is better than individual fire (I.T., 116 (/) (iii) ), so up to six hundred yards let firing take place/ only on the specific orders of commanders, who accordingly are to name the targets and ranges. In this phase therefore make them choose forward fire positions and work their units forward, using controlled collective fire at the same time. Under six hundred yards it is apparently 6; held : - ept the inevitable and allow individual fire, the unit commanders !>• still responsible for getting their men For ward up to the4 position of assault — about two hundred yards from the enemy. Still at this close range unit commanders slioiild do what they can to direct the fire, and i.illy they should see that men fire -Jowly and carefully. In general the rate of firing or snapping is far too fast, and pouches would be empty long before the iidting position would be reached. ( hving to the great importance of train- ing the see; ions, it is advisable to let them do this exercise, though both the phases below, separately from each other, and not in platoon. When they know all about it, let them work in platoon. II axing drawn up your sections in line at fourteen hundred yards, order the sec- tion commanders to extend and move on, and signal the skeleton enemy to open fire. First Phase : Fourteen to One Thousand Yards, Gaining Ground Without Firing. Practise the section commanders in all ways of getting their sections forward without undue exposure or delay, by rushes of the whole section, man-by- from one and both flanks and bv files, together, and any other way F2 68 that suggests itself. Stand over the section commanders in turn and tell them to advance the section by one method and ihen by another, and ask them which seems most suitable for various con- ditions of fire and ground (IT., 118 (4) ). The advance should be steady and determined. Before starting the advance from one position to another, section commanders are to decide and must tell the men to what point they mean the next advance to be made (I.T., 108 (2) ), in the same way as individual men were taught to mark their next halting places. Attention must be paid to the way in which advances are inaugurated. Rushes must be sudden and simultaneous (IT., 92 (5) ). The men have been trained to leave their cover quickly. The unit commander must give his directions for the next move with- out getting up (if himself lying) and tell the men to be prepared ; when all are ready, he and the men must jump up together and rush at once on the word or signal. The object of this, of course, is to avoid a concentrated fire being directed on the unit commander, and, perhaps, the two or three men nearest him, if they get up before the others, which would make it likely that some of them 69 would hi- hit inmicdiiitrK , while lli. ul the unit looked for a new leader, and so IvanCC t;ike pi KV ; \\h< i »>ne gets on the move together a casualty or two will not bring the whole to a stand- still. Of course, commanders should lead the way, but they must get in front by sprinting the first few yards. Second Phase : One thousand to Six Hun- dred Yards (Collective Fire) and Six Hundred to Two Hundred Yards (Indi- vidual Fire}. As soon as a section begins to fire, it becomes possible for it to practise the lessons in the use of fire which were learnt in Kxercise III., such as concentration and distribution of fire. From one position the commander must choose his next fire posi- tion, and work his section up to it in what- ever way is most suitable. On flat and open ground this position may simply be the halting place of the next rush, thirty or forty paces to the front, but it i? more instructive and practical t«i have positions far enough from each other, say one hundred and fifty or two hundred y;irds, to necessitate the advancing section making several successive rushes and using various devices to gain ground without attracting the enemy's attention. Practise ;o sections in all ways of advancing from one position to another, as was done before firing began, and encourage the use of covered ways. This exercise, if pro- perly done, represents what the section would have to do in battle. For the pur- pose of instruction, the unit commanders should be allowed to move about as in- structors, but when all ranks have been through the exercise and know what is needed, you should practise it under ser- vice conditions, and tell unit commanders to behave as if under fire; this is impor- tant, as it lets all see how much will be asked of the individual man under fire, and how difficult it is to exercise any wide control. For the same reason you must in this exercise begin the practice of ordering casualties of leaders, and carry it on through the whole of the rest of the train- ing. Order section commanders to be casualties, and let the next senior man carry on, then order that man to become a casualty, and let the next one take command. Collect these casualties with you and let them go round with you, and have for a time the onlooker's view of the game. Do not stint in ordering them, but let every man be ready to take up command. This readiness to assume command and to carry on the advance in N|)llc Of tl v Jllll- al>le in battle ;ind on parade 1'or training, I trnl ion lixed on the IHI-I and help, to counteraet disorder who) mixed up in reinforcement in battalion alt. 1'nder six hundred yards let the men us£ individual fire, choosing their own ts; at this time try to get them into the way of looking for the targets which most require to ho shot at at the moment — they must be always looking along the enemy's line, and must hot acquire the paralysing habit of only seeing straight in front of themselves. Call on unit commanders to keep in view the question of expenditure of am- munition. It is no good ordering men to snap-fire 200 times in the course of an advanoe when they would only have 100 rounds in their pouches on service, and no as of getting more; when blank is • used they should see that the am- munition of casualties is collected and redistributed. At some time in the course of this exer- cise the section must be practised in im- ;ig v ni;ui, and so on, ns taught to the section. Fire should be directed by the platoon commander, and controlled by the section commander. Teach the lateral distribution of fire along a given front among the four sections of the platoon. Teach also the principle of covering fire, one section being sent to make its way with every use of cover to a forward fire position, while the remainder continue firing. The first section, on arrival at the new fire position, opens fire, and the others follow in due course, one section only being dumb while the move- ment is in progress. If there is a choice of good lines of advance it is better that sections should not follow each other on one line, as the enemy may have noticed the move and be waiting for them. 74 EXERCISE VI. THE SECTION AND PLATOON IN RETIREMENT. For the general principles of retirements see I.T., 137. The platoon, when working with the company, will take its turn at being the rearmost portion of the troops, and will have the difficult task of getting away while in touch with the enemy, but its retirement will be covered by the fire of other portions of the company. On the other hand, if a platoon or section finds itself beyond support from other troops, as might happen often enough, it will have to act itself as a rearguard and retire by alternate parts. In both cases great advantage is gained if the position held can be vacated so stealthily that the enemy shall not be aware of its having been vacated till the defenders are well on their way to the rear. For this reason it will be worth while to accustom the men to employ, when prac- ticable, a procedure used in mountain warfare, withdrawing the bulk of men first and leaving only a few quick- footed men to keep up appearances and 75 hie as lone; as possible and then them at speed. Also all men must be taught to grovel backwards on their stomachs fioin the crest of their fire posi- tion till sufficiently under (-over, if their is cover, to stand up without being seen, after which they rise and make oft. Send out tin1 skeleton enemy with in- ductions to follow up the retirement slowly, and not to close in on the sections, as it is easy and tempting to do this when there are no bullets in the rifles. i ft Sec/ion or Platoon Acting with the Company. 1 )o the practice first by sections and then in platoon. Draw up the unit on a fire posi- tion about eight hundred yards from the enemy, the men in extended order, lying down, and open fire on the enemy. Tell the commander to choose his next halt- ing place and retire his unit on it, which he should do on the lines before indicated. The halting places should be chosen as far apart as two to four hundred yards; short retirements merely prolong the time exposure to fire and should not be used unless the enemy are very close or the fire very heavy. Once the men are clear of the position, they should move as fast as they can, trusting to escape casualties, 76 by speed, the alteration of range, and the fire of the few men left on the position As a rule, carry out all retirements at the double, so that the men shall not be con- fused by the hasty movement. As soon as the first party has reached the new position, the fringe of men left on the old one should creep back and go as hard as they can to rejoin their section or platoon, and they should be taught to judge the time of going for themselves, so as not to " let in " ths sec- tion or themselves, by going too early or staying too late. Repeat the movement to one or two further positions. It is a strenuous practice and makes demands on the men's limbs, wind, and willingness, but the rearguard is the post of honour and danger. Order casualties of leaders from time to time, and let the men be called to move in quick time sometimes, which they would have to do if there were signs of unsteadiness. (Jj) As a Section or Platoon Acting Alone. Act on the same lines as before, but let the commander run the show, which he should be able to do, after having done it under supervision. One party (a file or two in the case of a section, or one or two sections in that of a platoon) gets 77 Kirk to a fire position and opens fire to cover the retirement of the other. In i^iMirnil, it is U'ttiT th;it both purtir^ should not fall back on one and the same fire position; on the contrary, if they act on a wide front in ordinary country — say, three hundred yards apart — their fire is equally effective, but the enemy is broken up, and the danger of their being out- flanked or surrounded is less. For the same reason it is good practice, if the pla- toon is strong, to send out groups of four or five men still further on the flanks, and a group to precede the whole on the line of retirement by six hundred yards or so, in order to occupy positions and deny them to the enemy, and after one or two turns of this exercise tell the skeleton enemy to follow on harder and try to work round the flanks. In this part also continue to order casualties of leaders. EXERCISE VII. THE SECTION AND PLATOON IN INDEPENDENT ATTACK. It is very important to secure the intelli- gent co-operation of section and platoon commanders in the operations in which their company or battalion is taking part. I have read that in the Russo-Japanese War the result of one of the battles — I think at Penlin, 3ist July — turned on the action of an infantry section who gained a footing on the extreme flank of the Russian line, and drove off the de- fenders in the immediate vicinity, opened a way for the advance of the greater numbers, and led to the outflanking and retreat of the whole Russian force. If you give your unit commanders some chances of carrying out attacks, acting as if unsup- ported by other troops, they will find themselves faced with the same problems which confront commanders of larger bodies in the attack, and they will be more likely, when acting in combination, to look beyond just the limits of their own commands; they will be led to compre- hend the object of operations and the ;Q difficulties in tli .ind will b> quirk to seize any opportunity to further the general plan without wailiiu; orders It is true that SO small a be d\ section would scldmn be formally told to attack an objective- single handed, but there are often occasions on service when a platoon might have to carry out an attack on a small scale, as when a few of the enemy's riflemen are making themselves unpleasant, while not in sufficient force to do more than " snipe," or to require the divert n against them of a whole company. Though a section as now constituted is a very small unit to work with, I think no excuse is needed for performing the attack with the smallest unit, having in view the excellent training it forms for non-com- missioned officers and men. However, for this practice, it is advisable to form sections somewhat above the usual strength, by joining two together, so as to give at least eighteen rifles in the whole. After having put the sections through the exercise, you will, of course, let the platoon commanders eirry out the attack with their platoons. Put out a skeleton enemy of three or four men for each platoon or section, or one only for all to attack in turn, and post this enemy in some commanding place, with a good field of view and 8o fire so that if possible the unit shall have twelve to eight hundred yards to manoeuvre over before coming to close quarters. As an example, give out the supposition that this enemy are a cavalry patrol of the enemy, who have dis- mounted and are using their rifles on the company as it is on the move from some- where to somewhere else. The section or platoon is ordered to drive them off, neutra- lise their fire, or hold them in check, in case they should be the forerunners of a greater number. The enemy should begin to fire on a signal from you (with your flag), which you should give as you tell off the commander for the duty. If the other units are to attack the same enemy in turn, you should halt them under cover or turn them to the rear, so as not to see too much of the method the first lot choose to carry out their job. The method of the attack will depend on the nature of the ground — what suits one case may not suit another, and there may be two or three courses open in attacking any one position. The com- mander should accordingly look well at the ground before deciding how he will carry out the attack, but there are certain principles common to attacks, great or small, which he should put into practice. 8i COrc himsrll I'n.m interrup- tion on his Hanks and rear, and he should provide a supporting fire to distract the enemy and cover the advance of his mam lie cannot make large detach- ments or indulge in wide patrolling, nor would such small bodies ;is platoons be sent <>lt to attack if such were advisable; but, ,:t least he can post a file or two on some high ground, or, failing that, on one flank out of decisive range of the enemy, i.e., about eight hundred yards from him, with orders to keep up a steady fire until his advance masks their fire. This will prevent, or at least give warn- ing of, an attempt to cut in on the rear. He may also send a file perhaps two or three hundred yards to either flank, to move parallel with his advance and pre- vent his being enfiladed at short range, if the enemy should be tactless enough to avail himself of a chance of meeting the advance by a counter-attack. Until he sees pretty well what he has in front of him, he should divide his party two, sending one to engage the enemy and keeping the other as a e t.o support the first by fire if they get into difficulties, and to be available to carry on the attack after the other has got the enemy well busy, either by rein- ;ig it directly, or, better still, by G 82 continuing the advance along a fresh line leading to some position from which the enemy can be finally turned out, either by fire or by a charge, the first half joining in and advancing as soon as the enemy has turned his attention to the new attack. Both parties should keep scouts or a patrol of some sort out in front of them until the foreground is proved not to contain any hidden body of the enemy, or until the opening of fire by their own side makes it necessary for the scouts to merge into the firing line. I have seen on service a half -company go off to take post as a piquet on a long ridge; it neglected the above precautions, beyond having some scouts in front. There were four or five of the enemy on the ridge, and they waited till the scouts were close, shot some down and drove the others to cover, and then turned their fire on to the half -company, who were also driven to ground, and, as there was little cover, they were tied up till set free by some more infantry, who had to be specially sent off to move along the ridge. Had the half -company moved in two portions, the first would have contained this weak enemy, and the rear party could easily have circled round and got on to the ridge farther along, which would at once have caused the enemy to clear 83 out. Sec F.S.R., I., I, as to the results of the violation of" tin- primiplr, of lead- ing troops, and as therein directed, im- the principles taught en the minds of your non-commissioned officers, who ;uv commandcT*, albeit only of pl.r and sections. G 2 84 EXERCISE VIII. THE PLATOON AS AN ADVANCED GUARD AND AS A FLANK GUARD. (a) When the company is on the march, it should always be preceded by an ad- vanced guard — either a party of scouts, or, more usually, by one of the platoons. After the advanced guard comes in con- tact with the enemy its further action becomes either an attack to drive off the enemy, or a defence to delay his ad- vancing, according to his strength and tactics ; so I propose here merely to indi- cate suitable formations of march in ordinary, i.e., non-mountainous country, so that the platoons may be practised in taking them up without delay on being told off for the duty. The exercise takes little time, and can be done on the same parade as the flank guard exercise. An advanced guard may come under fire at any moment, and to provide against surprise (F.S.R., 64), its leading portions may move in extended order. The duties are given in F.S.R., 68, and apply quite completely to so small a body as a platoon. The platoon should be 85 divided into a vanguard and .1 main gu.ird. For the vanguard, a common plan i simply to extend a seetion on either side o( the ro.id, l>ut I prefer to dividr ihe section into three patrols, or more if 5tr< ngth per mits, who work along in a general line — «>ne to search the road and its immediate vicinity, and one on each side. The nature of the country regulates the breadth of ground the centre patrol can h from the road, and the distance to which the others are sent out on each side. The oth-.T sections follow as main guard, not so close as to be at once mixed up with the vanguard if fire is opened on the latter, nor so far as to be unable to sup- port it quickly with fire. The advanced guard is responsible for keeping touch with the main body (the company) (F.S.R., 64 (4)), but the company com- mander should satisfy himself that this is being done. If view is restricted, the mi in ^iiard must drop a connecting file to keep connection. This file must march with their beards on their shoulders, to see what the company is doing, and ihe commander know, and also to signal to the company, if the platoon has had to halt. If the country is open, the commander should still tell off a file for this duty, who will march with platoon, but be continually on the 86 look-out to the rear. The platoon commander ought, 'of course, to keep a watch himself, but may have other things to attend to, and it is well to take pre- cautions against the platoon either getting too far in front or letting the company get too close to it, by marching on while the platoon is investigating some suspici- ous locality. (£) The Platoon as a Flank Guard. A platoon may sometimes be used as a flank guard, as when a small convoy is on the march with only a company or two as escort. Flank guards are dismissed in a few words in F.S.R., 70. It is worth while to practise them once or twice to avoid delay in taking up the formation when the march is being started, or in im- provising a method of fighting off the enemy if he attacks. Represent the convoy or whatever it is by a man with a red flag to move along the road ; the platoon is then to move alons* parallel to the road, and far enough off to afford protection from effective rifle fire, i.e., at least eight hundred yards in open country. The skeleton enemy should be instructed to keep about the same dis- tance again on the flank beyond the platoon, and to move along parallel with it 8; •ng in, opening fire on an agreed signal. The in, in h formation should be on the same principles as those for the advanced I he plalnnn should move in two •s, and patrols or scouts should pre- cede it, both in the direction of the march and towards the flank which is being guarded. It is important to keep touch with the main body by connecting files at all times, otherwise if the road changes direction out of view of the flank guard it may separate them too far or bring them too close to the company. The method of fighting merely to hold off the enemy resembles that used by a rear guard for the same purpose, i.e., fire and movement by alternate portions. When the enemy opens fire on your signal, the patrol on the flank either falls back, or the platoon reinforces it. The patrol in the line of advance should still con- tinue to precede trie movements of the platoon in that direction, and should be told to conform to its movement. The platoon replies to the enemy's fire as soon as possible and begins the lateral fight — one half is sent, if possible under cover, to take up a fire position farther along the direction of the line of march, preceded by the patrol, which, to some extent, secures it from surprise from that direc- tion. As soon as the leading party has found a fire position and opens its fire, the other follows it, and either halts alongside it, so allowing it to go off to a new position, or continues its movement beyond it and takes up a third position to cover the further movements. The latter method is the quicker, as it saves the time of replacing men of the first party in their fire position by those of the second. The exercise need not be prolonged, as a few of these lateral movements are quite sufficient illustration to enable the men in future to take up their duty quickly. 8g EXERCISE IX. PRELIMINARY FOR THE ATTACK BY THE COMPANY IN BATTALION. A company attacking as part of the battalion is sure to find the men of differ- ent platoons mixed up in the course of the ,itt;ick with those of other platoons, both cf that company and of others. Before practising the attack, accompanied with this mixture of platoons, it is advisable to train them and their non-commis- sioned officers for their duties without allowing any mixing up. This may be done by bringing all the platoons of the company up into one line, and then extending each on its own ground. The result is that each platoon may be taken to represent the leading platoon of four companies told off to furnish the firing line and supports (I.T., 122). The four platoons form thus the firing line, the other three supposititious platoons of each company being in support. This forma- tion would be taken up when the enemy's rifle fire began to be effective, i.e., at or under fourteen hundred yards. Within this distance the firing line has to go on through the zones in which it uses col- lective and individual fire up to assaulting distance, being reinforced as needed, firstly by the supports, and finally at the time of the assault by all or part of the local reserve, which, in this case, would be composed of the four companies of the battalion not detailed to furnish the firing line and supports. Put out a skeleton enemy with orders to remain in one position, and fire slowly, but continuously. Draw up the four platoons, or as many as are present of the company at fourteen hundred yards or so from the enemy, in one line and at sufficient intervals to allow of their ex- tending to five paces, plus some space between flanks of sections after extension, to allow plenty of choice of lines of ad- vance. Indicate to each platoon a part of the enemy's position which it is to regard as its final objective of assault (I.T., 121 (3) ). Have the men extended to five paces, and carry out the attack right through on the lines of Exercise V., and finish with an assault and rally after it. Each company would have an officer with its platoon in the firing line to diredt the fire. If fire is opened between fourteen hun- dred and one thousand yards, it will not be effective against ordinary targets unless the whole four platoons direct their fire on tin- same target. Under one thousand yards fire should he controlled by section Commanders and duvrted 1)V plat< on . manders. Practise concentration of the fire of the ft uir platoons on one part of the enemy's line and lateral distribution of fire within the limits of that part. Give each platoon a fraction of this fraction of the enemy's frontage to deal with, and let the platoon commander again tell off his sections to fire at various marks inside his limits. Again switch the fire of all four platoons on to some other particular bit of the enemy's position, as done in previous exercises. To do this you must introduce and work with thoroughness a system of inter-com- munication (I.T., 1 19), but it should be one approved and adopted by your battalion commander, otherwise each com- pany of the battalion may be found using a different one. It is to be understood that orders as to the direction of fire in no way interfere with the gaining of ground to the front, a platoon firing at one object ceases fire in order to advance, but resumes its fire on the same object when it again halts. As soon as section fire is opened, encourage mutual support, some part of the line firing while others advance, and make section commanders continue to observe this principle. At some one parade for this exercise halt the whole line during the attack and practise entrenching under fire, the men working lying down (I.T., 121 (13))- Thereafter resume the advance. Move about yourself and let your sec- tion commanders do so also, and check any slovenly work on the part of the men in using, quitting, or getting into cover, and in the use of their rifles and judging distance if, as should often be done, it is left to them to estimate how far they are from the target of the moment. 93 EXERCISE X. Tin-; COMPANY IN ATTACK WITH THE BATTALION UNDKK ARTILLERY FIRE. When the battalion is moving forward to attack, and before the enemy's rifle fire is more than a distant and future danger, that of his artillery becomes an imminent and formidable menace as soon as the limits of its range are crossed, because of the suddenness with which it is capable of dealing destruction. Whether his artillery actually opens on the battalion is another matter. If the battalion shows up as a tempting target in column of route or mass, he most certainly will fire on it, but if it is skilfully led it may possibly escape his notice altogether; at the same time, it is hardly likely that it can move from five thousand to fourteen hundred yards from the enemy's infantry without giving some indications of its movement, and the probability is, that at some part of the advance it will find itself the recipient of the enemy's atten- tion. To escape the effect of this fire, the battalion and the company will have to break up into small shallow columns 94 such as platoons or sections at least 50 yards from each other laterally (IT., 1 1 8) and two hundred yards from front to rear ; in fact, a lot of little groups of men sufficiently apart to prevent the burst of one shell cover- ing more than one group. The advance in this order constitutes the first phase of the infantry attack. The company must be practised in getting into this forma- tion, and moving in it so as to avoid con- fusion in action, and also to let non- commissioned officers and men understand that this formation does not free theto from the control of their commander. At manoeuvres and exercises the adop- tion of this formation is sometimes burked on various pretexts, of which the most heinous is to say that the results of artillery fire are overrated; and the risk run in keeping in closed formation is more than compensated for by the comfort of the men, maintenance of control and saving of time. This theory I fancy had its origin in the South African War, where the Boer artillery was skilful but exiguous, if judged by European stand- ards. I have not been under shell fire myself, but I have seen' the results of it on a column of about two hundred men who came along a watercourse two thousand yards or so from the guns, in 95 something resembling a inarch formation. I he guns had the range, and the < -nciny left about fifty dead in that waterr* in a few minutes, so personally I am going to open out my company and trust to my peace training of it to keep it in hand and get it along fast enough to be on the spot when wanted. I need hardly give details how to prac- tise this. The point is, to get the company opened out quickly and without confusion, and this is to be done by tell- ing your platoon commanders what you want and where they are to go, and n»t by any drill. Platoons may further split up into columns of sections. Leave it to your platoon commanders to have the sec- tions moved apart to intervals of fifty yards. If the enemy's artillery is straight in front, a diamond formation seems suitable — a platoon at each angle — the length of the diagonal front to rear being over two hun- dred yards and side to side over one hun- dred ; or the platoons may simply follow each other at two hundred yards distance, though this is not a very handy arrange- ment. But, subject to keeping the dis- tances large enough, it is not the formation that matters, but the way it is taken up, and I will leave it at that. At the end of this phase of endurance of the enemy's artillery fire the company 96 comes under rifle fire and has to take to extended order, and on service it would perhaps have to do this and plunge into the attack without the platoons closing in from the scattered formation in which they have so far moved. But for the first few times you should close up at fourteen hundred yards and start from there, so as to tell the men what is next to be done when they come under rifle fire, and in any case the size of your exer- cise ground would probably necessitate your doing the two phases over more or less the same bit of ground. 97 EXERCISE XI. THE COMPANY IN ATTACK WITH THE BATTALION, UNDER RIFLE FIRE. I IK- immediate objects of the fire fight within effective rifle range are to pro- duce a fire sufficiently heavy to over- come the fire of the defence, and to reach a position from which the assault can be drlivcTcd (I.T., 121 (5 and 6)). In theory, then, the desideratum is to get so many men up to about two hundred yards from the enemy that they form a line practi- cally shoulder to shoulder, in order that their fire may be at least as heavy as that of the enemy, if the latter are also in one <. .ntinuous line, and in default of cir- cumstances admitting of effective cover- ing fire being maintained from positions in rear or on a flank. On this supposition it is frequently argued that a battalion and its companies, when advancing to the attack, should do so on a front not greater than that which the battalion would occupy if it were in single rank, but this does not really follow. The nature of the ground may be such that to attempt H 98 to build up a shoulder-to-shoulder firing line all along the enemy's position within charging distance, may be merely to send men to useless destruction by exposing them on fire-swept spaces, where they are sure to be knocked over before they can do any good. On the other hand, there may be other points where men may be massed so as to give not only a firing line of maximum density, but also a supporting force both to replace casualties and to carry out the assault. These are the points which it is of importance to gain and hold in strength sufficient to carry out the object of the attack — the assault. It is the duty of the battalion commander to give each of his firing line companies some such point as their objective, and to define the frontage and direction of their attack. It is similarly the duty of the commander of a firing line company to give each of his sections an objective within the limits assigned to his company (IT., 122 (4) and 123 (3-)). The problem for solution is, how to get to those points, and so it does not appear to matter much what frontage the battalion and its companies occupy when they start off for the attack at the fourteen hundred yards limit of effective rifle fire, provided of course, they do not encroach on the frontage of other units. Indeed, an attack 99 whu h st.irts (.11 ;i wide base and con- centrates only in its later stages seems much more likely than one which starts i'rcin lusr rquul to a single rank front- age to keep the enemy uncertain of its objective, and to be able to bring oblique or enfilade fire to bear on portions of his line. Therefore, when practising the com- pany in attack, do not be bound by cast iron rules as to the breadth of the zone of ground within which you are to bring your company from fourteen hundred yards up to the charging position. Four platoons following one straight behind the other, at two hundred yards distance, make a very unwieldy procession, and, in general, I would advise you to use some- thing in the nature of a diamond forma- tion at first, the three platoons in rear making their own way forward till they reinforce the leading portion which finally consists of the whole company. Put out the skeleton enemy on a front of, roughly, what your company will occupy in single rank, and let the position, if possible, have within it two, or at most, three points, which you can assign as objectives to the platoon commanders. You must consider this position as having been assigned to you as objective by your battalion commander, the ground on the right and left of it being the prey of other H 2 IOO companies, and not the object of your assault, though it should, nevertheless, frequently be the object of your -fire during the advance. Draw up the company at about fourteen hundred yards from the enemy. Tell the platoon commanders the relative posi- tions the platoons are to take up when the advance begins, roughly the distances between them (I.T., 123 (7)), the direction of the attack, if the enemy's position is not quite clearly to be seen, the frontage on which the company is free to manoeuvre, and the points which the sections are .to regard as their objectives; the details contained in IT., 123 and 124, may also be enumerated if the commanders are not experienced. As regards these details, I recommend that scouts be formed not in a line of men ex- tended at wide intervals, but as a line of patrols of four or six men each, and you or a subaltern should halt them early in the attack and tell them to send back word that they are held up by fire, or that they have defined the enemy's posi- tion: on this the nearest platoon reinforces them, and the process of building up the firing line begins from that point. As regards inter-communication, use connect- ing files and semaphore signalling to join up the various parts and make real use of them, but avoid sham messages. 101 \ I the ob i manner of tlu- .itt.uk have been detailed to all, tell tin- platoon commanders to mOVC "It their platoons to their p«>ilions and extend them to advance, and the scouts to get oft" in front. Five paces is the least ex- tension to ensure that a bullet aimed at one man may miss him with a fair chance of not hitting1 his neighbour. Do not let the scouts go too far away, because at this time of getting to grips with the enemy, their usefulness, when acting with their companies is mainly limited to guarding against ambush at close range, and as ground scouts to prevent the com- pany coming against some unseen obstacle, barbed wire, donga, canal, or what not. As soon as all are in position, the com- pany may be considered as being in the formation in which it would have arrived at the point where, in addition to the enemy's artillery fire, it comes under heavy and fairly accurate rifle fire. Give the signal to advance, and let the platoon commanders begin to work their platoons forward, using what covered ways they can find. After a little of this, have the scouts halted and reinforce them by one platoon, order fire to be opened, bearing in mind that one platoon's fire is probably useless at over one thousand yards from the enemy, but if your company is in the 102 diamond formation the platoons on each flank will probably be able to fire, and with favourable ground, e.g., a knoll, or bluff somewhere on the line of advance, the rear platoon also will be able to fire over the heads of the firing line. There is no danger in this if the men hold their rifles straight, and it would assuredly be done in war. I have myself seen it, and the chances of an accident are mini- mised by practice in peace. During this early opening of fire use every effort to keep the fire from being merely a make- believe, i.e., send word round by your connecting files or semaphore to fire at certain targets, and see that section com- manders direct their fire accordingly. In battle the information as to which part of the enemy's position seemed most to demand attention would, of course, reach you from those of your side who were suffering fire coming from that part of the position, and the result of your passing the word to fire at it as above would be that a shower of bullets would come drop- ping all round it, to the upsetting of the aim of the hostile marksmen. Under cover of this fire your firing line may be allowed to gain a little ground, platoons moving alternately so as to avoid a cessa- tion of fire. Thereafter continue to gain ground, and gradually reinforce the firing 103 line till all your supports are absorbed and the whole o>iiip;my is in the firing line. \\'hen , taken place the line will of a mixture of men of different sections and platoons. Avoid I movements in attempting to keep the men of each unit together in rein- •.g and recognise that admixture is unavoidable. (I.T., 93 (ii) and 123 (9) ). The organising of the result- ant disorder is one of the essential objects of training for the attack. Make your section commanders call on the men to right and left of them, if they are nearer them than any other unit commander, to act under their orders. Thus : " Private A to Private J under my orders." Have this done constantly till it becomes a matter of course. The men of files can always hang together, but prove that this is being done by asking men where their file mates are. Get this system started as soon as reinforcement is begun, and keep it in full swing through- out. Once it is started, these extempor- ized fire units must apply the principles learnt by the intact sections and squads in Exercise IX., i.e., supporting fire by part to cover movement of the others, control and distribution of fire, etc., and so work on up to assaulting distance and deliver an assault. After this, let section and 104 platoon commanders reform their men and units as quickly as possible, and then reform the company under your own orders. At subsequent parades introduce casualties among the section and platoon commanders, and let the senior privates in each of the mixed up fire units step into their places and carry on the attack without halt or confusion. EXERCISE XII. TIIK COMPANY IN ATTACK ACTING ALONE. On service a company may often have to attack some post of the enemy without having the support of either artillery or infantry, and exercises framed to illus- trate these conditions are very useful in developing the initiative of all ranks. In paragraph Y. of the preamble I gave an example, and I think, if you will peruse it again, you will see what sort of thing you should arrange for the exercise. At inspections one sometimes sees a company sent off by itself to carry out such an attack, and the method often adopted is to tell off the company into the firing line and supports, and, perhaps, a reserve. The whole then go straight for the object and perform a sort of travesty of what the company does when acting as part of a battalion. By this time I trust you will be quick to perceive that this is just what it ought not to do. As an isolated force it has to do much more than simply to form a firing line and bring off an assault. It must secure its flanks, have a real io6 reserve, employ a flank as well as a frontal attack, provide for its own with- drawal if worsted, be prepared to deal with a counter-attack, and observe all the principles laid down in IT., 121. Mutatis mutandis, your reserve may con- sist of only a platoon, your flank guards a file or two of men, your flank attacks a section or platoon with a subaltern accompanying it, and so on, but the precautions must be taken and the principles put into practice, or your attack would run risk of failure. You would do it all on service; therefore, do it all in peace. Carry out such exer- cises, carefully planned, and with observ- ance of service conditions, and I am quite sure you will see what a great deal there is to be done in this direction before you feel yourself and your company quite competent to undertake a similar task in the field. That first exercise against a skeleton enemy will be the forerunner of many others. Your criticism of the action of your non-commissioned officers must be carefully considered, as there are usually several justifiable ways of doing a thing, and it should always be construc- tive and not merely destructive (T. & M.R., 2(2)). EXERCISE XIII. THE COMPANY IN RETIREMENT. The men have been practised in retire- ment in pairs in Exercise II., and the sec- tions and platoons have also learned their part in Exercise VI. It remains to train the company for this duty, which it might have to do either as acting as rearguard to the battalion, whether the latter was, or was not, in conjunction with other troops, or as if effecting its withdrawal when isolated. In both cases the procedure and distribution are pretty much alike. In the former case, the company, if it gets into difficulties, may be able to get help from the rest of the force, but in the latter it will not be able to do so, and the com- mander should be especially careful to have in hand some portion of his company which he can use to extricate any detachment which gets " tied up." On the other hand, it is very desirable that the main body should not be called on to reinforce the rearguard when the company is not acting alone. So that in both cases you should be prepared to meet eventualities from your own resources. Again, a rearguard is io8 bound to have the majority of its force in action in order to hold back the enemy and present an appearance of force, so that it is not always possible to set apart a portion of so small a body as a company to act solely as reserve, and to remain con- tinuously outside the actual combat. The solution of the difficulty seems to lie in an intelligent application of the principles of rearguard fighting given in F.S.R., 71 to 73, and the early but timeous withdrawal from the fighting line of a portion of the company who move back to a position in rear from which they can cover the with- drawal of the remainder, but are still avail- able to be thrown into the fight, if it is necessary to inaugurate some sort of a counter attack to give portions heavily engaged a chance to break away from close grips. It is important in this exercise to teach non-commissioned officers and men to be ready to adopt quickly any method of withdrawal that may be ordered, be- cause the nature of the ground must determine the way in which a withdrawal can best be effected, and the nature of the ground may vary every few hundred yards. Therefore I merely suggest some ways of practising retirements, and during the course of the exercise you should change from one to another, and also encourage commanders to act on their own initiative, log when, ;is will pr«'b;il)ly h.ippen, your s\ of inter-communication fails to act with sufficient speed and accuracy. I.T., 137, ^iMirnil rules as to the action of pla- toons and sections, ;ind the standard set up in Exercises II. and VI. should be adhered to. Send out the skeleton enemy with orders to follow up the retirement, but not to close in under six hundred yards. (a) Get the whole company deployed into one line of platoons, with intervals be- tween them, occupying a wide front, four to eight hundred yards, the men at five or more paces extension. This may seem too wide a front, but, after all, the intervals between the platoons are only two hundred and forty yards, and an enemy trying to break straight through the line would be under fire at one hundred and twenty yards or less, while a wide front is the best precaution against having your flanks turned and your retreat intercepted. Send back a platoon from one of the flanks to take up quickly a position in rear clear away from the firing line ; three hun- dred to six hundred yards is not too much ; let it open fire, and let the remainder of the firing line work back by retirement of alternate sections, each running back thirty or forty yards, beginning this movement from the flank from which the first platoon no went, the platoon on the other flank holding on and only giving ground when the two centre platoons have got well on their way to the line on which the first platoon is halted. This is a slow retirement, but gives a maximum of continuous fire and the flanks are strong. (ti) With the whole company extended in one line, and no intervals between platoons. Retire by short rushes of alternate sections ; the rushes must be quite short, twenty yards at most, so that the sections that have retired can fire through the intervals of the rear portion of the line the instant that it begins to retire. This is meant for use after an unsuccessful assault, and only on flat ground. (c) With the company extended in one line, but with intervals between the platoons. Order the flank platoons to retire and take post to cover the with- drawal of the two centre platoons, who remain in position till the flank platoons are ready to open fire. Watch how the platoon commanders handle their pla- toons ; they should do so artfully, as taught in Exercise VI. (cT) Retire by half-companies, two pla- toons together, using your subalterns as half-company commanders, and putting the onus of finding suitable covering positions I II on them, nuTrly telling llu'in to cover each other's retirement. (e) With the company all holding one position, leave the scouts or picked men to cover the retirement by nipid fire, and withdraw the remainder at full speed, then cover the retirement of the scouts by the fire of the whole from a position in rear. \Yateh that the scouts creep back from thrir cover without letting the enemy know they are going ; and of this screen of scouts the flank men ought usually to be the last to go in order to make the enemy believe that the position is still occupied. 112 EXERCISE XIV. OUTPOSTS. L The general rules for outposts and the part played by an outpost company are to be found in IT., 147 to 157, and it is neces- sary accordingly to train for those duties in peace. Let us begin from the beginning, and see what infantry outposts are and what they have to do. A line of infantry outposts will very often have to be taken up after a day's fighting, or in close proximity to the enemy before a battle. The com- mander of an outpost battalion will be told by the staff to take up with his batta- lion a certain length of the front, say, from Farm A to Hill B, inclusive— perhaps a mile or even two in extent. He cannot possibly have time to ride all along the front and fix places for piquets and sentries. Instead of this, he looks at the ground and comes to the conclusion that it will require, say, all his four companies in the outpost line. He divides up his front into four parts, and gives each of ompanies one part. It is hi, duty to see that the eight companies form nl<>n^ the line that combines the be^t facilities defence and reconnaissance to the front. Accordingly, he tells the captain of A Company to take from Farm A to, die wood X, inclusive, the captain of • iiipany from the wood X, exclusive, to, say, the stream ML, inclusive, and so along. The captains of companies then have to go off and take up their frontages. As beforesaid, infantry outposts must expect to take up their line close to the enemy, and often when dusk is falling. This gives you your clue as to how it should be done. You must march your company in fighting formation, so as not to be ambushed — a screen of scouts or other covering troops in front and on the flanks, a party, section, or platoon ready to succour the covering party, and hold up the enemy, and a reserve ready to act under your orders, either for attack or defence. Your movement and the taking up of your line should be unseen by the enemy; therefore, move carefully under cover both from distant and close positions, from which you may be seen. The line must be taken up quickly. The main thing is to get it occupied ; there- fore, it is a mistake to halt the company while you plod round the whole of the I H4 front and plan just where each piquet and sentry will be. Instead, take a good look at the line as you march and decide what are the essential points to be held for defence and as observation points. As soon as your scouts have made good the ground a little in front of those points, send off what you think are neces- sary, sections or platoons, to seize these points, and act as piquets till you go round and adjust details. Thus your company will occupy the line in rough- and-ready fashion as quickly as they can advance. When the company breaks up to go to the piquet posts, go with any one of the piquets which is to be on one flank and settle the exact position of the piquet with reference to the line you intend to hold as your line of resistance, and any other details which you think the piquet commander should attend to, such as what localities should be patrolled, and estimate the number of men required Any surplus sections should accompany you from this piquet, and you and they then go along the line to the other piquets which you arrange similarly, using the surplus to reinforce those piquets that need them, and if at the end you have still a surplus of men you may either form them as a support in rear or dismiss them to remain with their own platoons. For purposes of messing on ser- vice the latter is convenient, but, tactically, US .) >M|)|)ort is olten needed, in wlneh ease the men's <-<>mf<»rt must take -erond place. You must make a clear distimlion between day and night outposts, though you practise the latter by daylight. In- fantry outposts by day and until the Ivances, are firstly patrols and look-out men, whose business is to look for any movement on the part of the enemy, and to prevent his seeing their own side's doings, and to report what they see of the enemy's, and, secondly, a line of piquets who occupy the line de- cided on as the line of resistance, and who may fall out and rest while things are quiet, with supports and sometimes a ve behind them. The patrols are active agents in getting information in front of the outpost line, and they will mostly consist of mounted troops >t in close country or thick weather. The look-out sentries are passive ob- stacles to the enemy's patrols or scouts penetrating the line; the piquets are the reserve of force ready to be called into action when needed. But a line suitable for observation and resistance by day is seldom suitable by night also. Fighting by day is done by shooting, and rough ground affording cover is likely to be chosen for the advance of the attackers. By night, however, the attack will be 12 made with the bayonet, and the attacker will avoid broken country, which will confuse and delay his advance. Choose your outpost line accordingly. By day seek for a good field of fire, mutually supporting positions, and good facilities for observation, and strengthen the posi- tion you mean to fight on. By night close the likely ways by which an enemy may advance by putting piquets on them in strengthened positions with obstacles prepared in front, and patrols lying out on intervening ground to intercept scouts. Thus, in an undulating hedge-covered country with many roads, by day your piquets would be behind the crests of the undulations, sentries only on the look-out, and patrols scouting in front. By night your piquets would be on the roads, which they would block with barbed wire or abattis of cut hedge stuff, and your patrols in the fields between and lying out along the road in front at some place where they could watch anything passing, and get back to the piquet line without running risks of being shot by their own side. We will see below what training is required for non-commissioned officers and men in their duties on piquet, patrol and sentry. When you have trained them in these duties, take up an outpost line as a tacti- cal exercise with your company, acting as "7 ;in outpost company by day, ami then as hy night, and if you have scouts send them out to act as an enemy's patrol in front to see how much of the operation of taking up the line is visible to them; then, after a certain hour, let them try to make their way through the line unseen. They must not work round the flanks as ex hypothesi; these are held by other out- companies; finally, let them start sniping the outposts as if ushering in an attack, and let your piquets take up the line of resistance, your patrols falling back on the firing beginning. II. The Training of Men and Platoons in Outpost Duties. An outpost company will more often consist of two or more small piquets of one or more platoons with a support, than simply of one large piquet with its support, so that when you come to train the whole company, as above, in taking up a part of an outpost line, the performance of the work will depend largely on the ability of your platoon and section com- manders to direct the men in their duties. Unless they are capable of doing this, time will be wasted as you will be occu- pied with one portion of the line while Fl8 the rest are doing nothing and awaiting your arrival, for in this class of work the instructor must remain for some time with each piquet while the men are being put through the various duties, and cannot supervise concurrently at all points. Therefore, it is best, before taking the men out for instruction, to give a day or two solely to the instruction of subalterns and non-commissioned officers. When they have got a knowledge of what is required, have the men out, divide them into piquets under subalterns and section commanders, who will put them through the duties, and the work will go on on proper lines, and you will be free to go round and supervise each in turn. You will have four subalterns, sixteen section commanders, and other non-com- missioned officers, a total of twenty rifles or so, but if you are short of non-commis- sioned officers, have out enough privates to give you sixteen or twenty rifles. Form them up as a piquet and make the supposi- tion that it has just received its orders to break off from the company and go to a certain point in the outpost line and take up its duties there. Day Piquets. Indicate some such point as a day piquet position at a reasonable distance from ng win-re tin* piquet is when you give it its orders, ;ind let tin- senior non-commi sioix march it there, as on service, the point rh< sen beiiiv^. if possible, such , ninodation must be provided for tin- support. The comiii.mder should look for ground outside the outpost line from which enfilade rifle or artil- 11 re might he brought to bear on him, and mark how he would protect his men from it hy traverses, breaking the line of loopholes into short lengths, keep- ing under lee of existing cover and so on. The strengthening of the piquet must be done with the aid of common-sense. It will seldom be enough to propose to dig one bit of trench all in one piece and hope the enemy will Be good enough to come and knock his head against it. Cover may be made or adapted in several separate groups, if this is needed, so as to make it possible to bring fire to bear on any part of the ground in front. The piquet must be prepared to make as brave a show as possible, therefore the commander, while strengthening the point near which his piquet is to rest, must decide what he will do if attacked. Probably there will be within the limits of his piquet's frontage one or two other points which might be useful for defence, and he must not ex- pect attack just from one direction. With regard to such alternative positions he should settle when and how he will use them, and whether he can afford time and 126 men to strengthen them, and, last but not least, whether he will be able to get men from one to the other if the enemy does develop a strong attack. If he can do all these he will have added immensely to his power of defence, provided he handles his men skilfully, as he will be able to hold one position till the enemy thinks he has denned its location, then dodge to another, while they will go on firing at the old one, and so make his piquet appear many times stronger than it is. Concealment of the defence is very important, and the non-commissioned officers should be reminded that this must be attended to. They may forget it as there is no actual digging. (e) Duties in Piquet. — The position of the piquet and alternative defence positions having been fixed, and trenches or other defences marked out on the position, and on the alternative positions if any, assem- ble the platoon at the piquet and show the non-commissioned officers how to tell off reliefs and other duties. Each group fur- nished by the piquet consists of three to eight men, and mounts one or two men as sentry, as the circumstances of the post require (I.T., 152 (3)), the sentry, single or double, being relieved in turn by the others of the group. The whole group is under command of the senior soldier or 127 non-commissioned I he arc to form the reliefs of the gi stay with the j)i(|uel, which nsii.illy is • i solely «'f the reliefs of ^roups and ' r,i men who h.ive no Specific duties are not ;itin^, «'veii at only a hundred yards distance, will dislodge de- termined men posted under cover, and a serious atUck must be made with the net or by shooting within the distance at which a man may be distinguished — ten yards or so. F.S.R., 138 (2), lays down for the British Army that the bayonet only is to be used in night attacks, and we may assume that any civilized army we may have to meet will pursue similar tactics. Aerial reconnaissance may nowadays allow an enemy to locate the position held by the main body of his opponent, in spite of its being covered by outppsts, but such reconnaissance does not admit of any hope of a successful night attack being made on that main body by eluding or passing through the outposts, because the surface of the ground cannot be sufficiently searched from above to dis- cover the small obstacles which must he avoided or known if the advance of a 1 irs^e body of men is to be carried out at night. So we may take it that now, as formerly, any large attack will fall first on the outposts, supposing, as we must, that these are placed so as to hold or watch all possible lines of advance. In addition to this, outposts must expect iso- lated attacks made against one or two K2 132 points held by them which the enemy desires to gain possession of. The duties of outposts by night are, then, to hold and defend the outpost line in sufficient strength to prevent any large body of the enemy breaking through, or getting a footing in some tactically important posi- tion on the line, and also to prevent the enemy's scouts from getting through and making observations, and, lastly, but of most importance, to get news of the enemy both as a means of forestalling any attack, and for the use of the force com- mander in framing his plans. Bringing the matter down to the level of a piquet of an outpost company, it seems to resolve itself into night patrolling and night defence of a position. As before pointed out, enclosed country allows of piquets closing the lines of advance by which large bodies can only hope to move undis- covered, while intervening ground can be searched by patrols. On the other hand, open country leaves the front vulnerable everywhere, and calls for a greater num- ber of piquets and closer patrolling than are needed by day. Of course, elementary instruction in these duties must be carried out by day- light to allow of supervision; so now assemble your platoon of non-commissioned '33 officers and give out that you are going to practise night work. Choose some place "in night piquet, realistic as may be, a bridge, a cutting, or anything else that constitutes a defile or otherwise blocks a likely line of advance from the enemy's direction. Also choose, and point out to tin* platoon, positions where the adjoining piquets on the right and left would be. (iive out the following instructions to the non-commissioned officers: — (1) Piquets must take up their night positions when it is getting dusk, the strengthening of the piquet and construction of obstacles being done in advance, secretly if possible, and towards evening the working party should withdraw and leave the intended night posi- tion empty till it is time to move into it, further work being com- pleted by twilight. (2) The provision of obstacles is more necessary than entrench- ment, as securing the piquet from being rushed while completing the latter. (3) Men must rest on their alarm posts, and bayonets may have to be kept fixed by all, if there is a possibility of a sudden attack 134 (I.T., 151 (/)), to ensure instant readiness. (4) All piquets must stand to arms one hour before light and remain ready for action till the patrols have found that there is no sign of an immediate attack. When relief takes place in the morning, night outposts will not return to camp till the patrols report all clear. After this, let the non-commissioned officer in command withdraw the piquet from its day position and march it to the night position. On arrival ask the non- commissioned officers in turn where they would place the piquet exactly and where they would put their obstacles. Obstacles for a night piquet should be under close fire, i.e., ten or twenty paces, but, in addition, booby traps and alarms may be placed further in front. Barbed wire is the best of all obstacles. The actual defensive measures to be taken do not differ from those taken for the defence of any position not on outpost. The position of the piquet and obstacles being decided on, let the non-commis- sioned officers mark on the ground the actual work they would undertake, having regard to the time available, which you should tell them, and, on the same lines 135 as for the day piquet, let them as com- manders in turn divide the men into re- liefs of sentries and patrols, tell them off to their alarm posts, and order them to occupy them once as if on alarm. A piquet by night, no matter how well entrenched, has a very limited field of action. Even with most carefully arranged night rests for the men's rifles its fire effect is small except at close ranges, and to re- sist attack by relatively larger bodies it must in general keep behind its defences. Hence a well organised scheme of patrols is necessary to supplement the passive op- position which the piquet can offer. The patrols are charged with the duty of bring- ing news of any advance of the enemy to attack, and, if he is close enough, of spying out his movements on and within his out- post line, of preventing his patrols or scouts penetrating their own line, of watching any localities which are of particular import- ance and unoccupied by piquets, such, for example, as villages beyond the outpost line which the enemy might try to occupy by night, and, lastly, of keeping up com- munication between the various bodies of the outposts. The strength of patrols is limited by the necessity of their being able to do this work without making a noise, and a strength of three to eight men is advised- A patrol performs its duty of ob- servation either by going from point to point, or by watching one particular place, when it is called a " standing patrol." If a piquet posts any group sentries by night, away from the piquet, such groups have just the same work as standing patrols, except that they may be ordered to main- tain their position in case of attack as they are near support, whereas patrols would fall back as soon as they had made sure the enemy was advancing, and possi- bly, if in accordance with their instructions, after treating him to a short burst of rapid fire. An ordinary patrol will also have to halt and listen perhaps for long periods, and so becomes for the nonce a standing patrol. Form up the platoon at the piquet posi- tion, and let the commander tell it off into three patrols to practise this duty, disre- garding reliefs, all three to be sent out at the same time in different directions, one man in each to be commander. Before they start off, tell them the following, which piquet commanders must see to : — (1) If there is no countersign pub- lished for the force, piquet com- manders must arrange either a word or a sign by which men may know their own side in the dark. (2) Patrols going out are to tell the nearest sentry which way they are going (IT, 156(5))- '37 (3) For patrols a code of signals should be arranged, e.g., a hiss or half-whistle, to call attention, answered by the same to show that the man called has heard it, followed by the signal, whatever it is : — a double hiss for " come up to me," a click of the tongue for " retire," but anything will do pro- vided it cannot be clearly heard much further off than the listeners for whom it is intended, and is neither a very common nor a very uncommon sound. (4) The piquet commander must tell patrols how long they are to stay out and any places he thinks must be visited, in addition to what they themselves may find advisable, on closer acquaintance with the ground. A suitable formation for a night patrol of six men would be four in the advanced party, followed at ten to fifty paces by the rear party or two. The reason for the stronger party being ahead is, firstly, that fighting at night begins with suddenness and ends rapidly, while reinforcement of one party by another is slow and uncer- tain, and, secondly, to ensure that some part of the patrol may have a good chance of getting away with news, whatever hap- '38 pens to the rest. Bayonets should be fixed and rifles sloped on the right shoulder, the right hand holding the small of the butt so as to come to the charge at once, and not to have any chance of a rifle falling on the ground. Tell patrol commanders to get their patrols into formation and practise move- ment in silence along a road and on ordinary road. If along a road, let them move on each side of it, off the metal on the roadside grass or dust, and under trees or close to the hedge or wall. On ordinary country the ball of the foot should be put down first as if to feel the surface^ before putting the full weight of the body on the advanced foot. A stick or broom-handle, a la " boy scout," is invaluable in moving over unexplored ground, as by it the real nature of objects dimly seen at one's feet can be made out, and awkward spills thereby avoided. The movement of patrols under these conditions will be very slow over any but quite level ground. As the patrols move let them practise the code of signals, halting, advancing, coming up into one line, etc., also the keeping up of communication by one file moving back and forward between the two parts of the patrol. They should practise also break- ing up and scattering as if attacked by overwhelming numbers, each individual '39 getting away as quickly and quietly as possible, and the whole rallying again at some place in rear. The patrol com- mander as he goes out must fix these rally- ing places, usually one is enough over the whole of a patrol's beat, and they should be outside the outpost line. Have the patrols moved so that on their beats they may meet each other once or twice, and use the sign to reply when challenge is made. As a second practice, direct one of the meet- ing patrols to consider itself hostile, and let the commander of the other patrol excogitate how he would deal with men who did not stand fast on being told to halt and could not give the countersign. Next tell the patrols to get into position to watch various localities, a farm steading, a ravine, or such like, as they would have to do for limited periods as patrols recon- noitring on their beats, or for the whole night as standing patrols. One of the best ways in which patrols can fulfil their office is by halting and listening with ears near the ground for sounds of human movement. There is no rule for thus lying up except that they must not get caught themselves. A couple of men should be left quite clear of the patrol to get away if the others strike trouble, and the commander of the patrol should have word passed to these two from time to time that all is well with 140 the rest, or they may wait in their place while the others have been quietly downed. Lastly, let patrols return to the piquet, and learn how to approach without getting themselves fired on, or causing useless alarm. A good way is for two of the patrol to advance a few steps at a time when near the piquet, halting and quietly code-signal- ling the "piquet sentry till they get his at- tention and warn him that the patrol wants to come in. It has taken longer to write about out- posts than it may take you to put your men through them, and I have purposely been discursive because a knowledge of what is needed from outposts is more important than any set exercise, and also because this duty is the one which newly raised troops are most likely to perform negli- gently, and at the same time the one which, if neglected, allows the enemy to bring raw troops to quick demoralisation. I have also purposely written as if unlimited ground were available, and, speaking generally, I think it is. You can, and should, practise your piqueting and patrolling on the ordinary countryside, with its main and bye-roads, paths, fields, and hedges. The practice of outposts when piquets are not entrenched, causes no damage, so that leave to move over the fields should not be hard to get, but even if it cannot be got, the principal and most important work of patrolling and watching all roads and paths, will he done on the ground on which they would he done on service. If fighting ever takes place in Britain, which Heaven fore- fend, outpost lines will be along the ordin- ary country and not on Salisbury Plain, so do not go into wild and desolate places f. >r your outposts, but take the ordinary country round where you are. 142 EXERCISE XV. DEFENCE. The subject of defence is treated of in F.S.R., 107-110, IT., 125-135, and in Chapter VII. , M.F.E., 1911. The duties required of the company commander and his subordinates are briefly denned by I.T., 132, to be similar to those they carry out in the attack. The whole spirit of the regula- tions is that the active Defence is merely a means to an end, viz., the ultimate assump- tion of the offensive, which may be carried out either by the same troops which have acted on the defensive or by fresh troops detailed for the purpose. In both cases the troops that have acted on the defensive must be ready to become the aggressors. Therefore, in training your men, you should keep this constantly in view and conserve a spirit of aggressive mobility. Men must not be allowed to think that once a position has been taken up and entrenched it is to be their location till fighting ceases; on the contrary, they should be encouraged to look for oppor- tunities while still on the defensive, to occupy alternative positions which '43 will make the task of the attack- ing enemy more difficult. Quickness in seizing and strengthening a posi- tion must be combined with mobility in leaving it to take up and strengthen a new one. Of course, the time available regulates the work that can be undertaken (M.F.E., VII. (2)); deep trenches and concealed head cover cannot be made with an enemy pressing in to assault, but the first requirement is the ability to choose positions that give a good field of fire and to strengthen them as thoroughly as the time available and the proximity of the enemy admit. In dealing with a company, the onus of choosing what localities it is tactically necessary to occupy and strengthen rests with the company commander, subject to the orders of his battalion commander. In the same way as on outpost, you will be given a bit of ground to defend, either acting with the battalion or as an isolated company, and the rest will be on your head. I do not propose to deliver a treatise on the tactical occupation of ground, but instead I will ask you to pro- cure and read two books. The first is "The Defence of Duffer's Drift," by Backsight Forethought (W. Clowes and Sons), the second is " A Staff Officer's Scrap Book," by Sir Ian Hamilton 144 (Edward Arnold). They are both most readable books, and are quite free of soporific effects. The first is small, and deals with the efforts of a half -company, under Lieutenant B. F., to defend a drift over a South African river. In the second the author takes you along with him through the Russo-Japanese War, of which he was a privileged spectator, and in your journey ings you look on at victories and defeats in the making, while the causes that led to them, great and small, are set forth, along with many shrewd comments on human nature and how it translates itself in the day of battle. Every fight bears its own lesson of what to do and what not to do in defence, and this told in no pedantic strain, but with the saving grace of humour, to mitigate the darker side of human carnage. Read them both, get to yourself the wisdom and under- standing with which they are filled, and you will know how to take up a position for defence. Having educated yourself to choose the points of a defensive position that must be occupied if the position is to be effec- tively held, you have still to train your men to the work of defending them, and they must learn to be able to do without the help of a supervising officer, as will often be the case on service. vlight defence is almost entirely a [Matter 01 lue, the immediate; object being to m. ike it impMssilile IW tin1 enemy to come Id elosr i|u,irt«Tv IMaloon ;ni(l section c< >m inanders then must he al>le to dispose their with this in view to the best advan- tage within the limits of the ground allotted to their iinils, and the men mu >t be able to site their I renches or whatever form of cover has to be constructed so as to use their rifles to the best effect. It is no good to teach men to dig trenches and make loop-holes unless they know the proper places for them. (M.F.E., 18 (7)). At the same time, practice in digging and the use of tools is very necessary for men who are not accustomed to such work. The hands of the untrained man blister and his muscles tire under the unusual effort, while he expends much energy with results small in comparison with what he can accomplish once he has learnt to use his strength well. Moreover, a certain amount of technical skill is required in making any but the most simple cover. To practise the execution of work, you must have ground which you are at liberty to turn up, as well as some materials for loop-holes and obstacles. These may not be obtainable at any and every parade, but you can give practice in the selection and siting of trenches on any bit of L 146 country without causing damage, the men merely spitlocking or marking with stones or anything else the position of the trenches on the surface of the ground, and describing what they propose doing. I would, therefore, advise that you make your training consist of two parts, firstly the siting of trenches and the plan- ning by unit commanders and men of defensive work, the choice and occupation of alternative positions, and the assump- tion of the offensive from the defensive, all this without actually breaking ground, and, secondly, ground and tools being then available, the performance of a course of making real cover and obstacles. But the first part cannot be carried out unless the men have a knowledge of what trenches, loop-holes and so on are like, and the objects with which they are made. In a company of raw recruits taken from the populace at large, there will be plenty who have no ideas on the subject at all. You must then precede your exercises either by a short lecture, materials for which you will find in plenty in the " Defence of Duffer's Drift," and the manuals of train- ing, or, better than a lecture, by showing them specimens of entrenchments made by regular troops. The main points to insist on are the securing of a field of fire, the necessity of concealment of the defences, the importance of head cover as a help to the delivery of an accurate fire by letting mrn keep the enemy in view without show- ing up themselves, the avoidance of en- til, ule fire- by making traverses, or by tak- ing .t enough to let men stand close up to the edges, and, in the case of isolated posts and points held as pivots of a posi- tion, the necessity of preparing an all- round defence so that these pivots will be able to continue fighting whatever happens «>n the intervening ground. The course of work actually performed for the second part should include digging all kinds of trenches, by which the men will learn to use their tools to the best advantage, and their hands and muscles will become hardened, the use of the excavated earth to form parapets and parados (cover from fire from the rear of the trench; forty inches of earth are needed to keep out a bullet), the drainage of trenches, the mak- ing of traverses against enfilade fire, the making of loop-holes and head-cover with the aid of all sorts of materials, sand bags, brushwood and heather, straw and twigs, stones and bricks (which must be covered with earth to deaden the effects of splinters), packing boards, and so on, L2 14$ the concealment of trenches and loop-holes so as to be invisible to the enemy (this is of great importance), the masking of loop- holes when not in use to prevent light showing through, the making of dummy trenches and loop-holes to draw the enemy's fire away, the improvement of existing cover, such as loop-holing walls and the use of hedges with or without ditches, making sangars, if stones are available, the making of obstacles of barbed and plain wire, and measuring and marking of ranges round a position, which should be done by some means not obvious to the enemy, and clearing the field of fire. It will seldom be practicable to obtain subjects for practical demonstra- tion of some of the latter in peace time; people will object to their walls being experimented on or their shrubberies laid low, and so even here a description of the method will have to be substituted for actual performance. For night defence the construction of night rests for rifles is needed. The best I know is a packing case, filled with earth, with the front and rear edges notched to hold the rifle stock. The magazine is laid hard up against the outside of the rear edge and the notches, front or rear, slowly deepened with a pen- knife till the sights bear on the target; afterwards earth is banked up outside the 149 bux ,ui(l head cover made al>« Tin- going may Seem a formidable liM , l)iit they arc things that will undoubtedly be requited 9S soon as you get on shooting terms with an enemy; while if you exhaust this list and feel the want of further occupation, the Engineering Manual will supply you with further subjects for your activities. Pending your getting facilities of ground, tools, and materials to execute work, you can proceed with the first part of training outlined above. If your non- commissioned officers have not had experi- ence, take them out as an instructional section in the same way as when teaching outpost work, and put them through the exercises which follow. But if they are already fairly competent, take the men on parade, forming them, if possible, into not less than two sections. Instruction in Siting Trenches. Choose any position on undulating ground, form the men in extended order in one line in rear of it, and order them to move up, and mark where each would place his trench in order to fire on an enemy advancing from the front. In doing this it should be an invariable rule that men must lie down, bring the rifle into ISO the firing position, look along the sights, and move forward or back till they see that they have got the best position to sweep the ground in their immediate front (see M.F.E., 31 (3)). Dead ground close to the trench gives the enemy a place in which to collect and organise an assault. Take the men in the same way on to other posi- tions and repeat the lesson till they all understand that the -first thing to be done is this aiming with the rifle to secure a good field of fire. At first halt them close to what you see is the best line, and afterwards halt them thirty or forty yards from it, and then give the order to choose sites. For instance, halt them on the top of a convex slope and let them find out that the best place to bring fire on to flat ground at its base is somewhere on the enemy's side of the convexity, for if the trench were made on the top of the slope the ground immediately in front would be hidden by the convexity. The section commanders must help the men in choosing sites. After the men have fixed and marked the proposed sites, let them lay down their rifles three paces in rear and kneel or lie down at the rear edge of the site as if waiting to commence work while you and section and platoon commanders go round and examine the line. Ask details from tin* mm how hi^h they would m.ikc tin- par.iprt, how thick it: should be, how they would make head-cover, how they w<»uld the work, ;md so on. T rarer ses and broken lines of Trenches. Repeat the exercise as above, but this time have the men in sections or small groups, and the trenches made not in one line, but in short lengths, separated by traverses. You will have to explain the construction and use of these to prevent enfilade fire (if not from long range), and to localise shell bursts. Again, have lines of trenches mapped out in short lengths on an irregular front, some a little for- ward, some a little back, with the earth at each end, banked up on the flanks with the same object (M.F.E., 33). Short Trenches for Two Men. Bring the men extended to six or eight paces on to a position, and let the men of each file close to two paces from each other. Each file is then to choose and mark a site for a short trench to hold both of them, or, as it would formerly have been called, a rifle pit, marking where they would make loop-holes to fire both to the front, and obliquely towards the right and left, so as to rake the ground '52 in front of the line of the other men's pits. This arrangement is not officially recog- nised, and it does not give the closest possible firing line, but it is an excellent way of making men think for themselves. When the men have got their bearings in the matter of taking up a line for en- trenchment, make them get into the way of changing from defence into attack. Take up a position as before, and as soon as the trenches are marked out, indicate a position at some distance as an objective for attack and start an advance against it, as done in the attack practices, forming a firing line rapidly of some named platoons and the support of the others. A skeleton enemy kept hidden till needed adds much to the realism. Defence of Pivots (M.F.E., 50 (j), and IT., 129). Find a position in which there are some points separated from each other which command the ground between, and also form such pivots for defence of the posi- tion as are described in the paras, above. According to the nature of the ground, such pivots might be, for platoons, as much as four hundred yards apart, i.e., attackers coming between them would be under fire at not more than two hundred yards. Send a platoon under a 153 commander to c:\c\\ pivot, and let him pliin iind nrnrk out hi which must include : — 1 . An arrangement for all-round de- fence, so that the pivot may be self-contained and capable of continuing the fight, although others may have been captured. 2. The siting accordingly of trenches and loop-holes to fire all round and especially to sweep the front and rear of adjoining pivots. 3. The adaptation of existing cover to save labour. 4. The provision of protection against enfilade and reverse fire, and the recognition of distant localities from which such fire, whether of artillery or rifle, might be brought to bear on the post. 5. The marking of ranges in each direction. 6. The provision of obstacles. 7. Any feasible scheme for alternative positions which his men could reach and occupy under fire. 8. The concealment of the defences, provision of dummy trenches, and loop-holes and any other shifts. 9. The telling off and posting of look-out men and fixing and occupying of alarm posts when work has been completed. 10. Drainage and sanitation. The concealment of defences from aerial reconnaissance will, perhaps, soon claim more attention than it gets at present. Practise an attack after defence, start- ing off one platoon under your own orders to "go for" an indicated enemy, and sending word either by messenger or by semaphore to the others, either to join you and form a firing line, or to move out in support, but, if the latter, do not fail to finally call them up to reinforce the firing line; counter-attacks must usually be made with a relatively strong firing line and small support. The Company in Defence Acting Alone. When you have put non-commissioned officers and men through the preceding course, plan some scheme on the lines of the defence of Duffer's Drift, to deal with a company isolated and beyond reach of immediate reinforcement. Any bridge over a railway line, a group of buildings supposed to contain stores, or a ford or bridge over a river, will provide you with an object to defend. Choose a line of 155 defence round it and determine what are the essential pivots to be held. To do this, so as to furnish an instructive lesson, it will usually be necessary for you to pay a visit to the place by yourself and formulate your proposed defence before bringing the company on to the ground. Pay great attention to crossing and sup- porting fire from the pivots, and look at the surrounding country with a view to meeting attack from any direction, for in this case the company, as well as the pivots in its line of defence, must be self- contained. Also have regard to the cer- tainty that you will have artillery fire against you, to which you will not be able to reply, and in consequence your pro- posed defences must include deep trenches or recesses to shelter the men from shell. Your defences will take the form of a chain of isolated groups about the point to be defended and separated from each other by possibly several hundred yards. It is no use simply to go /and sit inside a group of buildings which the guns would knock about your ears and against which the enemy can concentrate. The better plan is to break up his attack and hide your weakness by occupying well-strength- ened pivots, behind whose protection you may have some freedom of movement, and so be able, if the weakness or rashness of 1 56 the enemy gives opportunity, to inaugurate local counter-attacks. These, if success- ful in inflicting a sharp and sudden loss, will make him hesitate to deliver a de- cisive attack till he has found out all about you. With one company you cannot expect to achieve decisive results against any considerable body of the enemy, but must be content with keeping him in play for as long a time as possible, and an attitude of active bluff is the best means of doing so. When you have got your plans com- pleted, take out the company as strong as possible and complete in its proper pla- toons and sections — if there are too few men let one man count for two or three. Send off platoons to occupy and plan the defence of the pivots as done when prac- tising it before. Do the same scheme on two separate occasions. The first time do not send out a skeleton enemy, so that the men may have time to look round, but for the second time send out some scouts under a subaltern, and let the platoons fall out on their positions with patrols out in front. Fix a certain hour by which you expect the arrangements to be all ready, and arrange for the enemy to advance at that time, and open fire on the patrols if they are met. When the patrols have fallen back the enemy closes in and starts 157 sniping ;it the position. Then bring off a counter attruk, withdrawing some men for the purpose from pivots that are not threatened, and coming in on the flank of the attackers. In theory, of course, you should have a support or reserve available for this, but it does no harm to move men out of their trenches with the object of assuming the offensive, while the men learn thr essential part of their work by all being employed on the perimeter. Have out the company yet a third time on the same or a similar scheme, pivots and skeleton enemy as before. On this occasion, if the scheme is the same, change round the platoons to different pivots from what they occupied before, and when the arrangements for defence have been settled, leave only sentries and their groups on the pivots as look-outs, but have patrols in front. Form the remainder of the men into a support in some central position, and tell them off to occupy as alarm posts the pivots from which they were withdrawn. When the skeleton enemy attacks, rein- force the threatened part of the line by the men of the units told off for its defence, and with part, or even the whole of the rest, make a counter-attack. It is very desirable, though unfortunately not often possible, to perform these last three practices on ground where you are at I58 liberty to dig, and with an enemy of three or four companies instead of a few snipers. 'Night Defence, A night attack may be delivered as a sequence to fighting by daylight, in the course of which the enemy has established himself sufficiently close to the defences held by his opponent to see clearly the way to reach the point against which he intends to lead his force. Or he may deliver an attack without previous fighting, hoping to get the better of the defenders by sur- prise, and basing his plans solely on the results of reconnaissance. In the latter case the attack must be preceded by a night advance, long or short, according as the defenders' outposts and their patrols have succeeded in keeping the hostile troops at a distance or not', unless, indeed, the troops or their scouts or spies have not been in touch at all during the day in which case an attack would not be a wise proceeding, because the needful infor- mation about the ground and your forces is lacking. Such attacks as require a night advance as a preliminary are likely to be made either over open ground or along roads, for the difficulties and delays oc- casioned by moving troops over broken ground which is not thoroughly known are 153 great. But in the first case, when fighling has been going on by day, and the two forces arc in close contact at night- fall, separated perhaps by only a few hun- dred yards, the presence of broken ground in front of the defences is no guarantee that the enemy may not consider an attack by night to have a reasonable chance of succeeding against any of the points which he has been trying to carry by daylight. It follows then that in preparing a position for defence the pivots must be ready to withstand attack by night as well as by day, and also that roads or paths leading into the position from the surrounding country should be held and defended by night, in spite of their being innocuous by daylight owing to being swept effectively by fire from the adjacent pivots. It will be admitted, I think, that fire by night is ineffectual unless at very short ranges, or when delivered by men of extraordinary skill such as the up-country Boer and the American backwoods-men were pictured to be. A European enemy will seek to bring off his attack with the bayonet. The defenders will try to foil this attack, firstly, by the use of fire at the close range, which allows it to be effective, and, secondly, by the use of the bayonet. This plainly translates itself into obstacles to keep th£ enemy under fire, obstacles to hamper him i6o when at bayonet distance, and night rests to help the accuracy of the fire in certain desired directions. I have told you one good form of night rest, and there are several others, but all require some material if they are to be even approximately ac- curate. Failing material of any sort, tie white rags round the muzzles of the men's rifles if you can get them. After a week in the field your men will have nothing that is not very dirty, but in a civilised country some member of the population may per- haps be found ready to oblige a soldier. Working still on your daylight scheme show your non-commissioned officers and men how to make night obstacles in addi- tion to those meant for daylight defence, which latter may be any distance up to one hundred yards in front of the trenches. The night obstacles, on the other hand, should be quite close, the fire obstacles as close as ten yards, the bayonet obstacles, say a narrow ditch and a wire, close under the trenches so as to make a man stumble when trying to reach the defender with his bayonet. Make or plan these arrange- ments round the pivots, and then practise blocking and defending paths or roads by the same methods as for pivots, but with this variation, that a parapet which can only be used for defence at night may be as high as you consider needful without paying regard to its invisibility, while to be used by day are kept as low as possible. Iii .1 practical exercise the men to hold these night posts would have to be furnished either from your support or l>y thinning some of the pivots. Vet the most carefully arranged trenches and obstacles will be of no value unless the men occupy them in time to avail them- selves of their advantages. Time suffi- cient to allow of this must be got by p, it rolling in front as for outposts, by mak- iitomatic alarms in front of the ob- stacles (M.F.E., 55 (12)), by having alert sentries on the defence line, and by having a good and well understood arrangement of alarm posts by which each man shall be ready to occupy at once, in silence, and without confusion, the place which has been assigned to him. Patrolling has been dealt with under " Outposts," the alertness of your sentries will depend largely on the state of discipline to which you have brought your company, and on the com- monsenseness, to coin a word, of their training. Alarm posts are practised in the same way as on outpost. In many corps a standing order that when in camp or bivouac, on manoeuvre as well as on ser- vice, men are to fall in on their alarm posts once a day, the usual times being at re- treat or on arrival in camp (F.S.R., 48 M 1 62 (2) ), and this is done whether in Brigade (F.S.R., 47 (2)) or not. If such is the order in your battalion, adhere to it within your company when detached, if not, do it off your own bat. It does not fatigue the men and ensures attention being paid on all occasions to this important duty. EXERCISE XVI. HASTY EXPEDIENTS. I.T., 93 (iii.). directs the training of the section to include rough and ready ex- pedients so as to form a fighting front in any direction. This training is of great value, both from a disciplinary point of view, as it makes men quick to move on an order, and also from the point of view of moraly as men accustomed to get sudden and unexpected orders given under imaginary circumstances will be more likely to keep cool, when such orders are necessitated by the stress of actual battle, than men who have always been trained in a deliberate fashion. Such sudden orders must in general mean one of two things, either that the enemy has got you, or you have got him, "on the hop," if I may introduce an ex- pression from the cricket field, and that there is every chance of the bowler, who- ever he is, being badly scored off, unless he treats the batsman to something more difficult than the expensive half-volley. If you are fortunately able to find the enemy at a disadvantage, you will act M2 164 against him by rifle fire alone ; but, on the other hand, you may find yourself caught in a bad situation, by either artillery or rifle fire, or possibly by cavalry, who mean to use the steel. It follows then, in practising expedients, based, as they should be, on some possible situation, that you should make the central idea either offensive, as if attempting to bring your men into a position to get the best results from their fire, or defensive, as if to escape, or mitigate shell fire or rifle fire, to which you are subjected under adverse conditions. Against artillery fire from ranges or in positions at which you cannot reply effec- tively with rifle fire, your action at first, at all events, must be purely defensive, i.e., all you can do, will be to escape being overwhelmed by the shell fire, and even at effective rifle range, the shields of modern field guns, enable them to engage infantry on very equal terms, so long as the infantry is in front, or not far on a flank, of the line of guns. In the days of muzzle-loaders, it was the cavalry who possessed the power of suddenly annihilating infantry, when caught unprepared to withstand their charge. The magazine rifle has reduced this danger, but the quick-firing cannon has now equal, if not greater, powers of drilling out swift destruction to any in- fantry Unit it finds exposed in close formation, if only the range be ki. At least once in the Russo-Japanese War, and again in the Turko-Bulgarian war, it \ve may believe the somewhat ill-authenti- cated reports yet to hand, have artillery wiped out of existence in a few moments several hundred unfortunate infantry- men, who were caught in the rafdle fired at a range either ascertained previ- ously, or got at the moment by good luck or good judgment. The contingency of being thus caught by artillery is evidently one that should be prepared for by infantry, as was the forming of squares in the old days, when a cavalry charge was an ever present peril. In this case of artillery fire, the conditions and the object desired are practically always the same — the infantry is in close order of some sort, and wishes to break up into a congeries of small groups, so as to isolate the effect of the burst of each shrapnel. The matter of rifle fire is different, as there are any number of ways in which you may seek either to escape the results of the enemy's fire or attempt to use your own, and this is the proper field in which to practise expedients. Whenever you intend to carry out some such movement to meet a supposed situa- tion, you must let the men know exactly 1 66 what you are picturing, so that they also may understand what is needed. The essence of these practices is that they should be performed without time for de- liberate thought — the men must learn to think and act quickly. The most satisfac- tory way is to be yourself mounted, as you can then get the whole company to hear you at once, whereas, if on foot, the men who are farthest from you often lose the first part of what you say ; you then have to repeat it, and the thing loses its char- acter of surprise for the rest, who have already heard it once. Give out the situation in a loud voice, and in as few words as possible, then try and give the very order you think you would give, if the situation was a real one on service ; use your own imagination, in figuring what you would say, and how you would say it. To call attention, it seems legitimate to use your whistle, as on service the men would have some warning that things were about to happen, either by the arrival of shell or bullets, the sight of the enemy, or by the signal of their own scouts. In giving the situation, if you are receiving fire, give out what kind of fire it is, the enemy's position, if it is allowable to suppose it known, or if you are going to be on the offensive, give out where the enemy is, and what he is doing, and how you learn this, i.e., by your i67 scouts, or 1>v first-hand observation. For example, while the company is marching in fours aim. 1, you see, in imagination, two shells burst simultaneously near by, nnd about two hundred yards from each other, and you wisely deduce that the enemy is ringing on your company. Blow your whistle and give out "Artillery fire is opening on the company, from such and such a direction — open out to columns of sections." If you have taught your men \vh;it to do to escape artillery fire, they will open out at the double into columns of platoons, at not less than fifty yards interval, measuring roughly at right angles to the direction of the supposed fire (I.T., "8(3)). In practising this opening out under artillery fire, which, as I have said, is the one specific hasty manoeuvre performed under conditions nearly always similar, it is inexpedient to lay down any fixed rules for the positions to be taken up by the platoons. It sounds simple to say that the platoons of the leading half -company go to the right, and those of the rear half to the left, but when men are marching at ease, and shells begin bursting round them un- expectedly, I do not think there will be time for anyone to see which half- mv is leading. The main thing is to get the platoons instantly away 1 68 from the road on which the enemy has laid his guns, and from each other. Direct platoon commanders to lead their men at the double in any direction away from the platoon in front, except, of course, towards the rear. In theory, of course, this might result in alL» four mak- ing out towards one flank, but, even so, this is better than having any deliberative halts on the road, and in practice the platoons in rear can see which way those in front are heading, and wheel to go to the other flank. There is no advantage to be had from getting the men in the ranks into extended order, as the shrapnel scatter the whole width of their bursting zone in an impartial manner, nor is it any use to seek such slight cover as gives only a screen from view, unless with a view to getting away from the shell-swept locality without attracting notice. Platoon commanders should, of course, make for any cover that is sufficiently steep on the rear side to shelter them from the downward dropping shrapnel bullets. If there is no cover, the best thing after getting out into the line of platoons separated by fully fifty yards intervals, is to move rapidly forward. If cover exists with open ground round it, the men may be got away by " dribbling " man by man, in the hope that the enemy may not spot the movement, and continue or resume his shell practice, to defeat it. 6g nmi.in<|ers iiiust be told all orders ;is they p.iss, se« their units conform, ;md lf the ap- plication of the foregoing exercises, a scheme of company training which I actually curried out. This was in the days before platoons, so I have altered the scheme to show what I should have done had the company organisation been what it now is. I was given from Monday in one week to Saturday the next week to march out into camp, about 10 miles, and get back, i.e., two days of march, and ten halted working days. I had thirty-five rounds per man of ball cartridge available for field practice musketry, and a sufficiency of blank for the requirements of skeleton enemy and for use with the men in one or two of the exercises. My men were Regulars, and during the previous furlough season I had grounded them piecemeal in field work. 182 P, '73 £ -^ o3 o o -£ * T3 Cu 4J O c/; JH oi G O lj 0 4-* !^> D T3 •Q T3 K^ a o '-£ 5 'c a3 in tt 73 £ • C/; 4-> CT! a b^ rt 4J '5 aJ V) (U rt C/} 1 s* d CJ u, OJ 0) 'u 0) a X T3 0) .C U c 0) H a> u. ^ i_ 03 ag-ainst rain, and made a shelter trench round camp. Alarm posts. Individual advance in ex- tended order. Retirement by M V- 'c« a ^ 03 T3 T3 G Ifl O 3 S H Q - « 183 jj 1 •§ S ' a O — c a o JS :• 9 e • • JJ U.B- "*^ 5 \ WORK. ractice Musketry 1 advance in extc rounds ball per i ractice Musketry n independent at ball per man u U 0 «« ts3- ;1.§ •|S 4-1 ^ • g So "55 a. o a> (/i H bo <^ P. g tsi 2 *o i- £•-0-8 CU- y, T3 C "^ "3.2 § E 0 0 •g 2 i c ai C 1^8 DH C t3 c5 c5 ^ 2U T3 0 ^ 5 « c O. CQ S"S , i_> O "*•* a .c TO a> c . G •5 ,; d, 4-J '> K S * o .2 a (U C a> o S 80 c | 1 X .5 "•*3 15 0 *n **H a> 0 -, O hi c P 4-1 c a .M Ci} i 0 •M ^ o o a o c o § c ku ! 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